- Inference and Epistemic Transparency.Gabriele Usberti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (3):517-530.details
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Collecting truths: A paradox in two guises.Eric Updike - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (3):156-173.details
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The edenic theory of reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):276-308.details
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Understanding and the Norm of Explanation.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1171-1175.details
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Unreliable Knowledge.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):529-545.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.details
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Selfless assertions: some empirical evidence.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (4):1221-1233.details
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Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias.John Turri - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.details
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Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory.John Turri - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.details
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Prompting challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.details
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Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):385-392.details
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Knowledge, certainty, and assertion.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):293-299.details
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Knowledge Guaranteed.John Turri - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):602-612.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.details
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Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking.John Turri & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):615-634.details
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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.details
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Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.details
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Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology.John Turri - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1495-1501.details
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The two faces of compatibility with justified beliefs.Tero Tulenheimo - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):15-30.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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Scorekeeping trolls.William Tuckwell & Kai Tanter - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):215-224.details
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On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3311-3328.details
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If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.details
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Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of Assertion.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):264-270.details
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Full and partial grounding.Kelly Trogdon & D. Gene Witmer - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):252-271.details
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Strengthened, and weakened, by belief.Tue Trinh - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 47 (1):37-76.details
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Membership and knowledge. Scientific research as a group activity.Silvia Tossut - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):349-367.details
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Wondering about the future.Stephan Torre - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2449-2473.details
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Implicit Bias: from social structure to representational format.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1):41-60.details
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Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1529-1547.details
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Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge.Brett Topey - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4415-4436.details
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Saving Sensitivity.Brett Topey - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):177-196.details
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Being Familiar with What One Wants.Uku Tooming - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):690-710.details
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A defense of parrying responses to the generality problem.Jeffrey Tolly - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1935-1957.details
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One’s own reasoning.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):208-232.details
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Continuing on.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):670-691.details
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The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.details
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Knowledge and Belief: Comparative Approach.Seniye Tilev - 2022 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):91-106.details
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Disproportional mental causation.Justin T. Tiehen - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):375-391.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.details
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McDowell on Transcendental Arguments, Scepticism and “Error Theory”.Alan Thomas - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):109-124.details
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External world scepticism and self scepticism.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):591-607.details
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Closure Scepticism and The Vat Argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2017 - Mind 127 (507):667-690.details
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Atomic event concepts in perception, action and belief.Lucas Thorpe - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):110-127.details
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Has the ethics of belief been brought back on the right track? [REVIEW]Mark Textor - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):123-142.details
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Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
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Selfless assertions and the Knowledge Norm.Nicholas Tebben - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-20.details
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