Switch to: References

Citations of:

Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less

In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 124-134 (2016)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
    I accomplish two things in this paper. First I expose some important limitations of the contemporary literature on the norms of assertion and in the process illuminate a host of new directions and forms that an account of assertional norms might take. Second I leverage those insights to suggest a new account of the relationship between knowledge and assertion, which arguably outperforms the standard knowledge account.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Succeeding Competently: Towards an Anti-Luck Condition for Achievement.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):394-418.
    ABSTRACTAchievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently, only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Varieties of Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.
    According to robust virtue epistemology , knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We propose (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Hoops and Barns: A New Dilemma for Sosa.Kelp Christoph, Boult Cameron, Broncano-Berrocal Fernando, Dimmock Paul, Ghijsen Harmen & Simion Mona - 2017 - Synthese:1-16.
    This paper critically assesses Sosa’s normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa’s central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa’s account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if safe from failure, this thesis can’t be true. We then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155.
    Robust Virtue Epistemology maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • On Virtue, Credit and Safety.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):98-120.
    According to robust virtue epistemology, the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that in cases of knowledge, the subject’s cognitive success is attributable to her cognitive agency. But what does it take for a subject’s cognitive success to be attributable to her cognitive agency? A promising answer is that the subject’s cognitive abilities have to contribute to the safety of her epistemic standing with respect to her inquiry, in order for her cognitive success to be attributable to her (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Global Safety: How to Deal with Necessary Truths.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1167-1186.
    According to the safety condition, a subject knows that p only if she would believe that p only if p was true. The safety condition has been a very popular necessary condition for knowledge of late. However, it is well documented that the safety condition is trivially satisfied in cases where the subject believes in a necessary truth. This is for the simple reason that a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds, and therefore it is true in all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations