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  1. Accuracy Monism and Doxastic Dominance: Reply to Steinberger.Matt Hewson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):450-456.
    Given the standard dominance conditions used in accuracy theories for outright belief, epistemologists must invoke epistemic conservatism if they are to avoid licensing belief in both a proposition and its negation. Florian Steinberger (2019) charges the committed accuracy monist — the theorist who thinks that the only epistemic value is accuracy — with being unable to motivate this conservatism. I show that the accuracy monist can avoid Steinberger’s charge by moving to a subtly different set of dominance conditions. Having done (...)
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  • Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.
    Don’t form beliefs on the basis of coin flips or random guesses. More generally, don’t take belief gambles: if a proposition is no more likely to be true than false given your total body of evidence, don’t go ahead and believe that proposition. Few would deny this seemingly innocuous piece of epistemic advice. But what, exactly, is wrong with taking belief gambles? Philosophers have debated versions of this question at least since the classic dispute between William Clifford and William James (...)
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