

HEIDEGGER'S 1924 CLEARING OF THE AFFECTS USING ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*, BOOK II

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In *Being and Time*, Heidegger famously notes that the analysis of the affects (*pathē*) has taken barely one step forward since book II of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (H139).¹

The occasion for this reengagement with the possibility of a "step forward" is the availability of Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Marburg in 1924 on the *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. This course, which includes a detailed analysis of book II of the *Rhetoric*, has been published as volume 18 of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (2002) and just translated (2009).² Here Heidegger's penetrating but sparse remarks in *Being and Time* on *Befindlichkeit* ["affectivity"] are deepened and implemented in his reading of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

The relevance of this reengagement is direct. The dominant view of the affects in contemporary philosophy is arguably the position that affects are an unclearly expressed proposition, including the cognitively articulated propositional attitude. The position of this essay is that the modern propositional account of the affects is cleared away by and does not survive a reading of Heidegger's volume 18 on book II of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Lest someone think this is a trivial matter, the long and distinguished tradition going back to the Stoics, in which affects are indistinct cognitions that require clarification, is well articulated in modern times by Anthony Kenny and then in Martha Nussbaum's monumental *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*.³

Nussbaum's position, in particular, is highly nuanced, and it is an oversimplification to say that she is merely a cognitivist about the affects (emotions), pure and simple. One can get to a cognitivist account in at least two ways: first, bottom up, by saying that affects are unclear cognitions ("thoughts"); alternatively, one can redefine the boundary between affectivity and cognition top down such that thinking becomes infused with affection—pardon the expression, more "touchy-feely"—

that is, affects feedback into thought and enable the eruptions of thought of the kind that produce paradigm shifts in science, creativity in art, and personality transformation in therapy. These eruptions are a function of the affectivity of thinking. The boundary is transgressed not only from affectivity to cognition, but in the reverse direction as well, yielding a quality of thought that is densely suffused with an emotional tonality such as that exemplified in musicality. Nevertheless, I shall include Nussbaum's contribution as belonging to the cognitivist approach because, ultimately, even if she is able to translate partially between the two, she fights continuously against the incommensurability of thoughts and affects. In fact, Heidegger explicitly warns against the second, top down account—any cognitive determining of *Befindlichkeit* is confused with surrendering science ontically to feeling (H138).

Rhetoric is the art of doing things with words, even in a performative sense of speaking a world of commitments into existence in the community (*polis*), and Heidegger gives matters a strikingly innovative twist. The horizon of this speaking turns out to be acoustics—hearing. The work of rhetoric is speaking and listening to one another about what matters: "rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in which the self-interpretation of being-there [existence] is explicitly fulfilled. Rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there [existence], the hermeneutic of being-there itself" (1924: 76). Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is for those speakers and listeners—like Heidegger and his audience—whose existence is an issue for them. The three major distinctions or *pisteis* (views) of the *Rhetoric* are engaged: character (*ēthos*), affect (*pathos*), and speech (*logos*). While the *pathē* in which the world is disclosed as mattering to human being ultimately cannot be completely articulated and exhausted by *ēthos* or *logos* (or *nous*), diverse domains of relatedness are available where our being-with-one-another

shows up in the speaking and acting in the *polis*, where “polis” is used in the broad sense of engaging with one another as members of the same human community (1924: 72) of agents and doers.⁴

The distinction “*Befindlichkeit*”—how one finds oneself situated affectively—does not occur in volume 18 as an explicit distinction, but is in the background. But reading the texts from this volume as modern readers, we cannot help but bring distinctions such as *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, *Auslegung*, and *Rede* from the existential analytic of Dasein to our reading. It requires an effort of the imagination to momentarily quarantine such distinctions, which would only first formally occur explicitly in *Being and Time*, to appreciate the originality, power, and perhaps even shock of Heidegger’s interpretation as it must have sounded in 1924 to those hearing his lectures in the class for the first time. Consider:

These *pathe*, “affects,” are not states pertaining to ensouled things, but are concerned with a disposition of living things in their world, in the mode of being positioned towards something, allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects play a fundamental role in the determination of being-in-the-world, of being-with-and-towards-others. (1924: 83)

Affects determine being-in-the-world and being-with-and-towards-others. Affects show up as “making a difference,” as “mattering.” This “making a difference” is what it means when Heidegger says the *Befindlichkeit*—his terminology for the complex of moods, emotions, sensations, passions, and the felt aspects of existence—is that out of which something in the world (already) matters to an individual’s existence (Heidegger 1927: H137–38).⁵ Individual human existence is not merely or purely spontaneous. Dasein is not only or always the cause. Rather, Dasein is also at the effect of circumstances—and, thus, affected. Dasein is at the effect of its affects, which disclose the world, its situation and Dasein in it. Affects deliver Dasein over to such contingency—thrownness and the related facticity. The situation disclosed in affectivity is the source of what makes the context engage the individual in such a way that it matters to the individual. The source of how and why the sit-

uation makes a difference gets disclosed to Dasein initially in affectivity.

Befindlichkeit emerges from *pathē* in the broad sense of the way that human existence is over-taken, seized, overcome, by the world. Heidegger makes good use of Aristotle’s language here:

Speaking precisely, I cannot say that the soul hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say that the human being hopes, is brave. . . . “To say that the soul gets angry is the same as wanting to say that the soul builds a house. It would be better to say not that the soul has pity or learns or believes something, but that the human being does *tē psychē*” [*De Anima* Γ 4, 408b11 sqq.].... Therefore, the *pathē* are not “psychic experiences,” are not “in consciousness,” but are a being-taken of human beings in their full being-in-the-world. That is expressed by the fact that the whole, the full occurrence-context, which is found in this happening, in being-taken, belong to the *pathe*. The so-called “bodily state” of anxiety, joy, and so forth, are not symptoms, but also belong to the characteristic being of beings, of human beings. (Heidegger 1924: 133)

The text does at least three things. First, Heidegger’s anti-psychologism in the modern representational sense is in full evidence. More on this shortly. Second, the text shows Heidegger less neglectful of the physical (organic) body than he is usually regarded. The “bodily state” in which anxiety (fear) or joy is expressed in facial features or physical gestures are *not* symptoms of hidden, underlying *pathē*. They are the very being of the *pathē* themselves—nothing is hidden, though, of course, not displaying an affect is always a privative and derivative option. The fear is immediately available and present in the wide eyes and grimace—the joy in the laughing eyes and smile. Third, the text provides the “being taken of human beings in their full being in the world” as a precursor to thrownness—the “that it is and has to be.” “Being taken” is a kind of inside out “thrownness.” This text yields the full sense of *Befindlichkeit* when combined with the above-cited text on how our affectivity determines (even subordinates) our beliefs and cognitions to the mattering disclosed to Dasein.

Just as a *Befindlichkeit* can be articulated in a diversity of possibilities, interpretations, and expressions in speech, no one of which is intrinsically superior to the other, likewise an affect can be articulated—one might say “translated”—into a variety of different apophantic propositions expressing declarative content. But the translation is incomplete and indeterminate. Something escapes. That something is precisely the way in which the *Befindlichkeit* and the affect as a derivative form thereof make the world matter to us as individual *Dasein*. It is the difference between a piece of information “I am afraid of the snake” and the immediate reaction, for example, in which a certain Charles Darwin, visiting the snake house at the zoo, literally jerked his head backwards when the cobra, safely contained behind the glass, struck directly at him. The pattern is the same even with those reactions that are not hard-coded reflexes but rather a function of the social pretences and colonization of the notorious *das Man*—the inauthentic but seemingly inescapable “the one” (the “they self”)—in our comportment, behavior, and relatedness (distractedness).

While it is an over-simplification, the three *pisteis* (views) of the *Rhetoric* into *ēthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*, correspond to the interrelated distinctions of *Verstehen*, *Befindlichkeit*, and *Rede* in the existential analysis of *Being and Time*. The first correlation (*ēthos* ~ *Verstehen*) is perhaps the most controversial association and arguably the least relevant either to Heidegger’s thesis in volume 18 or to ours in this essay. However, one can get a sense of how well the correlation fits in that *ēthos* (character) is the source of *phronēsis* and the “most decisive positive possibility” that the speaker has at his disposal (1924: 112). Character is a “possibility engine” for the speaker, percolating up significant and relevant insights, to persuade and enroll others in a possibility and project of implementing the possibility by being an example of integrity and openness for possibility. The speaker wins over the audience to her (or his) belief, not only by logic and a passionate delivery but, just as significantly, by who she is as a possibility, exemplifying integrity and trustworthiness of character.

Turning to the *pathē*, according to Heidegger, the analysis at the level of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* requires that the *pathē* have,

beyond the concrete being of human beings, a characteristic way of being that could be gathered into the *logos* and articulated in speech (135). This is the crucial passage (and argument) for the thesis of this essay that the cognitive (propositional attitude) approach to the affects is incomplete, that something essential escapes. In the following passage, the *nous* is “more than human being can be” and escapes upward and the *pathos* is (so to speak) simultaneously pulled downward by its *hylē* (material). Consider:

As such, *nous* is *apathēs* [De an. Γ 4, 429a15], “that which nothing can touch.” . . . Thus *nous*, in relation to the being-opened-up of being-in, is more than the human being can be since the way that the human being takes up this possibility, *nous*, is *dianoēisthai*. Insofar as *nous* constitutes the being-opened-up of the human being, it is a *dia*, insofar as living is determined by *lupē* and *hedone* [pain and pleasure as the marks of *pathe*], *nous* is the *basic condition of the possibility of being-in-the-world*, which as such stands out behind the particular concrete being of individual human beings. (1924: 135)

The *nous* is *a-pathēs*. It is incommensurable with the *pathētika*—against thinking (*dianoēisthai*). *Nous* is untouchable — “that which nothing can touch” — in a way that ordinary human existence is constantly touched by particular affects and the totality of a world that matters affectively. In this context, *nous* maps to understanding as the locus of possibility and *pathē* to *Befindlichkeit* with its background marks of pain and pleasure [*lupē* and *hedone*] in the openness where human existence is situated. Heidegger and Aristotle drive *nous* back in the direction of *pathē*:

Book 1, Chapter 1 of *De Anima* investigates the extent to which *nous*, as a basic determination of the being of human beings, is a basic characteristic of this way of being; and the extent to which the human being only constitutes a definite possibility of the being of *nous*. . . . This universality of the possibility of grasping [in *nous*] is something that is not to be equated with the concrete being of the human being, which is always at the moment. What grounds this possibility of grasping everything, which grows out beyond the human being and its concrete being?

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. . . Aristotle discusses the *pathē* as those phenomena in which it is shown that the concrete being of human beings can only be understood if one takes it in its fullness. . . . It is, above all, decisive that we lose our composure, as in the case of fearing without encountering something in the environing world that could be the direct occasion of fear. (1924: 139–40)

In particular, the example in the last sentence points to the understanding of affects as disclosive of a whole way of being-in-the-world, not just particular things. We are discomforted or de-composed in fear without a particular fearful thing being encountered. This indicates a disclosure of Dasein's being-in-the-world as a totality that is at stake. However, Heidegger does not yet call out the paradigm of being-towards-death (as he will a few years later). Instead, following a close reading of Aristotle, Heidegger gives a short account of an example in terms of the Aristotelian four causes. The physician sees anger as a boiling up of blood in the heart and of the bodily temperature – an early version of the hard-wiring of our biology to its expression in a somatic-facial program; the rhetorician, going decisively beyond psychological representations, sees anger formally as seeking pay-back, an implacability towards others; the cause as final purpose (or “target”) is an individual, group, or idea that matters to human existence and at which one takes aim; and, finally, anger has certain immediate causes, which act as triggers, such as insults, slights, disdain, the imagined or actual dishonoring of people and their cherished ambitions, goals, and ideals.

This analysis maps closely to that provided by Heidegger in §30 of *Being and Time*, “Fear as a Mode of Affectivity” (H 140–42). Closely, but not identically, since the material cause drops out of both the *Rhetoric* and §30, and is only completed in the 1924 lectures by references to *De Anima*. Thus, that in the face of which we fear, the fearsome,⁶ is encountered within the world as a trigger that has danger (“dangerous objects”) as its context of involvements. The engaging thing is that, even as the fearsome comes at Dasein out of the world, like a charging lion or run-away Toyota, Dasein's fear is fundamentally a function of the possibility that the danger will pass by and miss Dasein, thus revealing the temporal as-

pect (*ekstasis*) of futurity even at the heart of contingency and thrownness based out of the past. Next, the formal definition of fearfulness, fearing as such [*Furchtsamkeit*], is a possibility that is already disclosed in the world as something that is freed into the clearing that Dasein opens up and there comes to matter to Dasein as threatening. Finally, that about which Dasein fears is Dasein itself. All roads—and fears—lead to Dasein; and Dasein is inevitably the about which (*woran*) of fear. Even if a person is afraid of an expensive repair of the leaking roof of his house, the fear is that Dasein lacks proper shelter and will be exposed to the storm. Thus, section §30 and its resonance with the 1924 lectures is a strong reminder that Heidegger provides a robust account of the emotions in all their everyday complexity and richness. The existentialist reading that focuses only on the mood of anxiety in the face of death misses the nearly seamless continuity with the work of the early Heidegger as it is carried forward from the rich and diverse details of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* into *Being and Time* (granted that such material was not necessarily available to the initial existentialist reading).

While the *logos* emerges from the *pathē* and the two are inextricably required to complete one another, the relationship is not reductive, unidirectional, or even complete in the sense that there is no conflict or struggle. Conflict and incompleteness are a part of the expression of *pathē* by *logos* and the feedback of *logos* into *pathē*. At the level of the 1924 text, this establishes the incommensurability of *pathē* and *nous*—in our interpretation—the incompleteness of articulating *pathē* as cognitions (propositional attitudes). If further textual evidence is required, the inexhaustibility of the *pathē* by the *logos* extends beyond knowing in the following:

We still have to come to an understanding in what follows as to how fear and the *pathē* stand in connection with *logos*. . . . Insofar as the *pathē* are not merely an annex of psychological processes, but are rather the ground out of which speaking arises, and which what is expressed grows back into, the *pathe*, for their part, are the basic possibilities in which being-there itself is primarily oriented toward itself, finds itself. The primary being-oriented, the illumination of

its being-in-the-world is not a knowing, but rather a finding oneself that can be determined differently, according to the mode of being-there of a being. (1924: 176; italics deleted from the original for readability)

The being-oriented and being-in-the-world of *pathē* are “not a knowing.” However, the *pathē* are a source of different possible understandings and interpretations that can, in turn, be articulated in the *logos*. In a sense, this gives indirect, limited comfort to the cognitivist approach to the affects, since it acknowledges the continuity and indispensability of *logos* and *pathē* (and *nous*); and yet it indicates the inexhaustibility of *pathē* as a source of further distinctions for being-in-the-world.

If one wishes to rise above the level of Heidegger’s textual interpretation of the *Rhetoric*, no matter how innovative, and, using Heidegger’s 1924 text as a springboard, marshal additional arguments against the cognitivist approach to the affects, one does not need to look far. Phenomena such as emotional ambivalence and the cognitive impenetrability of affects provide counter-examples to the cognitivist paradigm.

The cognitivist (“propositional attitude”) approach to affects is shown to have a counter-example by Pat Greenspan (1980).⁷ She focuses on emotions as opposed to affects or moods, but much of what she argues applies generally. Her counter-example extends at least to the assertion that the emotions are logical in any ordinary interpretation of the principle of contradiction. The example of ambivalence where an individual holds two contrary or even contradictory emotions about a single event, outcome, individual, or situation suggests that mixed emotions do not behave as propositions in any ordinary way. Greenspan succeeds in establishing that it is really about one and the same individual that we simultaneously and with respect to the same property experience satisfaction and frustration, happiness and unhappiness, hope and fear—as when, speaking in the first person for emphasis, a friend receives a promotion that I had myself hoped to receive. For this penetrating analysis, we are grateful (and without mixed feelings). Emotional ambivalence is common—love and hate, hope and fear, joy and sorrow. We have no trouble authentically en-

tertaining mixed emotions. Welcome to the real world—it happens often. We are thrown into ambivalence, and these mixed feelings come at us humans as a function of our contingency and thrownness. How this is reconcilable with the rationality of the emotions requires further argument and modifies our conception of rationality in interesting ways, according to Greenspan.⁸

The Aristotelian answer here is that rationality is a task, a work-in-progress that requires our being-with-one-another in the engaged speaking and acting of the *polis* in order to implement a community in which humans flourish, at least for those who Aristotle has defined as belonging to the “in group.” The Heideggerian answer is that *Befindlichkeit* readily encompasses ambivalence, and is not propositionally analyzable “all the way down.” For Heidegger, the possibilities of our *Befindlichkeit* are inexhaustible, for whenever one possibility is implemented on the thrown basis of our nullity, other possibilities are necessarily passed over and fade back into the background of dispositions and latent abilities.

If further example is needed that the affects cannot be completely articulated in propositional attitudes of belief and desire, then the evidence that affects are impervious to beliefs is useful. Zenon Pylyshyn is credited with coining the term “cognitive impenetrability,” with specific reference to visual perception; but the applications extend beyond the computational context of information processing in the visual system to affectivity, belief, and desire at large.⁹ The evidence that the individual is not really dealing with a belief (a candidate for cognitive verification) is that the individual still feels there is something uncanny and uncomfortable about that snake, even though it is rubber. The complex “Fear—snake—danger” does indeed contain a belief component, and it is one that becomes accessible and visible as the affective complex gets translated from the undifferentiated *Befindlichkeit* of being-in-the-world into the derivative, de-worlded, corresponding cognitive system. Yet the rubber snake still gives the individual an uncanny feeling. What does not get translated is the issue why it should *matter*. The snake becomes a reminder that Dasein is an individual being whose being is an issue for itself. Nothing is lost in the translation—nothing except the af-

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fect itself. In another example, I *know* that flying on a commercial airplane is much safer than getting behind the wheel of a car. Yet as I sit back in my airplane seat (let's say) I am still intermittently fearful, my palms get sweaty as the plane is taxiing toward the runway, and I experience a dryness in my mouth (i.e., fear) that I never experience in getting behind the wheel of a car. And I *know* which is safer—flying. Examples where true belief or knowledge does not make a difference to one's affects are common. Darwin knew the cobra was safely locked away behind the plate glass in the zoo. Yet he immediately jumped back when the snake struck. Of course, this is a reflex-like reaction; and it would go too far to assert that affects are mere reflexes. They are much richer. Yet they share a reflex-like function in that they are impervious to what the individual knows (believes).

It goes beyond the level of Heidegger's (or Aristotle's text) to complete the analysis of these examples. Yet we can marshal distinctions from these thinkers to do so. In the case of some fears such as snakes and the affect of disgust, we may actually be dealing with a hard-coded response.¹⁰ Evolution and natural selection hands down such responses to our contingent thrownness of a being-in-the-world of the ancient environment of evolutionary adaptation on the savannah plains of east Africa. We are embodied creatures and we have to bring forward our facticity and transform it as best we can. In the case of fear of flying, what is disclosed in the coach section of an airplane (among other things) is a world in which the passenger has limited personal space, no choice, and no control. One need not be a psychiatric case to find that such an extreme loss of control is threatening to the integrity of one's existence or to discover a pattern of threat activation that is impervious to (many) rational beliefs and arguments. As noted above, what does not get translated cognitively is the issue why it should *matter*. The fear of flying becomes a reminder that Dasein is an individual being whose being is an issue for itself. Once again, nothing is lost in the translation—nothing except the mattering, the affect itself.

The proponent of the cognitive, propositional attitude cannot escape by saying this is a special case. The incommensurability of *logos*

(and *nous*) to *pathē* applies across all the major distinctions of *pathē*—hard-coded, affective responses (“gut reactions”), social pretences, eruptive emotions, moods—whether inauthentic or authentic, and including cognitive impenetrability. This is a rich area for additional research. Let us engage in some as inspired by Heidegger's lecture and related distinctions.

(1) *Pathē* are candidate instances of “social pretences” built around roles in human relations at the level of the inauthentic *das Man* (the “they self”). In social pretences such as romantic love, the rebel without a cause, or a woman scorned, Dasein takes over its affect from its everyday way of being with other individuals in superficial community under the colonization of *das Man*.¹¹ Heidegger's 1924 lectures undertake what can best be described as a *tour de force* interpretation of Aristotle, enumerating nine different ways in which a human being encounters others as frightening (1924: 172; *Rhetoric* 1382b). I suggest that every one of them, without exception, is inauthentic. In each case, the other is implicated as the source of fear, and without the other, the *pathē* would not be; yet the fear is due to something lacking in integrity, underhanded, or deceptive.

In each case, a social pretence takes center stage (*Rhetoric* [1924: 172; *Rhetoric* 1382]). (i) Those who are literally partners in crime are afraid of one another. Those who commit a crime together expect to be compromised by the other's lack of trust. The supposed pretence of honor among thieves gives way to simple distrust and direct betrayal. (ii) When a powerful individual is unjust, this is a source of fear, since he has the power to inflict pain on one. The tyrant often pretends to catch someone in a lie or inconsistency before the individual victim “disappears” or is publicly crushed in a show trial. (iii) Those that have been injured are expected to lash out in return at those believed to have caused them injury. The pretence is that two wrongs make a right. (iv) Those who know they have injured another (as in the previous item (iii)) and are anticipating a reprisal are made even more dangerous in a fearful spiral of tit-for-tat. Again, two wrongs do not make a right, but spawn an entire series of fear-inducing wrongs. (v) Individuals competing for the same stakes in a situation of scar-

city—in what we would today call a “zero sum game”—are afraid of one another. The pretence is that there really is not enough to go around, even if the scarcity has been artificially manufactured, thereby generating even more fear. (vi) Those that have nothing to lose and so lose all fear themselves are in a powerful position to inspire fear in others precisely since they have no hope of escaping distress, but are able to inflict it. (vii) Those that, thanks to superior position or power, have already caused an injury to an inferior are feared as being able to do so again. The pretence on the part of the inferior individual is that one is important or significant enough to be worth the further injury or, on the part of the superior one, that he cares enough to do so. (viii) The weak are to be feared in so far as, if they are out to ruin an individual, and hiding their intention stealthily, then they may prepare a surprise attack that they will one day launch. The pretence is that the weak are interested in starting a fight with the stronger. (ix) Enemies who wear their heart on their sleeves are not be feared, since they are open; but those who are sly, deceptive, or reserved and pretend to be one’s friend are to be feared. The pretence is that of a “smiling face that pretends to be your friend.”

Other modern examples of *pathē* as social pretences include forms of infatuation and romantic love. The idealization of one another by star-crossed young lovers such as Romeo and Juliet is not based on a healthy process of getting to know one another, albeit deeply moving as a narrative in spite of that. Neither is Juliet as wonderful as Romeo imagined, nor Romeo as magnificent as Juliet idealized him to be. If their tragic story had not taken the dramatic turn it did in Shakespeare, Juliet would soon be tired of picking up Romeo’s dirty socks upon his return from a hard day at court; and Romeo would be tired of Juliet’s nagging about her in-laws. In another example, in the pre-ontological folktale, nothing is more certain than that after the injunction “you may open every door in the castle, but do not open that one” the hero or heroine will immediately do so; likewise, with Romeo and Juliet taking a romantic interest in one another. An irresistible attraction immediately followed upon the prohibition of contact and communication.

The social pretences of *Twelve Angry Men* and *Rebel without a Cause*—in the movies of the same titles—are taken over from our conventional understandings of possibilities as referred to by *das Man*. Here the translation from *pathē* to *logos* fails, not because the meaning is so deep and significant, but rather because it is so superficial and ambiguous. The rebel without a cause is the owner of a free floating narcissistic rage in search of a target on which to lock in order to bring to expression (and completion) a personal indignation that had nothing to do with the target either necessarily or even contingently. Other examples of social pretences include the shame of a woman scorned, wearing Hester Prynne’s scarlet letter, in Hawthorne’s novel of the same.¹²

Let consider one example in detail. The twelve angry men—actually it was eleven since one of them kept his wits about him—were angry about rising urban crime in the context of the 1950s in the USA, based on a stereotype of switch-blade wielding Hispanic street gangs; and, thus biased, were about to convict an innocent defendant of murder. All but one of them “knew” that the accused was guilty. The accused fit the stereotype. He fit the social role. He fit the profile of the pretence provided by conventional wisdom of *das Man*, though Heidegger’s distinction obviously does not occur in the film. Thus eleven of the twelve jurors themselves fit their own profile of men angry about urban decay and the misbehavior of the anonymous stereotype. The circumstantial evidence was compelling. Only one individual suspected (“knew”) that he did not know. This opened up a possibility not envisioned in the social pretences governing the conversation in the court, in this case not only with the accused and with his fellow jurors, but with gang members’ actual practices in using switch-blade knives. Based on the one, lone, holdout juror’s interpretation of the distinction between stabbing upwards versus downwards with the switch blade—he was able to articulate authentically what was possible to his fellow jurors, namely, that the accused was falsely accused and indeed innocent. The anger vanishes in a puff of instrumental practice as the jurors acknowledge a near fatal misinterpretation.

(2) Next, let us consider *pathē* as what are (in effect) hard-coded somatic patterns, for ex-

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ample, to laugh when tickled, to cry when deeply disappointed by loss, to take flight when outnumbered by hostile forces, or lash out indignantly when insulted. Even though we humans are able to interrupt these immediate reactions that overtake us, and, thus intervening with deliberation, are able to recapture our freedom in at least some instances, still such patterns point to Dasein's contingent thrownness (embodiment) in Heideggerian terms and *hylē*—material cause—in Aristotelian terms. It is possible that Heidegger would be dismissive of the results of the scientific discovery of mirror neurons and the social neuroscience opened up by fMRI research. Yet an alternative reading is that he leaves a place for the results of scientific research, albeit as a derivative form of being-in-the-world, knowledge.¹³

The short version of such research is that the same areas of the brain relevant to pain are activated in observing an individual experience pain as are activated by the individual's directly experiencing the painful stimulus. This is worth repeating – the one observing and the one experiencing pain show the same areas of the brain are activated, albeit with less intensity on the part of the observer. No one is saying that such neuronal activity provides a general law of causation between mind and body. It remains the case that correlation is not causation. Rather an implementation mechanism subserving a communicability of affect between human beings in the world is suggested. Thus, those philosophers are stopped short, who, for example, propose a thought (*Gedanken*) experiment in which two individual subjects are imaginatively linked at the level of their physiologies via a radio transmitter after having been artificially de-worlded. We no longer need to *imagine* such a thought experiment. The mirror neuron system (MNS) and fMRI studies provide all the access required to disclose the affective resonance of two individuals at the level of emotional contagion, vicarious experience, or synchronized behaviors such as contagious yawning. Our co-*Befindlichkeit* extends further downwards into the somatic infrastructure, though obviously without individual awareness of it, than was previously thought to be the case. How such contingencies are further elaborated for possibilities of human understanding is an

open question not addressed at the level of thrownness or Aristotle's material cause.

While fundamental ontology does not wait for the scientific results of neurology to make a contribution, and while the results of empirical science remain empirically valid and subject to refinement, revision, or even refutation, we should not be too surprised to learn that co-*Befindlichkeit*, *Mitsein*, and *Mitdasein* have an implementation mechanism that is identified at the level of neurology. What is surprising is that the neuronal mechanism should be so relatively simple. Instead of a neural network of amazing complexity and a causal thicket of semantic opacity, a granular one-to-one mapping between the mirror neuron systems of two individuals is functioning to produce the results. The Cartesian myth that humans are unrelated cogitos was debunked by Heidegger as part of his original contribution. The surprising thing is that a neurological correlate to such debunking has surfaced. We are related, even at the physiological level. Whether such an account will survive the onslaught of further properly skeptical scientific inquiry is a valid (and open) question. However, the recommendation to Heidegger scholars, at least for the time being, is to enjoy a moment of scientific satisfaction.

(3) Finally, *pathē* provide the basis of authentic commitments. Of course, Heidegger gives the classic, existential example of this as the mood of anxiety in the individualizing confrontation with death.¹⁴ Human existence uses this confrontation with death as disclosed in anxiety to shatter the complacency and distraction of the domination of the everyday—*das Man*—and engages in an authentic choice and commitment. In this example, human existence is individualized down to its ownmost potentiality and is alone—no one can die Dasein's death for it. Dasein is authentic—and all alone. Yet there are examples of *pathē* that disclose Dasein in relation to other individuals and do so authentically.

We must guard against a misunderstanding here. It is not that any given set of *pathē* are intrinsically authentic or inauthentic. For example, it is not that fear is inauthentic and anxiety authentic. It is true that Heidegger privileges the mood of anxiety in the face of death as disclosive of Dasein as whole and as an individualized self subsequently capable of au-

thetic projects and commitments. Yet it is easy to think of examples of inauthentic anxiety. The caricature of existentialism in which anxiety paralyzes the existential hero, who is unable to choose, is one example. Next, the vicarious anxiety created in the theatre during scenes of suspense, anticipation, or high expectation, provides another instance. Finally, the free floating anxiety of classical neurosis that emerges in phobias, paranoia, and obsessive compulsive rituals (or, more exactly, the prohibition of such rituals) also come to mind. In every case, the anxiety is arguably inauthentic because the individual is engaged at a level distinct from an anticipatory resoluteness that makes a difference to Dasein's life commitments or at a level in which Dasein engages in self-deception. We saw nine examples of inauthentic fear. Yet authentic fear is that which is experienced in choosing to go forward into danger in spite of feeling afraid. Of course, the warrior in battle who knows that he is at risk and feels afraid yet advances anyway is a paradigm case here. But not only warriors. The individual who stands at the end of the street where he lives and sees a tornado bearing down on him knows at that moment authentic fear and is strongly motivated to run and take cover. Likewise, anyone who has to speak truth to power—for example, Mandela, Gandhi, or King—and does so, not recklessly, but with deliberation and commitment to the cause (fairness, liberation, equality, and so on) experiences authentic fear. It does not determine the action. It does not stop the speaker. But it is there, at least initially.

All of the *pathē* are capable of being recruited as inauthentic social pretences or, alternatively, as the authentic basis of commitments including commitments to others. In parallel with and contrast to social pretences, there are certain *pathē* that are possible only in authentic interrelation with another individual, which loom large in Heidegger's analysis of the *Rhetoric*. Arguably, Heidegger might have usefully brought forward one or more examples of *pathē* that disclose an other Dasein instead of putting all his analytic eggs in the single basket of anticipatory resolutions towards death as disclosed in anxiety, resulting in a Dasein that is indeed authentic but seemingly always alone.¹⁵

While fear reveals threatening objects (including other individuals) and anxiety discloses the totality of Dasein, there are *pathē* that disclose another Dasein—Dasein as the other individual. Almost without exception, Aristotle's discussion of diverse *pathē* provides examples of the disclosure of others. There are entire groups of affects, both inauthentic and authentic, that Heidegger uncovers thanks to Aristotle's work in book II of the *Rhetoric* which Dasein cannot experience without the availability of the other individual.¹⁶ Many affects such as righteous indignation—at which we are about to look—or guilt, shame, jealousy, and so on—make a social reference to the other who is essential for the emergence and functioning of the affect in question.

A wonderful example of the *Befindlichkeit* of righteous indignation, essentially a social reference and response to the conduct of the other person (or group), is disclosed in the laboratory by R. H. Frank in the Ultimatum Game (UG).¹⁷ I hasten to add that Heidegger's distinctions are not ones used by Frank, but, as we shall see, bringing them to Frank's work with the passions is illuminating. In the UG, one player is given a set amount of money—say twenty dollars. He is then required to hand over, at his own discretion, a portion of the money to a second player. If the second player declines the offer, then both players get zero; otherwise, they get to keep the cash according to the proposed offer. From a rational point of view, where rationality is defined in terms of narrow self-interest, if player #1 offers one out of twenty dollars, then player #2 would still be better off taking it, since one dollar is more than zero dollars, which is what #2 had at the start. However, that is not what happens in the real world. Such “low ball” offers by player #1 are overwhelmingly refused by player #2. The second player forfeits his own narrow self-interest. Of course, the questions are: Why? What does it mean?

The standard interpretation is that the offer indicated above is grossly unfair. The individual is dishonored by the offer, even insulted by the lack of respect displayed in such a presumptuous proposal. This leads to righteous indignation (a particularly nuanced form of anger) and the punishing (sanctioning) of others' unfair behavior, a sanction that also has a

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negative consequence for player #2, though not as great a loss for #1 (who loses \$19) while #2 only loses \$1.

The less standard interpretation, though consistent with the above-cited intuition on basic fairness, is that this conclusion is the result of a process of reasoning that is akin to Aristotle's *phronēsis*, deliberation about what is good for the human being in context, rather than a rationally mathematical optimization. To deploy the distinctions of the *Rhetoric*, the *logos* is the mathematical calculation that articulates the explicit judgment that one dollar is more than nineteen. Duly noted. The *pathos* is the disclosure of righteous indignation based on the possibility—conspicuous by its absence—of a division of the assets that treats each participant with respect and gives each a mutually satisfying share of the proceeds. The *ēthos* is the intelligibility of the situation—integrity in a broad sense of workability (not necessarily one that blames or praises) that assigns one individual the function of division and the other that of approval of the division. The proposed division of one part of twenty does show a certain character—or more precisely lack thereof—and one that, in most cases, arouses the response of righteous indignation.

If one would like to discover a paradigm context disclosive of righteous indignation, this is what it looks like—being asked to agree to get one dollar while the other gets nineteen. Both parties have some power—the one to propose a distribution, the other to veto it. Now bargain!

Keeping in mind our earlier discussion of the proposition approach to affects (*pathē*), the situation is rich in propositional content. Yet the message is delivered as a decision, “Deal!” or “No deal!” based on the *pathē* that emerges from social reference to the other in interrelation. Yes, the *pathē* gets translated into some propositional content, but the latter does not exhaust the nuances of the interrelational context and why it *matters*. The latter also motivates the decision, the commitment, and it is the mattering that discloses how the situation engages the participants, not cognitively but affectively as beings-in-the-world to whom things matter. The individual who proposes a losing division of one dollar to nineteen not only gets the propositional content “No

deal!”—the individual also gets no money. And it is this latter case where the rubber of righteous indignation meets the road of mutual respect.

One thing is clearly demonstrated, based on experience. Players in the underdog position overwhelmingly refuse such low offers. When asked why, they say the offers are “unfair,” “disrespectful,” even “dishonoring.” In a broader sense, of course, we start to get the idea that a broad sense of rational self-interest does extend to being treated fairly, not just in the long run, but in individual instances.

What is clear is that when an individual experiences (whether expressed or not) righteous indignation at a dishonored agreement, broken promise, or unfair proposal, the affects are being recruited to sustain the social reference and relatedness of an authentic commitment to treat other individuals or groups with honor and respect. The eruptive affect of righteous indignation supports the commitment of a fair distribution, and, in other scenarios, this affects supports people keeping their agreements—at the cost and impact of everyone getting less. An entire class of affects requiring social referencing to others, such as shame and guilt and including moral sentiments, contributes to solving the problem of how creatures of limited generosity and strong self-interest can reasonably adhere to commitments. In this case, the holder of the dollars does not want to be the target of righteous indignation and is incited to make a division with regard to the \$20 that captures at least a semblance of equity, enabling both parties to feel they are better off.

Thus, *pathē* such as righteous indignation, guilt, shame, or jealousy do *not* seem like transformations of simple anger or fear, on the one hand, or love, on the other. That is because they are not. The last two groupings—social pretenses and irruptive reactions—include *pathē* that we cannot experience alone. We can only experience them with the participation and involvement of other individuals. They are interrelational as such. Other than that, there is nothing—no feature or function—that these divergent *pathē* have in common—not the affective content (feeling), not the behavior, or if one looks “under the hood”, not the neurology or endocrinology; not the source or target; nor the object or cause. Note that these are real

pathē. It is just that the category of *pathē* encompasses complex and diverging phenomena.

If one begins to suspect that Aristotle's *pathē* are an *ad hoc* grouping, albeit based on Aristotle's customary comprehension and rigor, and assembled together for the benefit of training the speaker in rhetoric, one should be also able to find examples of all of the distinctions that fall into each of the diverging categories—hard-coded response, social pretense, irruptive reaction, and mood. That is indeed the case. Completely varying examples of anger will display distinct aspects corresponding to each of the four distinct groups. For example, anger is a response to automobile driver A cutting off driver B in heavy rush hour traffic on the commute home. Anger is a social pretense as in the suburban person angered at the rising crime rate in inner city neighborhoods where he does not live. Anger is righteous indignation as one reads that human rights activist Aung San Suu Kyi is still under house arrest in Myanmar. Finally, anger shows up as a simmering and slow burn of a pervasive mood that results in a calculated payback, as a person is passed over for a promotion that she feels she deserves, secretly applies for and accepts a job elsewhere, quitting her current position on short notice. Sadness is a basic response to a lost puppy. Sadness is a social pretense as in mourning for a significant other in one's life with whom one has had little contact and a difficult relationship. Sadness is an irruptive reaction as when a father is disappointed—and saddened by—the behavior of his teenage son, who, for example, was caught drinking irresponsibly, watering down the vodka to replace that which he had consumed. Sadness will be a pervasive mood, as when contemplating the autumn of life and how short it is. In every case, each of the *pathē* is valid in itself, but does not necessarily have a common feeling that extends across the instances, nor a specific set of behaviors that are required. The hard-coded response and irruptive reaction are hard to fake, especially if one looks at micro expressions of facial muscles and considers the costs to both parties. Social pretense often lacks feeling or constant feeling. The mood lacks corresponding behavior, though the feeling is

relatively deep and rich. How this maps to Heidegger's distinction of *Befindlichkeit* is indicated at the level of the text above (§30 of *Being and Time*, "Fear as a Mode of Affectivity" [H 140–42]) as the way the world is disclosed to Dasein.

There is a final *pathē* in which the other Dasein is disclosed that also goes beyond that articulated in Heidegger's work on Aristotle. For this, of course, Heidegger eventually turned to Kant. It proposes a paradigm of affectivity toward the other which Heidegger explicitly refers to as "respect" [*Achtung*] in his Kant book with regard to authentic being-as-self (1929: 165; also coincidentally in §30).¹⁸ For Heidegger, human interrelations have an irreducible dimension of integrity as wholeness, not in the narrow sense of judging and evaluating the other's behavior in its minute moral idiosyncrasies and ethical peculiarities, but in the sense of a practice that determines the experience of respect towards others that leaves the other whole and in integrity, abstracting from all the contingent circumstances, the conflicts of interest and self-interests that shape and bias a person's perceptions, inclinations, and judgments.

The idea that every experience of the other has at its kernel a nucleus of respect for the other leads to a (dis)interested openness to what is occurring, leaving the other complete and whole in the other's own experience of possibilities. The other is left with the awareness that he or she is not alone but free to create and express possibilities and make commitments no matter how limiting one's facticity (thrownness) may seem to be in the moment. The mood of respect is a paradigm here, which does *not* necessarily mean an awareness of the moral law (as it would in Kant or even Scheler); rather it means a clearing for the other to create possibilities. (Of course, an ethics of *Mitdasein* has subsequently been derived.¹⁹) It means a clearing for care, in the strict Heideggerian sense, in which care includes the other in a being-with that is receptive to the other as whole and existing in what's possible for Dasein in the full sense of an authentic interrelation of committed speakers and listeners in community.²⁰

ENDNOTES

1. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1927); *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996); *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). ‘H’ cited inline refers to the Niemeyer edition pagination as usual.
2. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2009). The translation of Aristotle’s *pathē* as “affects” is a compromise but is guided by the examples including the full range of emotions, feelings, and moods engaged by Heidegger such as fear, anger, joy, hatred, and so on. Even in *Being and Time*, Heidegger considers a full range of human emotions: “And how about the temporality of such moods and affects as hope, joy, enthusiasm, gaiety? Not only fear and anxiety, but other moods, are founded essentially upon one’s having been; this becomes plain if we merely mention such phenomena as satiety, sadness, melancholy, and desperation” (H345).
3. Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); Martha C. Nussbaum, *Eruptions of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). To the best of my knowledge, Heidegger is not referenced by either of these authors.
4. All of these terms—*polis*, horizon, acoustics—take on new resonances in Heidegger’s reading.
5. “In der Befindlichkeit liegt existenzial eine erschliessende angewiesenheit auf Welt, aus der her Angehendes begegnen kann” (H137–38). “Matters” is the *Angehendes*—that which “goes towards” the individual from out of the disclosed world and matters to the individual because it is coming at him.
6. “Das *Wovor* der Furcht, das Furchtbare . . .” (H 140).
7. See especially the classic essay by P. Greenspan, “A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion,” in *Explaining Emotions*, ed., A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 223–51. The modification of rationality is engaged by R. H. Frank, *Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), a text that will be engaged shortly.
8. Pat Greenspan, “Practical Reasoning and Emotion,” in A. Mele and P. Rawlings, eds., *Rationality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 206–21.
9. Zenon Pylyshyn, “Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 22 (January 1999): 341–423. Though Pylyshyn is credited with coining the term, its application extends beyond visual systems and the concept can be found in both Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), and Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious,” in *General Psychological Theory*, ed. P. Rieff (New York: Collier, 1963); *Standard Edition* (S.E.) 14:166–215.
10. “Hard-coded” or “hard-wired” are relative terms, and the biological plasticity and ability of the nervous system to recover, even from severe failures such as cerebral stroke, is significant. However, this plasticity occurs over weeks and months, not minutes or hours.
11. This useful expression, “colonization,” is borrowed from John Riker of Colorado College.
12. See also “wild pig” behavior and ghost possession as examples of social pretences in certain Polynesian cultures discussed by Ian Hacking in his *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
13. The functional magnetic resonance imaging apparatus is abbreviated “fMRI.” See J. Decety and T. Chaminade, “When the Self represents the Other: A New Cognitive Neuroscience View on Psychological identification,” *Consciousness and Cognition* 12 (2003). J. Decety and P. L. Jackson, “The functional Architecture of Human Empathy,” *Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews* 3 (June 2004): 71–100; J. Decety and C. Lamm, “Human Empathy through the Lens of Social Neuroscience,” *The Scientific World Journal* 6 (2006): 1146–63. In all fairness, it should be noted that some such fMRI studies are being challenged, but not those by Decety et al. cited here. See Edward Vul, Christine Harris, Piotr Winkielman, and Harold Pashler, “Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition,” *Perspectives On Psychological Science* 4, no. 3 (2009): 274–90. But see also the reply by Mbwmmba Jabbi, Christian Keysers, Tania Singer, Klaas Enno Stephan, “Response to Voodoo Correlations in Social Neuroscience by Vul,” pending publication: <http://www.bcn-nic.nl/replyVul.pdf>.
14. The example of mood (*Stimme*) is discussed exhaustively in *Being and Time*, and will not be engaged here as a stand-alone paradigm, except where necessary for the reading of the text.
15. Lou Agosta, *Empathy in the Context of Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 2010), 28, figure 1.1.
16. As is well known, Heidegger also includes a penetrating analysis of the Kantian affect of respect as disclosive of the humanity of the other person as rep-

- resented by the moral law in Heidegger's first Kant book.
17. R. H. Frank, *Passions within Reason*. Naturally, Frank does not deploy the distinctions *logos*, *ethos*, *pathe*.
 18. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962); Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* Band 3: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991).
 19. See Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Lawrence J. Hatab, *Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); John H. Riker, *Wh It Is Good to Be Good* (New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 2010).
 20. I acknowledge the works of Larry Hatab and John Riker for inspiring my engagement with these issues..

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