

# GROUP BELIEF: SUMMATIVISM IN NON-SUMMATIVIST CASES

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**ABSTRACT:** The *summativists* generally analyze group belief in terms of belief of the majority. The *non-summativists* counterargue that it is possible for a group to believe that  $p$  even if “none” of its members believes that  $p$ . In doing so, they usually appeal to hypothetical cases in which groups are “structured” groups like committees, research groups, governments, as opposed to “collective” groups like Finns, America, Catholic Church. In this paper, I raise the objection that non-summativist cases involve summativism. While most contemporary objections to non-summativism tend to be *rejectionists*, i.e., showing that non-summativist cases involve group acceptance rather than group belief, my objection is newfangled in that it grants non-summativist cases group belief but shows that group belief in such cases is majority belief.

**KEYWORDS:** groups, group belief, summativism, non-summativism

## 1. Introduction

It is said that there are at least two senses of group: the “collective” group and the “structural” group.<sup>1</sup> It is said that the collective groups are groups such as Finland or the Africans; thus it is assumed that these groups are “unstructured” as opposed to structural groups such as the government of Finland.

But this talk of “structure” and “non-structure” is obviously meant to be respectively talk of “exactness” and “vagueness” with respect to the number of members. It is quite exact or clear to any Finnish who is aware about Finnish politics that the government of Finland consists of a limited number of members. The limitation of group members therefore gives us exactness, and this exactness in turn allows us to count this group as “structured” and not as “collective.” *Ceteris paribus*, it is assumed that collective or unstructured groups consist of indefinite group members given that it is quite vague and unclear to anyone just exactly how many members these collectives enjoy. These assumptions, I believe, are dubious for two reasons:

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<sup>1</sup> I borrow these terms from Tuomela (1992). For more discussion about the kinds of groups, see Gilbert (1987) and Bird (2010). For a sophisticated article on the nature of groups see Ritchie (2013).

Youssef Aguisoul

( $\Psi$ ) The collective group can also be definite and exact, thus structured.

( $\Psi^*$ ) The structured group is sometimes indefinite and vague, thus collective.

( $\Psi$ ). Truly, Finland, or the people of Finland, are limited in the same way the members of the Finnish government are limited. To state otherwise is to state that the Finns are never limited, that they are not amenable to count. But this is absurd. If we count the Finns, we will reach a definite number and hence exactness and hence structure.

Perhaps one now is tempted to say: no we cannot. Perhaps this temptation is motivated by the fact that the number of the Finns is continuously increasing by Finnish childbirths, and that therefore the count of the Finns is never limited to a definite number. But this I doubt.

Not only it is possible that there be, for various reasons I shall not state at the present, a moment in which there be a cease of Finnish childbirths, but it is possible to have every Finnish Birth Center counts Finnish childbirths, and have thereby definite numbers, which are, of course, continuously changing.

This may be an insufficient answer to our objector. He may in fact proceed to remark: what of Finnish pregnancies in the rural sides of Finland? I shall not reply in-depth. But all I claim is the perfect possibility to be, whether by sophisticated technology or else, updated, at a time, with the limited number of the Finns.

But our enemy might say: just like Finnish childbirths cause perils to the claim ( $\Psi$ ), Finnish fatalities cause the same perils. How do you account for this?

Again I say that it is perfectly possible to meticulously cover childbirths and fatalities with our sophisticated means of the present day.

But now if the Finns are quantitatively limited, then we have an exact knowledge about their number.

It may be said that, using Russellian terms, we have an exact knowledge of their number only via description or theory, but via knowledge by acquaintance or practice, we have no such knowledge.

While it is true that we may have an exact knowledge of the number of the Finns by description, I doubt that we cannot have such knowledge by acquaintance. Some of us do. Sociologists about population growth and decline, are indeed acquainted with such knowledge.

Therefore, if the Finns are limited in number and if this number may be rendered exact to some by description and to others by acquaintance, then the Finns are "structured," hence ( $\Psi$ ).

( $\Psi^*$ ). Structured groups like the government of Finland are not, as it is assumed, limited in number. Like the collective group the Finns, the number of the operative members of the Finnish government change continuously. The only

difference between structured groups and collective groups in this respect rests on “time.” Whereas the limited number of the Finnish government may change, perhaps centennially, i.e., with the slow change of the Finnish constitution, the limited number of the Finns changes hourly if not secondly.

Furthermore, the Finns who are knowledgeable about politics are acquainted with, and hence have an exact idea about, the number of the members of the Finnish government, in which case renders the Finnish government structured. But this is not always the case. Some of us may have a vague idea about the members of the Finnish government, which renders the latter collective rather than structured. Thus suppose I ask so-and-so who never heard about Finland itself “what is the number of the members of the Finnish Government?” I suppose that even though he would not know the number by acquaintance, that is, in any exact fashion, he would nevertheless reckon by description, supposing he has a basic idea of a government, that there ought to be a definite number of members of the Finnish government just like he would reckon by description that there ought to be a definite number of the Finns.

In conclusion, if these groups, “structured” and “collective,” share in common the fact that they have limited numbers, though changing in different intervals, and if these groups also share in common the fact that they may be clear to some but not to others, then there is *no* genuine difference between the structured and the collective. These are one and the same. Theoretically, or by description, which is our concern as philosophers, it is clear that the Finns are limited in number as much as it is clear that the Finnish government is limited in number.

Group epistemologists, on the other hand, usually analyze group belief, justification and knowledge, by resorting to groups as structured; as if structured groups are different from the collectives; as if the collectives are not appropriate as groups for group epistemology. This is wrong a view, and it shows bias. Correctly, as we saw, the difference between the kinds of groups at issue is minor rather than crucial. I move now to the subject of this paper, group belief.

Group belief is neither group knowledge nor group justification.<sup>2</sup> If a group believes that the earth is flat, their members may or may not have justification for that belief. They may for example have come to the belief on the grounds that they have visually perceived that the earth is stretchably flat, in which case they have a genuine epistemic justification. Conversely, they may have, supposedly, never seen the stretchability of the earth, in that, say, all of them being born stuck in a cave, and may have merely been receiving reports about the flatness of earth from a

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<sup>2</sup> See Schmidt (1994) if you are interested in group justification. See Faria (2022) if you are interested in group knowledge.

stranger who peaks once and in a while and who is not a member of their group, in which case they do not have a genuine epistemic justification, genuine as that which involves their own perception. Further, if knowledge of so-and-so is, as the tradition has it, a belief that is true plus a genuine justification, then our group knows that the earth is flat if the earth is indeed flat and not round, and believe that it is flat along a genuine justification. But group belief is merely a group belief, i.e., it is stripped from group justification and group knowledge.

Furthermore, group belief is much more problematic than *subjective* belief. “I believe that Estonians are friendly” is a proposition that contains myself believing a belief that is my own. But the proposition “Finland believes that Estonians are friendly” is one that contains a group believing a belief that is their own. But what do we mean by “their”? All Finns? Some Finns? One Finn? Finland the nation as such? To the question “who is believing in the first proposition?” the answer is evidently “I.” To the question “who is believing in the second proposition?” the answer is not as evident. Sure, it is Finland. But how come that things such as Finland have mental attitudes? Obviously, Finland the nation does not have consciousness; Finland as such does not desire or imagine or believe or whatnot. Still, we predicate beliefs to subjects like Finland all the time: Iran believes that America is the source of political trouble; this research group concludes that metaethics is essential than normative ethics. But what is for a group to believe so-and-so?

## 2. Summativism and Non-Summativism

Two foremost theories attempt to explain group belief: summativism and non-summativism. Summativism holds that group<sub>1</sub> believes that  $p$  is explained by its members believing that  $p$ . Non-summativism holds that it is possible that group<sub>1</sub> believes that  $p$  even if none of its members believes that  $p$ . While summativism “converges” the belief of the group with the beliefs of its members, non-summativism “diverges” them.

What is striking is that non-summativists usually, if not always, work with the notion of group in terms of “structured” groups. Thus they appeal to cases of research groups, committees, governments, and the like. We find Gilbert for example stating:

There is a kind of case which shows rather neatly that neither of the summative accounts considered so far can be correct. This depends upon the evident possibility that there can be coextensive groups, that is, groups with the same members (Gilbert 1987, 189).

The summativists on other hand are quite liberal about this issue. Be it a government or a people, if a group, in general, believes, then its belief is merely

reducible to the sum of its members' beliefs. But since I have argued above that there is no genuine distinction between the collective and the structured, any example I provide of a group, be it collective or structured, should not bother us as we proceed in this paper.

Now all summativists agree that group belief is reducible to its members' beliefs.<sup>3</sup> But some disagree apropos "the amount" of members' beliefs that would be necessary and sufficient to count group<sub>1</sub> as believing that *p*. Thus we find the Conservative summativists stating that

(CS) it is necessary that "most or all" members of group<sub>1</sub> believe that *p* so that group<sub>1</sub> believes that *p*.<sup>4</sup>

(CS) however is thickened by two claims; for "most" is not "all." That I ate most apples does not mean that I ate all of them apples; thus we may say that there is a Weak and a Strong version of (CS):

(Weak-CS) it is necessary that "most" members of group<sub>1</sub> believe that *p* so that group<sub>1</sub> believes that *p*.

(Strong-CS) it is necessary that "all" members of group<sub>1</sub> believe that *p* so that group<sub>1</sub> believes that *p*.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to (CS) there are the Liberal Summativists who hold that

(LS) it is sufficient that at least one member believes that *p* so that group<sub>1</sub> believes that *p*.<sup>6</sup>

I believe that (Strong-CS) and (LS) are false accounts.

(Ψ-1) The strong conservative view of summativism would be true if it is possible that group<sub>1</sub> believes that *p* and yet it is not the case that all of its members believe that *p*. Consider a newspaper report that states (N) Iran believes that America is the source of political trouble. "Iran" is ambiguous between two readings: Iran the collective and Iran the government. The members of Iran the collective would be Iranians; the members of Iran the government would be Iranian operative members. Now both readings imply that it is possible that Iran believes that (N) and yet not every member of Iran believes that (N). Thus there may be one Iranian citizen who

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<sup>3</sup> For an original defense of summativism see Quinton (1976).

<sup>4</sup> I borrow (CS) from Faria (2021, 84) and Lackey (2020, 187).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* Note that Faria, Lackey, Tuomela, and many others, always present the paradigm account of summativism (CS) as group G believes that P if "most or all" members of G believe that P. But I believe that we should render the disjunction explicit by distinguishing (Strong-CS) from (Weak-CS).

<sup>6</sup> I also borrow (LS) from Faria and Lackey.

is a dissident of his country and who believes the opposite of (N); and there may be one Iranian operative member who is equally a dissident. Thus (Strong-CS) is false.

( $\Psi$ -2) The liberal summativist view would be true if the belief of at least one member of group<sub>1</sub> is not sufficient for group<sub>1</sub> to believe that  $p$ . (LS) proponents usually resort to cases of authorial operative members.<sup>7</sup> Thus consider the current American president Joe Biden. (LS) proponents would say that the belief of Biden alone is sufficient for America to believe that (M) Iran is the source of political trouble. But this is wrong-headed. Biden is a “representative” of the majority of Americans. And if to represent is to present what was already presented, then in this case when most Americans present a belief at  $t_1$  such as (M), Biden would present (M) again at  $t_2$ . Thus it is not Biden’s belief alone in virtue of which we say group America believes, but it is the beliefs of the majority of Americans in virtue of which we say group America believes. It seems to me that (LS) proponents confuse Biden’s belief “as individual” with Biden’s belief “as representative.” The individual Biden is not the President Biden. The individual Biden might in fact believe the contrary of (M), and the president Biden is forced to “reiterate” what “most” Americans believe so that the collective America believes. The belief of the president Biden is therefore “irrelevant” to group belief, he may or may not as an individual believe (M), but as a president he is forced to reiterate whatever the majority of Americans believe. His individual belief may go along with the belief of the majority or may go along with the belief of the minority. Therefore the (LS) claim that the belief of Biden alone is sufficient for America to believe (M) is not true. These outcomes allows us to conclude that (Weak-CS) is true, group belief is merely majority belief: if the majority of group<sub>1</sub> believes that  $p$ , then group<sub>1</sub> believes that  $p$ , and, equally, if group<sub>1</sub> believes that  $p$ , then the majority of group<sub>1</sub> believes that  $p$ . So (Weak-CS) is both sufficient and necessary for group belief.<sup>8</sup>

Two objections are raised against (Weak-CS) to which I reply.

(I\*) It is objected that (Weak-CS) is not sufficient, that something else is needed. Thus suppose group<sub>1</sub> believes that the earth is round, and suppose that most members of group<sub>1</sub> believe that the earth is round. But suppose further that these members were not “explicit” about their belief, i.e., did not voice or proclaim their belief. Do we still say that group<sub>1</sub> believes?

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<sup>7</sup> See Lackey (2020, 187).

<sup>8</sup> (Weak-CS) has been traditionally endorsed. Cardinal thinkers like Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke—(respectively in *Leviathan* ((1651)1994, Ch. 16); *The Social Contract* ((1762)1997, Ch 2); *Two Treatises of Government* ((1689)1960, Ch 8.96)—affirm that such is the case about assemblies, groups, and collective entities; that these simply reflect the voices and votes of the majority.

I agree. We need more qualification. The latter objection reminds us of “dispositional beliefs” and “occurrent beliefs.” While dispositional beliefs are beliefs stored in the mind or beliefs that do not presently occur to the mind, occurrent beliefs are beliefs currently taken into consideration by the mind. Thus when I debate with others whether the earth is round, my belief that the earth is round is occurrent, for after all I am defending it. But while defending the latter occurrent belief, I have other beliefs non-occurrent such as my belief that God exists which is in this case not occurrent but dispositional. Back to group belief. Should we say that the belief of group<sub>1</sub> is reduced to the dispositional belief of most members of group<sub>1</sub> or reduced to the occurrent belief of most members of group<sub>1</sub>? For my part, I think both; whether this or that, group<sub>1</sub> believes that *p*. Think for example of religious groups. Muslims around the world gather at their mosques each Friday; in that context, most have the occurrent belief that God exists which would amount to group Muslims believes that God exists. But also when dispersed, most Muslims dispositionally believe that God exists which would amount to group Muslims believes that God exists.

(II\*) It is objected that (Weak-CS) is not necessary, that it is possible for group<sub>1</sub> to believe that *p* yet none of its members believe that *p*. Thus each member of a church committee may believe that gay marriage is permitted and yet the committee as one body decides to believe that gay marriage is not permitted. Therefore, members’ beliefs can diverge from group belief. This is by the way the non-summativist objection.

I have two replies.

First, the non-summativist implies that there is something that is a group, i.e., an ontological entity as such. Pettit (2003) for example argues that a group can have a mind of its own. But a group is a not an object of acquaintance, such as members of a group or colors of this flower. The non-summativists violate the Principle of Acquaintance (PA), which states that any ontological analysis, in this case, social ontology, that endorses objects of no acquaintance is preposterous.<sup>9</sup> Worse, to say that there is a social ontological entity such as a group which has mind or consciousness of its own is twice preposterous. For one, the non-summativist posits a mysterious entity, and for two, he ascribes to it an actual belief. So the non-summativist should explain how can he sidestep these violations.

Second, and more related to the objective of this paper, I believe that there is no divergence in non-summativist cases; I am inclined to think that any non-summativist case, which entails the structure of the famous church committee case, the case with which we will be concerned in the following section, involves

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<sup>9</sup> For literature on (PA) see Russell (1910) and Hull (2019).

convergence or summativism rather than divergence or non-summativism. I demonstrate this next.

### 3. The Non-Summativist Case

Consider the church committee case:

Suppose the Catholic Church forms a committee to deliberate on gay marriage. After hours of discussion, all of the members jointly agree that gay marriage should not be permitted. So the committee, as a group in a very conservative church, has this belief. However, it turns out that not a single member of the church committee actually believes this; instead, each one privately has a liberal perspective and supports gay marriage. But this is not the belief of the church committee, since its members felt that their decision should represent the Catholic Church and its traditional perspective (Faria 2021, 86).

The case (henceforth, the marriage case) does not specify the number of the committee members, and we should not obviously think that the committee consists of *every* catholic member. Suppose then that it consists specifically of “five” members.

Now is really there a divergence in the case above? The non-summativist says yes. Each member, he says, privately believes that (PRM) ‘gay marriage is permitted,’ and yet in discussing and deliberating the matter, they, using Gilbert’s notion,<sup>10</sup> *jointly commit as one body* to accept or believe that (Not-PRM) ‘gay marriage should not be permitted;’ and if so, he continues, we have a case that shows divergence; thus, (Weak-CS) is false; we have a case where group<sub>1</sub> believes that *p* even if none of its members believes that *p*.<sup>11</sup>

This is dubious. I believe that the case involves convergence not divergence. But first I present an objection to the case by Faria; then I present mine. Faria’s objection, unlike mine, is rejectionist, which is the trend nowadays. He (2021) observes no divergence of group belief from members belief by distinguishing between ‘group belief’ and ‘group acceptance’ and remarking that the marriage case involves the latter rather than the former.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Gilbert (1987, 194). Joint commitment is a notion that serves to explain non-summativism; members of a committee commit together to discuss an issue with the purpose to find a joint decision as to whether P, a one body decision, a joint decision, regardless of what each member ‘privately’ believes. Others also hold the joint acceptance account. See Tuomela (1992) and Schmidt (1994).

<sup>11</sup> If non-summativism is true, then of course any other version of summativism is false, and not only (Weak-CS).

<sup>12</sup> These debates on whether Gilbert’s account involves group acceptance or group belief are often depicted as debates between the rejectionists (those who believe that it involves group acceptance)



If his objection is correct, then the non-summativist, appealing to cases like the marriage case, does not genuinely reply to the summativist, since whereas the non-summativist talks in terms of group acceptance the summativist talks in terms of group belief. Their disagreement therefore would be verbal and ingenuine which renders both parties merely talk past one another. Worse, if Faria's objection is plausible, it would also obstacle my attempt to genuinely reply to the non-summativist. But is Faria's objection plausible?

Faria offers two objections: one from Doxastic Involuntarism and another from Truth Connection. I only present the former.<sup>13</sup> He contends that while we "voluntarily," or with control, choose to accept that *p*, we "involuntarily," or sans control, believe that *p*. Thus if it rains now before me, I would believe it *simpliciter*, involuntarily, instantly sans deliberation; conversely, I can accept say to teach Nietzsche's philosophy even if I believe *simpliciter* that it shouldn't be taught, and I do so likely to earn a living. Therefore, unlike believing that *p*, accepting that *p* is a voluntary, pragmatic, decision toward some subjective end.

Incorporating Faria's argument in the case in question, we learn that each of our five members believes that (PRM) involuntarily or instantly, whereas, toward a subjective end, they as one body voluntarily, pragmatically or deliberately, accept that (Not-PRM). We know that their subjective end, as the case reports, is that they have "felt that their decision should represent the Catholic Church and its traditional perspective." So there is group acceptance rather than group belief.

Again, if Faria is right, then all debates between the summativist and the non-summativist vis-à-vis this case, or any case in like structure, are incommensurable;<sup>14</sup> I however intend to counterargue the non-summativist cases, and in order to escape Faria's implicit incommensurability, I find it necessary to assess whether group belief and group acceptance are *indeed* distinct, and I should hope that they are not.

Hakli (2006) and Tuomela (2000) observe some interrelation between acceptance and belief.<sup>15</sup> Hakli for example would only partially agree with Faria. He concedes that whereas beliefs depend on evidence, acceptances depend on subjective ends, but he remarks further that beliefs might as well depend on subjective ends,

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and the non-rejectionists. For this see for example Gilbert (2002). If interested in arguments from rejectionists, see also Wray (2001).

<sup>13</sup> Faria (2021, 87–91). His two arguments are interconnected: Belief being 'involuntary' and based on evidence, the 'connection' it has with the world is *descriptive*. Acceptance being 'voluntary' and based on pragmatic reasoning, the 'connection' it has with the world is *prescriptive*.

<sup>14</sup> In this sense, the debates between rejectionists (e.g., Faria) and non-rejectionists (e.g., myself) are not incommensurable, since the point of these debates is to find whether the debates between summativism and non-summativism are commensurable or incommensurable.

<sup>15</sup> See Hakli (2006); see Tuomela (2000).

and acceptances on evidence.<sup>16</sup> Thus I can voluntarily believe that God exists on the “pragmatic” grounds that I desire to reside in Heaven; and I can involuntarily accept God’s existence if say I experience a miracle depicted as reasonable “evidence” for God’s existence.<sup>17</sup> Hakli coins such acceptances *acceptances as true*, and accordingly some beliefs are *beliefs as accepted*. Thus, like beliefs, acceptances involve evidence, and like acceptances, beliefs involve subjective ends.

Back to the case, if Hakli is right, then against Faria just because our five members are as one body motivated by subjective ends regarding whether (PRM), this by no means entail that group belief is not involved, for group belief and group acceptance in Hakli’s view are too interrelated to be unrelated. I assume therefore Hakli’s quasi-synonymous approach so that I may counterargue the case without being accused of incommensurability or verbal dispute.

Note that my objection to the case, furthermore, is different from Faria’s. Whereas his is “external” or rejectionist in that the marriage case involves another phenomenon, i.e., group acceptance, mine is “internal” since it grants the case to involve group belief. Contra the non-summativist, and implicitly contra rejectionists, I object that the case involves convergence, particularly in terms of (Weak-CS).

First, we notice a “discontinuance” of belief in the marriage case. Our five members “begin” by disjointly believing that (PRM), i.e., each member believing that (PRM), and finish by “discontinuing” doing so by jointly accepting as true that (Not-PRM), i.e., all of them believing that (PRM). And if something discontinues to be the case, then the cause of its discontinuance must be the object that interferes with the process of continuance. Thus if I discontinue to dislike Katie, it is due perhaps to what we might call “interfering reasons” such as ‘Katie has been kind to me.’ Analogously, there must be some interfering reason for the discontinuance in the marriage case, and fortunately we know what it is: they have felt that their decision should represent the Catholic Church and its traditional perspective.

Now to clearly state my objection it would be convenient first to modify the latter interfering reason. Substitute then “their decision” for “their belief as a group” and ‘its traditional perspective’ for “its traditional belief.”<sup>18</sup> We acquire this interfering reason:

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<sup>16</sup> Hakli (2006, 289).

<sup>17</sup> Think of Moses’ experience of splitting of the Red Sea.

<sup>18</sup> There should be no problem in making this substitution: regarding ‘their decision’ it is clear; regarding ‘perspective,’ if our members felt that they should represent the Church’s perspective on gay marriage, then this means that they wish to change their previous belief that (PRM) to the Church’s belief that (Not-PRM); thus perspective in this context just means belief.

(IR) our five members have felt that their belief as a group should “represent” the Catholic Church and its traditional belief.

(IR) is indispensable since—having therein clear-cut<sup>19</sup> epistemic terms together with “represent”—it demystifies the convergence in the case. We have a representative group and we have a traditional belief, meaning, the majority belief. This reminds us of (LS), that it is sufficient for one operative member of group<sub>1</sub> to believe that  $p$  so that group<sub>1</sub> believes that  $p$ . But we concluded that (LS) is false. Remember that we said a group representative, like Biden, is merely a reiterator of whatever most members of that group believe or desire or whatever mental attitude that group has. Biden’s belief is irrelevant. What is relevant is the belief of the majority.

Now since our five members of the church committee “represent” the Catholic Church, they must be operative members or representatives of most members of the Catholic Church; that is, whatever mental attitude the majority of the Church members expresses, our five members, being representatives and hence reiterators, are forced to reiterate it regardless of what they believe as individuals. Therefore, what explains our five members individually believing that (PRM) and yet collectively believing that (Not-PRM) is the fact that our five members *as individuals* believe that (PRM), but *as operative members* believe that (Not-PRM). Their beliefs as individuals are irrelevant; their individual beliefs may either fall within the majority or the minority, and in this case their belief that (PRM) falls within the minority.

But all this account so far corresponds to (Weak-CS); group<sub>1</sub> believes that  $p$  means that most members of group<sub>1</sub> believe that  $p$ ; so group Catholic Church believes that (Not-PRM) means that most members of the group believe that (Not-PRM).

But note that so far I have been arguing for a group belief where the group in question is the Catholic church and not our Committee of five members. So it will be said that the marriage case has it that our five members are grouped as a committee, and we are concerned about the belief of this group committee together with the beliefs of the members of this group committee, namely the individual beliefs of our five members. It will be said that we are not concerned about the belief of the group Catholic church and their members. It will be said that your objection works indeed but only if the group in question is Catholic Church and not if the

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<sup>19</sup> See Le Morvan (2017, 1221). He clarifies the distinction of ‘clear-cut’ epistemic terms—e.g., ‘knowledge,’ ‘justification’ and ‘belief’—from what he calls ‘in the ballpark’ epistemic terms—e.g., to be sure, evidence, certainty, perspective. The *analysans* of clear-cut epistemic terms are often epistemic terms ‘in the ballpark.’

Youssef Aguisoul

group is the Committee of five members. Again, the committee believes that (Not-PRM) even if each of its members believes that (PRM). There is no convergence here.

I believe that there is. The objector fails to see that the committee here does not consist simply of five members. After all, their final decision has been influenced! But influenced by whom? It is influenced by certain members call them the “invisible” members of the Catholic Church, who were somehow, transcendently, part of that committee. For while deliberating about whether to permit gay marriage or not, our five members have certainly conjured the presence of these invisible members, have invoked their beliefs, *as if* our visible five members were in discussion with their fellow invisible members. And if this is the case, then the committee is not really a committee of five members, but the committee is itself the group Catholic Church; the former “structured” group is only superficially structured; it is in fact a collective. Therefore, the committee *or* the Catholic church believes that (Not-PRM) because most of its members believe that (Not-PRM), and our five members being merely representatives only reiterate the voice of the majority, regardless of what they believe as individuals, and it merely happens to be the case that the beliefs of our five members, i.e., that (PRM), falls in the minority. Hence convergence!

#### **4. Conclusion**

The collective groups are not really different from the structured groups. A structured group involves a collective, and a collective involves a structured group. Thus the church committee involves invisible members together with our five members which renders this committee a collective, and the collective Catholic Church involves a structured group such as the church committee of our five members. Also, as we have seen in section 1, there is a genuine sense in which both Catholic Church and church committees may be collective groups and be structured groups. Both are collectives in that to some people the exact number of their members is unclear, i.e., to some people the image of both groups is vague. And both are structured in that theoretically these groups enjoy a determinate number of members. Therefore, the non-summativist strategy to show the possibility of divergence between group belief and members belief by appealing to cases involving structured groups will not do. We saw that the church committee is merely a superficially structured group, that that committee is in fact the collective Catholic Church.

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