

INTROSPECTION

SINCE we have treated our direct awareness of our own mental states as 'inner sense', it is natural to deal with introspection immediately after perception. But because the nature of introspective awareness plays a vital role in our argument, a good deal has already been said on the topic. It may be advisable, therefore, to begin by recapitulating what has been dealt with elsewhere. This is the business of the first section.

I. RECAPITULATION

In sense-perception we become aware of current happenings in the physical world. A perception is therefore a mental event having as its (intentional) object situations in the physical world. In introspection, on the contrary, we become aware of current happenings in our own mind. Introspection is therefore a mental event having as its (intentional) object other mental happenings that form part of the same mind. Nevertheless, introspection may properly be compared to sense-perception, and Kant's description of introspection as 'inner sense' is perfectly justified.

The possession of language may alter, and make more sophisticated, our perceptions. But perception is not logically dependent on language for its existence, as is shown by the fact that animals and young children can perceive although they cannot speak. In the same way, there seems no reason to think that introspection is logically dependent on language. That is to say, introspection does not logically demand the making of introspective reports, or

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having the power of making introspective reports. It seems plausible to say that animals and young children do not merely have pains, but are aware of having pains. It seems perfectly possible that they not merely have desires, perceptions and mental images, but that they are aware of having such things. If so, they have the power of introspection, although they lack the power to make introspective reports. Incidentally, this is compatible with the view that there is a close empirical connection between the possession of any extensive introspective ability, and the power to use language.

In the case of perception, we must distinguish between the perceiving, which is a mental event, from the thing perceived, which is something physical. In the case of introspection we must similarly distinguish between the introspecting and the thing introspected. Confusion is all the more easy in the latter case because *both* are mental states of the same mind. Nevertheless, although they are both mental states, it is impossible that the introspecting and the thing introspected should be one and the same mental state. A mental state cannot be aware of itself, any more than a man can eat himself up. The introspection may itself be the object of a further introspective awareness, and so on, but, since the capacity of the mind is finite, the chain of introspective awareness of introspections must terminate in an introspection that is not an object of introspective awareness.

If we make the materialist identification of mental states with material states of the brain, we can say that introspection is a self-scanning process in the brain. The scanning operation may itself be scanned, and so on, but we must in the end reach an unscanned scanner. However, the unscanned scanner is not a logically unscannable scanner, for it is always possible to imagine a further scanning operation. Although the series logically must end somewhere, it need not have ended at the particular place it did end.

The distinction between the introspecting and the introspected state casts light on the much-lamented 'systematic elusiveness of the subject'. The 'elusiveness' of that mental state which is an awareness of some other state of affairs, physical or mental, is a mere logical elusiveness, the consequence of the fact that the awareness of something logically cannot also be an awareness of that awareness.

In the case of most forms of sense-perception we say that we

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perceive *with* certain parts of the body. These parts of the body we call sense-organs. The full concept of a sense-organ involves both (i) that perceptions of a certain characteristic range arise as a causal result of the stimulation of these parts of the body; (ii) that certain alterations in these parts of the body are under the direct control of the will, alterations which enable us to perceive different features of the environment. As we saw in discussing perception, it is logically impossible for every perception to be a perception gained by the deliberate use of some sense-organ. For the will can only function where there is perception; to alter deliberately the state of a sense-organ we must perceive what is happening to the sense-organ. If this perception itself demands a sense-organ, and so *ad infinitum*, we are involved in a vicious infinite regress. This argument does not identify those perceptions that do not involve the deliberate use of an organ; but in fact it seems that all bodily perceptions fall into this class. The so-called proprioceptors, stimulation of which gives rise to bodily perception, are not *organs* in the fullest sense because their operation is not under the direct control of the will. In bodily perception there is nothing we perceive *with*.

Bodily perception has the further peculiarity that its object—our own body—is private to each perceiver. If each of us were confined to bodily sense, there would be no overlap between our sense-fields, in the way that there is overlap in the case of the other senses. This privacy is purely empirical, and we can imagine having the same direct perceptual access to states of other people's bodies that we now have to our own.

These two features of bodily perception make it an appropriate model for introspection conceived of as 'inner sense'. In the first place, when we are aware of happenings in our own minds, there is nothing that we are aware *with*. (If there were an organ involved it would be something whose operation was under the direct control of our will. This, in turn, would demand a power of gaining direct awareness of the different states of this 'introspective organ'. At some point there would have to be a direct awareness that did not involve the use of an organ.) In the second place, our introspective awareness is confined to our own minds. It was argued elsewhere that it is only an empirical fact that our direct awareness of mental states is confined to our own mind. We could conceive of a power of acquiring non-verbal non-inferential knowledge of

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current states of the minds of others. This would be a direct awareness, or perception, of the minds of others. Indeed, when people speak of 'telepathy' it often seems to be this they have in mind.

When we perceive, there are many (indeed innumerable) features of our environment that we do not perceive. In the same way, when we are aware of our own current mental states, there are mental states and features of mental states of which we are unaware. These are mental states or features of mental states of which we are unconscious. Unconscious mental states stand to conscious mental states, in the realm of our own mind, as unperceived states of affairs stand to perceived states of affairs in the physical realm. In between the unperceived and the perceived there are those things which are just perceived, or are marginally perceived. In the case of introspective awareness there is a similar twilight zone.

Perception may be erroneous. We argued at length in Chapter 6 that, contrary to what might be called the Cartesian tradition, it is equally possible for introspection to be erroneous. This does not mean that introspective awareness may not *in fact* regularly satisfy the conditions for *knowledge*.

Eccentric cases apart, perception, considered as a mental event, is the acquiring of information or misinformation about our environment. It is not an 'acquaintance' with objects, or a 'searchlight' that makes contact with them, but is simply the getting of beliefs. Exactly the same must be said of introspection. It is the getting of information or misinformation about the current state of our mind.

It is the burden of this book that a mental state is a state of the person apt for the bringing about of certain bodily behaviour. So when I acquire by introspection the information that, for example, I am sad now or that I have a certain sort of perception now, this information is information about certain of my behaviour-producing or potentially behaviour-producing states. Now if introspection is conceived of as 'acquaintance' with mental states, or a searchlight that makes contact with them, it is difficult to see how all it can yield is information of such highly abstract nature about inner causes or potential inner causes. But if introspection as well as perception is conceived of as a mere flow of information or beliefs, then there is no difficulty.

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We can even find an analogy for the sort of information acquired in introspection in the tactual perception of pressure upon our body. In such tactual perception we may be aware of no more than that something we know not what is pressing, with greater or lesser force, upon us. 'Pressing with greater or lesser force' here seems to mean no more than a greater or lesser aptness for producing a certain sort of effect: either the distortion or motion of our flesh.

The only further topic to be recapitulated is that concerning the biological value of introspection. We argued that without introspection there could be no purposive mental activity. As we have seen, purposive physical behaviour logically demands perception. For unless we can become apprised of the situation as it develops, so that this awareness can react back upon the cause that initiates and sustains purposive behaviour, there will be no possibility of the adjustment of behaviour to circumstances that is an essential part of such behaviour. And it is by perception that we become apprised of the situation as it develops.

If there are to be purposive trains of mental activity, then there must equally be some means by which we become apprised of our current mental state. Only so can we adjust mental behaviour to mental circumstances. For instance, if we are doing a calculation 'in our head' we will need to become aware of the current stage in the mental calculation that we have reached. Only if we do become so aware will we know what to do next. So there must be a way of becoming aware of our current mental state, which means that there must be introspection. The biological value of purposive mental activity is, of course, obvious. It permits of a far more sophisticated response to stimuli if we can 'think before we act'. But such thinking must be purposive thinking to be of real value.

This does not imply that purposive mental activity demands a highly self-conscious introspective scrutiny. Something far less may be, and normally is, all that is required. But without information of some sort about the current state of our mind, purposive trains of mental activity would be impossible.

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II. INTROSPECTION AS INNER SENSE: OBJECTIONS

There are certain further objections to accepting the picture of introspective awareness as 'inner sense'. This section will be devoted to considering and rebutting them.

The first difficulty was drawn to my attention by C. B. Martin, although I do not know how seriously he takes it. He points out that although it is a commonplace that we can have perceptions without acquiring beliefs, there is no parallel occurrence of introspective awareness without belief. This sets a gulf between perception and introspection.

Belief-free perceptions occur only when we have both cast-iron reasons for believing that the perception fails to correspond to physical reality, and extensive experience of the deception. Such reasons and such experience are very largely acquired because of the empirical possibility of checking our beliefs by reference to the perceptions of others. Now, in the case of introspection, there is no overlap between person and person in the field of objects presented to each 'perceiver'. Correction of introspective 'observation' is therefore extremely difficult, and it is not easy to be certain that error has occurred. The result is that we do not often find cases where 'the deliverance of introspection' clashes with what we are quite certain are the facts about our current state of mind. However, we can very easily conceive that, in a future where far more is known than at present about the workings of the brain, it would be possible to be quite sure that certain introspections were illusory. I might appear to myself to be angry, but *know* myself to be afraid. So the difference between perception and introspection that Martin has pointed out seems to be a contingent one, and provides no reason to resist the assimilation of introspection to perception.

In discussing perception, we distinguish between 'perception without belief' and 'perception without acquiring of belief'. If a pond looks to me to be elliptical, but I know it to be round, this is a case of 'perception without belief'. If I gaze for a while at a red book, this will normally involve 'perception without acquiring of belief'. For since I know that the book will continue to be red during the next instant, I do not *acquire* any new belief about the book when that new instant arrives and I am still perceiving the book. Now Martin may be correct in saying that 'introspection

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without belief' does not occur. But, we have argued, it is only a contingent fact that it does not occur. It is worth noting, therefore, that introspective awareness without *acquiring* of belief certainly does occur. I may be directly aware that I am angry, and know that my anger will continue for some little while. So when, an instant later, I am introspectively aware of my current anger, I have not *acquired* any belief that I am angry now. In this case, then, the parallel between perception and introspection is complete, which strengthens the view that the lack of parallel pointed out by Martin is not significant for an account of the *concept* of introspection.

A second, closely connected, difficulty is raised by Peter Geach in his monograph *Mental Acts* (Routledge, n.d.). He argues that introspection is not a form of perception because, although there are mental images corresponding to perceptions, it is nonsense to speak of 'introspective images' which stand to introspections as mental images stand to perceptions. He dismisses McTaggart's view that there can be such 'introspective images', saying 'Of course McTaggart's idea is quite wrong, . . .' (Sect. 24, 'The Notion of Inner Sense').

Now we argued that mental images were what might be called a logically degenerate species of perception. They resemble perceptions, but lack essential marks of perception. In the first place, they are not brought into being by stimulation of the sense-organs, but rather by internal causes. In the second place, they involve no acquiring of belief or even 'potential belief'.

Now, assuming Martin to have been correctly answered, introspection without belief is at least a meaningful notion. Assuming our account of mental images to be correct, this gives us introspections which answer to the second criterion for images. It will then not be difficult to conceive of a sub-class of these belief-free introspections which fulfil the first criterion also.

The point about the stimulation of the sense-organs cannot, of course, be duplicated exactly in the case of introspection, but a parallel criterion can be formulated. If introspection is to be compared with perception, we must say that, where it is veridical, the mental state of affairs that we are aware of *brings about* the awareness of it. For, as we have argued, it is an essential mark of veridical perception that the situation that is perceived is the cause of the perception. And even where there is introspective error, in

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normal cases it will be some existent mental state that is 'mis-interpreted', and which has brought about the 'mis-introspection'. For in normal cases of misperception—taking a bush for a bear, for instance—there is an object which is the cause of the perception, and which is said to be the 'thing perceived'. In the introspective case, it may be, for instance, that our mental state is fear. This state is 'mis-introspected' as anger, that is to say, it is the mental state of fear that brings about the 'mis-introspection' that we are angry. (Notice, incidentally, that if introspection demands that the mental state introspected brings about our introspective awareness of it, then any Parallelist doctrine of the mind cannot explain our awareness of our own mental states.) Now, for 'introspective images', all we need to maintain a parallel with mental images is to say that, in addition to their being completely belief-free, they must not be caused by mental states in the fashion that ordinary veridical and illusory introspections are caused. Whether or not there are mental states answering to these criteria is another question, but all we are required to do against Geach is to show the intelligibility of the notion of 'introspective image'.

However, there is one phenomenon in our mental life which perhaps can be understood as involving such 'images'. I refer to the puzzling 'replicas' of emotion that we sometimes have when, for instance, we see plays performed or try to feel ourselves into the emotional situation of others, and which we can sometimes summon up in ourselves at will. When I am aware of 'feeling pity' for Lear, has it not some plausibility to say that my mental state stands to an introspective awareness of real pity much as mental images stand to perceptions? For I do not simply *think* that Lear is to be pitied. I am aware of a mental state that resembles pity. Yet I am not in fact pitying anybody, and I know I am not pitying anybody. (Unless, of course, Lear's plight moves me to real pity for humanity, or something like that.) Here we seem to have quite a plausible candidate for an actual case of an 'introspective image'.

Now to consider an argument of a different sort which is developed by Sydney Shoemaker (*Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*, Cornell University Press, 1963, Ch. 3, Sect. 5). We have pictured introspection as resembling perception. We 'perceive' that we are in a certain mental state. Shoemaker argues that it is a contingent matter, to be settled empirically, whether a certain person is

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perceiving a certain object or not. I can perceive Jones, perceive a tree and perceive whether or not he perceives the tree. If we follow out this pattern with regard to introspection, it ought to be possible for me to perceive myself, perceive a particular mental state that I am in and perceive whether or not I am aware of that mental state. But this is not possible, Shoemaker argues. It is impossible that I should perceive that I was not perceiving the mental state, because I automatically must be perceiving it. So we must give up the comparison of introspection to perception.

The argument is undoubtedly ingenious, but it is an ingenuity that does not produce a great deal of confidence. It is reminiscent of Berkeley's ingenious but sophistical argument that a thing cannot exist unthought of because, when one tries to imagine such a thing, one is *ipso facto* thinking of it. Let us seek release by considering a third person instead of a first person case.

It is sometimes possible to perceive (mediately) that another person is in a certain mental state. Now we have allowed that a person can be in a mental state without being aware that he is in that state. So, having observed that the person is in that mental state, might we not seek to learn by further observation whether or not he was aware that he was in that state? And would it not be a contingent fact which of the two alternatives was the case? Here we have the parallel to the perception of Jones, the perception of a tree and the perception that Jones is or is not perceiving the tree. We perceive Jones, perceive his anger and perceive that he is or is not aware of being angry. There seems no shadow of incoherency in this third person case. This suggests that any incoherency in Shoemaker's case may not spring from applying the model of perception to the case of introspection.

It may be objected that this case is no real parallel to the case of introspection. For in the case of Jones our perception is clearly inferential. But introspection is supposed to be direct, that is, non-inferential, awareness of our own mental states.

But we can overcome this objection by constructing an imaginary case. Suppose I have telepathic powers with respect to Jones's mental states. On a certain occasion I acquire 'by telepathy' the knowledge that Jones is in a particular mental state. That is to say, I acquire the non-inferential knowledge that Jones is in a particular mental state. I am left in doubt whether Jones is or is not aware that he is in that mental state. But then, perhaps after

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further effort of concentration, I acquire non-inferential knowledge on this point also. Is this not a third person parallel to Shoemaker's case?

Emboldened by this, let us consider the first person case. Suppose I acquire a piece of unwelcome information. May I not scrutinize myself to see whether I have fully accepted the information? And may I not come to realize that a part of my mind has rejected it? (Supporting evidence might be the fact that I continued to act, or had impulses to act, in a way that was only appropriate if the information was false.) And if this occurs, is it not the very case that Shoemaker claims to be impossible? Part of my mind 'perceives' that another part of my mind fails to perceive the truth of certain information. Shoemaker may still object that since part of my mind perceives the truth, therefore *I* perceive the truth. This is true, but surely trivial. I perceive the truth, but I also do not perceive the truth. And I perceive that I do not perceive the truth.

It may be objected that this is a case of 'split consciousness'. This is true. If I accept the truth at all levels of my mind, that is to say, if my mind is not split on the matter, the situation cannot arise. But is not the inquiry into whether or not my mind is split in this way about a piece of information always a logically possible inquiry? And is this not parallel to the inquiry about whether Jones can or cannot see the tree that I see? So I do not think that Shoemaker's clever argument need worry us.

The final objection to conceiving of introspection as a form of observation stems from a point noticed by Hume. Wittgenstein once remarked:

'... if you go about to observe your own mental happenings you alter them and create new ones; and the whole point of *observing* is that you should not do this——' (I have lost, and have been unable to trace, the reference)

I do not think this argument has much weight. It is true that a careful and attentive scrutiny of our own current mental state will often serve to alter it. But the relatively 'reflex' awareness of our mental state, which is more usual, does not normally alter the state 'perceived'. In any case, I am quite unable to see how the argument can be stated without assuming the possibility of the very thing it is supposed to call into question. Wittgenstein

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himself speaks of attempting 'to observe your own mental happenings'. And how else could he identify the attempt? I am inclined to take the point, therefore, as Hume took it: a mere empirical difficulty for introspective observation.

III. INTROSPECTION AND BEHAVIOUR

We have argued that introspection is the acquiring of information (or misinformation) about our own current mental states. These mental states will be, *qua* mental states, states of the person apt in their various ways for the production of certain sorts of physical behaviour. So introspection will be the acquiring of information about current states of ourselves apt for the production of certain behaviour. But, of course, introspective awareness of mental states is itself a (distinct) mental state (more precisely, it is a mental event). So it, too, must be an aptness for certain behaviour: a certain sort of selection-behaviour towards ourselves. Now since the concept of a mental state is such a complex one, as compared to simpler concepts like 'red' or 'round', it will be advisable to spell out in more detail the sort of behaviour a person would have to exhibit to convince us that he had the capacity for introspective discriminations. This is the business of this section.

It may be helpful to consider an imaginary model first. What behaviour would convince us that a person could acquire a *non-inferential* knowledge that certain substances, such as untoughened glass, were brittle simply by putting their fingers in contact with the substance?

It will not be enough that the person was able to discriminate in a systematic way between material that is brittle, and material that is not brittle. Such behaviour will show that the perceiver can make a distinction between two sorts of material, a distinction that is in fact the distinction between being brittle and not being brittle. But does the perceiver perceive the distinction *as* the distinction between being brittle and not being brittle? The successful sorting does not demonstrate this.

What must be added? In the first place, the perceiver must be able to discriminate between those occurrences which constitute the manifestation of the disposition of brittleness and those which do not. For instance, a number of samples of material are struck sharply. Some break up, shatter or fly apart. Some do not. The

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perceiver must demonstrate that he can discriminate between the first sort of performance and the second sort.

This addition, although necessary, is clearly insufficient. The perceiver has still got to demonstrate that he understands the link between the first sort of discrimination (where nothing actually happens to the samples of material) and the occurrence or non-occurrence on other occasions of breaking, shattering or flying apart as a result of being struck. What sort of behaviour will demonstrate understanding of this link?

The answer is that the behaviour must have as its *objective* the actualization of the disposition or the prevention of the actualization of the disposition. Suppose the perceiver is rewarded when samples of material do not break, but punished when they do break. Suppose, after touching samples of material, the perceiver sorts them into two groups which are in fact the group of the brittle and the group of the non-brittle materials. Suppose furthermore that he treats objects in the two groups differently. The first group are handled very carefully, that is to say they are handled in a way that is, as an objective matter of physical fact, not conducive to their breaking. The other group are handled in a quite normal way, that is to say, a way that would as an objective matter of physical fact be conducive to their breaking if, contrary to the facts, they had been brittle. Does not such behaviour show that the perceiver perceives the connection between the original tactual discrimination and the brittleness or lack of brittleness of the samples? The perceiver has shown a capacity to link the original discrimination with later easy breaking and absence of easy breaking.

Let us now use this case as a model (over-simple and over-schematic perhaps) to unfold the behaviour that will betoken the making of non-inferential introspective discriminations. Let us take as our example the non-inferential awareness that we are angry.

We must in the first place exhibit a capacity to behave towards ourselves in a systematically different way when we are angry and when we are not angry. (Such behaviour, of course, must be something more than the behaviour the anger itself expresses itself in, if it does express itself. For this would allow no distinction between a mere angry state, and *being aware* that one was in an angry state.) To take a quite artificial example, we might exhibit

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the behaviour of pressing a button that lighted up a red light, when, and only when, we are angry.

(It is clear, incidentally, that the teaching and learning of such discriminations will be a rather tricky business in the case of anger that is not expressed in angry behaviour. Nevertheless, even if there are (empirical) difficulties in *checking* on whether discrimination has been successful, we can still have the possibility that it *is* successful and that in fact we light up the red light when and only when we are angry.)

This behaviour so far only shows that we can discriminate between the cases where we are in fact angry, and the cases where we are not. It does not show that we are aware of the distinction *as* a distinction between being angry and not being angry. What further capacities for behaviour must we exhibit?

In the next place, we must have the capacity to discriminate systematically between angry behaviour and non-angry behaviour in ourselves and others. When I say 'angry behaviour' here I do not mean behaviour that actually springs from anger, I mean *angry behaviour*. There can be angry behaviour that has not sprung from anger, and some behaviour brought about by anger is not what we would call *angry* behaviour. But there are certain typical sets of behaviours which occur when we are angry. (The relation of anger to its expression is more complicated than the relation of brittleness to its manifestations.) We must have the capacity to discriminate this sort of behaviour from other behaviour.

Finally, we must exhibit the capacity to link the original discrimination with angry behaviour. We must show ourselves capable of behaviour having as its *objective* the aiding or the inhibiting of the expression of anger. Suppose, for instance, we exhibit the following behaviour. After picking out those cases which are in fact cases where we are angry, we take action that has an inhibiting effect on anger but no similar effect on other mental states. We put our heads in cold water, or address soothing words to ourselves! We take no such action in the other cases. Have we not shown that the original introspective awareness was an awareness of *anger*?

No doubt what I have said here is oversimplified. But I think it has shown that there is no difficulty in principle in giving an account of the introspective acquiring of information about our own mental states as an acquiring of a capacity for certain sorts of

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discriminative behaviour. The parallel between perception and introspection is therefore maintained.

IV. MENTAL STATES AND THE MIND

One final topic remains to be discussed in this chapter. The account given in the last section would seem to be adequate for no more than an awareness of a current happening apt for the production of a certain sort of behaviour in a certain body. (If it is asked 'What body?', the answer is that the awareness is itself an acquiring of a capacity for discriminative behaviour by a certain body, and that the discriminative behaviour is directed towards that self-same body.)

Now if we consider a statement such as 'I am angry now' (taken as a purely descriptive remark), it seems to say more than is involved in the introspective awareness. For does not the use of the word 'I' here imply (among other things) that the current happening apt for the production of a certain sort of behaviour belongs to an organized set of happenings—a mind—all of which are happenings apt for the production of behaviour in the same body? The analysis of the last section does not do justice to this implication.

One might try to brush aside this difficulty by arguing that what is *meant* by 'a mind' is simply that group of happenings which are apt for the production of certain sorts of behaviour in a particular body. Unfortunately, however, this does not seem to be correct. For we can perfectly well understand the suggestion that something which is not *our* mind should have a capacity to bring about certain behaviour by our body of the sort that betokens mind. The notion of such 'possession' of our body seems a perfectly intelligible one, even if we think that in fact it never occurs.

What, then, does constitute the unity of the group of happenings that constitute a single mind? We are back at the problem that proved Hume's downfall. Is it a matter of the resemblance holding between the members of the group, or causal relations, or memory-relations (which are perhaps a sub-species of causal relation)? As we have seen in Chapter 2, it is possible to have mental happenings which we would be prepared to say were ours, yet which fulfilled none of these criteria.

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I do not see any way to solve the problem except to say that the group of happenings constitute a single mind because they are all states of, processes in or events in, a single *substance*. Resemblance, causal relationship and memory are all of them important. Unless there were extensive relations of this sort between the different mental states that qualify the one substance we should not talk of the substance as 'a mind'. But the concept of a mind is the concept of a substance.

In taking the mind to be a substance, then, the Cartesian Dualists show a true understanding of the formal features of the concept of mind. Their view that the mind is a *spiritual* substance is, however, a further theory about the nature of this substance, and, while it is an intelligible theory, it is a singularly empty one. For it seems that we can only characterize the spiritual (except for its *temporal* characteristics) as 'that which is not spatial'. Modern materialism is able to put forward a much more plausible (and much more easily falsified) theory: the view that the mind is the brain. Mental states, processes and events are physical states of the brain, physical processes in the brain or physical events in the brain. (The Attribute theory also takes the mind to be the brain, but takes mental states, etc., as quite special, non-material, states of the material brain.)

But we must however grant Hume that the existence of the mind is not something that is given to unaided introspection. All that 'inner sense' reveals is the occurrence of individual mental happenings. This is the difficulty from which this section started. I suggest that the solution is that the notion of 'a mind' is a *theoretical* concept: something that is *postulated* to link together all the individual happenings of which introspection makes us aware. In speaking of minds, perhaps even in using the word 'I' in the course of introspective reports, we go beyond what is introspectively observed. Ordinary language here embodies a certain theory. The particular *nature* of this substance is a *further* theoretical question, but when ordinary language speaks of 'minds' it postulates *some* sort of substance.

The position, then, is this. Introspection makes us aware of a series of happenings apt for the production of certain sorts of behaviour in the one body. In a being without language, it may be presumed that introspection goes no further than this. Beings with language go on to form the notion that all these states are

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states of a single substance. This postulated substance is called 'the mind'. Once the notion of 'the mind' is introduced, there can be further speculation about its particular nature. (Just as, once the notion of the gene is introduced, there can be further speculation about *its* particular nature.) There is no absolute necessity for such a postulation of a single substance in the observed facts: it is simply a natural postulate to make. And sometimes, particularly in the case of primitive persons, a mental state of which we become introspectively aware may seem so alien to the other members of the 'bundle' that we may form the hypothesis that it is not a state of the same substance of which the other members are states. 'It is not I, but something alien.' Such an hypothesis is perfectly intelligible, even if it is not true, and even if it is a mark of maturity to recognize that everything we become aware of by introspection is part of the *one* mind: our own.

A *person* is something that has both body and mind. It will be seen, then, that when in the past we have spoken of a mental state as a state of a *person* apt for the production of certain sorts of behaviour we already presuppose the existence of *minds*. To that extent, this account of a mental state goes beyond the bare deliverances of introspection, and puts forward a *theory* about the objects of introspective awareness. But provided it is clear that we are doing so, there seems to be no objection to this procedure.