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  1. Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703.
    Whether perceptual experience represents high-level properties like causation and natural-kind in virtue of its phenomenology is an open question in philosophy of mind. While the question of high-level properties has sparked disagreement, there is widespread agreement that the sensory phenomenology of perceptual experience presents us with low-level properties like shape and color. This paper argues that the relationship between the sensory character of experience and the low-level properties represented therein is more complex than most assume. Careful consideration of mundane examples, (...)
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  • Perceptual Experience in Kant and Merleau-Ponty.Peter Antich - 2019 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (3):220-233.
    I argue that the descriptions of perceptual experience offered by Kant and Merleau-Ponty are, contrary to what many commentators suppose, largely compatible. This is because the two are simply referring to different things when they talk about experience: Kant to empirical cognition and Merleau-Ponty to perception. Consequently, while Merleau-Ponty correctly denies that Kant accurately describes the conditions for the possibility of perception, Kant nevertheless provides a plausible account of the conditions of empirical judgment. Further, the two approach experience with different (...)
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  • Merleau‐Ponty on Abstract Thought in Mathematics and Natural Science.Samantha Matherne - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):780-97.
    In this paper, I argue that in spite of suggestions to the contrary, Merleau-Ponty defends a positive account of the kind of abstract thought involved in mathematics and natural science. More specifically, drawing on both the Phenomenology of Perception and his later writings, I show that, for Merleau-Ponty, abstract thought and perception stand in the two-way relation of “foundation,” according to which abstract thought makes what we perceive explicit and determinate, and what we perceive is made to appear by abstract (...)
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