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The fracture in self-awareness

In Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity: Central Topics in Phenomenology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 21--40 (1998)

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  1. Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (1):13-25.
    The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.
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  • Food for thought.J. G. Taylor - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):421-424.
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  • Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore (...)
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  • The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
    In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible (...)
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  • Self and consciousness.Dan Zahavi - 2000 - In Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 55-74.
    In his recent book ‘Kant and the Mind’ Andrew Brook makes a distinction between two types of selfawareness. The first type, which he calls empirical self-awareness, is an awareness of particular psychological states such as perceptions, memories, desires, bodily sensations etc. One attains this type of self-awareness simply by having particular experiences and being aware of them. To be in possession of empirical self-awareness is, in short, simply to be conscious of one’s occurrent experience. The second type of self-awareness he (...)
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  • Phenomenological dimensions of bodily self–consciousness.Dorothée Legrand - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 204--227.
    This article examines the multi-dimensions of bodily self-consciousness. It explains the distinction between the self-as-subject and the self-as-object and argues that each act of consciousness is adequately characterized by two modes of givenness. These are the intentional mode of givenness by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects and the subjective mode by which the subject is conscious of intentional objects as experienced by him. It clarifies the relationship of these modes of givenness to the transitivity and non-transitivity of (...)
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  • Is Mental Illness a Form of Violence Against the Self? Notes on Ego Disintegration in Schizophrenia.Cătălina Condruz - 2020 - Human Studies 43 (2):171-193.
    This article seeks to provide a phenomenological inquiry into schizophrenia through which I propose to bring to the fore the mental violence exercised against the self in the case of a psychotic patient. My main aim is to show that a phenomenological analysis of mental illness, interpreted as a disintegration of the ego, can be very fruitful for understanding violence in general because it raises fundamental questions concerning intersubjectivity, intentionality, and self-awareness. In order to accomplish this objective, I will take (...)
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  • The Transcendence of the Ego in Continental Philosophy — Convergences and Divergences.Stathis Livadas - 2019 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 8 (2):573-601.
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  • On the naturalizing of phenomenology.Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):365-79.
    In the attempt to construct a scientific approach to consciousness, it has been proposed that transcendental phenomenology or phenomenological psychology be introduced into the framework of cognitive neuroscience. In this article, the consequences of such an approach in terms of basic assumptions, methods for the collection of data, and evaluation of the collected data are discussed. Especially, the proposed notions of mutual constraint and the second perso are discussed. It is concluded that even though naturalising of phenomenology might not prove (...)
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  • Michel Henry and the phenomenology of the invisible.Dan Zahavi - 1999 - Continental Philosophy Review 32 (3):223-240.
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  • What can self-disorders in schizophrenia tell us about the nature of subjectivity? A psychopathological investigation.Helene Stephensen & Josef Parnas - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):629-642.
    The purpose of this article is to show how schizophrenia, understood as a distortion of the most intimate structures of subjectivity, illustrates the nature of subjectivity as such, while at the same time how philosophical considerations may help to understand schizophrenia. More precisely, schizophrenic experiences of self-alienation seem to reflect a congealing or concretization of a form of differentiation or potential alterity implicit in the dynamic nature of subjectivity. In other words, we propose that the structure of subjectivity includes potential (...)
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