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In previous research, Schopenhauer is regarded as a consistent representative of a classical picture theory of language. The paper shows, however, that Schopenhauer does not only present a use theory of meaning in his lectures on logic, but also justifies it with the help of the context principle. Furthermore, it is discussed to what extent Schopenhauer's use theory of meaning is similar to the semantic theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein and his successors. |
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This essay argues that there is room for a third position between moral particularism and moral generalism in their orthodox forms. The view proposed in this essay is inspired by the later Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and holds that formulations of ethical principles can be interpreted as grammatical statements, while ethical problems can be interpreted as instances of grammatical tension. On this reading, situations in which ethical principles turn out to conflict come out as moments in the evolution of language. (...) |
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The article deals with Cantor’s diagonal argument and its alleged philosophical consequences such as that there are more reals than integers and, hence, that some of the reals must be independent of language because the totality of words and sentences is always count-able. My claim is that the main flaw of the argument for the existence of non-nameable objects or truths lies in a very superficial understanding of what a name or representation actually is. |
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Computation and formalization are not modalities of pure abstractive operations. The essay tries to revise the assumption of the constitutive nonsensuality of the formal. The argument is that formalization is a kind of linear spatialization, which has significant visual dimensions. Thus, a connection can be discovered between visualization by figurative graphism and formalization by symbolic calculations: Both use spatial relations not only to represent but also to operate on epistemic, nonspatial, nonvisual entities. Descartes was one of the pioneers of using (...) |
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The paper aims at recovering some epistemological issues in the debate between Putnam and Habermas about the objectivity of values. To begin with, I take up some discussions in philosophy of language and pragmatism in order to develop a framework according to which it is possible a less unilateral comprehension of the relation between naturalism and the normativity of ‘life forms’ (1). This account attempts to contextualize the Habermas /Putnam debate. Then I summarize Putnamt’s positions (2). Thirdly, after pointing out (...) |
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Algumas discussões contemporâneas têm sido bastante influenciadas pela teoria hegeliana da normatividade. Gostaria de propor aqui uma leitura da Introdução à Filosofia do Direito fortemente inspirada na ideia de uma ontologia social constituída pela autoridade normativa das práticas compartilhadas, salientando as diretrizes hegelianas em debates contemporâneos na filosofia prática e na teoria social. Primeiramente, procuro acessar a teoria hegeliana da liberdade como respostas ao desafio moderno de se pensar a autodeterminação de maneira unilateral. Em seguida, procuro compreender a noção hegeliana (...) |
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O artigo procura mostrar que os chamados “Absurdos de Moore” (asserções do tipo “Está chovendo, mas eu não acredito que esteja” são o resultado do desrespeito aos princípios epistemológicos assumidos pelo próprio Moore. Além disso, ele apresenta um modo de dissolver os absurdos através da análise filosófica de Wittgenstein da crença e do conhecimento. A motivação para elaborar esse trabalho é a de descobrir se existe, como alguns comentadores sugerem, algum problema ético relacionado com o suposto paradoxo, por exemplo, uma (...) |
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