- Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability.Alexander Carruth - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):25–46.details
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The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Nature of Properties: Causal Essentialism and Quidditism.Jennifer Wang - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):168-176.details
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Preface.Raphael van Riel & Albert Newen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):5-8.details
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Grounding theories of powers.Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11187-11216.details
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Powerful qualities and pure powers.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1423-1440.details
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Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.details
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Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.details
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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
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In Defence of Powerful Qualities.John H. Taylor - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.details
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Did Rorty’s Pragmatism Have Foundations?James Tartaglia - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):607-627.details
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Identity Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):60-90.details
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Identity Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):30-60.details
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Fizykalistyczny panpsychizm.Galen Strawson - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (1):181-205.details
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Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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Conceivability Arguments, Properties, and Powers: A New Defense of Dispositionalism.Robert Schroer - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):352-370.details
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New Foundations of Dispositionalism - introduction.Andrea Raimondi & Lorenzo Azzano - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-26.details
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The non-identity of the categorical and the dispositional.David Oderberg - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):677-684.details
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Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2018 - Topoi 39 (5):1073-1088.details
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Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1065-1085.details
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The evolutionary argument for phenomenal powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):293-316.details
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Inherent Properties and Statistics with Individual Particles in Quantum Mechanics.Matteo Morganti - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (3):223-231.details
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A new look at relational holism in quantum mechanics.Matteo Morganti - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):1027--1038.details
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Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory.Vassilis Livanios - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (2):279-295.details
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Powers and Nomic Relations: Powerful Categoricalism and the Dualist Model.Vassilis Livanios - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1401-1423.details
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Challenging the identity theory of properties.Vassilis Livanios - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5079-5105.details
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Challenging the identity theory of properties.Vassilis Livanios - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5079-5105.details
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When is a Concrete Property Basic?Pat Lewtas - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):607-622.details
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Panpsychism, Emergentism and the Metaphysics of Causation.Pat Lewtas - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity.Vincent Lam & Michael Esfeld - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (2):243-258.details
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The Binding Problem for Strong Experiential Monism.Santtu Heikkinen - 2022 - Sophia 61 (4):795-809.details
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Conscious Thought and the Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem.Philip Goff - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):98-122.details
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The Identity Theory of Powers Revised.Joaquim Giannotti - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):603-621.details
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Pure Powers Are Not Powerful Qualities.Joaquim Giannotti - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (1):(A2)5-29.details
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New powers for Dispositionalism.Giacomo Giannini - 2021 - Synthese 199:2671-2700.details
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Causal properties and conservative reduction.Michael Esfeld - unknowndetails
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Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):125-153.details
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Truth-conditions and the nature of truth: Re-solving mixed conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):684-688.details
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Lowe's Unorthodox Dispositionalism.Travis Dumsday - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):79-101.details
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How to Be a Pluralist in Substance Ontology.Travis Dumsday - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):995-1022.details
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Towards a Unitary Case for Russellian Panpsychism.Luca Dondoni - 2021 - Philosophia 2021 (1):1-22.details
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The Silence of Physics.Barry Dainton - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2207-2241.details
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Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?Gabriele Contessa - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638.details
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Fred’s red: on the objectivity and physicality of mental qualities.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-27.details
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Making sense of powerful qualities.Ashley Coates - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8347-8363.details
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Alien worlds, alien laws, and the Humean conceivability argument.Lok-Chi Chan, David Braddon-Mitchell & Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - Ratio 33 (1):1-13.details
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Why Can’t There Be Numbers?David Builes - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.details
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A Humean Non-Humeanism.David Builes - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):1031-1048.details
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The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers.Stephen Barker - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):605-653.details
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