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Emotion, higher-order syntactic thoughts, and consciousness.Edmund T. Rolls - 2008 - In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 131--167.details
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Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show.Ian B. Phillips - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):381-411.details
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Creative action in mind.Peter Carruthers - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):437 - 461.details
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Rosenthal's Representationalism.Jacob Berger & Richard Brown - 2022 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Jorge Morales & Hakwan Lau - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 233-260.details
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Case study evidence for an irreducible form of knowing how to: An argument against a reductive epistemology.Garry Young - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.details
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Thought without language: Thought without awareness?Lawrence Weiskrantz - 1997 - In Thought and Language. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 127-.details
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Prime-sight and blindsight.Lawrence Weiskrantz - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):568-581.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Consciousness and Action: Does Cognitive Science Support (Mild) Epiphenomenalism?Morgan Wallhagen - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):539-561.details
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Blindsight and philosophy.Gerald Vision - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):137-59.details
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The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality.Cody Turner - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):747-774.details
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Nagel's case against physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2):91-108.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Replies to critics.Declan Smithies - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-15.details
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Perception and the external world.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.details
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Why is “blindsight” blind? A new perspective on primary visual cortex, recurrent activity and visual awareness.Juha Silvanto - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:15-32.details
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The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness.Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):459-484.details
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Conscious access overflows overt report.Claire Sergent & Geraint Rees - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):523-524.details
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The timing of conscious states.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.details
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Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.details
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Expertise and the evolution of consciousness.Matt J. Rossano - 2003 - Cognition 89 (3):207-236.details
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Common sense about qualities and senses.Peter W. Ross - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):299 - 316.details
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Neural Computations Underlying Phenomenal Consciousness: A Higher Order Syntactic Thought Theory.Edmund T. Rolls - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Perceptual experience and perceptual knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1013-1041.details
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The cost of explicit memory.Stephen E. Robbins - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):33-66.details
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Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing.Ian Phillips - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):419-451.details
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Representationalism and Blindsight.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):541-556.details
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What is so special about episodic memory: lessons from the system-experience distinction.Shen Pan - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-26.details
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The Propositional Structure of Perception.Mineki Oguchi - 2011 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (1):1-16.details
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A Map of Consciousness Studies: Questions and Approaches.Takuya Niikawa - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:530152.details
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Adaptive complexity and phenomenal consciousness.Shaun Nichols & Todd Grantham - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):648-670.details
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Threefoldness.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):163-182.details
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Methodological considerations in studying awareness during learning: Part 1: Implicit learning.Daisuke Nakamura - 2013 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 44 (1):102-117.details
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The inevitable contrast: Conscious vs. unconscious processes in action control.Ezequiel Morsella & T. Andrew Poehlman - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.details
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The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular interaction theory.Ezequiel Morsella - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.details
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Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.details
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Does Knowledge Entail Belief?Masaharu Mizumoto - 2008 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (1):59-78.details
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On Smithies’ Argument from Blindsight.Kengo Miyazono - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-6.details
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The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 Blindsight.Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:104 - 128.details
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Neural holism and free will.Daniel A. Levy - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-228.details
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Neural holism and free will.Donald Levy - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229.details
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Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.details
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Neural mechanisms of visual awareness: A linking proposition. [REVIEW]Victor A. F. Lamme - 2001 - Brain and Mind 1 (3):385-406.details
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Prefrontal lesion evidence against higher-order theories of consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.details
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The vagueness constraint and the quality space for pain.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.details
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The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind.Stan Klein - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (4):355-376.details
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