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  1. On a Three-Valued Logic with Blamey’s Interjunction for the Formal Description of Atomic Transactions.Mateusz M. Radzki - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (2):177-191.
    The article demonstrates that to describe the property of atomicity of transactions in database systems, we need a three-valued logic with propositional connective characterized in the same way as Blamey’s interjunction. However, the article explains that since Blamey’s partial logic with interjunction is a logic without tautologies, it does not satisfy some salient conditions of being a logic of atomic transactions. The article introduces a logic of the considered kind, and provides an example of the formal exposition of the case (...)
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  • On Logic in the Law: "Something, but Not All".Susan Haack - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (1):1-31.
    In 1880, when Oliver Wendell Holmes (later to be a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) criticized the logical theology of law articulated by Christopher Columbus Langdell (the first Dean of Harvard Law School), neither Holmes nor Langdell was aware of the revolution in logic that had begun, the year before, with Frege's Begriffsschrift. But there is an important element of truth in Holmes's insistence that a legal system cannot be adequately understood as a system of axioms and corollaries; and (...)
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  • Foreword: Three-Valued Logics and Their Applications.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2014 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):1-11.
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  • Variations on Intra-Theoretical Logical Pluralism: Internal Versus External Consequence.Bogdan Dicher - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):667-686.
    Intra-theoretical logical pluralism is a form of meaning-invariant pluralism about logic, articulated recently by Hjortland :355–373, 2013). This version of pluralism relies on it being possible to define several distinct notions of provability relative to the same logical calculus. The present paper picks up and explores this theme: How can a single logical calculus express several different consequence relations? The main hypothesis articulated here is that the divide between the internal and external consequence relations in Gentzen systems generates a form (...)
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  • Logiczne i filozoficzne problemy związane z logiką rozmytą.Ernest Januszewski - 2007 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 55 (1):109-127.
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  • Logic is a Moral Science.Hartley Slater - 2015 - Philosophy 90 (4):581-591.
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  • The Necessity of Tomorrow's Sea Battle.Jeremy Byrd - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):160-176.
    In chapter 9 of De Interpretatione, Aristotle offers a defense of free will against the threat of fatalism. According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle concedes the validity of the fatalist's arguments and then proceeds to reject the Principle of Bivalence in order to avoid the fatalist's conclusion. Assuming that the traditional interpretation is right on this point, it remains to be seen why Aristotle felt compelled to reject such an intuitive semantic principle rather than challenge the fatalist's inference from truth (...)
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  • Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
    Some philosophers have argued that putative logical disagreements aren't really disagreements at all since when you change your logic you thereby change the meanings of your logical constants. According to this picture classical logicians and intuitionists don't really disagree, they just mean different things by terms like “not” and “or”. Quine gave an infamous “translation argument” for this view. Here I clarify the change of logic, change of meaning (CLCM) thesis, examine and find fault with Quine's translation argument for the (...)
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