- Phenomenal Grounds of Epistemic Value.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12888.details
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Justifying Desires.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):335-349.details
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Against Interpretability: a Critical Examination of the Interpretability Problem in Machine Learning.Maya Krishnan - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (3):487-502.details
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Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios.Tim Kraft - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):269-295.details
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Bolzano on the intransparency of content.Stephan Krämer - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):189-208.details
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Belief as an act of reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.details
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Justified Group Belief, Group Knowledge and Being in a Position to Know.Jakob Koscholke - 2020 - Episteme 20 (1):1-8.details
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Options must be external.Justis Koon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1175-1189.details
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What Topic Continuity Problem?Alexander W. Kocurek - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.details
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Erratum to: Russell–Myhill and grounding.Boris Kment - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):298-298.details
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Knowledge, belief, normality, and introspection.Dominik Klein, Olivier Roy & Norbert Gratzl - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.details
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Knowledge, belief, normality, and introspection.Dominik Klein, Olivier Roy & Norbert Gratzl - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4343-4372.details
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Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.details
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A Proof‐Theoretic Account of the Miners Paradox.Ansten Klev - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):351-369.details
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Literal force : a defence of conventional assertion.Max Kölbel - 2009 - In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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The Epistemology of Folk Epistemology.Richard F. Kitchener - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):521-530.details
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Supplementives, the coordination account, and conflicting intentions.Jeffrey C. King - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):288-311.details
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Phenomenology, anti‐realism, and the knowability paradox.James Kinkaid - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1010-1027.details
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Pragmatic infallibilism.Brian Kim - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-22.details
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How to expect a surprising exam.Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3101-3133.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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What Kind of Perspectivism?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):415-443.details
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Expressivism and Mind-Dependence.Sebastian Köhler - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (6):750-764.details
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The ‘extendedness’ of scientific evidence.Eric Kerr & Axel Gelfert - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):253-281.details
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The End of Vagueness: Technological Epistemicism, Surveillance Capitalism, and Explainable Artificial Intelligence.Alison Duncan Kerr & Kevin Scharp - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32 (3):585-611.details
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On Living the Testimonial Sceptic’s Life: Can Testimonial Scepticism Be Dismissed?Arnon Keren - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):333-354.details
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Infelicitous Cancellation: The Explicit Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicature Revisited.Jonas Åkerman - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-10.details
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Savoir que l’on sait. La question de la transparence dans les attitudes épistémiques.Neil Kennedy - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):451-478.details
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Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation.Brendan Kenessey - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):204-232.details
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Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.details
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Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.details
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Familiarity inferences, subjective attitudes and counterstance contingency: towards a pragmatic theory of subjective meaning.Christopher Kennedy & Malte Willer - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1395-1445.details
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Defending the Possibility of Knowledge.Neil Kennedy - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):579-601.details
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Taking things for granted: comments on Harman and Sherman.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):141-147.details
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The knowledge norm of blaming.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):256-261.details
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Testimony by Presupposition.Paula Keller - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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Moral Assertion.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):639-649.details
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Lotteries and justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.details
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Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100.details
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In defence of virtue epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):409-433.details
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Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):298-310.details
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How to be an infallibilist.Christoph Kelp, Adam Carter & Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2675-2682.details
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Epistemology extended.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):230-252.details
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Common sense as evidence: Against revisionary ontology and skepticism.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):53-78.details
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Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.details
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Assertion: A Function First Account.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):411-442.details
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Proper functions: etiology without typehood.Geoff Keeling & Niall Paterson - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (3):1-17.details
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Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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