Two studies tested whether observers could differentiate between two facets of pride—authentic and hubristic—on the basis of a single prototypical pride nonverbal expression combined with relevant contextual information. In Study 1, participants viewed targets displaying posed pride expressions in response to success, while causal attributions for the success (target's effort vs. ability) and the source of this information (target vs. omniscient narrator conveying objective fact) were varied. Study 2 used a similar method, but attribution information came from both the target (...) and an omniscient narrator; the congruence of these attributions was varied. Across studies, participants tended to label expressions as authentic pride, but were relatively more likely to label them as hubristic pride when (a) contextual information indicated that targets were arrogant and (b) no mitigating information about the target's potential value as a hard-working group member (i.e., that success was actually due to effort) was presented. (shrink)

In Clark’s thoughtful analysis of the evolution of the two facets of pride, he suggests that the concurrent existence of hubristic and authentic pride in humans represents a “persistence problem,” wherein the vestigial trait (hubristic pride) continues to exist alongside the derived trait (authentic pride). In our view, evidence for the two facets does not pose a persistence problem; rather, hubristic and authentic pride both likely evolved as higher-order cognitive emotions that solve uniquely human—but distinct— evolutionary problems. Instead of being (...) conceptualized as serial homologues, with one the vestigial form of the other, we argue that hubristic and authentic pride are both derived homologues of a vestigial proto-pride emotion that existed in our shared ancestry with other primates. (shrink)

This commentary offers a linguistic perspective on “pride”. On the basis of a semantic analysis it demonstrates that the interpretation of pride put forward by Tracy, Shariff, and Cheng (2010) is Anglocentric and is consistent with the contemporary use of the English word pride. It compares the English concept of pride with the Russian concept of gordit’sja and demonstrates their differences. It calls for a psychological account of “pride” free from an ethnocentric bias.

Pride in our own actions tells a story: we faced a challenge, overcame it, and achieved something praiseworthy. In this paper, I draw on recent psychological literature to distinguish to between two varieties of pride, 'authentic' pride that focuses on particular efforts (like guilt) and 'hubristic' pride that focuses on the whole self (like shame). Achievement pride is fitting when either efforts or traits explain our success in meeting contextually relevant, authoritative, and challenging standards without excessive opportunity cost. When it (...) is fitting, our lives are at least somewhat meaningful. (shrink)

Although scientists dating back to Darwin have noted the importance of the body in communicating emotion, current research on emotion communication tends to emphasize the face. In this article we review the evidence for bodily expressions of emotions—that is, the handful of emotions that are displayed and recognized from certain bodily behaviors. We also review the previously developed coding systems available for identifying emotions from bodily behaviors. Although no extant coding system provides an exhaustive list of bodily behaviors known to (...) communicate a panoply of emotions, our review provides the foundation for developing such a system. (shrink)

Tracy, Shariff, and Cheng (2010) present a timely and eloquent review of the current research on the emotion pride in terms of a naturalist framework. The present commentary not only echoes arguments relating to pride’s adaptive function, but also highlights some points of theoretical clarification. Specifically, we question the necessity of the naturalist approach and the emphasis on two facets of pride.

Osiurak and Reynaud highlight a major omission of models of cumulative technological culture. I propose an additional problematic omission: pride. By taking this emotion into account, we can address the question of why humans seek to learn, teach, and innovate – three processes essential to cumulative technological culture. By fostering achievement, prestige, and social learning, pride provides a pivotal piece of the puzzle.

I reject Lindquist et al.'s implicit claim that all emotion theories other than constructionist ones subscribe to a approach. The neural mechanisms underlying relevance detection, reward, attention, conceptualization, or language use are consistent with many theories of emotion, in particular componential appraisal theories. I also question the authors' claim that the meta-analysis they report provides support for the specific assumptions of constructionist theories.

Lindquist et al. convincingly argue that the brain implements psychological operations that are constitutive of emotion rather than modules subserving discrete emotions. However, the nature of such psychological operations is open to debate. I argue that considering appraisal theories may provide alternative interpretations of the neuroimaging data with respect to the psychological operations involved.

This article seeks to analyze the conditions in which group-based pride is rationally appropriate. We first distinguish between the shape and size of an emotion. For the appropriate shape of group-based pride, we suggest two criteria: the distinction between group-based pride and group-based hubris, and between we-mode and I-mode sociality. While group-based hubris is inappropriate irrespective of its mode due to the arrogant, contemptuous, and other-derogating character of this emotion, group-based pride in the we-mode is appropriate in terms of shape (...) if it is felt over an achievement to which the group members collectively committed themselves. For the same reason, members of I-mode groups can feel appropriately proud of the achievement of their group if they have collectively contributed to it. Instead, group-based pride by mere private identification with a successful group can be rationally appropriate if it manifests the person’s reduced-agency ideal and is also part of a coherent pattern of rationally interconnected emotions focused on the same ideal. Moreover, we suggest that pride in the success of one’s family member or a close friend is typically felt over the rise of social status that one group member’s success grants to the group. However, social status cannot be valued for its own sake as this undermines the values upon which social status is founded. Instead, direct or indirect causal contribution to the success of one’s child, friend, or student can warrant group-based pride, which may be justified on the basis of shared values without causal contribution as well. Finally, regarding the size of group-based pride, members of we-mode groups are warranted to experience and express more intense pride than members of I-mode groups. Moreover, the proper intensity of this emotion depends on the particular other to whom the expression is directed. Finally, criteria of appropriate size don’t apply to shared group-based pride as sharing increases the intensity of emotion by default. (shrink)

Emotions can be understood as a coherent, integrated system of general-purpose coping strategies, guided by appraisal, for responding to situations of crisis and opportunity (when specific-purpose motivational systems may be less effective). This perspective offers functional explanations for the presence of particular emotions in the emotion repertoire, and their elicitation by particular appraisal combinations. Implications of the Emotion System model for debated issues, such as the dimensional vs. discrete nature of appraisals and emotions, are also discussed.

Admiration is thought to have essential functions for social interaction: it inspires us to learn from excellent models, to become better people, and to praise others and create social bonds. In intergroup relations, admiration for other groups leads to greater intergroup contact, cooperation, and help. Given these implications, it is surprising that admiration has only been researched by a handful of authors. In this article we review the literature, focusing on the definition of admiration, links to related emotions, measurement, antecedents, (...) and associated behaviors. We propose a conceptual model of admiration that highlights admiration’s function for approaching and emulating successful models, thus contributing to social learning at the interpersonal level and to cultural transmission at the group and societal level. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has created enormous challenges for organizations and employees. Due to the effectiveness of idiosyncratic deals in management practices, more and more organizations use this human resource management tool to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, whether there are potential risks or negative effects of i-deals in the COVID-19 pandemic environment is not very clear. Drawing upon social cognitive theory, we proposed that i-deals may foment focal employees’ unethical behavior by triggering their hubristic pride, and (...) such process may be moderated by their trait of grandiose narcissism. We conducted a survey during the COVID-19 outbreak and tested our hypotheses with 492 samples from Shandong Province, China. Consistent with predictions, we found a positive relationship between i-deals and hubristic pride, which, in turn, increased their unethical behavior. And the relationship between i-deals and unethical behavior was mediated by hubristic pride. Furthermore, grandiose narcissism strengthened the positive relationship between i-deals and hubristic pride, as well as the indirect effect of i-deals on unethical behavior via hubristic pride. Our findings contributed to the literature on i-deals and provided guidance for organizations to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.

In addition to active wake, emotions are generated and experienced in a variety of functionally different states such as those of sleep, during which external stimulation and cognitive control are lacking. The neural basis of emotions can be specified by regarding the multitude of emotion-related brain states, as well as the distinct neuro- and psychodynamic stages (generation and regulation) of emotional experience.

This article describes James’s distaste for taxonomic classification of emotion and argues that he would not have been pleased by current scholarship which still focuses on the definition and classification of discrete emotions, distracting scholars from more fundamental underlying processes. I argue that as in James’s time, current taxonomies are still arbitrary and still constrain the kinds of questions psychologists ask.

Many argue that higher-cognitive emotions such as pride arose de novo in humans, and thus fall outside of the scope of the kinds of evolutionary explanations offered for ?basic emotions,? like fear. This approach fractures the general category of ?emotion? into two deeply distinct kinds of emotion. However, an increasing number of emotion researchers are converging on the conclusion that higher-cognitive emotions are evolutionarily rooted in simpler emotional responses found in primates. I argue that pride fits this pattern, and then (...) consider some of the possible mechanisms by which the basic forms of these emotions have been transformed, arguing that we can see this transformation in part as the progressive internalization of originally externalized processes associated with norms, selfhood, and social structure. This connects the emotion literature with the literatures on the Social/Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis and situated cognition, offering the possibility of a more unified theory of human emotions. (shrink)

Tracy, Shariff, and Cheng (2010) propose that human pride has two facets (hubristic pride [HP] and authentic pride [AP]) which, despite their similarities, diverge in important ways, including their evolutionary histories and functions. Put simplistically, AP emerged from HP. While AP and HP are thus homologous, HP continues to exist in humans, alongside AP. This is problematic on the most common interpretation of homology, in which an ancestral trait transforms into a derived trait, but does not remain present independently. I (...) suggest that construing HP and AP as serial homologues (duplicated but varying traits within single organisms) solves this problem, and also resolves some of the other tensions in their account of pride as a “single” emotion with “two” facets. (shrink)

ABSTRACTNearly everyone agrees that physical pain is bad. Indeed, if anything merits the status of a platitude in our everyday thinking about value, the idea that pain is bad surely does. Equally,...

Pride is a status-related self-conscious emotion. The present study aimed to investigate the nature of status behind pridein four studies with using the two-facet model of pride, status maintenance strategies and with differentiating subjective social status (SSS) and objective social status (OSS). In Study 1 and 2 we used questionnaire methods with structural equation modeling (SEM) in order to identify the relationship patterns between SSS, OSS, status maintenance strategies and pride. In Study 3 and 4 we used vignette methods and (...) SEM to identify these links. All four studies gave evidence for the SSS  prestige status maintenance strategy  authentic pride relationship pattern. Similarly consistent result was found regarding the dominance status maintenance strategy  hubristic pride link. Depending on the assessment method (questionnaire vs. vignette) and the evaluative frame of reference (self vs. other), OSS was related to either authentic and hubristic pride, only hubristic pride, or neither of them. Based on these results, one thing can be taken for granted: pride is a subjective status-related emotion. However, the present results suggest that it is not necessarily true for objective social status. (shrink)

This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 looks at how esteem affects knowledge transfers. Motivated by Akerlof [2015], I examine in two separate models, how esteem | via individuals' choices of values | affects teaching and learning. In teaching, there is the following trade-off: prestige can be obtained if one is able to influence others to value one's expertise, but doing so reduces one's relative achievement, hurting one's pride. This leads to non-monotonicity of teaching in students' learning potential and (...) teachers' ability. In learning, I analyse how social pressure affects learning given an option to \escape". I show that social pressure can be used to motivate individuals to learn and possibly value an activity. However, too much pressure causes those with lower relative potential to exhibit escapism due to increasingly negative esteem. Implications of the models are discussed. Chapter 2 studies how workers' identities are relevant to incentive theory. In particular, I conduct the first experiment exploring the relationship between identity and optimal incentives. I construct workgroups which are either homogeneous or heterogeneous in members' identities and examine their productivity at a real-effort task under tournament pay and team pay. I find that in homogeneous workgroups, productivity is higher under team pay; in heterogeneous workgroups, on the other hand, productivity is similar under both incentive schemes. Team pay induces greater helping of peers | especially in homogeneous workgroups. Tournament pay induces higher personal effort | especially in heterogeneous workgroups. I also find that incentives influence workers' identities. Chapter 3 uses a laboratory experiment to study competitions for power | and the role of patronage in such competitions. We construct and analyze a new game | the \chicken-and-egg game" | in which chickens correspond to positions of power and eggs are the game's currency. We find that power tends to accumulate, through a \power begets power" dynamic, in the hands of \lords." Other subjects behave like their vassals in the sense that they take lords' handouts rather than compete against them. We observe substantial wealth inequality as well as power inequality. There are also striking gender differences in outcomes | particularly in rates of lordship. In a second treatment, where we eliminate patronage by knocking out the ability to transfer eggs, inequality is vastly reduced and the \power begets power" dynamic disappears. (shrink)