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Do we need a new theory of truthmaking? Some comments on Disjunction Thesis, Conjunction Thesis, Entailment Principle and explanation

Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Wojciech Wciórka & Piotr Wilkin

Philosophical Studies 165 (2):591-604 (2013)

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Two Concepts of Truthmaking: a Compatibilist Solution to the Controversy Between Substantive and Deflationary Approach.Błażej Mzyk - 2023 - Acta Analytica:1-20.details For many years there has been a debate in truthmaking theory between proponents of the substantive and deflationary approaches. Substantivists about truthmaking maintain that we need entities called truthmakers, while deflationists of truthmaking argue that the asymmetric form of the T-schema is sufficient. In contrast to incompatibilists, who argue that one should adopt only one of these approaches, I propose a compatibilist theory of truthmaking in which the two approaches complement each other through the distribution of different functions of truthmaking. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Logic and/of Truthmaking.Jamin Asay - 2016 - In D. M. Deng, Hanti Lin & Syraya C. M. Yang (eds.), Non-classical Logic, Structural Modelling and Meaning: The Proceedings of the Second Taiwan Philosophical Logic Colloquium TPLC-2014. Springer Verlag.details The purpose of this paper is to explore the question of how truthmaker theorists ought to think about their subject in relation to logic. Regarding logic and truthmaking, I defend the view that considerations drawn from advances in modal logic have little bearing on the legitimacy of truthmaker theory. To do so, I respond to objections Timothy Williamson has lodged against truthmaker theory. As for the logic of truthmaking, I show how the project of understanding the logical features of the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Non-maximalism Reconsidered: Truthmaking and the Dependence of Truths on Being.Błażej Mzyk - 2023 - Filozofia Nauki 31 (1):1-30.details Truthmaking non-maximalism usually assumes that some truths do not have truthmakers. I suggest, however, that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically, and that different types of non-maximalism can be distinguished. To do so, I refer to two positions. The first is deflationary truthmaking, some of whose proponents assume that no truths have truthmakers. The second distinguishes between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and moreover do not depend on being. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Truthmaking for Meinongians.Maciej Sendłak - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-20.details This paper aims to introduce Meinongian Abstractionism (MA), i.e. a view on the metaphysics of truthmaking and modality. This approach is based on the notion of objectives—one of the key elements of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. In the light of it, worlds are interpreted in terms of sets of subsistent and non-subsistent objectives. This—along with Meinong’s characterization of objectives—provides a ground for possible as well as impossible worlds. One of the consequences of Meinongain Abstractionism is a reformulation of the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Transferring Non-Responsibility.Pedro Merlussi & Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi - 2019 - Ethic@: An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 18 (3):285–298.details The Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that "not being responsible for" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p is true, and no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p ⸧ q is true, then no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that q is true. Here we (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
We don’t need no explanation.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):903-921.details Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while it’s true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations

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