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Carelessness and Inattention: mind-wandering and the physiology of fantasy from Locke to Hume

In Charles Wolfe & Ofer Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: embodied empiricism in early modern science. Springer. pp. 243--263 (2010)

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  1. Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...)
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  • Prolegomena to a phenomenology of mind-wandering.Saulius Geniusas - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    For as long as philosophers ignore mind-wandering, they will disregard from one-third to one-half of conscious thoughts. Regrettably, mind-wandering is only seldom addressed in phenomenology. The fundamental ambition of this paper is to offer the first systematic phenomenological investigation of mind-wandering that relies on the classical principles of Husserlian phenomenology. The paper begins with a critique of the dominant conceptions of mind-wandering in contemporary psychology and philosophy. Against such a background, the paper develops a new, phenomenologically-grounded conception of mind-wandering. The (...)
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  • Locke and Projects for Naturalizing the Mind in the 18th Century.Charles T. Wolfe - 2021 - In The Lockean Mind. London: Routledge.
    How does Locke contribute to the development of 18th-century projects for a science of the mind, even though he seems to reject or at least bracket off such an idea himself? Contrary to later understandings of empiricism, Locke goes out of his way to state that his project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: “I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind” (Essay, I.i.2). Locke further specifies that this (...)
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