Если личность (personhood) 1 -это качество или состояние, позволяющее быть отдельным лицом, то церебральностью (brainhood) можно назвать качество или состояние, позволяющее быть мозгом. Через это онтоло гическое качество определяется «церебральный субъект», получивший, по крайней мере, в индустриально развитых и высокомедикализирован-ных обществах, множество социальных описаний начиная с середины ХХ века. В статье исследуется историческое развитие церебральности. Предлагается рассмотреть мозг как необходимую область локализации «современного Я», и, следовательно, церебральный субъект - как антропологический тип современности (хотя бы потому, что современность придает высшую ценность (...) человеку как автономному агенту выбора и инициативы). Также утверждается, что идеология церебральности стала причиной возникновения множества нейроисследований, а не их следствием; показано, как разрастающийся комплекс нейрокультурных дискурсов и практик воплощает и поддерживает эту идеологию. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine Robert Boyle's strategies for making imperceptible entities accessible to the senses. It is well known that, in his natural philosophy, Boyle confronted the challenge of making imperceptible particles of matter into objects of sensory experience. It has never been noted, however, that Boyle confronted a strikingly similar challenge in his natural theology – he needed to make an equally imperceptible God accessible to the senses. Taking this symmetrical difficulty as my starting point, I propose a (...) new approach to thinking about the interconnections between Boyle's natural philosophy and natural theology. For the most part, studies of science and religion in the early modern period work by seeking out the influence of explicitly stated religious beliefs on scientific ideas. I argue, by contrast, that we need to focus on Boyle's representational practices, using his attempts to represent imperceptible entities as a means of uncovering metaphysical and theological presuppositions that he did not always articulate when stating his religious beliefs. With new interpretations of bothA Discourse of Things Above Reason(1681) andSome Physico-Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection(1675), I show that there were crucial similarities between Boyle's practices for representing both God and atoms. I go on to show, moreover, that Boyle used these practices to enact an ontological stance at odds with one of his most important professed beliefs. (shrink)

Responding to Mark Harris, I reflect on his tantalizing question whether the provision of naturalistic explanations for biblical miracles renders the narratives more, or less, credible. I address his “reversal,” in which professional scientists now feature among defenders of a literalistic reading, while professional biblical scholars are often skeptical. I suggest this underlines the ambivalence of scientific naturalism from the standpoint of Christian theology. Historical examples are adduced to show that, until the mid‐nineteenth century, naturalistic and theistic explanations were commonly (...) regarded as complementary. Accordingly, the primacy often accorded to scientific progress in accounts of secularization is questionable. Two concluding questions are raised. If a methodological naturalism inheres in biblical scholarship, as in the sciences, how do biblical scholars decide whether the historical trajectories they construct for the composition of biblical texts are destructive or affirmative of faith? Second, when the miracle is the Resurrection of the dead Christ, does not the scientific impossibility of this foundational event remain sacrosanct? (shrink)