Aberrations and variations within kinds of creatures required explanation to Western medievals, who took the Genesis creation narratives together with Aristotelian species to imply that change was limited to within species; consequently, species were presumed static. Medieval philosophers often explained variation—including “new” kinds like mules—as due to problems in procreation/gestation (following Aristotle) or by sin. I argue that Aquinas's explanation of variation in women, people with disabilities, and mules suggests that Aquinas cannot be taken to entirely reject the possibility of (...) new kinds, and parallels in his explanation of the existence of women and the possible existence of new kinds provides warrant for a re‐evaluation of his understanding of the notion of the natures or essences shared by kinds. Sin—individual or original—is an inadequate explanation for variation, and the argumentative parallels between Aquinas's treatment of women and mules challenge presumptions about what medievals mean by “static kinds” at all, revealing space for evolutionary thought. (shrink)

In much of Christian thought humans are taken to have an ultimate end, understood as the highest attainable good. Christians also anticipate “the life everlasting.” Together these ideas generate a paradox. If the end can be reached in a finite amount of time, some longer-lasting state will be better still, so the purported end is not the highest good after all. But if the end is to possess some good forever, then it will never be reached. So it seems an (...) everlasting being cannot have an ultimate end—a conclusion that apparently makes human life pointless. How can the paradox be solved? (shrink)