- What Assertion Doesn't Show.Conor McHugh - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and action.Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99-118.details
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(Un)knowability and knowledge iteration.Sebastian Liu - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):474-486.details
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Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):603-619.details
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Testimony, evidence and interpersonal reasons.Nick Leonard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2333-2352.details
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Must, knowledge, and (in)directness.Daniel Lassiter - 2016 - Natural Language Semantics 24 (2):117-163.details
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Resolving Bank-Type Puzzles via Action-Directed Pragmatics.Igal Kvart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-58.details
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On the alleged perversity of the evidential view of testimony.Arnon Keren - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):700-707.details
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The myth of true lies.Jesper Kallestrup - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):451-466.details
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What Norm of Assertion?Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):51-67.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.details
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Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):364-383.details
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Expressing 2.0.Trip Glazer - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (1):70-92.details
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Critique of Experimental Research on Selfless Assertions.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2019 - Diametros 16 (59):23-34.details
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Group Testimony: Defending a Reductionist View.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):283-304.details
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Hope, knowledge, and blindspots.Jordan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):531-543.details
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Assertion and Certainty.Alexander Dinges - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):169-186.details
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Science, assertion, and the common ground.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.details
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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
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How Infallibilists Can Have It All.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):363-380.details
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Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators.Anthony Booth & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):169-179.details
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Closure and Epistemic Modals.Justin Bledin & Tamar Lando - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22.details
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On the Pragmatic Explanation of Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):225-237.details
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Inquiry Beyond Knowledge.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Justification as faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.details
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Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Prescriptive and Evaluative Norms of Assertion.Jonathan Ichikawa - forthcoming - Analysis Reviews.details
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The truth about assertion and retraction: A review of the empirical literature.Markus Kneer & Neri Marsili - forthcoming - In Alex Wiegmann (ed.), Lying, Fake News, and Bullshit.details
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Whose Responsibility is it Anyway? Accountability and Standpoints for Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal.Sheena Ramkumar - 2022 - Dissertation, Durham Universitydetails
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Aristotle on Knowledge and its value.Michael Coxhead - 2018 - Dissertation, King's College Londondetails
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Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Certainty.Baron Reed - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Humanistic, Fideistic Philosophy of Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560).Charles William Peterson - unknowndetails
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Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Assertion, norms, and games.Ishani Maitra - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 277--296.details
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Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
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Logical Omnipotence and Two notions of Implicit Belief.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2019 - In Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.), Epistemologia Analítica: Debates Contemporâneos. Santa Maria: Editora Fi. pp. 29-46.details
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A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.Nevin Climenhaga - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge.details
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Recent Work on Assertion.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):365-380.details
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Asserting as Commitment to Knowing. An Essay on the Normativity of Assertion.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Barcelonadetails
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Imagination and epistemology.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2008 - Dissertation, Rutgers Universitydetails
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