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  1. Moderate Monism, Sortal Concepts, and Relative Identity.Harold Noonan - 2013 - The Monist 96 (1):101-130.
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  • Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism: A Reply.J. Stone - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):325-329.
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  • Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism: A Reply to Eagle.Jim Stone - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):263–267.
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  • Reply to Stone on Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism.Antony Eagle - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):159 - 162.
    Recently, Jim Stone has argued that counterpart theory is incompatible with the existence of temporal parts. I demonstrate that there is no such incompatibility.
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  • Coincidence and Modal Predicates.P. Mackie - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):21-31.
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  • Moderate Monism and Modality.Harold W. Noonan - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):88–94.
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  • Moderate Monism, Persistence and Sortal Concepts.Harold Noonan - unknown
    Coincidence comes in two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism is the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism is the position that even temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court. The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position is moderate monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained.
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  • Persistence and Modality.Penelope Mackie - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    It seems plausible to say that what changes an entity can or cannot survive depends on its persistence conditions, and that these depend, in turn, on its sortal kind. It might seem to follow that an entity cannot belong to two sortal kinds with potentially conflicting persistence conditions. Notoriously, though, this conclusion is denied by ‘contingent identity’ theorists, who hold, for example, that a permanently coincident statue and piece of clay are identical, although the persistence conditions associated with the kinds (...)
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  • Three-Dimensionalism and Counterpart Theory.Simon Langford - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):321-325.
    Jim Stone argues that one cannot combine three-dimensionalism with counterpart theory. This paper argues to the contrary.
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  • Moderate Monism: Reply to Noonan and Mackie.Jim Stone - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):91-95.
    Moderate Monism is the position that permanent, but not temporary, coincidence entails identity. Harold Noonan writes: " According to the moderate monist if God creates ex nihilo a bronze statue and later annihilates it, destroying both the statue and the bronze of which it is composed , the statue and the bronze are identical. If, however, God simply radically reshapes the bronze at t10 the statue ceases to exist and the piece of bronze survives, so despite their coincidence up to (...)
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  • Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism: A Reply to Eagle.Jim Stone - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):263-267.
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