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Putnam’s Proof Revisited

In Sanjit Chakraborty & James Ferguson Conant (eds.), Engaging Putnam. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 63-88 (2022)

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  1. Simulations, Skepticisms, and Transcendental Arguments.Abraham Lim - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (2):123-153.
    I have developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the SIM-style argument. In this paper, I have four main aims. First, I employ the SIM-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s Brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the SIM-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my (...)
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  • Merely superficially contingent a priori knowledge and the McKinsey paradox.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-15.
    The conclusion of the McKinsey paradox is that certain contingent claims about the external world are knowable a priori. Almost all of the literature on the paradox assumes that this conclusion is unacceptable, and focuses on finding a way of avoiding it. However, there is no consensus that any of these responses work. In this paper I take a different approach, arguing that the conclusion is acceptable. First, I develop our understanding of what Evans calls merely superficially contingent a priori (...)
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  • Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.
    Putnam’s vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or (...)
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