An enchanting abundance of types:

Nietzsche’s modest unity of virtue thesis

**1 Introduction**

This paper makes two main assumptions. First, Nietzsche was a perfectionist. By this I mean that he thought that the only intrinsic good is the realization of human nature. This is an interpretation of Nietzsche that has found some resonance recently in the work of Thomas Hurka, among others.[[1]](#endnote--1) Second, Nietzsche believed that people have character traits, and that part of what it takes to realize human nature is to develop and act from particular character traits. This is also an interpretation that has found some uptake in recent Nietzsche scholarship.[[2]](#endnote-0)

It might seem, given my assumptions, that this paper is merely another turn of the screw. I think (and hope) that that’s false. I think (and hope) that I’m swinging a wrecking ball at the dominant virtue-theoretic conception of Nietzsche.

Why? Because I think that, despite my agreement with the dominant conception on certain broad issues, the way that consensus has been developed is fundamentally mistaken. I think that, although Nietzsche accepted a distant cousin of Brian Leiter’s “Doctrine of Types,” according to which, “Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular *type* of person,” the details of his actual view are quite different from the flat-footed position Leiter attributes to him.[[3]](#endnote-1) Leiter argues that Nietzsche thought that type-facts partially explain the beliefs and actions, including moral beliefs and actions, of the person whom those type-facts characterize. With this much, I agree. However, the Doctrine of Types as formulated by Leiter, is manifestly unsupported *both* by Nietzsche’s texts *and* as an empirical hypothesis. Although Leiter has teamed up with Joshua Knobe to shore up the empirical credentials of his version of the Doctrine of Types, and although Knobe is one of the best experimental philosophers currently working in moral psychology, their account of the Doctrine is wrong both textually and empirically. That is to say, Nietzsche did not hold the version of the Doctrine they attribute to him, and it’s a good thing he didn’t, because the version that he actually *did* hold is better empirically supported than the version that they attribute to him. For Nietzsche – and in reality – types are not immutable or fixed. Although not everyone is endowed with the same type, which type someone belongs to can (though needn’t) evolve over the course of her lifetime. In particular, whereas I agree with Leiter that the neo-Aristotelian account of character development is empirically inadequate, I do so not because I think no character development occurs but because I think that character development occurs *in a different way*. In addition, for Nietzsche – and in reality – types on their own are not normative. Character, which is normatively evaluable, only arises through the refinement, calibration, and development of temperament.

It might seem like I’ve just set myself an ambitious-enough goal, but I want to do more in this paper. The main point I want to argue is that Nietzsche held a person-type-relative unity of virtue thesis, according to which what’s intrinsically good for a particular person is to develop and act from particular character traits that “fit” her type. Typically, a single virtue will best fit a given type. Whatever virtue that is, is the type’s cardinal virtue. Any other virtues that the person with that type “ought” in some sense to develop are determined by the extent to which they support or enable the type’s cardinal virtue and the extent to which they fail to hinder or undermine it.

In addition, I discuss how Nietzschean types are to be individuated. This is an issue that Leiter, somewhat surprisingly, never takes up, and it has important implications for the plausibility of the Doctrine both as an interpretation of Nietzsche and as an empirical proposal. I will argue that, for Nietzsche, there is an “enchanting abundance of types” (*TI* V:6), not just a binary distinction between higher and lower, master and slave, noble and contemptible.[[4]](#endnote-2) Moreover, I will argue that, for Nietzsche, part of what it can mean for a person to be of a certain type is that she is susceptible to social determination of her character. Some types – important and widespread types – are *meta-types*. They’re not dispositions to *be* a certain way, but dispositions to *become* particular to-be-specified ways through the shaping power of social factors.

Finally, I will argue that Nietzsche seems to have held, or at least been tempted by, a *Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Types*, according to which some types, when fulfilled, are intrinsically better (or, in the words he preferred, ‘higher’) than others. This might seem to be at odds with my earlier claim that, for Nietzsche, types are not normative. The two fit together in the following way: merely being of a particular type has no value in Nietzsche’s eyes. What does have value is *living up to* the potential inherent in one’s type. The maximum value of a life, as it were, is determined by one’s type, but whether one attains that maximum is a contingent matter. A person of a “higher” type who fails to live up to her nature (to acquire and act from the virtues characteristic of her type) is no better (and probably worse, because she is such a disappointment) than a person of a lower type who successfully lives up to his nature. The Doctrine of Types and the Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Types are distinct theses, though the latter presupposes the former. (After all, if there are no types, then of course no type is better or higher than any other type.) It’s unclear whether Nietzsche took the Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Types to be a true proposition, or whether he merely talked at times as if it were true because he thought that faith in the Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Types (i.e., the *pathos of distance*) was required for nobility. The answer to that question hinges on his metaethics, which I will not discuss here. Even if he only ventriloquized his commitment to the Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Types, this second doctrine figures prominently in the cognitive, affective, evaluative, and behavioral dispositions and attitudes he attributes to others when explaining, predicting, and evaluating their moral psychologies. It might turn out that *having faith in* the Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Types (and faith that one’s own type is at or near the top of the hierarchy) is more important than actually *being* a person of one type or other.

**2 Leiter’s Evidence for the Doctrine of Types**

A cruise through Nietzsche’s writings will acquaint any reader with, as he himself would put it, “an enchanting abundance of types” (*TI* “Anti-nature” 6). There are higher and lower men. There are slaves, nobles, and priests. Philosophers are often discussed as a type, as are free spirits, free thinkers, and good Europeans. There is of course the overman, and his blinking counterpart, the last man. Nietzsche also discusses poets as a type, as well as saints and nihilists. The fourth book of *Zarathustra* is a veritable menagerie of types: the king, the leech, the magician, the retired pope, the ugliest human, the voluntary beggar, and the shadow. Finally, there are the eponymous types: the Apollonian, Dionysian, Socratic, Christian, and Kantian, along with the Schopenhauers, Buddhas, Napoleons, Cesare Borgias, and Goethes. Such types represent, for Nietzsche, the creation of new values by those who initially represent them, and who thus give them their names.

What are these types? What does it mean to belong to a given type? In his argument that Nietzsche is committed to the Doctrine of Types, Leiter (1998, 2002) cites seventeen passages from Nietzsche’s published work: D 38, D 104, D 109, D 199, D 542, GS P:2, GS 6, GS 187, GS 221, GS 231, GM P:2, GM III:7, GM III:15, TI “Errors” 1, TI “Errors” 2, TI “Anti-nature” 6, and TI “Skirmishes” 37.[[5]](#endnote-3) This might seem like decisive evidence, drawn from Nietzsche’s earliest mature work, *Daybreak*, to one of his latest, *Twilight of the Idols*. In the vast majority of cases, however, Leiter cites the passage but doesn’t quote it, quotes some of the passage but not enough context to show what Nietzsche really thinks, or simply misinterprets the passage. The evidence from these passages, considered carefully and in detail, fails to establish a commitment to the Doctrine of Types as Leiter characterizes it. I’ll discuss these passages at some length, not to belabor the point, but to support a more defensible version of the Doctrine of Types.

2.1 *Daybreak* 38

Here’s the first, which Nietzsche titles “*Drives transformed by moral judgments*”:

The same drive evolves into the painful feeling of *cowardice* under the impress of the reproach custom has imposed upon this drive: or into the pleasant feeling of *humility* if it happens that a custom such as the Christian has taken it to its heart and called it *good*. That is to say, it is attended by either a good or a bad conscience! In itself it has, *like every drive*, neither this moral character nor any moral character at all, nor even a definite attendant sensation of pleasure or displeasure: it acquires all this, as its second nature, only when it enters into relations with drives already baptized good or evil or is noted as a quality of beings the people has already evaluated and determined in a moral sense.

This passage demonstrates Nietzsche’s commitment to a moral psychology in which a person’s drives partially explain their behavior. Types, according to Leiter, are determined by drives; basically, a type is a weighted set of drives, or perhaps a weighted set of drives and their semantic interrelations (e.g., whether the drive to dominate is directed at the pleasure drive). So when Nietzsche claims here that drives partially explain behavior, he provides evidence for part of Leiter’s Doctrine of Types interpretation: types partially explain behavior because drives do. However, the rest of the Doctrine of Types interpretation isn’t just unsupported but manifestly undermined by this passage. For one thing, Nietzsche clearly thinks that drives change in the face of social pressures and evaluations. If drives aren’t fixed, then (since types comprise drives) types aren’t fixed either. Furthermore, although Nietzsche recruits drive psychology to explain behavior here, he does not use it to explain moral judgment and belief. Instead, moral judgment and belief are explained through social and cultural influences.

2.2 *Daybreak* 104

Next, consider D 104:

All actions may be traced back to evaluations, all evaluations are either *original* or *adopted* – the latter being by far the most common. Why do we adopt them? From fear – that is to say, we consider it more advisable to pretend they are our own – and accustom ourself to this pretense, so that at length it becomes our own nature. Original evaluation: that is to say, to assess a thing according to the extent to which it pleases or displeases us alone and no one else – something excessively rare!

Again, Nietzsche recruits facts about a person (in this case, their evaluations) to explain their actions. But as in D 38, he claims not that the vast majority of people’s evaluations are foisted on them by their society and culture, not that they originate from people’s drives (at least not the drives of the person who makes the evaluation). Perhaps one’s drives, and therefore one’s type, filter or modulate these social and cultural influences, but it’s clear that Nietzsche doesn’t think that drives alone determine or explain behavior.

2.3 *Daybreak* 109

Just five sections later, we encounter probably the most detailed and remarkable passage on drives in all of Nietzsche’s writings, which I quote at length:

I find no more than six essentially different methods for combating the vehemence of a drive. First, one can avoid opportunities for gratification of the drive, and through long and ever longer periods of non-gratification weaken it and make it wither away. Then, one can impose upon oneself strict regularity in its gratification: by thus imposing a rule upon the drive itself and enclosing its ebb and flood within firm time-boundaries, one has then gained intervals during which one is no longer troubled by it – and from there one can perhaps go over to the first method. Thirdly, one can deliberately give oneself over to the wild and unrestrained gratification of a drive in order to generate disgust with it and with disgust to acquire a power over the drive. […] Fourthly, there is the intellectual artifice of associating its gratification in general so firmly with some very painful thought that, after a little practice, the thought of its gratification is itself at once felt as very painful […] Fifthly, one brings about a dislocation of one’s quanta of strength by imposing on oneself a particularly difficult and strenuous labour, or by deliberately subjecting oneself to a new stimulus and pleasure and thus directing one’s thoughts and plays of physical forces into other channels. […] Finally, sixth: he who can endure it and finds it reasonable to weaken and depress his *entire* bodily and physical organization will naturally thereby also attain the goal of weakening an individual violent drive. […] *that* one *desires* to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does not stand within our own power; nor does the choice of any particular method; nor does the success or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of *another drive* which is a *rival* of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us.

On the one hand, this passage demonstrates Nietzsche’s commitment to explaining behavior – a lot of behavior, if not all of it – in terms of drives and their interrelations. If types are weighted sets of drives, then types too explain behavior. On the other hand, the whole passage is about how drives change over time, how they take one another as objects, and how this modifies their interrelations. By definition, this will modify the type of the person in whom those drives inhere, once again showing that types are not “fixed at birth.”[[6]](#endnote-4)

2.4 *Daybreak* 199

Next consider D 199:

However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute his being. He can scarcely name even the cruder ones: their number and strength, their ebb and flood, their play and counterplay among one another, and above all the laws of their nutriment remain wholly unknown to him. This nutriment is therefore a work of chance.

This passage establishes what Nietzsche thinks is determinative of a person’s type: your type is the “totality of drives” that “constitute” your “being.” Your type is not dependent on your beliefs, your sentiments, your culture, or any of a variety of other candidates. What makes you who you are is the constellation of your drives. What are drives for Nietzsche? I’ve argued elsewhere that a Nietzschean drive is a largely stable affective and behavioral disposition: a tendency to experience particular emotions (such as pride, disgust, elevation, contempt, and resentment) and act from them.[[7]](#endnote-5) Note that, in this passage, the strength and interrelations among drives are treated not as fixed (as Leiter would have it) but as mutable. Drives survive, swell, and abate depending on their “nutriment,” which for Nietzsche seems to mean the degree to which they are freely expressed, manifested, or vented. Any given agent possesses particular drives with particular intensities and particular interrelations – perhaps even innately – but *which* drives someone has, *how strong* they are, and *how* they affect one another changes as they are or are not expressed. In this same passage, Nietzsche goes on to claim that drives can be starved *to death*, indicating that he thinks not only that their strength but also their existence is a contingent matter, not something fixed at birth or conception.

It might seem that these four passages are enough to undermine Leiter’s version of the Doctrine of Types, but I recommend caution. Nietzsche does here claim that, like our dreams, “our moral judgments are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us, a kind of acquired language for designating certain nervous stimuli.” This suggests that Leiter is right to think that Nietzsche aims to explain moral beliefs in terms of physiology and psychology, but not that he aims to explain them in terms of immutable facts about physiology and psychology.

2.5 *Daybreak* 542

Next, consider D 542

The reverence we accord the aged man, especially when he is an aged thinker and sage, easily blinds us to the *aging of his mind*, and it is always necessary to draw forth the signs of such an aging and weariness out of their hiding-place – draw forth, that is to say, the physiological phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices – so as not to become the fools of reverence and injurers of knowledge. For it not infrequently happens that the aged man is subject to the illusion of a great moral renewal and rebirth and from the sensibility thus engendered in him passes judgment on the work and the course of his life, as though it was only now that he had been endowed with clear sight: and yet the inspirer behind this feeling of wellbeing and these confident judgments is not wisdom but weariness.

Here again we see that physiological facts about a person (the fact that he is old and weary) are recruited to explain – in this case, to explain *away* – his moral judgments. However, age is manifestly not a *fixed* physiological fact, which type-facts are supposed to be according to Leiter. Clearly, a given person’s age changes over the course of his lifetime. So, once again, we have a partial vindication of the Doctrine of Types (physiological facts explain moral psychological judgments) but only a partial vindication. Type-facts are mutable.

2.6 *The Gay Science* P:2

Next, consider the preface to *The Gay Science*, section 2:

assuming that one is a person, one necessarily has the philosophy that belongs to that person; but there is a big difference. In some it is their deprivations that philosophize; in others, their riches and strengths. The former need their philosophy, whether it be as a prop, a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or self-alienation. For the latter it is merely a beautiful luxury – in the best cases, the voluptuousness of a triumphant gratitude that eventually still has to inscribe itself in cosmic letters on the heaven of concepts.

Once again, Leiter takes this passage to indicate that fixed, psycho-physical facts about a person explain that person’s moral beliefs. Each person “necessarily has the philosophy that belongs to that person.” But we need to proceed cautiously here. Why does Nietzsche preface his claim with the rider, “assuming one is a person”? Are there “ones” who are not “persons”? What would it mean for someone to fail to be a person? Leiter seems to assume that this caveat is meaningless throat-clearing. I suggest, on the contrary, that for Nietzsche *being a person* is an honorific category. Some human animals, in his view, do not qualify as persons. In particular, he seems to feel such contempt for those who fail to integrate, harmonize, or at least wall off their drives from one another so that they can exist in a peaceful détente that he refuses to recognize them as people. I don’t have time to argue for this here, but it fits well with some prominent interpretations, according to which selfhood and personhood are normative categories for Nietzsche.[[8]](#endnote-6) We will see this criticism several more times: when Leiter claims that Nietzsche thinks that *everyone’s* moral actions and beliefs are explained by type-facts, the passages he cites typically at most support the interpretation that *philosophers’* moral actions and beliefs are explained by type-facts.

2.7 *Beyond Good and Evil* 6

For example, consider our next passage, *BGE* 6,

Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown.

 Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what morality does all this (does *he*) aim? Accordingly, I do not believe that a “drive to knowledge” is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has, here as elsewhere, employed understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere instrument. But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they may have been at play just here as *inspiring* spirits (or demons and kobolds) will find that all of them have done philosophy at some time – and that every single one of them would like only too well to represent just *itself* as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate *master* of all the other drives. For every drive wants to be master – and it attempts to philosophize in *that spirit*. […] To be sure: among scholars who are really scientific men, things may be different – “better,” if you like – there you may find something like a drive for knowledge, some small, independent clockwork that, once well wound, works on vigorously *without* any essential participation from all the other drives of the scholar. […] In the philosopher, conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to *who he is* – that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.

Nietzsche here describes drives as philosophizing, that is, as leading the agents in whom they inhere to construct philosophies that valorize the drives in question. Again, though, all this shows is that Nietzsche thinks that *philosophers’* moral beliefs are explicable in terms of type-facts that characterize them. (This passage is in Part One of *BGE*, which is after all titled “On the Prejudices of Philosophers.”) Other people’s moral beliefs and actions may be explicable in other terms. Indeed, Nietzsche even says so! He points out that the moral beliefs of “really scientific men” don’t have much of anything to do with the rest of their psychology. So, as before, this passage does not support the Doctrine of Types as a characterization of *humans*; at best, it supports the Doctrine of Types as a characterization of *philosophers*. Given Nietzsche’s obsession with the peculiar psychological makeup of philosophers, it would be rash at best to infer anything about people more generally from his claims about philosophers.

2.8 *Beyond Good and Evil* 187

Like *BGE* 6, *BGE* 187 is quite specifically targeted at philosophers:

Even apart from the value of such claims as ‘there is a categorical imperative in us,’ one can still always ask: what does such a claim tell us about the man who makes it? There are moralities which are meant to justify their creator before others. Other moralities are meant to calm him and lead him to be satisfied with himself. With yet others he wants to crucify himself and humiliate himself. With others he wants to wreak revenge, with others conceal himself, with others transfigure himself and place himself way up, at a distance. This morality is used by its creator to forget, that one to have others forget him or something about him. Some moralists want to vent their power and creative whims on humanity; some others, perhaps including Kant, suggest with their morality: ‘What deserves respect in me is that I can obey – and you ought not to be different from me.’ – In short, moralities are also merely a sign language of the affects.

Nietzsche clearly does not think that every human being constructs her own morality. He clearly does not think that everyone is a philosopher or a moralist. This passage is only about philosophers, about people who create valuational schemes. *Their* moral judgments are determined by type-facts about them, but who knows what explains the moral judgments and actions of everyone else? Note also that this passage begins to shed some light on the individuation question: how many types are there, and how are they to be individuated? One might think that *being a philosopher* is a type because philosophers all have the same constellation of drives, but this passage suggests otherwise. Although there may be some drives that are distinctive of and universal among philosophers, they don’t share the same constellation of drives. Some philosophers are driven to justify themselves before others. Some philosophers are driven to seek equanimity. Others have masochistic drives. Still others are vindictive. The vast majority of people are not philosophers, yet even within the philosophical type there is an enchanting abundance of subtypes.

2.9 *Beyond Good and Evil* 221

Next, consider a passage that finally discusses a non-philosophical type, the *commander*:

In a person […] who is called and made to command, self-denial and modest self-effacement would not be a virtue but the waste of a virtue: thus it seems to me. Every unegoistic morality that takes itself for unconditional and addresses itself to all does not only sin against taste: it is a provocation to sins of omission, one more seduction under the mask of philanthropy – and precisely a seduction and injury for the higher, rarer, privileged. Moralities must be forced to bow first of all before the order of rank; their presumption must be brought home to their conscience – until they finally reach agreement that it is immoral to say: ‘what is right for one is fair for the other.’ (*BGE* 221)

Here we see some evidence of Nietzsche’s commitment to the Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Types. He insists that there is an “order of rank” among types of people, such that what counts as a virtue for some (altruism, humility, modesty, obedience) is a vice in others. It might seem that his notion of someone “who is called and made to command” supports Leiter’s version of the Doctrine of Types: if you are called and made to command, it hardly makes sense to say that you might cease to be thus called and made. However, a suitably modest notion of mutability is consistent with this: if we think of types as constellations of drives, and as drives as evolving dispositions that are subject to the “laws of nutriment” discussed earlier, we can see that someone who is called and made to command will only slowly and painfully give up their calling. Indeed, one might think that *having less mutable drives* is itself a second-order type-fact: some individuals have flimsy natures that can be directed and redirected easily, whereas others have firmer natures that resist such redirection.[[9]](#endnote-7) Perhaps those who are called and made to command fall on the latter end of the spectrum.

2.10 *Beyond Good and Evil* 231

Now consider *BGE* 231:

at the bottom of us, really ‘deep down,’ there is, of course, something unteachable, some granite of spiritual *fatum*, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined selected questions. Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, there speaks an unchangeable ‘this is I’; about man and woman, for example, a thinker cannot relearn but only finish learning – only discover ultimately how this is ‘settled in him.’ At times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire strong faith in us; some call them henceforth their ‘convictions.’ Later – we see them only as steps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem we *are* – rather, to the great stupidity we are, to our spiritual *fatum*, to what is unteachable very ‘deep down.’

Once again, I want to suggest that this passage, which Leiter assumes is about all human animals, is really only about *philosophers*. As I’ve emphasized elsewhere, Nietzsche’s use of pronouns is deliberate to the point of being devious. While some writers might use ‘we’ to mean ‘all people,’ he rarely does.[[10]](#endnote-8) The scope of his first-person plural pronouns alone is worthy of a book-length study. In this passage, I think, it’s fairly clear that the scope of his ‘we’ is not all humans but only philosophers – and maybe not even all of them. Do all people encounter “cardinal problems”? Are all people “thinkers”? Do all people have “convictions”? Not according to Nietzsche, at least. These are the purview of philosophers. So while it might be the case that *their* constellations of drives are “deep,” “unteachable,” and “granite,” it does not follow that everyone’s are.

2.11 *Genealogy of Morals* P:2

We now move on to the *Genealogy*, which contains a number of passages that seem to support Leiter’s version of the Doctrine of Types. First, consider *GM* P:2:

For this alone is fitting for a philosopher. We have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit – related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one sun.

Leiter cites this passage as evidence that beliefs and actions of *all humans* are explained by the *causal* necessity of their psycho-physical types. A careful review of the passage shows just how preposterous this is. First of all, Nietzsche is obviously speaking only about philosophers. (Note again his deliberate usage of the first-person plural.) Second, the necessity he has in mind is not the *causal* necessity that Leiter attributes but some sort of *normative* necessity. Nietzsche is saying not that what is *bound* to happen but what *would be fitting, worthy, or appropriate* depends on one’s psycho-physical type.[[11]](#endnote-9) Viewed in this light, the passage supports the person-type-relative unity of virtue thesis mentioned above. What’s good for someone is to fulfill their nature; different people have different natures (different types); so what’s good for different people is to develop and act from different character traits.

2.12 *Genealogy of Morals* III:7

Leiteralso cites a couple of passages from the third essay of the *Genealogy*:

Every animal – therefore *la bēte philosophe*, too – instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power; every animal abhors, just as instinctively and with a subtlety of discernment that is ‘higher than all reason,’ every kind of intrusion or hindrance that obstructs or could obstruct this path to the optimum. (*GM* III:7)

In *GM* III:7, once again, the main focus is on philosophers, not all people. That said, Nietzsche does here subsume philosophers under the category of animals, which is quite broad indeed. But what type-facts does this passage attribute? According to Leiter (2002, p. 8), it shows that Nietzsche thinks that will-to-power is a type-fact. The meaning of this is less precise than one might hope. Is the claim that every animal is characterized by the same type-fact, namely will-to-power? In that case, there’s little sense in calling it a *type*-fact. Type-facts, if they refer to anything, are distinctive of their types. Is the claim perhaps that there is only one type – the animal type? – and that every animal is characterized by it? Again, this doesn’t seem to help. At best, it would be a roundabout way of formulating a universal theory of not just human but animal nature. In my view, the best way to fit *GM* III:7 into Nietzsche’s moral psychology is to treat it as meta-psychological. It doesn’t characterize any particular type, but instead describes how drives work in general, where the contingent constellation of drives in a given animal determines its type. Moreover, expressing those drives (as many of them as possible, without mutual undermining) constitutes flourishing. The relation between types and actions isn’t directly causal, but normative. (It may be *indirectly* causal, since if Nietzsche is right animals typically strive to thrive, but they needn’t achieve what they strive for, and in some interesting cases they don’t.)

2.13 *Genealogy of Morals* III:15

What about *GM* III:15?

For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering – in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy: for the venting of his affects represents the greatest attempt on the part of the suffering to win relief, anaesthesia – the narcotic he cannot help desiring to deaden pain of any kind. This alone, I surmise, constitutes the actual physiological cause of *ressentiment*, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects. (*GM* III:15 [cited by Leiter as I:15])

Once again, we see the explanation of moral beliefs and actions (blame and punishment) bottoming out in psycho-physical facts (the suffering of the punisher), so once again I agree with Leiter that psycho-physical facts explain moral beliefs and actions. But, as before, we have to ask: is the *type* of person described here fixed or mutable? I suppose one could claim that *being a sufferer* is a type, but it seems more appropriate to say that people of *any* type can suffer. Perhaps some types are more susceptible to suffering than others (Nietzsche seems to think that higher types are especially susceptible), but whether someone suffers is contingent on her behavior, her life-history, her social and cultural setting, and her environment more broadly.

2.14 *Twilight of the Idols* “Errors” 1

I now move on to the last of Nietzsche’s writings cited by Leiter in support of the Doctrine of Types, *Twilight of the Idols*. This whirlwind of a book encapsulates many of his mature views, and so might be thought to be decisive evidence of his conception of types. Consider first *TI* “Errors” 1:

everyone has heard of the book in which the famous Cornaro recommends his meager diet as a recipe for a long and happy – and virtuous – life. This is one of the most widely read books, and several thousand copies are still being printed in England every year. There is no doubt in my mind that few books (except of course the Bible) have wreaked as much havoc, have shortened as many lives as this well-meaning curiosity has done. The reason: confusion of cause and effect. This conscientious Italian thought that his diet was the cause of his longevity: but the preconditions for a long life – an exceptionally slow metabolism and a minimal level of consumption – were in fact the cause of his meager diet. He was not free to eat either a little or a lot, his frugality was not ‘freely willed’: he got sick when he ate more.

Again, we see that physiological type-facts explain actions: Cornaro was virtuous (in his fashion) because his metabolism was slow. But the physiological facts are not determinative. Nietzsche emphatically does not claim that Cornaro ate little *because and only because* his metabolism was slow. Indeed, he even suggests that, at times, Cornaro ate a great deal. How else can we make sense of the assertion that “he got sick when he ate more”? So, as before, type-facts do not determine behavior. Instead, they determine the conditions for flourishing. Since people tend to seek out conditions under which they will flourish (unless they are corrupt or decadent – an issue I don’t have time for here but which is discussed in *TI* “Errors” 2), what it’s *fitting, worthy,* or *appropriate* for them to do tends to be what they actually do. But the causal claim follows from the conjunction of the normative claim and the assumption that most people have a modicum of prudence. It wasn’t *impossible* for Cornaro to have a lavish diet; he *avoided* such a diet because it made him sick. By the same token, other people for whom Cornaro’s diet is unhealthy don’t *of necessity* *avoid* it. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that many of them foolishly *adhere* to it. Thus, they are not necessitated by type-facts, but type-facts do constrain the conditions under which they can flourish.

2.15 *Twilight of the Idols* “Anti-nature” 6

Next, consider *TI* “Anti-nature” 6:

let us think how naïve it is to say ‘this is the way people should be!’ Reality shows us an enchanting abundance of types, a lavish profusion of forms in change and at play: and some worthless idiot of a moralist sees all this and says: ‘no! people should be different from the way they are’!? He even knows what people should be like, this miserable fool, he paints a picture of himself on the wall and says ‘*ecce homo*!’

This is the passage from which I derive the title of my paper. It suggests several things. First, there are many, many psycho-physical types. Second, types are constantly “in change and at play.” Third, it is not a trivial matter to regularize this abundance of types: people differ from each other in significant ways, and the difficulty (though not the impossibility) of some sort of Procrustean social, political, or moral policy makes it a foolhardy endeavor. Finally, in addition to potentially thinking that some types are (when fully developed) superior to others (when fully developed), Nietzsche seems to suggest here that the very fact of the *diversity* of types is itself valuable. Not only is there a hierarchy among types, but the fact that there is a hierarchy rather than an egalitarian mélange is itself normatively significant.

2.16 *Twilight of the Idols* “Errors” 2

Only two passages remain among those Leiter cites in support of his version of the Doctrine of Types. The penultimate is *TI* “Errors” 2:

The most general formula at the centre of all religions and moralities is: ‘do this, don’t do that – and then you’ll be happy! Otherwise…’. Every morality, every religion, is this imperative, – I call it the great original sin of reason, the immortal unreason. In my mouth, this formula changes into its opposite […] someone who has turned out well, a ‘happy one’, has to perform certain acts and will instinctively avoid others, he is the physiological representative of the system he uses in dealing with people and things. In a word: his virtue is the effect of his happiness.

As before, the necessity Nietzsche has in mind here is not causal necessity, as Leiter would have it, but normative necessity. Individuals *flourish* by expressing their types, but not every individual *actually* (let alone necessarily) does express his type. This passage also raises the pessimistic possibility that some types cannot be fulfilled, or at least that it’s nigh-impossible to fulfill them. Broken people, whose drives are in such disarray that the expression of one almost inevitably undermines the expression of the others, will find it difficult if not impossible to flourish. “Happy” people, in Nietzsche’s view, have all and only the virtues they need to express their natures. The more complicated someone’s constellation of drives is, the more difficult it will be to express them all (or express almost all of them while modulating, attenuating, or redirecting enough of the ones that are not directly expressed). It’s passages like this that lead me to attribute to Nietzsche a person-type-relative unity of virtue thesis. If what’s good for someone is to express their nature or type, and their type is the constellation of their drives, then what’s good for someone is to develop and act from whichever virtues mutually support the expression of all of her drives.

This claim might seem to fly in the face of Nietzsche’s repeated insistence that it’s particularly admirable when someone healthily harbors multiple *prima facie* conflicting drives. “One must have chaos within oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star” (*Z* V:5). The point here, I take it, is not that internal chaos is itself a good, but that harnessing and coping with internal chaos is a more impressive *achievement* than developing the virtues that support a simpler type. Just as we admire other achievements (intellectual, aesthetic, whatever) in part because of the resistance that must be overcome to arrive at them, so we admire those people whose characters were developed by overcoming especially great resistance.

2.17 *Twilight of the Idols* “Skirmishes” 37

The final passage I want to consider is *TI* “Skirmishes” 37:

The loss of any hostile instincts that might arouse mistrust – and that is what our ‘progress’ really amounts to – represents just one of the consequences of a general loss of vitality: it takes a hundred times more care and caution for such a conditional and mature being to keep going. This is why people help each other, this is why everyone is sick to some extent, why everyone is a nurse. This is called ‘virtue’ -: with people who still knew a different sort of life – one that was fuller, more extravagant, more overflowing – it would have been called something else, maybe ‘cowardice’, ‘misery’, or ‘old lady morality’ … Our tenderized ethics is a consequence of decline (this is my claim, this is, if you will, my innovation); on the other hand, harsh and horrible ethics can be the consequence of a surplus of life: since a lot can be risked, a lot can be challenged, a lot can also be squandered. What used to be the spice of life would be poison for us … To be indifferent, that is also a form of strength – and we are too old, too mature for this as well: our morality of sympathy […] is one more expression of the physiological over-excitability that is characteristic of everything decadent.

For the final time, it’s clear that moral beliefs and actions are here being explained in terms of type-facts, in terms of psychological and physiological facts about the agents who hold those beliefs and form those actions. This passage and the one on commanders are the two main passages that Leiter cites in which Nietzsche attributes types to people other than philosophers. So, instead of seventeen passages to support the Doctrine of Types, we are left with two. Moreover, as I explained above, the passage on commanders is consistent with a notion of sticky mutability: the agent’s drives are not fixed and immutable, as Leiter would have it, but they aren’t will-o’-the-wisps either.

**3 Giving Leiter a Hand**

In the previous section, I canvassed all seventeen passages that Leiter has cited as evidence for the Doctrine of Types interpretation. One happy fact for Leiter is that this investigation bears out his idea that Nietzsche thinks that some – perhaps even most – moral beliefs and actions can be explained by physiological facts about the person who has the beliefs or performs the actions. Beyond this, however, the Doctrine of Types looks pretty shaky. Many of these passages dealt only with philosophers, not people in general. Many of them dealt with drives, but made it clear that drives and their interrelations are mutable. Many of them suggested that the relation between drives and behavior is indirect and prudential (people tend to pursue what will make them flourish, which is in turn determined by their drives) rather than directly causal.

Perhaps, though, I haven’t been sufficiently charitable to Leiter and his doctrine of Types. In personal communication and on his blog, Leiter has criticized my attack on the Doctrine of Types in two ways.[[12]](#endnote-10) First, he complains that I’ve misunderstood what he means by fixedness. Second, he thinks that it does me no good to point out that many passages that he’s used to support the Doctrine of Types deal only with philosophers. Does either of these criticisms have any merit?

Let’s recall that, according to the Doctrine of Types, “Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular *type* of person.” What does it mean for one’s psycho-physical constitution to be fixed? In his unpublished criticism of my understanding of fixedness, Leiter makes two main claims. First, if, as I affirm, types partially explain actions and beliefs (because they comprise drives, which themselves partially explain actions and beliefs), “then *something* must be ‘fixed’” about them. The idea here seems to be that if X is explanatory, then X is fixed. I confess I do not understand why Leiter finds this principle plausible, which means that I also do not understand this criticism. If he simply means that, for him, something’s being explanatory and its being fixed are equivalent, then I agree that types are fixed. Though I would then ask why we should talk of fixedness at all, rather than explanation. For what it’s worth, *Merriam-Webster* lists the following relevant definitions of ‘fixed’: 1) securely placed or fastened: stationary, 2) nonvolatile, 3) not subject to change or fluctuation, 4) immobile.

Second, Leiter agrees that I’ve shown that Nietzsche thinks that drives (and so also types) are not atemporally fixed. He then turns around and says that the Doctrine of Types allows for temporal mutability! I find this a little hard to believe. Over the last fifteen years, Leiter has consistently described types as “largely immutable” (1998 pp. 209 & 230; 2002 p. 91; 2007 p. 7; Knobe & Leiter 2007 p. 88), plain old “immutable” (1998 p. 219), “immutable, determining” (1998 p. 221; 2002, p. 83 n. 15), and “essential,” “necessary,” and “hardwired” (2013 p. 247). On top of this, when he tries to buff the empirical credentials of his interpretation, he cites psychological models such as the “Big Five” personality model, which includes traits for openness, neuroticism, extroversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. But *according to this model, external factors have no influence whatsoever on these trait dimensions, and the only thing that determines them is biological facts*.[[13]](#endnote-11) So which is it? Does Leiter think that types are temporally immutable (preserving the alleged empirical credentials of his view but making it inconsistent with Nietzsche’s texts) or temporally mutable (preserving consistency with Nietzsche’s – though not Leiter’s – texts but sacrificing the interpretation’s alleged empirical credentials)? Perhaps his considered opinion is that types are “largely” but not entirely “immutable.” I would then insist on pointing out that the drives Nietzsche discusses in the passages above can and do change quite a bit, though typically only slowly. They change based on their ongoing interactions with each other as well as through exogenous inputs from the environment, again calling into question the empirical credentials of the Doctrine of Types.

What of the criticism that my discussion of the passages cited in support of the Doctrine of Types pays undue attention to the fact that the majority of them deal only with philosophers? Here I will mostly rest content to play the burden-shifting game. Leiter claims on his blog that I owe “an explanation of why Nietzsche would think *philosophers* are different in kind from the rest of humanity, such that the explanation of their beliefs and action would be different – and different in a surprising way, i.e., that the beliefs and actions of *philosophers* are explicable by the Doctrine of Types, but the beliefs and actions of ordinary ‘herd animals’ are not.” I don’t see why, instead, Leiter doesn’t owe us an explanation for why we should generalize from passages about philosophers (a group Nietzsche really had it in for!) to all people. Beyond burden-shifting, though, here are a few reasons we should be wary about generalizing in this way. First, BGE 6 is indisputably not generalizable. It’s in a part of the book titled “On the Prejudices of Philosophers,” and it discusses how philosophers come up with their beliefs. Second, in some of the *Daybreak* passages discussed above, Nietzsche explicitly claims that the vast majority of people end up mimicking the evaluations (and, presumably) the behavior of others, that only very rare individuals generate their own evaluations. Who are those rare individuals? Another glance at BGE 6 suggests that they might be philosophers. Third, if my arguments above are on the right track, Nietzsche seems to think that the degree of stickiness of one’s drives is itself a dimension of individual difference, and that philosophers (and perhaps those who are “born to command”) have especially sticky drives. So once again we have a reason not to generalize from philosophers to the rest of humanity.

**4 Conclusion**

In closing, I want to point to a couple of further issues that merit full-fledged discussion but which I can only name here. The first is Nietzsche’s developmental psychology. Unlike Aristotle, who thinks that one becomes virtuous through practice, realizing all the while that one is not virtuous but aiming to become so, Nietzsche (as I argue in Alfano forthcoming a, forthcoming b, forthcoming c) thinks that the temporal relation runs in the other direction. First, one supposes, imagines, hopes, or fantasizes oneself to be a certain way – to have certain character traits. In so doing, one becomes committed to a standard of conduct, which includes not only one’s behavior but also one’s thoughts, feelings, emotions, preferences, and deliberative strategies. Commitment to this standard in turn induces congruent behavior. Thus, thinking of oneself as having certain traits, as fulfilling a certain type, is temporally – and, I would argue, conceptually – prior to *actually having* those traits. This is a theme that crops up especially in the *Genealogy*, where Nietzsche describes the nobles not so much as *being* higher but as *imagining* themselves to be higher, as enchanted by the *pathos of distance* (GM I:3, III:14). This pathos induces (enough of) them to behave as if they were higher, which has knock-on social effects that lead to self-confirmatory conduct. This theme also crops up, in a less uplifting way, in his description of psychological slavishness, which seems to be a disposition to simulate, mimic, or even acquire whatever character traits are attributed to one. Instead of or in addition to feeling committed to a certain code of conduct, the slave feels that *others*, perhaps others with the power to punish, *expect* him to behave in accordance with a certain code of conduct. Thus, while both masters and slaves become what they are taken to be, the masters do so by becoming what they take *themselves* to be (and what fellow masters take them to be), whereas the slaves become what *others* (and only others) take them to be. This is what I meant above when I claimed that, for Nietzsche, part of what it can mean for a person to be a certain type is that she is susceptible to social determination of her character.[[14]](#endnote-12) It’s also what I meant when I claimed earlier that *having faith in* the Doctrine of the Hierarchy of Types (and faith that one’s own type is at or near the top of the hierarchy) is more important than actually *being* a person of a higher type.[[15]](#endnote-13)

I’ll close with a methodological point. In *GS* 120, Nietzsche revises the dictum “virtue is the health of the soul” to “*your* virtue is the health of *your* soul,” and in *A* 2, he claims, “A virtue needs to be our *own* most personal need and self-defense: in any other sense, a virtue is just dangerous.” As I argue elsewhere , Nietzsche has a person-type relative unity of virtue thesis.[[16]](#endnote-14) Quotes like these suggest that if we want to discern his virtue theory, we need to look not (or at least not only) at his praise of ancient noble societies, of Napoleon, and of Cesare Borgia, but (also) at his self-attributions. The reason that clumsy commentators on Nietzsche’s remarks on virtue have found him so difficult to interpret is not, as Jessica Berry facilely suggests, that he has no theory of virtue, but that he held such a relativistic view.[[17]](#endnote-15) The very same traits that he praises as virtues in some constitute vices in others. If one simply attempts to compile a catalogue of all and only the virtues that Nietzsche consistently praises and never condemns, one comes up empty-handed. However, if one applies a more subtle approach, one sees that *within a given type*, his praise is consistent. For instance, in his own type, Nietzsche praises certain intellectual virtues – curiosity chief among them, but also versions of intellectual courage, honesty, solitude, cruelty towards one’s own conscience, and so on – that hang together.[[18]](#endnote-16)

To summarize, then: Nietzsche thinks that people’s beliefs and actions, including their moral beliefs and actions, are to be explained largely in terms of their psycho-physical types. Psycho-physical types in turn are to be understood as constellations of largely stable but nevertheless mutable and interrelated drives. These drives can relate to one another in a mutually undermining way, or they can relate to one another by supporting, recruiting, or at least ignoring one another. For Nietzsche, virtue consists in the alignment of one’s drives, that is, in the fulfillment of one’s type. Such alignment might include altering one’s drives to some extent. There are at least three kinds of higher-order type-facts: slavishness, masterliness, and rigidity. Slavishness is a second-order disposition to acquire, simulate, or mimic the traits that are attributed to one, whereas masterliness is a second-order disposition to acquire, simulate, or mimic the traits that one attributes to oneself. Some people embody greater degrees of rigidity by having first-order drives that are less susceptible to modulation; others embody lesser degrees of rigidity by having flimsier first-order drives. Someone of a higher type, according to Nietzsche, has drives that are harder to bring into alignment, so when that does happen, it’s more of an accomplishment and thus more praiseworthy. Nietzsche thinks that his own type centers on a kind of insatiable curiosity, which recruits intellectual courage, solitude, cruelty towards one’s own tender feelings, and other auxiliary virtues. Thus, he so often self-attributes curiosity and its allied virtues not only to show us what belongs to his type but also to summon those very traits within himself, since he also takes himself to have the higher-order disposition of masterliness.[[19]](#endnote-17)

**Notes**

1. Thomas Hurka, “Nietzsche: Perfectionist,” in B. Leiter & N. Sinhababu (eds.), *Nietzsche and Morality*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 9-31. [↑](#endnote-ref--1)
2. Mark Alfano, “How one becomes what one is: The case for a Nietzschean conception of character development,” in I. Fileva (ed.), *Character: Multiple Perspectives*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming a). Mark Alfano, “How one becomes what one is called: On the relation between traits and trait-terms in Nietzsche,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* (forthcoming b). Mark Alfano, *Nietzsche’s Socio-Moral Psychology*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming c). Mark Alfano, “The most agreeable of all vices: Nietzsche as virtue epistemologist,” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 21:4 (2013a): 767-790. Edward Harcourt, “Nietzsche and the ‘aesthetics of character,’” in S. May (ed.), *Nietzsche’s* On the Genealogy of Morality: *A Critical Guide*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 265-84. Peter Railton, “Nietzsche’s normative theory? The art and skill of living well,” in C. Janaway & S. Robertson (eds.), *Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 20-51. Bernard Reginster, “Honesty and curiosity in Nietzsche’s free spirit,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, LI/3 (2013): 441-63. Simon Robertson, “The scope problem – Nietzsche, the moral, ethical, and quasi-aesthetic,” in C. Janaway & S. Robertson (eds.), *Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 81-110. Christine Swanton, “Nietzsche and the virtues of mature egoism,” In S. May (ed.), *Nietzsche’s* On the Genealogy of Morality: *A Critical Guide*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 285-305. [↑](#endnote-ref-0)
3. Joshua Knobe and Brian Leiter, “The case for Nietzschean moral psychology,” in B. Leiter & N. Sinhababu (eds.), *Nietzsche and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 83-109. Brian Leiter, “The paradox of fatalism and self-creation in Nietzsche,” in C. Janaway (ed.), *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Brian Leiter. *Nietzsche on Morality* (New York: Routledge, 2002). Brian Leiter, “Nietzsche’s theory of the will” *Philosophers’ Imprint*, 7(7) (2007): 1-15. Brian Leiter, “Moralities are a sign-language of the affects,” *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 30(1-2) (2013): 237-58. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
4. I cite Nietzsche’s texts using the standard English-language acronyms. Translations are by Maudemarie Clark and Alan Swenson, R. J. Hollingdale, and/or Walter Kaufmann. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
5. I leave out passages from the *Nachlass* on methodological grounds. In general, I think that the unpublished texts should be used only to illustrate, nuance, or illuminate an interpretation that is established by looking at the published texts. On this point, Leiter and I are, as far as I can tell, pretty much in agreement. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
6. Knobe & Leiter, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
7. Alfano forthcoming a & 2013a, op. cit. Mark Alfano, “Nietzsche, naturalism, and the tenacity of the intentional,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 44(3) (2013b): 457-64. Mark Alfano, “The tenacity of the intentional prior to the *Genealogy*,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 40(2010): 123-40. See also Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology,” in J. Richardson & K. Gemes (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on Nietzsche*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013a), 727-55. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
8. Alfano 2013a, op. cit. Mark Alfano, *Character as Moral Fiction*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013c). Lanier Anderson, “What is a Nietzschean self?” in C. Janaway & S. Robertson (eds.), *Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 202-35. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
9. This idea gains empirical support from William Fleeson, “Towards a structure- and process-integrated view of personality: Traits as density distributions of states,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80(6) (2001): 1011-27. William Fleeson, “Moving personality beyond the person-situation debate: The challenge and the opportunity of within-person variability,” *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 13(2) (2004): 83-87. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
10. Alfano 2012, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
11. In an unpublished criticism of this paper, Leiter questions my understanding of the German, claiming that there are no grounds for thinking that the necessity involved is normative rather than causal. I confess myself befuddled by this criticism. Nietzsche talks about what’s “*geziemt*” (fitting, proper) for a philosopher, saying that philosophers have no “*Recht*” (right, title) to isolated thoughts. Leiter seems to ignore this normative vocabulary and focus entirely on the tree metaphor, which is after all a *metaphor*. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
12. <http://brianleiternietzsche.blogspot.com/2013/12/alfano-on-nietzsches-doctrine-of-types.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
13. McCrae, R., Costa, P., Ostendorf, F., Angleitner, A., Hrebickova, M., Avia, M., Sanz, J., & Sanchez-Bernardos, M., “Nature over nurture: Temperament, personality and life span development,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78(1) (2000), 173-186. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
14. Though I don’t have space to go into it here, I also contend that this account of character development is empirically adequate – a view I explore at length in *Character as Moral Fiction* (Alfano 2013c, op. cit.). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
15. If this is right, it has devastating consequences for Katsafanas’s attempt to turn Nietzsche into a liberal egalitarian in Paul Katsfanas. *Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism*. Oxford University Press, 2013b). [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
16. Alfano 2012 & forthcoming c, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
17. Jessica Berry, “On the very idea of a ‘Nietzschean’ virtue ethics,” this volume. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
18. For more on this, see Alfano forthcoming c & 2013a, op. cit. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
19. I am grateful to Brian Leiter, Bernard Reginster, Mark Migotti, and Christine Daigle for comments and criticisms of this paper. Special thanks are due to John Hacker-Wright and Daniel I. Harris for organizing a conference on Nietzsche and Virtue at Guelph University where I had the good fortune to present a draft of this paper. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)