This paper is about the question of whether or not virtual rape should be considered a crime under current law. A virtual rape is the rape of an avatar in a virtual world. In the future, possibilities for virtual rape of a person him- or herself will arise in virtual reality environments involving a haptic device or robotics. As the title indicates, I will study both these present and future instances of virtual rape in light of three categories of legal (...) philosophical theories on rape in order to answer the aforementioned question. I will argue that a virtual rape in a future virtual reality environment involving a haptic device or robotics should in principle count as the crime of rape; for it corresponds to rape as it is viewed under the liberal theories that currently dominate the law. A surprising finding will be that a virtual rape in a virtual world re-actualizes the conservative view of rape that used to dominate the law in the Middle Ages and resembles rape as it is viewed under the feminist theories that criticize current law. Virtual rape in a virtual world cannot count as rape under current law; however, and at the end of this paper, I will suggest qualifying it as sexual harassment instead. (shrink)

This article analyses the definitional reforms and re-categorisation of sexual offences under the Thai Penal Code in the period of 13 years, namely, the 2007 and 2019 amendments. The incidents are of uniqueness as the 2007 amendment shared much resemblance with jurisdictions that have departed the original meaning of rape and attempted to re-conceptualise sexual offences, whereas the 2019 amendment shared much similarities with jurisdictions that decided to retain the original meaning of rape and categorise other serious sexual offences in (...) other names. The article argues that, apart from accounts based on criminal law principles, the two definitional revisions had been carried out in the environments of different legal culture and social values in the Thai legislative bodies. It appears that the 2007 amendment followed a feminist perspective that emphasises the harm of sexual offences to bodily/sexual integrity as a state for individuals to realise their personhood, while the re-categorisation of sexual offences in the 2019 amendment suggests a greater role of the feminist perspective in another camp that views penile-penetration inherently differs from non-penile penetration and implies that the law continues, to a certain extent, regulating sexuality since the 2019 amendment used the reason of “naturalness” of sexual intercourse to distinguish between penile penetration and non-penile penetration. (shrink)

The authors identify a pervasive tendency, especially in the world of development and humanitarian response, to hierarchize or prioritize certain types of victims of sexual violence in armed conflict over others. Within this broader context, they focus on what a considered feminist acknowledgement of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence should look like. On the one hand, they emphasize that one and the same patriarchal template is used to humiliate and shame male and female victims of sexual violence alike. On (...) the other, they urge that in light of the pervasiveness of patriarchal ideology and its harmful and wide-reaching social effects, the time is not yet ripe to endorse a gender-blind approach to CRSV. (shrink)

In their well-known paper, John Gardner and Stephen Shute (2000) propose a pure case of rape, in which a woman is raped while unconscious and the rape, for a variety of stipulated reasons, never comes to light. This makes the pure case a harmless case of rape, or so they argue. In this paper I show that their argument hinges on an outdated conception of trauma, one which conflates evaluative responses that arise in the aftermath of rape with the non-deliberative (...) somatic responses of a central nervous system to a threatening event. In the first part of this paper, I elaborate this objection by drawing on the neurobiological model of trauma. This gives me an opportunity to illustrate the different ways that rape harms its victims, including the central way, what I call ‘threat-circuitry harm.’ This discussion of trauma invites us to rethink the wrong of rape, and sets the groundwork for my argument, in the second part of the paper, that the wrong of rape consists in its central harm. (shrink)

We consider the complex interactions between rape culture and epistemology. A central case study is the consideration of a deferential attitude about the epistemology of sexual assault testimony. According to the deferential attitude, individuals and institutions should decline to act on allegations of sexual assault unless and until they are proven in a formal setting, i.e., a criminal court. We attack this deference from several angles, including the pervasiveness of rape culture in the criminal justice system, the epistemology of testimony (...) and norms connecting knowledge and action, the harms of tacit idealizations away from important contextual factors, and a contextualist semantics for 'knows' ascriptions. (shrink)