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  1. Comments to 'Logics of Public Communications'.Hans P. van Ditmarsch - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):181-187.
    Take your average publication on the dynamics of knowledge. In one of its first paragraphs you will probably encounter a phrase like “a logic of public announcements was first proposed by Plaza in 1989 (Plaza 1989).” Tracking down this publication seems easy, because googling its title ‘Logics of Public Communications’ takes you straight to Jan Plaza’s website where it is online available in the author’s own version, including, on that page, very helpful and full bibliographic references to the proceedings in (...)
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  • Logic of Change, Change of Logic.Hans van Ditmarsch, Brian Hill & Ondrej Majer - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):227 - 234.
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  • Introspective Forgetting.Hans van Ditmarsch, Andreas Herzig, Jérôme Lang & Pierre Marquis - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):405-423.
    We model the forgetting of propositional variables in a modal logical context where agents become ignorant and are aware of each others’ or their own resulting ignorance. The resulting logic is sound and complete. It can be compared to variable-forgetting as abstraction from information, wherein agents become unaware of certain variables: by employing elementary results for bisimulation, it follows that beliefs not involving the forgotten atom(s) remain true.
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  • Keep Changing Your Beliefs, Aiming for the Truth.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):255-270.
    We investigate the process of truth-seeking by iterated belief revision with higher-level doxastic information . We elaborate further on the main results in Baltag and Smets (Proceedings of TARK, 2009a , Proceedings of WOLLIC’09 LNAI 5514, 2009b ), applying them to the issue of convergence to truth . We study the conditions under which the belief revision induced by a series of truthful iterated upgrades eventually stabilizes on true beliefs. We give two different conditions ensuring that beliefs converge to “full” (...)
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  • Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Why, How, and Where To?Hannes Leitgeb & Krister Segerberg - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):167-190.
    We investigate the research programme of dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) and analyze its underlying methodology. The Ramsey test for conditionals is used to characterize the logical and philosophical differences between two paradigmatic systems, AGM and KGM, which we develop and compare axiomatically and semantically. The importance of Gärdenfors’s impossibility result on the Ramsey test is highlighted by a comparison with Arrow’s impossibility result on social choice. We end with an outlook on the prospects and the future of DDL.
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  • Dynamic Epistemic Logics: Promises, Problems, Shortcomings, and Perspectives.Andreas Herzig - 2017 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 27 (3-4):328-341.
    Dynamic epistemic logics provide an account of the evolution of agents’ belief and knowledge when they learn the occurrence of an event. These logics started to become popular about 20 years ago and by now there exists a huge number of publications about them. The present paper briefly summarises the existing body of literature, discusses some problems and shortcomings, and proposes some avenues for future research.
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  • Truth-Tracking by Belief Revision.Alexandru Baltag, Nina Gierasimczuk & Sonja Smets - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (5):917-947.
    We study the learning power of iterated belief revision methods. Successful learning is understood as convergence to correct, i.e., true, beliefs. We focus on the issue of universality: whether or not a particular belief revision method is able to learn everything that in principle is learnable. We provide a general framework for interpreting belief revision policies as learning methods. We focus on three popular cases: conditioning, lexicographic revision, and minimal revision. Our main result is that conditioning and lexicographic revision can (...)
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  • Doxastic Logic.Michael Caie - 2019 - In Jonathan Weisberg & Richard Pettigrew (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 499-541.
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  • Relation-Changing Modal Operators: Fig. 1.Carlos Areces, Raul Fervari & Guillaume Hoffmann - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (4):601-627.
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  • DEL-Sequents for Progression.Guillaume Aucher - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):289-321.
    Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) deals with the representation and the study in a multi-agent setting of knowledge and belief change. It can express in a uniform way epistemic statements about: 1. what is true about an initial situation 2. what is true about an event occurring in this situation 3. what is true about the resulting situation after the event has occurred. We axiomatize within the DEL framework what we can infer about (iii) given (i) and (ii). Given three formulas (...)
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  • Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction.Johan van Benthem & Eric Pacuit - unknown
    The combination of logic and game theory provides a fine-grained perspective on information and interaction dynamics, a Theory of Play. In this paper we lay down the main components of such a theory, drawing on recent advances in the logical dynamics of actions, preferences, and information. We then show how this fine-grained perspective has already shed new light on the long-term dynamics of information exchange, as well as on the much-discussed question of extensive game rationality.
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  • Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision.Francesco Berto & Christopher Badura - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):178-193.
    We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
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  • Generalizing AGM to a Multi-Agent Setting.Guillaume Aucher - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (4):530-558.
    We generalize AGM belief revision theory to the multi-agent case. To do so, we first generalize the semantics of the single-agent case, based on the notion of interpretation, to the multi-agent case. Then we show that, thanks to the shape of our new semantics, all the results of the AGM framework transfer. Afterwards we investigate some postulates that are specific to our multi-agent setting. Finally, we give an example of revision operator that fulfills one of these new postulates and give (...)
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  • Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Implicit and Explicit Beliefs.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):107-140.
    Epistemic logic with its possible worlds semantic model is a powerful framework that allows us to represent an agent’s information not only about propositional facts, but also about her own information. Nevertheless, agents represented in this framework are logically omniscient: their information is closed under logical consequence. This property, useful in some applications, is an unrealistic idealisation in some others. Many proposals to solve this problem focus on weakening the properties of the agent’s information, but some authors have argued that (...)
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  • Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
    We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show how various abstract postulates for (...)
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  • Inquisitive Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Ivano A. Ciardelli & Floris Roelofsen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1643-1687.
    Information exchange can be seen as a dynamic process of raising and resolving issues. The goal of this paper is to provide a logical framework to model and reason about this process. We develop an inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic , which enriches the standard framework of dynamic epistemic logic , incorporating insights from recent work on inquisitive semantics. At a static level, IDEL does not only allow us to model the information available to a set of agents, like standard epistemic (...)
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  • On the Epistemic Foundation for Iterated Weak Dominance: An Analysis in a Logic of Individual and Collective Attitudes.Emiliano Lorini - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):863-904.
    This paper proposes a logical framework for representing static and dynamic properties of different kinds of individual and collective attitudes. A complete axiomatization as well as a decidability result for the logic are given. The logic is applied to game theory by providing a formal analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies (IDWDS), or iterated weak dominance for short. The main difference between the analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak dominance given in this (...)
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  • What Will They Say?—Public Announcement Games.Ågotnes Thomas & Ditmarsch Hans van - 2011 - Synthese 179 (S1):57 - 85.
    Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changing actions available to individual agents, and their knowledge pre-and post conditions. For example, public announcement logic describes actions in the form of public, truthful announcements. However, little research so far has considered describing and analysing rational choice between such actions, i.e., predicting what rational self-interested agents actually will or should do. Since the outcome of information exchange ultimately depends on the actions chosen by all the agents in the system, and assuming that agents (...)
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  • Converse-PDL with Regular Inclusion Axioms: A Framework for MAS Logics.Barbara Dunin-Kęplicz, Linh Anh Nguyen & Andrzej Szalas - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (1):61-91.
    In this paper we study automated reasoning in the modal logic CPDLreg which is a combination of CPDL and REGc. The logic CPDL is widely used in many areas, including program verification, theory of action and change, and knowledge representation. On the other hand, the logic REGc is applicable in reasoning about epistemic states and ontologies. The modal logic CPDLreg can serve as a technical foundation for reasoning about agency. Even very rich multi-agent logics can be embedded into CPDLreg via (...)
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  • Deceit and Indefeasible Knowledge: The Case of Dubitatio.Sara L. Uckelman - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):503-519.
    The current trend in knowledge revision in the Dynamic Epistemic Logic tradition focuses on the addition of new knowledge, rather than the possibility of losing knowledge. Yet there are natural situations, such as an agent who does not want another agent to know that she knows a certain piece of information, where there is a need to be able to model the retraction of a proposition from a knowledge base. One situation where this is systematically required is the variant of (...)
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  • Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
    The theory of belief revision deals with (rational) changes in beliefs in response to new information. In the literature a distinction has been drawn between belief revision and belief update (see [6]). The former deals with situations where the objective facts describing the world do not change (so that only the beliefs of the agent change over time), while the letter allows for situations where both the facts and the doxastic state of the agent change over time. We focus on (...)
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  • Dynamic Epistemic Logic I: Modeling Knowledge and Belief.Eric Pacuit - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):798-814.
    Dynamic epistemic logic, broadly conceived, is the study of logics of information change. This is the first paper in a two-part series introducing this research area. In this paper, I introduce the basic logical systems for reasoning about the knowledge and beliefs of a group of agents.
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  • Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW]Giacomo Bonanno - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
    We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007 ). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we (...)
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  • Awareness Dynamics.Brian Hill - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):113-137.
    In recent years, much work has been dedicated by logicians, computer scientists and economists to understanding awareness, as its importance for human behaviour becomes evident. Although several logics of awareness have been proposed, little attention has been explicitly dedicated to change in awareness. However, one of the most crucial aspects of awareness is the changes it undergoes, which have countless important consequences for knowledge and action. The aim of this paper is to propose a formal model of awareness change, and (...)
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  • Logical Dynamics of Belief Change in the Community.Fenrong Liu, Jeremy Seligman & Patrick Girard - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2403-2431.
    In this paper we explore the relationship between norms of belief revision that may be adopted by members of a community and the resulting dynamic properties of the distribution of beliefs across that community. We show that at a qualitative level many aspects of social belief change can be obtained from a very simple model, which we call ‘threshold influence’. In particular, we focus on the question of what makes the beliefs of a community stable under various dynamical situations. We (...)
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  • My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic.Hans van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):191-209.
    We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special (...)
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  • Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision.Brian Hill - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):291-323.
    In the companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part I), a general framework for realistic modelling of instantaneous states of belief and of the operations involving them was presented and motivated. In this paper, the framework is applied to the case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, firstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-specified, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators (...)
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  • An Epistemic and Dynamic Approach to Abductive Reasoning: Abductive Problem and Abductive Solution.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada, Fernando Soler-Toscano & Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):505-522.
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  • Probabilistic Dynamic Belief Revision.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.
    We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief (...)
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  • Dynamics of Lying.Hans van Ditmarsch - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-33.
    We propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a ‘lie that $\varphi $ ’ (where $\varphi $ is a formula in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a state transformer relative to the formula $\varphi $ . The states that are being transformed are pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs of (...)
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  • My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic.Hans Van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):191 - 209.
    We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents' beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs ('no preferences'), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own ('my preferences'), and the special (...)
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  • Generation and Selection of Abductive Explanations for Non-Omniscient Agents.Fernando Soler-Toscano & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):141-168.
    Among the non-monotonic reasoning processes, abduction is one of the most important. Usually described as the process of looking for explanations, it has been recognized as one of the most commonly used in our daily activities. Still, the traditional definitions of an abductive problem and an abductive solution mention only theories and formulas, leaving agency out of the picture. Our work proposes a study of abductive reasoning from an epistemic and dynamic perspective. In the first part we explore syntactic definitions (...)
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  • AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (AGM), "On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions" was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twentyfive years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in (...)
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