- Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
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Can Libertarians Make Promises?Alfred Mele - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:217-241.details
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Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
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On the very concept of free will.Joshua May - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866.details
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Free Will and Desire.Brian Looper - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1347-1360.details
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Agentive Duality reconsidered.Annina Loets & Julia Zakkou - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3771-3789.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Luck and history‐sensitive compatibilism.Neil Levy - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.details
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Bad Luck Once Again.Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.details
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Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith.John Lemos - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.details
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The nature and basis of human dignity.Patrick Lee & Robert P. George - 2008 - In Adam Schulman (ed.), Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. [President's Council on Bioethics. pp. 173-193.details
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Alternative Possibilities and a Dogma on Freedom Debate選択可能性と「自由論のドグマ」.Taehee Lee - 2018 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 51 (1):19-40.details
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O pojęciu zdarzenia będącego złamaniem prawa przyrody.Adrian Kuźniar - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (3):107-123.details
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Moral Responsibility and Foundationalism.Stephen Kershnar - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):381-402.details
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How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341.details
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How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327-341.details
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Swinburne on the Conditions for Free Will and Moral Responsibility.David P. Hunt - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):39--49.details
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Identity reconsidered.Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):715-725.details
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The Consequence of the Consequence Argument.Marco Hausmann - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):45-70.details
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Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality.Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3179-3197.details
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Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1417-1436.details
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The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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Modest libertarianism and practical reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.details
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Freedom, obligation, and responsibility: Prospects for a unifying theory.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):106-125.details
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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions. [REVIEW]Meghan Griffith - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.details
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Does free will remain a mystery? A response to Van Inwagen.Meghan Elizabeth Griffith - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.details
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Against the Mind Argument.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):273-294.details
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Are We Rarely Free? A Response to Restrictivism.Pettit Gordon - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):219-237.details
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VI—Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism.Philip Goff - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):123-144.details
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VI—Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism.Philip Goff - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):123-144.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Freedom and Unpredictability.Michael Garnett - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):666-680.details
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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.details
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The assimilation argument and the rollback argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.details
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Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
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Justice Without Retribution: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Stakeholder Views and Practical Implications.Farah Focquaert, Gregg Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw & Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Neuroethics 13 (1):1-3.details
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On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action.Alicia Finch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):151-170.details
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Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):335–347.details
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Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Disputatio (45):219-243.details
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To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.details
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The demand for contrastive explanations.Nadine Elzein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1325-1339.details
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Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..details
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Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):127-144.details
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Free will, chance, and mystery.Laura Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80.details
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Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.L. Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-180.details
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