BackgroundWhile healthcare professionals’ right to invoke the conscience clause has been recognised as a fundamental human right, it continues to provoke a heated debate in Polish society. Although public discourse is filled with ethical and legal considerations on the conscience clause, much less is known about the attitudes of healthcare professionals regarding that matter. The aim of this study was therefore to describe the attitudes of Polish physicians, nurses and pharmacists towards the ethical and legal aspects of the conscience clause.MethodsWe (...) analysed a group of three hundred healthcare professionals: physicians, nurses and pharmacists in Poznan, Poland, using a standard questionnaire comprising of 29 questions about various ethical and legal aspects of the conscience clause and participants’ personal experiences with the conscience clause. The study was conducted between January and March 2020.ResultsThis research shows that although most Polish healthcare workers support the right to invoke the conscience clause they differ significantly in their opinions on to whom and to what medical procedures the conscience clause should apply to. It also demonstrated that while the conscience clause is rarely invoked in Poland, most healthcare professionals declare that the current legal regulations in that sphere are unclear and inaccurate.ConclusionsWhile there is an urgent need to raise the awareness regarding the conscience clause among medical students and healthcare professionals and educate them about such issues, it is even more important to improve the legal system in regard to the CC so that it protects both HCPs’ right to the CC and safeguards patients’ rights to medical services. (shrink)

Lawrence Nelson (2018) criticizes conscientious objection (CO) to abortion statutes as far as they permit health care providers to escape criminal liability for what would otherwise be the legally wrongful taking of a pregnant woman’s life by refusing treatment (i.e. abortion). His key argument refers to the U.S. Supreme Court judgment (Roe v. Wade 1973) that does not treat the unborn as constitutional persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, Nelson claims that within the U.S. legal system any vital interests of (...) pregnant women must always take precedence over fetuses’ interests. While agreeing with the main thesis of the article, we believe that the author’s argument neither vindicates his claim, nor explains why those who believe that fetuses are equally protectable human beings do not have the right to refuse to perform an abortion in lifethreatening emergency circumstances (AE). Therefore, the main aim of our commentary is to outline, by referring to our earlier works on conscientious objection in health care (Z_ uradzki 2016) and cultural exemptions (Ciszewski 2016), a better and universalizable argumentative path that would lead to the same conclusion. (shrink)

„Skoro powszechnie przyjmuje się, że sumienie jest suwerenne, to nie wiadomo, po co lekarz miałby uzasadniać pisemnie swój światopogląd” – napisała Naczelna Izba Lekarska w skardze do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Trybunał tę część skargi oddalił w wyroku z 7 października 2015 r., ale stwierdził, że „Celem prowadzenia dokumentacji medycznej nie jest (…) utrwalanie na piśmie poglądów filozoficzno-prawnych lekarza”. Uznał też, że uzasadnienie „powinno mieć charakter medyczny, a nie służyć wyjaśnieniu światopoglądu lekarza, czy też wskazaniu zasady moralnej leżącej u podstaw jego zachowania”. (...) Podobną interpretację akceptuje wielu polskich prawników, twierdząc, że skoro sumienie czy światopogląd lekarza są „indywidualne”, „autonomiczne”, „suwerenne”, to merytoryczne powody odmowy wykonania świadczenia medycznego nie mogą podlegać jakiejkolwiek ocenie i kontroli. (shrink)