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Zhuangzi chooses a butterfly as a metaphor for transformation, a sighted creature whose inherent nature contains, and symbolizes, the potential for transformation from a less valued state to a more valued state. If transformation is not to be valued; if, according to a recent article by Jung Lee, ‘there is no implication that it is either possible or desirable for the living to awake from their dream’, why not tell a story of a mole awakening from a dream? This would be a more perfect story. There would be no point of a mole awakening since (setting aside tactile, olfactory, auditory and taste sensations for the purpose of the example), there is no way to distinguish between the world of the mole’s imagination and the real world that is forever unavailable to a mole. In addition, Zhuangzi relates the story of the coming of a great sage in which it is clearly stated that ‘Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream’. Such textual evidence both from the choice of metaphors and evidential passages indicates that the message of the Zhuangzi is not epistemological relativity, but one of transformation from a state of intellectual blindness to a state of true understanding.

Of the two most common interpretative fallacies of Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream anecdote, and the *Zhuangzi* in general, described in the present author’s, *Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation*, Jung H. Lee’s article, ‘What is it like to be a butterfly? A philosophical interpretation of Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream’ (Lee, 2007), appears to be an instance of type one, the confusion hypothesis. The confusion hypothesis, described at length in *Chuang-Tzu for spiritual transformation*, is that the butterfly dream story symbolizes the incorrigibility of the confusion between reality and dream. Lee’s interpretation, which appears mainly to be a restatement of Graham’s interpretation, would seem to argue that there is nothing remarkable in the butterfly’s awakening; indeed, in the entire story, and here he quotes from Graham’s assertion, ‘there is no implication that it is either possible or desirable for the living to awake from their dream’ (Lee, 2007, p. 101). It is thus, by implication, either neutral or desirable to remain in confusion—not being able to tell reality from illusion—and this is the philosophical fruit of Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream story. The only

Correspondence to: Robert Elliot Allinson, Philosophy Department, Soka University in America, 1 University Drive, Aliso Viejo, CA 92656, USA. Email: rallinson@soka.edu

'argument' that Lee produces on behalf of this restatement of the confusion hypothesis is Graham's above assertion of it.

In the text of the *Zhuangzi*, there are many examples of statements in which defective knowledge or, lesser insight, is contrasted with a greater knowledge or accurate insight. For example, in chapter 1 of the *Zhuangzi*, it is remarked that 'the blind and the deaf cannot discern colors and sounds; there is blind understanding as well'. In the *Zhuangzi*, there are copious references to the 'True men of old' implying that these men were able to distinguish truth from falsehood and that Zhuangzi distinguished and thus was able to distinguish between true men and false men.¹ The appellation, 'True men of old' is meant honorifically, that is, it is better to be a true man of old than, for example, a charlatan. If one is to be guided by evidential passages, and not merely an argument from authority, as citing the ungrounded opinion of Graham's, it is clear that Zhuangzi considers that not only is it possible to discern truth from falsehood, but that it is highly desirable to do so. To put it in Zhuangzi's terms, which could not be more clear, intellectual blindness, that is, a lack of true understanding, or an understanding of what is real, is the philosophical defect which is the counterpart to physical blindness, which is a lack of the ability to see reality (the physically blind could still have internal imagination but would lack external verification). It is clear from these passages that not only does Zhuangzi consider that true understanding is possible; he considers that it is also highly desirable. Just as it is better to be sighted than to be blind, it is better to be able to have true insight than to live in illusion or the state of not knowing. Otherwise, why would he attribute the capacity for making such a distinction to the sage? Why would he call the incapacity to discern reality 'blindness', that is, a lack of seeing? Why would he even distinguish or be able to distinguish between blind understanding and veridical understanding? Why would he cite veridical understanding as better than blind understanding?

The problem with the confusion hypothesis of Lee is that, as Lee seems to assert, if what one gains from awakening from the butterfly dream is an incapacity or a continuation of an incapacity, then Zhuangzi is arguing that after philosophy we are no better off than we were before, and there is no point therefore in waking up. What we experience upon awakening is no better or different than what we experience in a dream. In this case, why would he pit the blind man against the man who can see? If all are blind, his use of these stories is perverse. Why become a sage if the end result of the True Man of Old is that he is as confused and wrong-headed as an ignoramus?

While Lee would like to credit the awakened one with a Socratic knowledge of ignorance, this is illegitimate, because this would imply a state of knowledge, i.e. the capacity to see the difference between knowledge and ignorance and there is no evidence from the confusion hypothesis that awakening from a dream is privileged in its knowledge. According to Graham's assertion, which is Lee's only 'argument', there is no point to the awakening. The post-awakening 'knowledge of ignorance', even if it were asserted to be the outcome of the awakening from the dream, is not as

it is stated in the quotation, 'possible or desirable' ('there is no implication that it is either possible or desirable for the living to awake from their dream').

Even if we were to grant that we do have knowledge of ignorance, this, as a level of ignorance (by definition one has not yet awakened to ultimate knowledge) is available in the dream and there is no need to wake up from the dream. The problem is, of course, *ex hypothesi*, one cannot rely upon the 'knowledge' one possesses in a dream. *A fortiori*, how could one then rely upon 'knowing' one's ignorance?

Descartes argued that while the dreaming state and the awakening state were ontologically separate, prior to his sixth *Meditation*, his statement of the problem was that there was no distinguishing mark as to ascertain which of the two states one was experiencing at any moment in time. With Lee's interpretation of Zhuangzi, it is not clear that one could even say that there was an ontological difference between illusion and reality. If that is the case, however, one can justifiably ask, how or why could the question of how to tell them apart arise in the first place? In other words, the question of whether they are the same or not could only arise in a context in which there is a difference between the two, but, on Lee's hypothesis, such a difference cannot be posited. The knowledge of such a distinction would require access to the reality state and *ex hypothesi*, Lee's hypothesis does not permit this.

As asked in my *Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation*, why did Zhuangzi choose a butterfly for a metaphor in the first place? He could have, as a contemporary Western philosopher has, chosen a bat, but Zhuangzi does not choose a creature which is blind. He chooses a creature which not only is sighted, but is famed for its embodiment of transient beauty. The butterfly is, in a word, an honorifically perceived creature. This is a creature that Chinese ladies of the Court attempted to capture in nets. No Chinese lady attempted to capture a bat.

There is another fundamental feature of the butterfly that makes its existence captivating. The butterfly is a transformation from an ugly worm. The butterfly is a philosophical Cinderella. The butterfly does not change back into an ugly worm. Its transformation is one way and it is a transformation from a state of ugliness to a state of envied beauty.

Such well-known features of a butterfly must have figured into Zhuangzi's choice of such a philosophical metaphor. He could have just as easily chosen a mole or a bat if he had wanted to illustrate that in the end, as Lee argues, knowledge was blind. He chose rather a sighted creature whose inherent nature contains, nay symbolizes, the potential for transformation from a less valued state to a more valued state.

If the butterfly, for all of its transformation from ugliness to beauty, in the end, stands for the impossibility of distinguishing ugliness from beauty, falsehood from truth, then why give us the butterfly dream story at all? Why not tell a story of a frog not being able to see out of a well? If transformation is not to be valued, if 'there is no implication that it is either possible or desirable for the living to awake from their dream', why not tell a story of a mole awakening from a dream? This would be a more perfect story. There would be no point of a mole awakening since (precluding tactile, olfactory, auditory and taste sensations for the purpose of the example), there

is no way to distinguish between the world of the mole's imagination and the real world that is forever unavailable to a mole.

If in the end, if one is left with confusion, and confusion is implied to be the ideal state, why awaken from a dream at all? ('there is no implication that it is either possible or desirable for the living to awake from their dream'), there is no point in relating the story of awakening from a dream, if upon post-awakening we are, in effect, not awake at all. It would be pointless to awake and sadistic on the part of philosophers to relate stories of awakening that led nowhere. If, in the end, one cannot tell illusion from reality, falsehood from truth, there is no need to resort to a metaphor of a transformative creature and an awakening from a dream, to relate this. Zhuangzi's literary conceit would be inept and weak. Zhuangzi, rather than one of China's greatest poets, would be a clumsy craftsman.

The main point is that there is textual evidence both from evidential passages and the choice of metaphors that Zhuangzi is pointing the way to a higher state of knowledge, an awakened state. In his most developed story, that of the great sage, his approach becomes more apparent. In his story of the great sage dream, the great sage is one who will arrive to explain how awakening is possible. This is textual evidence that not only is awakening possible, but since it is explained by a great sage (an honorifically designated person—a person whose appellation implies possession of higher knowledge or wisdom), it is desirable. The great sage dream fulfills the promise which is only hinted at in the butterfly dream.²

How has Lee fallen into such error? Why is he so insistent on seeing the *Zhuangzi* as a relativistic tract which counsels all men to be content with a life in which truth and falsehood are exchangeable and reality and illusion are words which, unlike the famous text of the *Zhuangzi*, are *not* distinguishable from the chirping of birds. Words for Zhuangzi must be distinguishable from the chirping of birds, but if reality and illusion are indistinguishable—as they are for Lee—words cannot be distinguished from the chirping of birds for *no valid distinctions are allowed*. Unlike Lee's interpretation, that Zhuangzi is not arguing systematically, the presentation of the chirping of the birds argument by Zhuangzi, both in terms of its placement in the work and in terms of its brilliance in internally capturing truth inside of a poetic image, is both systematic and poetic at once. Zhuangzi's epistemological and poetic brilliance of the choice of the chirping of the birds passage in chapter 1 rivals Plato's epistemological and poetic brilliance in his choice of the image of the bird in the cage in *Theatetus*. It is also at the same time therapeutic for I would agree with Lee's statement that 'the full force of what Zhuangzi says can only be understood if we can appreciate *how* he says it and *why* he says it' (Lee, 2007, p. 189, emphasis his). The *how* in this case, is encasing an argument of compelling logic within a poetic metaphor; the *why* in this case is therapeutic since therapy cannot be separated from truth. The therapy is the gift of understanding that words have a meaning and therefore *it is worth our while to read them*. We will be rewarded with meaning if we read on. This is what Zhuangzi is saying and *why* he is saying it. It prefigures the great sage dream in which we are told that a great sage will appear and will offer an explanation of our awakening. That we can awaken is our therapeutic goal. That we

can awaken depends upon words having meaning. We are not being lied to when we are being told that we can awaken.

The skeptical thesis, that words have no meaning is not only contradictory to what Zhuangzi actually says in the famed chirping of birds passage, it would not even allow Lee to put forward his thesis that words have no meaning. As Spinoza well noted, the consistent skeptic must be dumb, but, Zhuangzi not only speaks, he chatters much, and in the famed story of the two geese, it is the silent goose which is cooked. Zhuangzi, to be a consistent skeptic, would be silent.³ We have the poetic chatter of Zhuangzi. Why would we have this, if in the end, words and chirps are the same? Why would we not have a silent Zhuangzi if skepticism were our fate? If skepticism were our fate, do we need stories of transformation and awakening from dreams to teach us that there was no point in our waking up after all? In the *text* and not in Lee's assertions, awakening is held out as a great hope. In the *text*, the great sage will be able to explain our predicament. For the skeptic, for Lee, no explanation is possible for explanation depends upon the meaning of words and the distinction between truth (a valid explanation) and falsehood.

For Lee's hypothesis to be valid, the entire *Zhuangzi* would be a kind of sham, a Diary of a Philosophical Seducer. Remember, Zhuangzi starts out his text with the wonderful story of the flight of the great bird Peng who takes off on a great adventure, an adventure, a flight, which clearly prefigures the rest of the text. Unlike Wittgenstein, whose later writings were at times, piece-meal and unstructured, Zhuangzi is a great poet-philosopher, and his writings, though at times creating the appearance of unstructuredness, are at bottom deeply structured (cf. Lee, 2007, p. 190). Structure should not be equated with logic. Shakespeare's *Lear* has a great structure to it; but Shakespeare is not a logician.

The great flight of the bird, the bird's transcendence, a flight upwards, which affords the bird an expansive viewpoint, is mocked by the dove and the cicada, Zhuangzi's skeptics, who do not think that such a great voyage is possible. Is Zhuangzi offering to take us on a great adventure just to show us that these creatures, depicted in the text as petty-minded, are right in the end? The bird, itself a transformation from a fish, already embodying the message of the text, is an early symbol of transformation. Is this symbol given to us in order to show that transformation is not possible and the promise offered at the beginning of the text is simply a false lure? Not only would this make Zhuangzi into a philosophical Don Juan, but it would imply a structure, a structure of deceit and ultimately a structure of despair. For the flight in the end would have been for nothing. We did not need to leave the ground to be skeptics. We already have the dove and the cicada for this. We do not need to embark on the great journey with Peng. What is the point of it all? If Lee is correct, this is not only meaningless; it is sadistic. Ironically, if we follow his way, the text is not piece-meal and unstructured; it is devilishly structured to lead us along the primrose path to land in a thicket of thorns.

Why would the elaborate and fanciful poetic philosophy of Zhuangzi be necessary in order to arrive at a great awakening which *pace* Lee is a 'modest realization that our perspectives, like dreams, are ever fallible and corrigible' (Lee, 2007, p. 190).

While, from the standpoint of skepticism, which is a self-refuting standpoint, *one cannot discover that anything is corrigible*, on the other hand, if this is what we gain from the great poet-philosopher, it seems that we did not need stories of birds transforming from fish and dreams of butterflies to convey such a prosaic message. It would be a literary displacement. We would not need ‘a flight into the extraordinary’ to convey the message of Greek skepticism. This would be literary overkill. The medium in this case would *not* be the message and this would make Zhuangzi out to be a hack poet as well as an incoherent philosopher.

This is not to say that one cannot find passages that reflect relativism in the text, but these passages serve the purpose of breaking down conventional arguments that stem from adopting specific, dogmatic standpoints. Together with these charming passages, designed to break down dogmatic positions, there is another line of ‘argument’ developed in the *Zhuangzi*, which is designed to lead the reader in the direction of spiritual transformation and it is this line of argument that seems to be missed by some commentators.⁴ That this line of argument bears certain resemblances to Buddhism is not an argument that this is a false interpretation of Taoism. (The only ‘evidence’ that Taoism cannot speak on behalf of enlightenment that Lee offers is the quotation from Graham that ‘there is no implication that it is either possible or desirable for the living to awake from their dream’.) It only shows that there is a kinship in all great traditions.

Ironically, if one analyzes the last sentence in Lee’s essay in which he discusses the theses of the present author, one discovers that he thinks that the butterfly dream does signify something positive. For Lee, and here he quotes Taylor, ‘the butterfly dream provides a critique of epistemology in which we discover something of our deep or authentic nature as selves’ (Lee, 2007, p. 191). Such a gain is impossible and illicit on Lee’s interpretation that Zhuangzi’s epistemology cannot distinguish reality from illusion, truth from falsehood. We cannot discover something of our *authentic* nature unless there is a distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, truth and falsehood, validity and invalidity. On Lee’s interpretation of Zhuangzi, no such distinction is either possible or desirable.

Lee cannot have it both ways. There is nothing authentic that one can discover in the realm of mistakenness. There is nothing valid to be discovered in the realm of confusion. If there is no waking up, no enlightened state, no state which is above confusion, then we cannot discover something ‘of our deep or authentic nature’.

What is Lee’s only ‘argument’ that there is no enlightenment? It is that Graham does not think that there is. A quotation from Graham is not an argument. It is *an argumentum ad autoritatum*, that is, a fallacy.

How can Lee have strayed so far from the textual *Zhuangzi*? Perhaps, a great deal of Lee’s confusion rests in his lack of understanding of the great sage passage. Reading from Lee’s translation which is taken from Graham’s, one can mark the passage, ‘Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream’ (Lee, 2007, p. 190). There is no suggestion here that this ultimate awakening is equivalent to death, but this is the only option for interpretation offered by Lee.

Why or how death is taken to be the meaning of 'ultimate awakening' is unknown and unargued for. It is true that earlier in the textual passage that death along with life is discussed, but there is no connection in the text made between death and an ultimate awakening. Moreover, it is counter-intuitive that death would constitute an awakening of any sort. Why would Zhuangzi liken death to an awakening? What evidence can be pointed to, to indicate this?

In contrast to the ultimate awakening equals death hypothesis of Lee, we can consider Zhuangzi's option that higher knowledge is possible and that one day (not stated to be during death), awakening will be not only a possibility; it will be an eventuality. However much this claim might seem too Buddhist to Lee, it is for all that, all too clearly to be found in the text. In the text of the great sage story, it clearly states: 'Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream'.

There is no reference to death here as in Graham's musings (in the attribution by J. H. Lee). What there is, is a clear statement that there *will* be knowledge of whatever we previously thought before. Ultimate knowledge is not subject to infinite corrigibility or it would not be *ultimate* knowledge. Whereas an infinity of corrigible opinion may have satisfied Wittgenstein (in Lee's attribution), it plainly does not satisfy Zhuangzi. Otherwise, he has no need to have recourse to a state of ultimate knowledge. Finality is finality; it is not subject to revision.

The great sage will someday be able to explain all of this to us. In Graham's translation, it reads:

This saying of his, the name for it is 'a flight into the extraordinary'; if it happens once in ten thousand ages that a great sage knows its explanation it will have happened as though between morning and evening.

The appearance of the great sage is the appearance of one who knows the distinction between reality and dream and at the same time can provide an explanation for how we know that at the ultimate awakening we know that everything we had thought previous to the appearance of the great sage was illusory. It does not matter, as Lee argues, where one begins the quotation from this passage (Lee, 2007, p. 190). In the end, wherever we choose to start this story, the ending is the same. *A great sage knows its explanation. The story does not end in confusion or corrigible explanation.* It ends in knowledge. If all that ultimate awakening amounted to was a knowledge of fallibility (which appears to be the interpretation of Lee), we would already have this in the idea of Socrates' or Laoji's knowledge of ignorance. This did not require an ultimate awakening on the part of Socrates or Laoji.

That knowledge is fallible is a commonplace among contemporary analytic philosophers and few if any would seem to claim to have had an ultimate awakening. To put this point slightly differently, the ultimate awakening passage demonstrates conclusively that in principle it is possible that a sage will appear who will know the difference between reality and dream. Whether or not the butterfly or the dreamer in the butterfly dream story can know this may be moot, but there is no question that the great sage can know this. The great sage is not lost in the confusion of not being able to discern illusion from reality. There is no

epistemological relativity. The great sage passage is coherent with the adumbration of chapter 1 of the *Zhuangzi* where words are different from the chirping of birds. The great sage will explain how this is possible. It is not up to us to explain how he will explain this. This will take us beyond the *Zhuangzi*. What is crucial for the proper understanding of the *Zhuangzi* is that, in principle, the great sage will be able to provide an explanation. In short, an explanation is possible in principle. This is not confusion. This is the promise of clarity.

The great sage is the embodiment of the verification principle for being able to distinguish truth from falsity, reality from illusion, clarity from confusion. The great sage is the spiritual counterpart of A. J. Ayer's verification principle in logical positivism. In the famous example of there being mountains on the other side of the moon, Ayer argued that in principle it was possible to verify this though at the time of the writing of his *Language, Truth and Logic*, it was not empirically possible to do so. Similarly, while a great sage is possibly not available yet, it is possible in principle for a great sage to arrive. For *Zhuangzi*, the possibility of the great sage is not merely possible in principle, it is an empirical eventuality.

While it could be argued that the butterfly dream does not carry the implication that in Graham's quotation that 'it is either possible or desirable to awaken from the dream', there is no question that the possibility and the desirability of awakening from the dream are clearly stated in the great sage dream story. We look forward with anticipation to the great sage and *the knowledge, not the confusion* or lack of understanding, that will be provided. We look forward to the prospect of moving from a state of confusion to a state of knowledge. This possibility is not a mere logical possibility; it is put forward as an eventuality and an eventuality that is to be looked forward to with anticipation. We look forward to clarity, not confusion. This is not surmise; this is textual. In Graham's version: 'Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream'.

This is not a logical possibility; it is a future promise. It does not say 'if there is an ultimate awakening'. It clearly states that at the ultimate awakening—and there is no doubt that such an event will occur—we shall have knowledge. It says later that 'if it happens once in a thousand ages that a great sage knows its explanation' the point is that it is epistemologically possible in principle that an explanation of an ultimate awakening is possible. This cannot be equated with either confusion or the counsel to be satisfied with confusion. This cannot be equated with corrigibility or the counsel to be satisfied with corrigibility. This is a promise that one day, knowledge and ultimate knowledge will be not only possible, but actual, and the philosophical explanation of its actuality simply waits upon the arrival of a great sage who comes along once in every ten thousand ages.

That a great sage may appear who will be able to supply an explanation is a statement that such an explanation is possible. *If an explanation is possible, this is not confusion. We are not to be left in confusion forever*; our lot is not to be left with the knowledge that we are fallible beings. We are left with hope. We are left, not with the blind digging of the mole or the upside down hanging of the bat. We are left with the transformation and the beautiful flight of the butterfly.

In the great sage passage, it is true that death and life are discussed at the beginning of the passage, but the passage moves on. The most relevant part of the passage for our purposes is the passage that occurs *after* the questions of whether life or death are delusions. After these series of *seemingly* unanswered and unanswerable questions, it is clearly and univocally stated that ‘While we dream we do not know that we are dreaming, and in the middle of a dream interpret a dream within it; *not until we awake do we know that we are dreaming*. Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream.’ (emphasis added)

It is clear from the passage that one moves from a physical dream to a physical awakening—note the italicized passage. The ultimate awakening is clearly marked as an analogy with physical awakening—albeit an awakening on a higher level—since it occurs directly after a statement referencing physical awakening. At the point of ultimate awakening—if this is not a state of enlightenment, then I do not know what a state of enlightenment or awakening is—we possess knowledge. It cannot get any clearer than this. Knowledge, not confusion is what we possess. *This* knowledge is not a fallible and corrigible perspective. To know all that has gone before is a dream is only possible if one is experiencing a state of reality.

The analogy is clear. It works like this. It is only when we physically awaken from a dream (and therefore experience what we experience while awake) that we can know what we had experienced previously was a dream. Analogically, it is only in a state of knowledge, in a state of contact with reality, that one can know what is an illusion. This state is not a corrigible, fallible state. It is an ultimate state of knowledge. What we gain from this is not the ‘modest realization that our perspectives, like dreams, are ever fallible and corrigible’ (a substitution by commentators for the actual opposite textual claim). We gain from this that one day there will be a state of knowledge.

In waking up from a physical dream—and this is a Taoist image, not a Buddhist one—we can then know that we were dreaming. We can know dreams from a state of reality. Likewise, when we have an ultimate awakening—a Taoist image as well as a Buddhist one—we can know that what we previously thought was reality was all illusion. This is not a statement about corrigibility; it is a statement about our understanding that what we experienced pre-awakening was *illusory*. This is not a statement about corrigibility; this is a statement about reality and illusion. This is not a statement about ‘our perspectives’ (note there is no quantifier here but the logical implication is ‘all our perspectives’), like dreams are *ever* fallible and corrigible’ (emphasis added); this is a statement that all of our *previous* (*plainly excluding the present statement*) statements did not capture reality.

For Lee, we awaken ‘to the more modest realization that our perspectives, like dreams, are ever fallible and corrigible’ (Lee, 2007, p. 190). This cannot be the ultimate awakening. The ultimate awakening is not ever fallible and corrigible. Our previous perspectives may have been, but now, post-awakening, we do possess knowledge. This is not what Lee thinks, the concern over ‘the epistemological relativity of *every* perspective’ (Lee, 2007, p. 190, emphasis his). For *every* cannot include the ultimate perspective or it would not be ultimate. It is, and it only can be,

that Zhuangzi's concern is 'on the question of the illusion-reality distinction' (Lee, 2007, p. 190). For it is that all that went before is known to be illusion is what not only what is seen by the sage, but what all of us will eventually see for it is said in the *text* that 'Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream'.⁵ The knowledge that is possessed is of the understanding that what we thought to be true was an illusion.

We *were* confused; we *will* reach a state when we shall possess clarity. Illusion can only be perceived from a standpoint of reality, just as a dream can only be perceived to be a dream when one wakes up: 'not until we awake do we know that we are dreaming'.

We do not remain in the dream forever. That is the entire point of waking up. That is how we know we were dreaming: by waking up. Philosophically speaking, the only way we can understand that our previous perspectives were not grounded in reality is by a philosophical awakening, an awakening that Zhuangzi assures us will occur, and along with it, a sage who will explain how it was possible.

Notes

- [1] For evidential passages demonstrating that there is a distinction drawn in Zhuangzi between truth and falsehood, cf. Allinson (2003).
- [2] This is argued at length in 'The great sage dream: The case of external textual transformation' (Allinson, 1989, ch. 7).
- [3] Cf. 'The goose that cackled' (Allinson, 1989, ch. 12).
- [4] Cf. The Preface and the Introduction (Allinson, 1989).
- [5] It must be recalled that the butterfly dream story is not a story that refers to an ultimate awakening. Even if one takes the view that that story can betoken confusion, the great sage dream story admits of no such interpretation. Most importantly, it is the great sage dream story that speaks of the ultimate awakening. The butterfly dream story may need to be relocated in the text to precede the great sage dream story so that it is clear that it is a provisional point of view to be trumped by the great sage dream story, or its fragment sequence may need to be reordered such that a state of confusion is not the final result of the dream. An entire chapter in *Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation* (Allinson, 1989) is devoted to justifying each of these strategies. The justification for the reordering of the fragment sequence is outlined in chapter 6, 'The butterfly dream: The case for internal textual transformation' and the justification for the relocation of the butterfly dream story in the text is set out in chapter 7, 'The butterfly dream: The case for external textual transformation'. In the absence of any definitive ordering of the text, such strategies are considered justifiable by no less of an authority than Burton Watson (cf. Watson, 1993).

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