- Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment.Javiera Perez Gomez & Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):593-613.details
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Nothing at Stake in Knowledge.David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Florian Cova, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Christopher Y. Olivola, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas Lopez, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):224-247.details
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Are Intellectual Virtues Truth-Relevant?Blake Roeber - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):381-92.details
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The epistemic significance of non-epistemic factors: an introduction.Andrea Robitzsch, Nikola Kompa & Igal Kvart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-11.details
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Pragmatic encroachment, stakes, and religious knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.details
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Knowledge and the permissibility of action.N. Ángel Pinillos - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2021-2043.details
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Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution.Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, Víctor Fernández Castro, Javier González de Prado Salas & Manuel Heras–Escribano - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):409-430.details
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Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution.Eduardo P.\'Erez-Navarr, V.\'Ictor Fern\'And Castro, Javier Gonz\'ale Prado & Manuel Heras-Escribano - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):409-430.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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The epistemic significance of modal factors.Lilith Newton - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):227-248.details
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Assertion, belief, and ‘I believe’-guarded affirmation.Anders Nes - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):57-86.details
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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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The Attitude of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):678-685.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and action.Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99-118.details
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Belief: What is it Good for?John MacFarlane - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment.Matt Lutz - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1-24.details
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Implicature and non-local pragmatic encroachment.Dustin Locke - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).details
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Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.details
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Matthew Brandon Lee & Paul Silva - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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On the Arbitrariness Objection to the Threshold View.Matthew Lee - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):143-158.details
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Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5769-5790.details
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Proselytism as Epistemic Violence: A Jewish Approach to the Ethics of Religious Persuasion.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - The Monist 104 (3):376-392.details
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Practical reasons for belief without stakes☆.N. G. Laskowski & Shawn Hernandez - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):16-27.details
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The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmatics.Igal Kvart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1639-1671.details
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Resolving Bank-Type Puzzles via Action-Directed Pragmatics.Igal Kvart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-58.details
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Delimiting the Proper Scope of Epistemology.Rebecca Kukla - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):202-216.details
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Knowledge embedded.Dirk Kindermann - 2019 - Synthese (5):4035-4055.details
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Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.details
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Credence as doxastic tendency.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4495-4518.details
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Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):717–727.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):157-166.details
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A normative comparison of threshold views through computer simulations.Alice C. W. Huang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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