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  1. Resisting the Gamer’s Dilemma.Thomas Montefiore & Paul Formosa - 2022 - Ethics and Information Technology 24 (3):1-13.
    Intuitively, many people seem to hold that engaging in acts of virtual murder in videogames is morally permissible, whereas engaging in acts of virtual child molestation is morally impermissible. The Gamer’s Dilemma (Luck in Ethics Inf Technol 11:31–36, 2009) challenges these intuitions by arguing that it is unclear whether there is a morally relevant difference between these two types of virtual actions. There are two main responses in the literature to this dilemma. First, attempts to resolve the dilemma by defending (...)
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  • A Kantian approach to education for moral sensitivity.Paul Formosa - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6):1017-1028.
    An important aspect of moral expertise is moral sensitivity, which is the ability to be sensitive to the presence of morally salient features in a context. This requires being able to see and acquire the morally relevant information, as well as organise and interpret it, so that you can undertake the related work of moral judgement, focus (or motivation) and action. As a distinct but interrelated component of ethical expertise, moral sensitivity can and must be trained and educated. However, despite (...)
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  • Making moral machines: why we need artificial moral agents.Paul Formosa & Malcolm Ryan - forthcoming - AI and Society.
    As robots and Artificial Intelligences become more enmeshed in rich social contexts, it seems inevitable that we will have to make them into moral machines equipped with moral skills. Apart from the technical difficulties of how we could achieve this goal, we can also ask the ethical question of whether we should seek to create such Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs). Recently, several papers have argued that we have strong reasons not to develop AMAs. In response, we develop a comprehensive analysis (...)
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  • Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates?Francisco Lara - 2021 - Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (4):1-27.
    Can Artificial Intelligence be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these (...)
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  • Is It Still Double Edged? Not for University Students’ Development of Moral Reasoning and Video Game Play.Sarah E. Hodge, Jacqui Taylor & John McAlaney - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Previous research with video game play and moral development with adolescents, found both positive and negative relationships. This study aimed to extend this research to explore moral development and video game play with University students. One hundred and thirty-five undergraduate students (M = 20.29 SD = 2.70) took part in an online survey. The results suggested higher moral reasoning for participants who described themselves as gamers and those which do not players, compared to the those who play but do not (...)
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  • A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs).Alejo José G. Sison & Dulce M. Redín - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (1):47-65.
    We examine Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) critique of the need for Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs) and its rebuttal by Formosa and Ryan (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) set against a neo-Aristotelian ethical background. Neither Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) essay nor Formosa and Ryan’s (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) is explicitly framed within the teachings of a specific ethical school. The former appeals to the lack of “both empirical and intuitive support” (Van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019, p. 721) for (...)
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