Switch to: References

Citations of:

What's in a (Mental) Picture

Alberto Voltolini

In A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer. pp. 389-406 (2015)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

The Singularity of Experiences and Thoughts.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):459-473.details Recently, various people have maintained that one must revise either the externalistically-based notion of singular thought or the naïve realism-inspired notion of relational particularity, as respectively applied to some thoughts and to some perceptual experiences. In order to do so, one must either provide a broader notion of singular thought or flank the notion of relational particularity with a broader notion of phenomenal particularity. I want to hold that there is no need of that revision. For the original notions can (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):237-256.details As far as I can see, there are two basic ways of cashing out the claim that intentionality is ultimately phenomenal: an indirect one, according to which the intentional content of an experiential intentional mental state is determined by the phenomenal character that state already possesses, so that intentionality is so determined only indirectly; a direct one, which centers on the very property of intentionality itself and can further be construed in two manners: either that very property is determined by (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
A Radical Relationist Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrea Marchesi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7509-7534.details The problem of intentional inexistence arises because the following (alleged) intuitions are mutually conflicting: it seems that sometimes we think about things that do not exist; it seems that intentionality is a relation between a thinker and what such a thinker thinks about; it seems that relations entail the existence of what they relate. In this paper, I argue for what I call a radical relationist solution. First, I contend that the extant arguments for the view that relations entail the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
(Mock-)Thinking about the Same.Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24:282-307.details In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

1