- The Moral Closure Argument.Matt Lutz - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (1).details
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In Defense of Deliberative Indispensability.Matt Lutz - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):118-135.details
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Background beliefs and plausibility thresholds: defending explanationist evidentialism.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2631-2647.details
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Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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The Externalist’s Demon.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):399-434.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Evidence and armchair access.Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):479-500.details
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Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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A note concerning justification and access.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):369-386.details
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Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Harold Langsam - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):79-101.details
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How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist.David Mark Kovacs - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2129-2152.details
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Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):192-204.details
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A Plea for Exemptions.Timothy Kearl - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Rationality as the Rule of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):538-559.details
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The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust.Jesper Kallestrup - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):150-174.details
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Perceptual Fundamentalism and a priori bootstrapping.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2087-2103.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Options and Diachronic Tragedy.Brian Hedden - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.details
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Accessibilism Defined.Michael Hatcher - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):1-23.details
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Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.details
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You can call me 'stupid', ... just don't call me stupid.Delia Graff Fara - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):492-501.details
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Is belief evaluation truth sensitive? A reply to Turri.D. E. Weissglass - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8521-8532.details
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Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):375-395.details
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The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
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Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285.details
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Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.details
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Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?Sinan Dogramaci - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):61-96.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
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Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).details
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Conservatism, preservationism, conservationism and mentalism.J. Comesana - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):489-492.details
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Rationality versus Normativity.John Broome - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):293-311.details
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Contextualism, skepticism, and the Gettier problem.B. Brogaard - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):367 - 386.details
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Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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The Importance of Evaluating the Perspectival.Matt Bedke & Bruno Guindon - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):132-144.details
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Luck and decision.Will Barrett - 2006 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):73–87.details
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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.details
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Approximate Coherentism and Luck.Boris Babic - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (4):707-725.details
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Reliabilism and Brains in Vats.Jon Altschul - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.details
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2019 - In John McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Walesdetails
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Internalist vs. externalist conceptions of epistemic justification.George Pappas - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscriptdetails
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.details
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Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - 2020 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.details
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