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  1. William Heytesbury and the Conditions for Knowledge.David B. Martens - 2010 - Theoria 76 (4):355-374.
    Ivan Boh affirms and Robert Pasnau denies that William Heytesbury holds merely true belief to be sufficient for knowledge in the broad sense. I argue that Boh is correct and Pasnau is mistaken, and that there is a long-running orthodox medieval tradition agreeing with Heytesbury about the conditions for knowledge. I offer a hypothesis about the origins, continuance and demise of that medieval tradition, and some remarks about the tradition's significance.
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  • Epistemic logic.Vincent Hendricks - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge and belief. It provides insight into the properties of individual knowers, has provided a means to model complicated scenarios involving groups of knowers and has improved our understanding of the dynamics of inquiry.
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  • Quantified Temporal Alethic Boulesic Doxastic Logic.Daniel Rönnedal - 2021 - Logica Universalis 15 (1):1-65.
    The paper develops a set of quantified temporal alethic boulesic doxastic systems. Every system in this set consists of five parts: a ‘quantified’ part, a temporal part, a modal (alethic) part, a boulesic part and a doxastic part. There are no systems in the literature that combine all of these branches of logic. Hence, all systems in this paper are new. Every system is defined both semantically and proof-theoretically. The semantic apparatus consists of a kind of$$T \times W$$T×Wmodels, and the (...)
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  • Doxastic logic: a new approach.Daniel Rönnedal - 2018 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (4):313-347.
    In this paper, I develop a new set of doxastic logical systems and I show how they can be used to solve several well-known problems in doxastic logic, for example the so-called problem of logical omniscience. According to this puzzle, the notions of knowledge and belief that are used in ordinary epistemic and doxastic symbolic systems are too idealised. Hence, those systems cannot be used to model ordinary human or human-like agents' beliefs. At best, they can describe idealised individuals. The (...)
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  • Searles verpatzte Lösung des Freiheitsproblems.Wolfgang Lenzen - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):35-68.
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