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  1. On the Immorality of Tattoos.Matej Cíbik - 2020 - Journal of Ethics 24 (2):193-206.
    Tattoos are widely regarded as morally neutral, and the decision to have them as carrying no ethical implications. The aim of this paper is to question this assumption. I argue that decisions to have tattoos involve risks that are not merely prudential—they are normative. The argument starts with a thesis that the power we presently have over our lives is constrained by the need to respect our future selves. If we make a discretionary choice that disregards our future interests and (...)
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  • More Than A Feeling: The Communicative Function of Regret.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):664-681.
    Rüdiger Bittner argues that regret is not useful and so it is always unreasonable to feel and express it. In this paper, I argue that regret is often reasonable because regret has a communicative function: it communicates where we stand with respect to things we have done and outcomes that we have caused. So, I not only argue that Bittner’s argument is unsuccessful, I also shed light on the nature and purpose of regret.
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  • Analyzing Ethical Conflict in the Transracial Adoption Debate: Three Conflicts Involving Community.Janet Farrell Smith - 1996 - Hypatia 11 (2):1 - 33.
    This essay explores ethical conflicts underlying the discourse of the policy debate about transracial adoption, focusing on the adoption of Black children by whites. Three underlying conflicts are analyzed, namely, the values of equality versus community, interracial community versus multiculturalism, individuality versus racial-ethnic community. The essay concludes with observations on multicultural families.
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  • The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
    This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work . In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a (...)
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  • Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck.David Enoch - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):372-386.
    Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in effect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained - and so presumably explained away - as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical significance (...)
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  • The Moral Problem of Risk Impositions: A Survey of the Literature.Jonathan Wolff Madeleine Hayenhjelm - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E26-E51.
    This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total (...)
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  • Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.
    How is the problem of free will related to the problem of moral luck? In this essay, I answer that question and outline a new solution to the paradox of moral luck, the source-paradox solution. This solution both explains why the paradox arises and why moral luck does not exist. To make my case, I highlight a few key connections between the paradox of moral luck and two related problems, namely the problem of free will and determinism and the paradox (...)
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  • Luck for Moral Luck?Samuel Laves - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-12.
    In their article “No Luck for Moral Luck”, the authors claim to have dissolved the philosophical puzzle of resultant moral luck through empirical studies that show that people do not judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently. In this paper, I will argue that one can accept the results of their experiment and still uphold the puzzle of resultant moral luck. In order to do so, I will first turn to Machery’s suggestion that implicit biases should be viewed as (...)
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  • “Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way”.Paul Russell - 2017 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. Pp. 159-79..
    In the third and final part of his A Theory of Determinism (TD) Ted Honderich addresses the fundamental question concerning “the consequences of determinism.” The critical question he aims to answer is what follows if determinism is true? This question is, of course, intimately bound up with the problem of free will and, in particular, with the question of whether or not the truth of determinism is compatible or incompatible with the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility. It is (...)
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  • Surviving Long‐Term Mass Atrocities1.Claudia Card - 2012 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):35-52.
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  • Compensation as Moral Repair and as Moral Justification for Risks.Madeleine Hayenhjelm - 2019 - Ethics, Politics, and Society 2 (1):33-63.
    Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act? On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoring the moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is that it is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act of punishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potential of compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between apologetic compensation and non-apologetic (...)
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  • Ewaluacyjne i egzystencjalne aspekty trafu moralnego.Wojciech Lewandowski - 2019 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 67 (2):141-168.
    Fenomen szczęścia stanowi problem dla etyki z dwóch powodów. Po pierwsze, utrudnia sformułowanie jednorodnych sądów moralnych dla dwóch lub więcej działań, które wydają się do siebie podobne w każdym moralnie istotnym aspekcie, z wyjątkiem niektórych udanych lub niefortunnych zdarzeń, które mają miejsce w jednym przypadku, a w drugim nie. Wystąpienie tych zdarzeń nie było pod kontrolą żadnego z agentów, ale dla zewnętrznych obserwatorów wydaje się być podstawą bardziej rygorystycznego lub bardziej tolerancyjnego osądu moralnego w jednym przypadku, a w drugim nie. (...)
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  • Spacetime Gaps and the Persistence of Objects Through Time.Thomas K. Javoroski - unknown
    When we begin to investigate the persistence of objects through time, we find immediately that the sort of concerns embodied in Leibniz's Law cause philosophers to divide themselves into the two major camps of Purdurantists and Endurantists. What is required according to each for a given object at a given time to be identified with a given object at another time is held to be dramatically different, even while both often look to the same general sort of indicators for their (...)
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  • First Acts, Last Acts, and Abandonment.David O. Brink - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (2):114-123.
    This contribution reconstructs and assesses Gideon Yaffe’s claims in his book Attempts about what constitutes an attempt, what can count as evidence that an attempt has been made, whether abandonment is a genuine defense, and whether attempts should be punished less severely than completed crimes. I contrast Yaffe’s account of being motivated by an intention and the completion of an attempt in terms of the truth of the completion counterfactual with an alternative picture of attempts as temporally extended decision trees (...)
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  • Expecting Bad Luck.Lisa Tessman - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (1):9-28.
    This paper draws on Claudia Card’s discussions of moral luck to consider the complicated moral life of people—described as pessimists—who accept the heavy knowledge of the predictability of the bad moral luck of oppression. The potential threat to ethics posed by this knowledge can be overcome by the pessimist whose resistance to oppression, even in the absence of hope, expresses a sense of still having a ‘‘claim’’ on flourishing despite its unattainability under oppression.
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  • More Work for Hard Incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.
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  • Free Will and Open Alternatives.Carlos J. Moya - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):167-191.
    In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom are motivated by (...)
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  • Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):528-554.
    What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: (...)
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  • The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.
    Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the (...)
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  • Less Blame, Less Crime? The Practical Implications of Moral Responsibility Skepticism.Neil Levy - 2015 - Journal of Practical Ethics 3 (2):1-17.
    Most philosophers believe that wrongdoers sometimes deserve to be punished by long prison sentences. They also believe that such punishments are justified by their consequences: they deter crime and incapacitate potential offenders. In this article, I argue that both these claims are false. No one deserves to be punished, I argue, because our actions are shot through with direct or indirect luck. I also argue that there are good reasons to think that punishing fewer people and much less harshly will (...)
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  • Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.
    Every account of moral responsibility has conditions that distinguish between the consequences, actions, or traits that warrant praise or blame and those that do not. One intuitive condition is that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness cannot be affected by luck, that is, by factors beyond the agent’s control. Several philosophers build their accounts of moral responsibility on this luck-free condition, and we may call their views Luck-Free Moral Responsibility (LFMR). I offer moral and metaphysical arguments against LFMR. First, I maintain that considerations (...)
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  • Victims, Vectors and Villains: Are Those Who Opt Out of Vaccination Morally Responsible for the Deaths of Others?Euzebiusz Jamrozik, Toby Handfield & Michael J. Selgelid - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics (12):762-768.
    Mass vaccination has been a successful public health strategy for many contagious diseases. The immunity of the vaccinated also protects others who cannot be safely or effectively vaccinated—including infants and the immunosuppressed. When vaccination rates fall, diseases like measles can rapidly resurge in a population. Those who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons are at the highest risk of severe disease and death. They thus may bear the burden of others' freedom to opt out of vaccination. It is often asked (...)
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  • Neuromoral Diversity: Individual, Gender, and Cultural Differences in the Ethical Brain.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11.
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  • When Do Circumstances Excuse? Moral Prejudices and Beliefs About the True Self Drive Preferences for Agency-Minimizing Explanations.Simon Cullen - 2018 - Cognition 180:165-181.
    When explaining human actions, people usually focus on a small subset of potential causes. What leads us to prefer certain explanations for valenced actions over others? The present studies indicate that our moral attitudes often predict our explanatory preferences far better than our beliefs about how causally sensitive actions are to features of the actor's environment. Study 1 found that high-prejudice participants were much more likely to endorse non-agential explanations of an erotic same-sex encounter, such as that one of the (...)
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  • The Indeterminacy Paradox: Character Evaluations and Human Psychology.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):1–42.
    You may not know me well enough to evaluate me in terms of my moral character, but I take it you believe I can be evaluated: it sounds strange to say that I am indeterminate, neither good nor bad nor intermediate. Yet I argue that the claim that most people are indeterminate is the conclusion of a sound argument—the indeterminacy paradox—with two premises: (1) most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations); (2) (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility, Technology, and Experiences of the Tragic: From Kierkegaard to Offshore Engineering.Mark Coeckelbergh - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):35-48.
    The standard response to engineering disasters like the Deepwater Horizon case is to ascribe full moral responsibility to individuals and to collectives treated as individuals. However, this approach is inappropriate since concrete action and experience in engineering contexts seldom meets the criteria of our traditional moral theories. Technological action is often distributed rather than individual or collective, we lack full control of the technology and its consequences, and we lack knowledge and are uncertain about these consequences. In this paper, I (...)
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  • On Moral Understanding.David Levy - 2004 - Dissertation, University of London
    I provide an explanation of moral understanding. I begin by describing decisions, es- pecially moral ones. I detail ways in which deviations from an ideal of decision-making occur. I link deviations to characteristic critical judgments, e.g. being cavalier, banal, coura- geous, etc. Moral judgments are among these and carry a particular personal gravity. The question I entertain in following chapters is: how do they carry this gravity? In answering the question, I try “external” accounts of moral understanding. I distin- guish (...)
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  • Responsibility for Crashes of Autonomous Vehicles: An Ethical Analysis.Alexander Hevelke & Julian Nida-Rümelin - 2015 - Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (3):619-630.
    A number of companies including Google and BMW are currently working on the development of autonomous cars. But if fully autonomous cars are going to drive on our roads, it must be decided who is to be held responsible in case of accidents. This involves not only legal questions, but also moral ones. The first question discussed is whether we should try to design the tort liability for car manufacturers in a way that will help along the development and improvement (...)
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  • Forgiveness and Moral Development.Paula Satne - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1029-1055.
    Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining (...)
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  • Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck.Mark Silcox - 2006 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.
    Thomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy for explaining (...)
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  • Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception.Joseph E. Corbi - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):61-80.
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  • Voluntad y responsabilidad moral.Sergi Rosell - 2013 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 38 (1):121-138.
    In this article I argue against the idea that actions are to be morally judged only for the motive or intention out of which the agent performed or intended to perform the action. Particularly, I put forward different cases by which I discuss the contrast between will or intention and consequences; between negligence and decisions under uncertainty, and outcomes; between deliberate and inadvertent acts; and between intention and action; aiming to show the additional role played by each pair’s second element (...)
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  • Logical Luck.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):319-334.
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  • Consequentialism and Rational Choice: Lessons From the Allais Paradox.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
    This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected (...)
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  • Making Moral Decisions.Holly M. Smith - 1988 - Noûs 22 (1):89-108.
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  • Simon on Luck and Desert in Sport: A Review and Some Comments.Sigmund Loland - 2016 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (1):15-25.
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  • Naturalized Epistemology, Morality, and the Real World.Louise M. Antony - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):103-137.
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  • On Winning and Athletic Superiority.Nicholas Dixon - 1999 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 26 (1):10-26.
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  • Sports and “The Fragility of Goodness”.Jeffrey P. Fry - 2004 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 31 (1):34-46.
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  • Feminist Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and Moral Luck.Marilyn Friedman - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (1):29 - 40.
    Can men who dominate women nevertheless be happy or lead flourishing lives? Building on Claudia Card's exploration of moral luck, this paper considers the belief that male dominators cannot be happy. The discussion ranges over both virtue theory and empirical research into the "belief in a just world." I conclude that there are reasons to avoid believing that male dominators cannot be happy or flourish, and that feminism does not need that belief.
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  • Climate Change, Individual Emissions and Agent-Regret.Toby Svoboda - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):84-89.
    Some philosophers are skeptical that individuals are morally blameworthy for their own greenhouse gas emissions. Although an individual’s emissions may contribute to climate change that is on the whole very harmful, perhaps that contribution is too trivial to render it morally impermissible. Against this view, there have been attempts to show that an individual’s lifetime emissions cause non-trivial harm, but in this paper I will consider what follows if it is true that an individual is not blameworthy for her emissions. (...)
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  • Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s Wrongs and Crimes.Derk Pereboom - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):439-454.
    In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros argues that wrongdoers acquire special duties to those they’ve wronged, and from there he generates wrongdoers’ duties to contribute to general deterrence by being punished. In support, he contends that my manipulation argument against compatibilism fails to show that causal determination is incompatible with the proposed duties wrongdoers owe to those they’ve wronged. I respond that I did not intend my manipulation argument to rule out a sense of moral responsibility that features such duties, (...)
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  • The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of Double Effect.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.
    The classical principle of double effect offers permissibility conditions for actions foreseen to lead to evil outcomes. I shall argue that certain kinds of closeness cases, as well as general heuristic considerations about the order of explanation, lead us to replace the intensional concept of intention with the extensional concept of accomplishment in double effect.
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  • A New Mixed View of Virtue Ethics, Based on Daniel Doviak’s New Virtue Calculus.Michelle Ciurria - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):259-269.
    In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics , Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a person can do the right thing for the wrong reason, (...)
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  • Risk and Distributive Justice: The Case of Regulating New Technologies.Maria Paola Ferretti - 2010 - Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (3): 501-515.
    There are certain kinds of risk for which governments, rather than individual actors, are increasingly held responsible. This article discusses how regulatory institutions can ensure an equitable distribution of risk between various groups such as rich and poor, and present and future generations. It focuses on cases of risk associated with technological and biotechnological innovation. After discussing various possibilities and difficulties of distribution, this article proposes a non-welfarist understanding of risk as a burden of cooperation.
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  • Why Epistemologists Are so Down on Their Luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.
    It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from (...)
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  • Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti- luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck. Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti- luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.
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  • Hypothetical Retrospection.Sven Ove Hansson - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):145-157.
    Moral theory has mostly focused on idealized situations in which the morally relevant properties of human actions can be known beforehand. Here, a framework is proposed that is intended to sharpen moral intuitions and improve moral argumentation in problems involving risk and uncertainty. Guidelines are proposed for a systematic search of suitable future viewpoints for hypothetical retrospection. In hypothetical retrospection, a decision is evaluated under the assumption that one of the branches of possible future developments has materialized. This evaluation is (...)
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  • Hegel on Purpose.Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis - 2019 - Hegel Bulletin 40 (3):444-463.
    In this paper we propose a new interpretation of Hegel's views on action and responsibility, defending it against its most plausible exegetical competitors.1 Any exposition of Hegel will face both terminological and substantive challenges, and so we place, from the outset, some interpretative constraints. The paper divides into two parts. In part one, we point out that Hegel makes a number of distinctions which any sensible account of responsibility should indeed make. Our aim here is to show that Hegel at (...)
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  • In and Out of the Ethical: The Realist Liberalism of Bernard Williams.Richard Flathman - 2010 - Contemporary Political Theory 9 (1):77-98.
    In his later writings, the British philosopher Bernard Williams increasingly turned his attentions to issues concerning practical politics and in political theory. He advanced a moderately sceptical and realist liberalism that features distinctive views concerning the appropriate relations among moral, ethical and political theory, and concerning legitimacy, freedom and equality, and democracy. This article examines these and related features of his thinking and locates them in the context of currently influential formulations of liberalism.
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