A large part of the contemporary phenomenology of medicine has been devoted to accounts of health and illness, arguing that they contribute to the improvement of health care. Less focus has been paid to the issue of prevention of disease and the associated difficulty of adhering to health-promoting behaviours, which is arguably of equal importance. This article offers a phenomenological account of this disease prevention, focusing on how we—as embodied beings—engage with health-promoting behaviours. It specifically considers how we engage with (...) oral hygiene regimens to prevent periodontitis and why we are not good at it. The article suggests that poor adherence to health-promoting behaviours can be explained with reference to the concept of the absent body, because prevention of disease is generally concerned with pre-symptomatic illness experience. The final section contains a discussion of some strategies for the improvement of disease prevention based on this viewpoint. (shrink)

The phenomenology of medicine is that part of the research field of the philosophy of medicine that asks about the subjective experience of illness. In contrast to the philosophy of medicine, the phenomenological approaches explicitly include medical and bioethical questions as part of their research interests. The paper provides an overview of the most important questions and topics of the phenomenology of medicine. Subsequently I will refer to the fundamental critique articulated by feminist positions in the field of phenomenology of (...) medicine. In addition to the socio-political contextualisation of the experience of illness, this also includes the necessary recourse to empirical research. (shrink)

In this paper I explore health and illness through the lens of enactivism, which is understood and developed as a bodily-based worldly-engaged phenomenology. Various health theories – biomedical, ability-based, biopsychosocial – are introduced and scrutinized from the point of view of enactivism and phenomenology. Health is ultimately argued to consist in a central world-disclosing aspect of what is called existential feelings, experienced by way of transparency and ease in carrying out important life projects. Health, in such a phenomenologically enacted understanding, (...) is an important and in many cases necessary part of leading a good life. Illness, on the other hand, by such a phenomenological view, consist in finding oneself at mercy of unhomelike existential feelings, such as bodily pains, nausea, extreme unmotivated tiredness, depression, chronic anxiety and delusion, which make it harder and, in some cases, impossible to flourish. In illness suffering the lived body hurts, resists, or, in other ways, alienates the activities of the ill person. (shrink)

We introduce two concepts—social certainty and social doubt—that help to articulate a variety of experiences of the social world, such as shyness, self-consciousness, culture shock, and anxiety. Following Carel's (2013) analysis of bodily doubt, which explores how a person's tacit confidence in the workings of their body can be disrupted and undermined in illness, we consider how an individual's faith in themselves as a social agent, too, can be compromised or lost, thus altering their experience of what is afforded by (...) the social environment. We highlight how a loss of bodily or social certainty can be shaped and sustained by the environments in which one finds oneself. As such, we show how certain individuals might be more vulnerable to experiences of bodily and social doubt than others. (shrink)

Phenomenology of illness has grown increasingly popular in recent times. However, the most prominent phenomenologists of illness defend a psychologizing notion of phenomenology, which argues that illness is primarily constituted by embodied experiences, feelings, and emotions of suffering, alienation etc. The article argues that this gives rise to three issues that need to be addressed. (1) How is the theory of embodiment compatible with the strong distinction between disease and illness? (2) What is the difference between problematic embodiment and illness? (...) (3) How is existential edification, that illness can give rise to according to the phenomenologists, to be understood? The article then engages in an analysis of Heidegger’s and Waldenfels’ phenomenology with the ambition of developing a notion of existence, which can transgress the psychologization of illness. Rather than arguing that illness is constituted by experiences of suffering and alienation, it emphasizes that broaches upon conatively guided activities constitute illness. (shrink)

This article adopts Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to explore the complex relationship between patients and physicians. It delves into the coexistence of two distinct voices in the realm of medicine and health: the “voice of medicine” and the “voice of life-world.” Divided into three sections, the article emphasizes the importance of shifting from a scientific-medical attitude to a more personalistic approach in physician–patient interactions. This shift aims to prevent depersonalization and desubjectification. Additionally, it highlights the equal and irreducible nature of patients (...) while acknowledging the vital role physicians hold in the realm of illness. The article stresses the need for a balanced and equitable relationship between both parties, rooted in the shared life-world. Moreover, empathy is underscored as a crucial element in fostering meaningful dialogue, wherein understanding diverse perspectives and attitudes towards illness is paramount. The article argues that differences between patients and physicians are necessary for empathy, while shared similarities form its foundation. Ultimately, a harmonious relationship facilitates empathy and enables the constitution of a new sense of life for both patients and physicians. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has occasioned a great deal of ethical reflection both in general and on the issue of reverse triage; a practice that effectively reallocates resources from one patient to another on the basis of the latter having a more favourable clinical prognosis. This paper addresses a specific concern that has arisen in relation to such proposals: the potential reallocation of ventilators relied upon by disabled or chronically ill patients. This issue is examined via three morally parallel scenarios. First, (...) the standard reallocation of a ventilator in accordance with reverse triage protocols; second, the reallocation of a personal ventilator from a chronically ill patient ordinarily reliant on it; and, third, the reallocation of a personal ventilator owned by a financially privileged individual but who is not ordinarily reliant on it. This paper suggests that whilst property rights cannot resolve these scenarios in a satisfactory manner, it may be possible to do so if we draw on the resources of phenomenology. However, in contradistinction to a recent paper on this topic, we argue that ethical claims to ventilators are not well grounded by the overly demanding notion that they are embodied objects. We suggest that the alternative phenomenological notion of homelikeness provides for a more plausible resolution of the issue. The personal ventilators of individuals who commonly rely upon them become part of their ordinary, everyday or homelike being. They are a necessary part of the continuation or maintenance of their basic state of health or wellbeing and the reallocation of such objects is unethical. Keywords: Phenomenology, COVID-19, Pandemic, Triage, Reverse triage, Ventilation, Chronic illness, Allocation of resources. (shrink)

In this paper I will try to systematically lay out and describe the multiple dimensions of the embodied experience of illness, which until recently has been the main focus within the field of the phenomenology of medicine. In order to do this, I will turn to analysis of the nature of embodiment in Husserl’s phenomenology. I will argue that based on Husserl’s phenomenology of the body, one can distinguish four ways of experiencing one’s body, or four dimensions of embodiment. I (...) will distinguish between experience of one’s body as 1) a bearer of sensations ; 2) a seat of free movement, characterized by the faculty of “I can” ; 3) a material thing in a causal relationship with the material world ; 4) a material thing embedded in a social context. I will then apply the proposed classification of dimensions of embodiment to the experience of illness, focusing on the various ways these dimensions have been used within the phenomenology of medicine. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it provides a framework for classification of the existing interpretations of the experience of illness; secondly, it opens up a way for a comprehensive analysis of the experience of illness which includes both individual and social aspects of embodiment as well as their mutual intertwining. (shrink)

This essay presents somaesthetics of discomfort as an extension of the field of somaesthetics as developed by Shusterman. Using the work of Peirce and Dewey as a foundation upon which Shusterman and Johnson have considered the body as the basis of aesthetics, I propose that somaesthetics of discomfort provides a means of enhancing bodily awareness and reflection useful for domains of inquiry, such as healthcare and design. Taking Peirce’s notion of the irritation of doubt in a literal sense, I explore (...) bodily discomfort as the inception of inquiry. I consider work done by phenomenologists concerning experiences of comfort and discomfort, which includes definitions of each. My argument follows the perspective put forth by Peirce, Dewey, and contemporary pragmatists that experience is qualitative and that feeling is at the root of reflection. I explain how discomfort may be considered a type of aesthetic experience and provide examples of bodily discomfort as somaesthetic. In closing, I consider somaesthetic focus on discomfort as fostering moral imagination and empathy. (shrink)

Recovery is a commonly used concept in both professional and everyday contexts. Yet despite its extensive use, it has not drawn much philosophical attention. In this paper, I question the common understanding of recovery, show how the concept is inadequate, and introduce new and much needed terminology. I argue that recovery glosses over important distinctions and even misrepresents the process of moving away from malady as "going back" to a former state of health. It does not invite important nuances needed (...) to distinguish between biomedical, phenomenological, and social perspectives. In addition, I claim that there are many conditions where we are making use of the concept of recovery, although the person recovered from the condition in question, has not regained the same degree of soundness. I show how the concept of recovery leads to conceptual discrepancies that can result in worsening patients' conditions. To gain a fuller understanding, I propose to rethink the direction of the process in question. I define the process of moving away from malady as a move forward towards a new state of soundness. I also suggest three terms, corresponding to different perspectives, to describe this movement forward: 'curing', 'healing', and 'habilitating'. This new terminology provides a more nuanced understanding of the states of both malady and soundness and an attentiveness as to how they differ and relate. (shrink)

In current phenomenology of medicine, health is often understood as a state of transparency in which our body refrains from being an object of explicit attention. In this paper, I argue that such an understanding of health unnecessarily presupposes an overly harmonious alignment between subjective and objective body, resulting in the idea that our health remains phenomenologically inaccessible. Alternatively, I suggest that there are many occasions in which one’s body in health does become an object of attention, and that technologies (...) mediate how a relation with one’s body is formed. First, I show prominent accounts in current phenomenology of medicine understand health in terms of a harmonious alignment between objective and subjective body. Second, I argue that there are many occasions in which there is a disharmony between objective and subjective body, and suggest that also in health, we cannot escape being an object that we often relate to. Then, I draw on postphenomenology to show how technologies such as digital self-tracking applications and digital twins can be understood as mediating the relationship with one’s own body in a specific way. In conclusion, I argue that both technologies make present the objective body as a site for hermeneutic inquiry such that it can be interacted with in terms of health parameters. Furthermore, I point to some relevant differences in how different technologies make aspects of our own body phenomenologically present. (shrink)

Objectification is a real problem in medicine that can lead to bad medical practice or, in the worst case, dehumanization of the patient. Nevertheless, objectification also plays a major and necessary role in medicine: the patient’s body should be viewed as a biological organism in order to find diseases and be able to cure them. Listening to the patient’s illness story should not be replaced, but, indeed, developed by the physical examination of his body searching for the causes of his (...) complaints. Whereas phenomenologists have so far mainly been identifying the back sides of objectification in medicine, in this paper the aim is to analyze differences between detrimental objectifications and objectifications that do not deprive the patient of his subjectivity but, rather, at least in some cases, may lead the patient to feel more at home with his body. (shrink)

In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the “philosophical anthropology” presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus’ efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics (...) and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas. (shrink)

During the last few decades, many thinkers have advocated for the importance of the phenomenological approach in developing the understanding of the lived experience of illness. In their attempts, they have referred to ideas found in the history of phenomenology, most notably, in the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. The aim of this paper is to sketch out an interpretation of illness based on a yet unexplored conceptual framework of the phenomenology of French thinker (...) Jean-Luc Marion. Focusing on concepts of the saturated phenomenon and flesh, the paper develops an interpretation of illness as the saturated phenomenon, which highlights a variety of dimensions of illness already elaborated within the phenomenology of medicine, such as the affective dimension of illness, the disruptive dimension of illness, the transformed perception of the self in illness, mineness of flesh in illness and the inexpressible and hermeneutical dimension of illness. In addition to that, the paper explores some of the consequences the proposed interpretation of illness offers regarding the nature of illness and health. It is argued that illness in its essence is very similar to the experience of other saturated phenomena, suggesting that the difference between them does not lie within the character of the affective givenness, but rather within the dynamic relationship between the affective givenness and its conceptualization. It is also shown that the experience of health is compatible with the experience of saturation and thus is not limited to the tacit and harmonious background state. (shrink)

This paper examines the existential context of physical and mental health. Hans Georg Gadamer and The World Health Organization’s conceptualizations are discussed, and current medicalized and idealized views on health are critically examined. The existential dimension of health is explored in the light of theories of selfhood consisting of different parts, Irvin Yalom’s approach to “ultimate concerns” and Martin Heidegger’s conceptualization of “existentials.” We often become aware of health as an existential concern during times of illness, and health and illness (...) can co-exist. The paper discusses how existential suffering in Western culture is described, to an increasing degree, as disorders or psychological deficits, and perfectionistic health goals easily can become a problem. We seek to avoid suffering rather than relate to it, with all the tension that may create. The paper argues that suffering is an unavoidable aspect of people’s experience of their lives, and actively relating to suffering must be regarded as a fundamental aspect of health. The need and usefulness of a concept of “existential health” is discussed. (shrink)