Content, object, and phenomenal character

Authors

  • Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves The University Of Texas at Austin

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p417

Abstract

The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011) attempts to defend the object view; (3) refine Pautz’ (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) arguments against the object view, which mainly resort to the fact that it cannot account for the grounding role of hallucinatory experiences; (4) and finally adjudicate in favor of the content view and against the overestimation of the naïve intuition.

Author Biography

Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves, The University Of Texas at Austin

Department of Philosophy

Philosophy of Mind - Perception

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Published

2012-09-23

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Section

Articles