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Proper functions: etiology without typehood.Geoff Keeling & Niall Paterson - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (3):1-17.details
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Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 49 (2):235-252.details
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Evidentialism and the Problem of Basic Competence.Timothy Kearl - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Autonomy, agency, and the value of enduring beliefs.Jason Kawall - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 107-129.details
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The pragmatics of transparent belief reports.Antti Kauppinen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):438-446.details
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Realism and the logic of conceivability.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3885-3902.details
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A Rational Agent With Our Evidence.Dominik Kauss - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Expressivism about knowledge and the value of knowledge.Klemens Kappel - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):175-194.details
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Is Evidence Knowledge?Juan Comesaña & Holly Kantin - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):447-454.details
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Plato on the Attribution of Conative Attitudes.Rachana Kamtekar - 2006 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (2):127-162.details
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Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.details
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The myth of true lies.Jesper Kallestrup - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):451-466.details
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What’s the matter with Huck Finn?Hrishikesh Joshi - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):70-87.details
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What Norm of Assertion?Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):51-67.details
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Knowledge and the norms of assertion.John Koethe - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):625-638.details
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Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Luminosity in the stream of consciousness.David Jenkins - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1549-1562.details
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Knowing Our Own Hearts: Self‐Reporting and the Science of Love.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):226-242.details
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Knowledge and Explanation.C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):137-164.details
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Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.details
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Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.details
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Eyewitness evaluation through inference to the best explanation.Hylke Jellema - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-29.details
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Representing as Adapting.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.details
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Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox.Tomasz Jarmużek, Krzysztof Krawczyk & Rafał Palczewski - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):291-313.details
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Intentionalism and change blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.details
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Hallucinating real things.Steven P. James - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3711-3732.details
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Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.details
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Norms of Testimony in Broad Interdisciplinarity: The Case of Quantum Mechanics in Critical Theory.Rasmus Jaksland - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):35-61.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-19.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese 198 (S8):1981-1999.details
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Contextualism and the knowledge norm of assertion.Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):491-498.details
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Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Truth and Falsity in Communication: Assertion, Denial, and Interpretation.Kensuke Ito - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):1-18.details
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The problems of transformative experience.Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1065-1084.details
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Updating without evidence.Yoaav Isaacs & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):576-599.details
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Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.details
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Duty and knowledge.Yoaav Isaacs - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):95-110.details
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Decision Theory without Luminosity.Yoaav Isaacs & Benjamin A. Levinstein - forthcoming - Mind:fzad037.details
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Mind‐wandering: A philosophical guide.Zachary C. Irving & Aaron Glasser - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1):e12644.details
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The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients.Paul O. Irikefe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-29.details
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A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem.Paul Oghenovo Irikefe - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):840-867.details
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