- A Abordagem Ecológica das Habilidades e a Epistemologia dos eixos.Carvalho Eros - 2022 - In Plinio J. Smith & Nara Figueiredo (eds.), A epistemologia dos eixos: uma introdução e debate sobre as certezas de Wittgenstein. Porto Alegre: Editora Fênix. pp. 101-123.details
|
|
Relativism, metasemantics, and the future.Derek Ball - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1036-1086.details
|
|
Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?Haicheng Zhao & Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):118-126.details
|
|
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
|
|
The conceptual nature of imaginative content.Margherita Arcangeli - 2020 - Synthese (1-2).details
|
|
Creative Imagining as Practical Knowing: an Akbariyya Account.Reza Hadisi - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (2):181-204.details
|
|
Norms of Testimony in Broad Interdisciplinarity: The Case of Quantum Mechanics in Critical Theory.Rasmus Jaksland - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):35-61.details
|
|
The ethics of believing out loud.Heather Spradley - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):1-15.details
|
|
Realism and the logic of conceivability.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3885-3902.details
|
|
Incentivizing Replication Is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust.Hugh Desmond - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):906-917.details
|
|
Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.details
|
|
Publishing without (some) belief.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):237-246.details
|
|
Conceptions of scientific progress in scientific practice: an empirical study.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2375-2394.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Boundaries of the Mind.Katalin Farkas - 2017 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 256-279.details
|
|
Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):7-23.details
|
|
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
|
|
Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
|
|
Evidential support and best explanations.Earl Conee - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):71-85.details
|
|
(1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Episteme:1-16.details
|
|
Absolutely general knowledge.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser & Beau Madison Mount - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):547-566.details
|
|
A Modest Argument Against Scepticism.Tobies Grimaltos Mascaros & Carlos J. Moya Espí - 2020 - Quaderns de Filosofia 7 (1):33-43.details
|
|
Opaque Updates.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):447-470.details
|
|
Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Value of Presence.David de Bruijn - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):319-336.details
|
|
Where Tracking Loses Traction.Mitchell Barrington - 2020 - Episteme 20 (1):1-14.details
|
|
(1 other version)Losing Confidence in Luminosity.Simon Goldstein & Daniel Waxman - 2020 - Noûs (4):1-30.details
|
|
Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
|
|
CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning.Steven James Bartlett - 2021 - Salem, USA: Studies in Theory and Behavior.details
|
|
Faith, Hope, and Justification.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 201–216.details
|
|
Preserving the interest theory of rights.Mark McBride - 2020 - Legal Theory 26 (1):3-39.details
|
|
How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College Londondetails
|
|
Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
|
|
Full and partial grounding.Kelly Trogdon & D. Gene Witmer - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):252-271.details
|
|
Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
|
|
Theory of inquiry.Christoph Kelp - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):359-384.details
|
|
Remembering the Past and Imagining the Actual.Daniel Munro - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2).details
|
|
Speech acts in mathematics.Marco Ruffino, Luca San Mauro & Giorgio Venturi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):10063-10087.details
|
|
Epistemic Pluralism.Nick Zangwill - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (4):485-498.details
|
|
The Grounds of Political Legitimacy.Fabienne Peter - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (3):372-390.details
|
|
The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
|
|
Two dogmas of empirical justification.Jack C. Lyons - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):221-237.details
|
|
Some Problems with the Anti‐Luminosity‐Argument.Wim Vanrie - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):538-559.details
|
|
(1 other version)Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
|
|
Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder.Evan Taylor - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (1):73-93.details
|
|
(4 other versions)The value of knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
|
|
A working hypothesis for the logic of radical ignorance.Vincenzo Fano & Pierluigi Graziani - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):601-616.details
|
|
Reliabilism and imprecise credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.details
|
|
Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.details
|
|
I know how I know: perception, self-awareness, self-knowledge.Andrea Giananti - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10355-10375.details
|
|