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  1. Retributivism, Justification and Credence: The Epistemic Argument Revisited.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):177-190.
    Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified under the circumstances, we ought not to do it. In this paper, I argue that we ought to dismantle harsh retributivist criminal justice systems for this reason; we cannot be sufficiently certain that the harm is justified. Gregg Caruso, Ben Vilhauer and others have previously argued for the same conclusion; however, my own version sidesteps certain controversial premises of theirs. Harsh retributivist criminal (...)
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  • Autism Spectrum Condition, Good and Bad Motives of Offending, and Sentencing.Jukka Varelius - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):143-153.
    It has been proposed that the ways in which the criminal justice system treats offenders with Autism spectrum condition should duly account for how the condition influences the offenders’ behavior. While the recommendation appears plausible, what adhering to it means in practice remains unclear. A central feature of ASC is seen to be that people with the condition have difficulties with understanding and reacting to the mental states of others in what are commonly considered as adequate ways. This article aims (...)
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  • Criminal Quarantine and the Burden of Proof.Michael Corrado - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1095-1110.
    In the recent literature a number of free will skeptics, skeptics who believe that punishment is justified only if deserved, have argued for these two points: first, that the free will realist who would justify punishment has the burden of establishing to a high level of certainty - perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt, but certainly at least by clear and convincing evidence - that any person to be punished acted freely in breaking the law; and, second, that that level of (...)
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  • Reasonable Pluralism About Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense.J. P. Messina - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (1):189-208.
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  • Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment.Gregg D. Caruso - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):13-28.
    Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible (...)
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  • Free Will Fallibilism and the “Two-Standpoints” Account of Freedom.Michael Louis Corrado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):1967-1982.
    In this paper I propose a form of free will fallibilism. Unlike the free will realist who is fully persuaded that we have sufficient evidence of freedom to justify holding individuals morally responsible for what they do and imposing punishment, and unlike the free will skeptic who is fully persuaded that we do not have enough evidence to believe that we face a future of open alternatives, the free will fallibilist will believe that we have enough evidence to justify a (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility and Intentional Action: Sehon on Freedom and Purpose.Michael Louis Corrado - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):246-264.
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  • Free Will, Punishment, and the Burden of Proof.Michael Louis Corrado - 2018 - Criminal Justice Ethics 37 (1):55-71.
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  • Good Night and Good Luck - In Search of a Neuroscience Challenge to Criminal Justice.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (1):1-31.
    This article clarifies what a neuroscience challenge to criminal justice must look like by sketching the basic structure of the argument, gradually filling out the details and illustrating the conditions that must be met for the challenge to work. In the process of doing so it explores influential work by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, and Stephen Morse respectively, arguing that the former should not be understood to present a version of the challenge, and that the latter's argument against the (...)
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