- Deflating truth about taste.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):389-402.details
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Does Roush show that evidence should be probable?Damien Fennell & Nancy Cartwright - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):289 - 310.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Objects of Thought? On the Usual Way Out of Prior’s Objection to the Relational Theory of Propositional Attitude Sentences.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):438-444.details
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Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.details
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What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought.Davide Fassio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1523-1544.details
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Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3459-3480.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (3):497-525.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity.Davide Fassio - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1084-1106.details
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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
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Seemings and Moore’s Paradox.R. M. Farley - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Knowability and the capacity to know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.details
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Indiscriminability and the sameness of appearance.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.details
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Gnostic Disagreement Norms.Domingos Faria - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A2)5-22.details
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A hard look at moral perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.details
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Critical study of John Hawthorne's knowledge and lotteries and Jason Stanley's knowledge and practical interests. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):178-192.details
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A working hypothesis for the logic of radical ignorance.Vincenzo Fano & Pierluigi Graziani - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):601-616.details
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Deceiving versus manipulating: An evidence‐based definition of deception.Don Fallis - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Against cognitive homelessness.J. C. Espejo-Serna - 2019 - Humanitas Hodie 2 (1):h214.details
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Disagreement and inconsistency: a problem for orthodox expressivism.John Eriksson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-17.details
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El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Ángeles Eraña & Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 51:9-36.details
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Why group mental states are not exhaustively determined by member states.Brian Epstein - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):417-433.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding.David Enoch, Talia Fisher & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):85-103.details
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Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love.N. L. Engel-Hawbecker - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-214.details
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Logical reasons.Pascal Engel - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.details
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In what sense is knowledge the Norm of assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.details
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Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge.Mylan Engel - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):33-56.details
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The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
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Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.details
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Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1481-1505.details
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Question-embedding and factivity.Paul Egré - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):85-125.details
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The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):837-852.details
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Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):375-395.details
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The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
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I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid.Andy Egan & Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):77–93.details
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Exploring Scientific Inquiry via Agent-Based Modelling.Dunja Šešelja - 2021 - Perspectives on Science 29 (4):537-557.details
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Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.details
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Epistemic Warrants and Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Perception.James Edwards & Dimitris Platchias - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:343-364.details
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Can pluralism account for the normativity of truth?Douglas Edwards - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):403-414.details
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Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1361-1378.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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Transmission of warrant-failure and the notion of epistemic analyticity.Philip A. Ebert - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):505 – 521.details
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Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
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Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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