Özgün Makale

Hegelian Roots of Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition*

Axel Honneth'in Tanınma Kuramının Hegelci Kökleri

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Abstract

This study attempts to understand whether there were changes over time in Hegel's opinions on the idea of recognition, which were the basis of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition, and how later philosophers writing on recognition and intersubjectivity have comprehended Hegel's intellectual heritage, together with their criticism of peculiar aspects of Hegel's point of view. In this regard, in order to be able to understand Honneth's theory of recognition, it is necessary to inquire into the relation between Honneth's and Hegel's theories in a philosophical context. The current inquiry is both related to the aspects of how Honneth was affected by Hegel, and is also particularly focused on Hegel's Jena period. The point of emphasis in this study is whether or not Hegel abandoned the theories of intersubjectivity and recognition after his Jena period. Therefore, the discussion focuses on Hegel's Jena period and the aspects which distinguished this period from others. This study also critically examines the views respecting the abandonment of the recognition on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and intersubjectivity after the Jena period, and suggests that recognition and intersubjectivity still retain their dominance on this work known also as Jena *Phenomenology*, dated as the end of the Jena period.

Keywords: Honneth, Hegel, recognition, intersubjectivity

Öz

Bu çalışma, Axel Honneth'in tanınma kuramına temel teşkil eden Hegel'in tanınma ve öznelerarasılık üzerine görüşlerinin zaman içinde değişip değişmediğini; tanınma üzerine yazan sonraki kuşak düşünürlerin Hegel'in düşünsel mirasını nasıl algıladıklarını ve görüşlerini hangi açılardan eleştirdiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, Honneth'in tanınma kuramını anlayabilmek için onun Hegel ile düşünsel bağlamda ilişkisinin sorgulanması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Mevcut sorgulama, Honneth'in Hegel'den ne bağlamda ve ne şekilde etkilendiğiyle ilgili olmakla birlikte özellikle Hegel'in Jena dönemine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu makalede, Hegel'in Jena dönemi sonrası felsefesinde öznelerarasılık ve tanınma kuramlarını terk edip etmediği üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu sebeple ilk önce Hegel'in Jena dönemi ile bu dönemi farklı kılan yönler ele alınmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Jena dönemi sonrasında, *Tinin Fenomenolojisi*'nde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın terk edildiğine dair görüşlerin yeniden gözden

geçirilmesi gerektiği; Hegel'in felsefesinde Jena döneminin bitişine tarihlenen ve Jena *Fenomenolojisi* olarak da bilinen bu eserde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın halen gücünü koruduğu savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Disinformation, insincere speech, epistemic responsibility

The Hegelian Origins of Theory of Recognition

The emergence of Honneth's theory of recognition in the 1990s was clarified by the closeness of the intellectual relationship between Honneth and Hegel (Thompson, 2015, p. 176). In order to understand Honneth's theory of recognition, it is therefore necessary to first comprehend his relation to Hegel in the intellectual context. It cannot be denied that Hegel's writings, especially of the Jena period, were very influential in the emergence of Honneth's theory of recognition. The importance of the Jena writings among his works stems from the fact that he sees recognition not only as a practical model for explaining how people are socialized, but as a moral development in social conflicts. Honneth mentioned his intellectual relationship with Hegel particularly in the first episode of his work *The Struggle for Recognition* (1995) and in his article "Moral Development and Social Struggle" (1992) from the same period.

In these studies, for the very first time, Honneth inclusively put forward the theory of recognition, and he clearly states that the origins of his theory are based on the Jena writings, which are Hegel's earlier works (Honneth, 1992, 1995). In short, Honneth, while establishing the theory of recognition, referred specifically to Hegel's Jena writings written between 1802-1806, rather than his better-known subsequent works. Honneth sees the unity between Hegel's conceptualization of the intersubjective aspect of human identity in the Jena period philosophy, and the historical role he himself has attributed to moral struggles of recognition (Honneth, 1995, pp. 62–63). In other words, for Honneth, in the Jena period, Hegel sees the struggle of recognition as a means of social action in which individuals become increasingly morally demanding.

The mutual demands of subjects for recognition can be defined as a normative tension inherent in social life. This tension and moral conflict between interdependent subjects in a social context eventually emerge as a struggle for recognition. Honneth argues that with the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1807, Hegel abandoned his conception of the central role of recognition in the formation of human identity and social relations, and replaced it with a transcendental philosophy centered on *Geist* (Honneth, 2007, pp. 132–133). In this context, concerning or with regard to intersubjectivity and recognition in *the Struggle for Recognition,* Honneth asserted that *"none of these ever again acquires a systematic function within Hegel's political philosophy"* (Honneth, 1995, p. 63) and that, in later periods, Hegel abandoned these ideas, at least as his central philosophical theme. However, later, Honneth would re-evaluate this claim, and reconsider his position.

According to Frederick Neuhouser, Honneth recently reversed his position, arguing instead that recognition is at the center of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right* published in 1821 (Honneth & Ganahl, 2012; Neuhouser, 2009). This revision shows the significance Honneth attached to his intellectual debt to Hegel in his philosophy. Honneth, indeed, has tried to revive Hegel's concept of ethical life or ethicality (*Sittlichkeit*) and the underlying actualized understanding of freedom, especially in his recent work, *The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel's Social Theory,* published in 2010. In this context, the article is concerned with the context, and the way in which Honneth was affected by Hegel, with a specific focus on the Jena period, which most strongly influenced Honneth. Another important issue to be discussed in this work

is whether Hegel abandoned the theories of intersubjectivity and recognition in post-Jena philosophy, as mentioned earlier. For this reason, it is significant firstly to examine the Hegel's Jena period, and the aspects that differentiate this period from others.

Essentials of Hegel's Jena Philosophy

Hegel left Jena on November 13, 1806, days after the city's fall to Napoleon's armies, taking with him the concluding pages of the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* which he had first drafted in 1801.[2] At the beginning of the Battle of Jena on October 14, 1806, Hegel was working on corrections of the draft.[3] Napoleon entered Jena the day before the war began. In a letter to his friend, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Hegel describes his impressions of Napoleon's entry referring to him as the "world-soul on horseback" (Hegel, 1984, p. 114). The importance of this appellation can be understood in the light of Hegel's desire that the Enlightenment and the French Revolution would spread to Germany. As a matter of fact, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* should be read as evidence that the French Revolution's achievement in practice as the spirit of the revolution was being realized in German "philosophy" and "thought". Hence, Hegel saw Napoleon as the means, albeit unwitting, of the emergence of historical self-consciousness, in other words, the "world spirit on horseback". Leo Rauch states:

> "Hegel says: 'The true is the totality.' Any partial 'truth' would run afoul of its opposite and be contradicted by it. Only the entirety, Hegel believed, can be trusted to give the parts their proper meaning. Only a complete world-system can enable us to understand the details— whether it be a 'detail' such as the battle of Jena, or a philosophical 'truth'" (Rauch, 1983b, pp. 9–10).

When, upon Schelling's suggestion, Hegel left Frankfurt for Jena in 1801, this city was the center of German philosophy, the home to twelve well-known philosophers, including Schiller, Fichte,[4] Schlegel, and Schelling. Shortly after he took up residence at Jena, Hegel authored *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy,* comparing the philosophical systems of his two contemporaries (Rauch, 1983b, p. 10).

It is plausible to classify Hegel's works in the Jena period into critical and systematic writings, and the above-mentioned is one of the most important of his works in the former category (Horstmann, 2016). Receiving the title of *Privatdozent* in the fall semester of 1801-1802, Hegel, continued his critical works throughout this period, publishing other critiques in the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* (Kritische Journal der Philosophie), coauthored with Schelling between 1802-1803. In these pieces, Hegel reveals himself as highly critical of the philosophy of his time, especially of the philosophical positions of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte, whom he accused of developing a reflexive philosophy of subjectivity, as mentioned in the subtitle of *Faith and Knowledge* (Glauben und Wissen), published in 1802 (Horstmann, 2016).

Hegel's Late Jena Period and Intellectual Changes

With Schelling, Hegel developed a new identity-philosophy or philosophy of identity aimed at eliminating the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, to challenge these philosophical tendencies. This identity philosophy can be characterized by two preconditions:
1) Each opposition is the result of the unity of opposites.

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2 Hegel sent some parts of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to his friend Niethammer to pass on to the publishing house a few days before Jena was captured. A few days after the fall of Jena, he had to leave Jena and his home there with the last pages of *Phenomenology.*
3 This war, known as the twin wars of Jena and Auerstedt, was fought with the French forces led by Napoleon III. It took place between the Prussian army under Frederick William and resulted in Prussia losing the war.
4 Fichte lived in Jena until 1799.

2) Opposing factors are unities that appear or are defined as opposing agents.

Hegel argues that "*one should understand the overcoming of the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity as a single process which reconstructs the unity underlying the opposing factors and makes them possible in the first place*" by considering these preconditions (Horstmann, 2016). As in the Jena period, in his later periods, Hegel continued to refrain from abandoning the search for a unity that included internal opposites. His efforts regarding the process aimed at establishing unity led Hegel to develop various systems that would make this unity possible, and named the three components fundamental to all these systems as "Logic and Metaphysics", "Real Philosophy" or "Philosophy of Nature", and "Philosophy of Spirit" (Horstmann, 2016).

In the middle of the Jena period, Hegel declared that he would base his entire philosophy on a unified world system. His lectures of 1803-1804 and 1805-1806 reveal the early versions of this system. These lectures were the first discussions of many concepts and ideas, such as *praxis, recognition, and alienation,* which were to be later deliberated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.* According to Rauch, these ideas have had an impact far beyond their intrinsic values on a range of intellectual works, notably Marxism, existentialism, and social sciences in general (Rauch, 1983b, p. 10). It would surely be appropriate to add to Rauch's list the theory of recognition, especially given its importance today.

While the *Phenomenology of Spirit* continued to be influential after Hegel's death, Jena lectures were not translated into English until James Black Baillie's *The Phenomenology of Mind,* approximately eighty years later. The 1805-1806 lectures were published by Johannes Hoffmeister, under the title *Jenaer Realphilosophie II,* on the centenary of Hegel's death in 1931, and the following year the first part of the lectures conducted in 1803-1804 was published under the name of *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* (Rauch, 1983b). Apart from the Phenomenology of Spirit, systematic studies on the Jena period include *Jenaer Systementwürfe* (Jena Drafts of a Philosophical System). Thanks to these efforts, comprehensive sections of the chapters dealing with the philosophies of nature and spirit are available today (Horstmann, 2016).

These lectures on the philosophy of nature and spirit, dated to the period 1805-1806, discussed intensely in the philosophies of Frankfurt School thinkers like Marcuse and Habermas, would not be translated into English for many years (Rauch, 1983b, p. 11).[5] Although it is possible to define a shift in position in the second half of *Realphilosophie - Philosophie des Geistes* (philosophy of spirit), which includes the lectures of Hegel's last period in Jena, 1805-1806, Hegel also clearly defined his philosophy of this period as *Philosophie der Sittlichkeit* (the philosophy of the ethical life) (Rauch, 1983b). These studies show changes and revisions regarding his concept of spirit, the transformation of the philosophy of spirit, initially presented in the form of an ethical theory of life, into a theory of consciousness.

In this period, Hegel was again concerned with the ideas of Fichte, and in this context, the logical structure of self-consciousness, and as a result, he regarded it as his mission to present a new approach, which he had been struggling with since at least 1804-1805 (Horstmann, 2016). From Honneth's point of view, Hegel's approach towards Fichte in Frankfurt was purely critical, especially at the beginning of the Jena period, and possibly even before. Hegel sees Fichte as a central representative within the tradition of natural right, which failed to provide a theoretical explanation of "*a genuinely free community of living connections*" (Hegel, 1977b, p. 145). However, regarding Fichte's concept of recognition, Hegel had a more positive view, and incorporated

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5 Each series of Jena lectures proposes a different world system in the context of both the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of the human spirit. The challenge faced by all thinkers interested in these lecture notes, according to Rauch, is that these notes contain incomplete texts, perhaps cryptic points that are planned to be opened in the course.

this into the categorical framework of his theory in his "System of Ethical Life", written after his "Natural Law" study published in 1802 (Honneth, 1992, pp. 206–207).

In this way, the philosophy of spirit was freed from its narrow systemic connections, and Hegel developed a structure in harmony with the new concept of spirit. This change provided the framework in which a meaningful systematic context was formed by a combination of the formal structure of self-consciousness, resulting from the unity of universality and singularity, the natural universe, and psycho-social phenomena. Hegel would ever more retain these thoughts on the structure of self-consciousness, the final product of the Jena period (Horstmann, 2016). Therefore, it can be claimed that the development of the theory of recognition in Hegel is one of the most important grounds in his philosophy in the process starting with the establishment of self-consciousness and continuing with the objectification of the spirit.

Hegel's Theory of Struggle for Recognition and its Origins

Recognition is one of the best-known and central themes of Hegel's philosophy of politics in particular, although not of all other areas. For this reason, it is expected that the discussions theorists of society and politics, including Honneth, focus on the "struggle for recognition" shaped by Hegel's master-slave dialectic.[6] For Evangeline Sembou, the term "struggle for recognition" refers to the struggle of individuals for the recognition of their personality by others. This is a struggle for the self, and involves an interpersonal encounter, but should not be understood as aggression among rival egos.[7] When these different approaches to recognition are examined in depth, it is seen that recognition involves not simply a struggle for existence in the encounter with an "other", but rather, a dialectical process, after which the ego reflects on itself, and also to ethical thinking, that will eventually become the basis of the principle of reciprocity.

Hegel leaned on the theory of the struggle for recognition, intending to take a theoretical view of the concept of "social struggle", defined by Machiavelli and Hobbes in their respective political and social philosophies. These writings, according to Honneth, are based on a permanent struggle to preserve the subjects' own physical identities in the context of the reality of social action. Hegel's theory of the struggle for recognition, inspired by Machiavelli and Hobbes, provided justification for the concept of dialectical conflict with moral motivation, rather than purely for individuals' self-preservation, and Hegel envisioned the ethical self-shaping of the spirit (Honneth, 1992, p. 198). In this context, recognition can only be achieved through the process of self-assertion, self-negation, and self-definition in respect to another person (Sembou, 2003, p. 263). The reason is that recognition includes an intersubjective structure, and is based on reciprocity. Therefore, in Hegel's understanding, the formation of one's self is a prerequisite for recognition. Correspondingly, the idea of the struggle for recognition becomes significant for political and social philosophy because of its potential to explain social and political institutions in the context of interpersonal relations (Sembou, 2003, pp. 263–264).

Ideational Shifts in Hegel's Philosophy: Transition from Intersubjectivity and Recognition to Consciousness and Spirit

One of the most prominent polarizations over Hegel's philosophy, including the theory of recognition, is the debate over whether he remained loyal to his interest in the theories of intersubjectivity and related recognition in the post-Jena period. There is strong support for the view that the theories of intersubjectivity and recognition, considered central during the Jena period,

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6 For a discussion on the master-slave dialectic in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, see. (Hegel, 1977a, pp. 111–119)

7 The "struggle for life and death" in Hegel's *Phenomenology theories of Spirit* is an exception to this, see. (Hegel, 1977a, pp. 113–115).

were marginalized in the following periods. Thinkers like Habermas and Honneth argue that the theory of intersubjectivity was sacrificed for the sake of a metaphysical conceptualization of the absolute spirit. Sembou, on the other hand, opposed this view in his article entitled "Hegel's Idea of a 'Struggle for Recognition': *The Phenomenology of Spirit*" in 2003 (Pinkard, 1996; Pippin, 2000; Williams, 1992). In this context, Sembou constructed arguments around his conviction that the intersubjective structure of recognition is preserved, at least in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Sembou, 2003, p. 263).

The Criticism by Jürgen Habermas to Hegel's Ideational Shift

Jürgen Habermas is one of those critical of the loss of importance of intersubjectivity and recognition in Hegel's post-Jena philosophy, and in this context, was a determinant in the formation of Honneth's thoughts on the matter. In particular, Habermas focused on Hegel's Jena period in a chapter of *Theorie and Praxis*, entitled "Labor and Interaction: Hegel's Views on the Philosophy of Jena Spirit" (Arbeit und Interaktion: Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes) referring to his philosophical shifts. This chapter discusses the intersubjectivity of the spirit, the distinctive feature of Hegel's philosophy of the Jena period, especially in the philosophy of spirit discussed in *Realphilosophie I* and *II.* This intersubjectivity, it is argued, emerged in the context of its relation to the dialectic of "self" and "the other" (Habermas, 1973, p. 144). In making this inference, Habermas sets out the aspects in which Hegel's thought differs from Fichte's. For Habermas, Fichte seeks the dialectical relation of "self" and "the other" in the subjectivity of knowing himself, while Hegel, in contrast, attempts to find the dialectical relation of "self" and "the other", i.e., the interaction between the "self" and "the other" as another "self" in the intersubjectivity of the spirit:

> "The dialectic of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, which is expressed in that the "I" simply posits itself, remains confined within the condition of solitary reflection. As a theory of self-consciousness, it resolves the aporias of that relation in which the "I" constitutes itself by knowing itself in terms of (bei) an "other" identified as itself. Hegel's dialectic of self-consciousness passes over the relation of solitary reflection in favor of the complementary relationship between individuals who know each other" (Habermas, 1973, pp. 144–145).

Within the framework of the relationship between "self" and "the other", Hegel developed the concept of "struggle for recognition", in which the person recognizes himself in the other, a clear differentiation from the ideas of Fichte. This struggle for recognition has become a key issue, a matter of almost life-or-death in his philosophy (Habermas, 1973, p. 149).

Habermas argues that in his *Realphilosophie* lectures, Hegel sees communicative action as the mediator of the formative process of the self-conscious soul. Hegel points to the role of three channels in the emergence of this self-shaping process: family (more precisely, family property), language, and labor or means (Habermas, 1973, p. 152). Habermas argues that for Hegel (Habermas, 1973, p. 157), religion is shaped in the dialectic of representation, labor and the struggle for recognition (Sembou, 2003, p. 264). In Habermas' view, Hegel sees the development of spirit as being achieved through the dialectical link between labor and its interaction and the social allocation of nature and mutual recognition. Habermas further argues that even if this dialectical connection between labor and interaction fell from the special position it held in the Jena period, it was nevertheless also evident in the master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Habermas, 1973, p. 161). He attributes this change to Hegel's abandonment of the systematics of Jena's lectures, turning instead to *Enzyklopädie*'s[8] adoption of subdivisions of subjective spirit,

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8 *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences).

objective spirit, and absolute spirit (Habermas, 1973, p. 161). Habermas also emphasizes that even in the context of the young Hegel's *Realphilosophie*, there is an implicit tendency to break from intersubjectivity. As justification, he states that, as a central theme in Hegel's philosophy in the Jena period, his original assumption of the identity of nature and spirit is that spirit is implicit in nature (Sembou, 2003, p. 264). Habermas notes that the dialectical unity of spirit and nature cannot be grasped in the context of intersubjectivity. Thus, in Habermas's view, intersubjectivity gradually gave way to the elaboration of spirit in Hegel's theory (Habermas, 1973, pp. 162–165).

The Criticism by Ludwig Siep and Michael Theunissen to Hegel's Ideational Shift

Ludwig Siep is another theorist who emphasized Hegel's departure from the theory of intersubjectivity in post-Jena philosophy. Siep argues that in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* during and after the Jena period, Hegel refers to two stages in the recognition relationship, each of which has a similar structure. The first of these stages refers to the interaction between individuals, and the other, to the relationship between individuals and institutions.[9] However, Siep argues that, with the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a problematic structure emerged in the second of these levels, that is, significant imbalances emerged in the power relationship between individuals and institutions. For Siep, the main problem is that Hegel doesn't seem to be able to transfer the mutually symmetrical structure of recognition to the later period of his philosophy, leading to the view of a low degree of individual's independence from the state compared to the state's greater authority over individuals.

For Siep, In Hegel's Jena Phenomenology, the highest level of recognition takes place in the context of consciousness, and such recognition brings limitations, especially in the context of reciprocity. These limitations in referring to individuality in the context of recognition show that the individual renounces his individuality and special nature. This structure corresponds to the recognition at the second level of Siep's classification, that is, the relationship between individuals and institutions, and is related to the universal consciousness of the political society. In this context, the universal consciousness can truly forgive, forget and tolerate, but conscience and acting particularity have no rights against the recognized universality.[10]

Michael Theunissen elaborated a similar criticism in his study on Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* of 1821. For Theunissen,[11] Hegel's work presents us with a critical description of the modern thinking of natural law and social reality in a tradition stretching from Hobbes to Fichte (Sembou, 2003, p. 264). For Theunissen, this criticism is made in the first two chapters of the *Philosophy of Right*, namely "Abstract Right" and "Morality". In the context of these criticisms, Hegel proposes an alternative understanding of freedom, and puts forward the theory of intersubjectivity. However, for Theunissen, intersubjectivity seems to contradict the Hegelian doctrine of ethical life,[12] therefore, he explores whether a place for intersubjectivity can be created in the foundations of ethical life with in a three-level framework.[13]

At the first of these levels, intersubjectivity is possible through the concept of "living well", which consists of the absolute end and the determining ground of self-consciousness.[14] At the second level, intersubjectivity is mediated by the objective moral substance, which Hegel defines

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9 (Siep, 1979, pp. 53–54) Quote from (Sembou, 2003, p. 264)
10 (Siep, 1979, pp. 121–126) Quote from (Sembou, 2003, p. 265)
11 German. kritische Darstellung
12 German. sittlichkeitslehre
13 (Theunissen, 1982, pp. 318–321) Quote from (Sembou, 2003, p. 265)
14 German. das lebendige Gute

as the substance or spirit that permeates the lives of individuals.[15] For Theunissen, the problematic nature of ethical life emerges in the self-consciousness of the third level of ethical substance. This level allows the eventual suppression of intersubjectivity and the personification of the ethical essence in the state. In his view, although the domain of intersubjectivity is civil society, Hegel's theory of the state erases every trace of intersubjectivity.[16]

Honneth made a similar criticism, that, after the Jena period, Hegel abandoned the previous important place given to the theory of intersubjectivity and recognition. Honneth's initially intense criticisms on this issue especially in the *Struggle for Recognition,* seem to have been eased later. Honneth's criticism of Hegel is very important, as both being the subject of the article, and as the basis of his own theory.

Axel Honneth's Criticism about Recognition and Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Works

Many writers believe that, after the Jena period, the central theme of Hegel's philosophy diverges from intersubjectivity and its associated recognition. Axel Honneth, one of the currently most influential advocates of these views, seems to owe much to Habermas his understanding of this approach (Sembou, 2003, p. 266). However, compared to Habermas, Honneth has a more intense emphasis on the struggle for recognition that emerged in the ethical shaping of spirit as the major contribution of Hegel's early works in the context of critical social theory.[17]

In this context, Honneth suggests that modern social philosophy emerged with the idea that social life is determined by the struggle for self-preservation in the history of thought. He argues that the young Hegel first developed the theory of "struggle for recognition" by his critical approach to views that had formed the basis of his political and social philosophy as a social struggle for the sake of life, as put forward by Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. In other words, Honneth, referring to the contractual tradition and Niccolò Machiavelli before Hegel, claims that the modern social philosophy is formed in the context of the socialization problematic, depending on the struggle for self-protection (Honneth, 1995, pp. 5–10). Honneth has shifted the basis of his philosophy the process of transforming the struggle for survival, initiated by Hegel, into an ethical, psychological, and sociological struggle for recognition, under the influence of Machiavelli and Hobbes. The struggle for self-preservation has now turned into a struggle for the sake of greater recognition.

A struggle for recognition for Hegel, as Honneth perceives, consists of "*a struggle among subjects for the mutual recognition of their identity generated inner-societal pressure toward the practical, political establishment of institutions that would guarantee freedom*" (Honneth, 1995, p. 5). As another result of this, the demands of individuals for the intersubjective recognition of their identities are embedded in social life as a moral tension. This structure transcends the hitherto institutionalized level of social progress, and thus gradually leads to a communicative state of freedom (Honneth, 1995, p. 5).

Honneth argues that Hegel revised the concept of social struggle in his work *System of Ethical Life* (System der Sittlichkeit), written between 1802-1803. This is in fact a new expression of the modern political philosophy, accepting the state as an artificial rather than a natural institution, and the idea that the philosophy emerged through the study of why individuals socialize, and how they co-exist. In this theoretical framework, it is possible to see in Hegel that the aim of struggle has shifted from self-preservation to recognition.

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15 German. objective sittliche
16 (Theunissen, 1982, pp. 367–381) Quote from (Sembou, 2003, pp. 265–266)
17 Honneth is the student of Habermas and was particularly influenced by his communication theory. In this context, the sphere of rights for Honneth is again defined and expanded by communication.

According to Honneth, Hegel was very impressed by the fact that Machiavelli and Hobbes built a philosophical system on this idea, on the basis that humans were egocentric/selfish/egoist beings motivated by the pursuit of their own interests (Honneth, 1995, pp. 5–6). However, rather than starting from an understanding of struggle based on the idea of "*bellum omnium contra omnes*" (the war of all against all)[18], Hegel argues instead that the result would be the struggle for intersubjective recognition with basic forms of interpersonal recognition (family, forbidden relationships). Once this structure is damaged by different kinds of struggles in the context of crime, a higher structure of relationship, "ethical life" emerges (Honneth, 1995, pp. 17–18).

According to Honneth, the theory of "the struggle for recognition", which has its origins in Hegel's work on *System of Ethical Life*, was further developed with the philosopher's *First Philosophy of Spirit* (Philosophie des Geistes), dated to 1803-1804. In this work of Hegel, philosophical theory of consciousness gradually replaces Aristotelian natural teleology as the dominant theme (Honneth, 1995, p. 27). Through this work, Hegel started to reformulate the model of struggle for recognition. In this process of formulation, different modes of recognition were re-qualified as different stages of the development of consciousness in which spirit is formed. However, according to Honneth, with such a reformulation Hegel compromised the strong structure of intersubjectivity, which as a result, loses its social-historical character, and becomes an analysis of the individual's education for society (Honneth, 1995, pp. 29–30).[19] Moreover, Hegel began to see spirit as the unifying element of truth. Thus, his philosophical analysis reached a structure that follows the development of spirit "*which plays itself out within the sphere of human consciousness*" (Honneth, 1995, p. 33) Hegel discusses the philosophy of spirit in three parts in *Enzyklopädie*, and in the light of this information, it is possible to discern three possible stages of the explanation of spirit in terms of its relation with consciousness (Sembou, 2003, p. 267):

> 1) Subjective Spirit (*der subjektive Geist)*: The relationship between individual consciousnesses. The psychological dimension of spirit.
> 2) Objective Spirit (*der objektive Geist*): The relation of consciousness with social and political institutions. The social and political dimension of spirit.
> 3) Absolute Spirit (*der absolute Geist*): Reflection of socialized individuals to social and political institutions. Art, religion, and philosophical dimension of spirit (Rauch, 1983a, p. 16).

Despite some similarities with Hegel's division in the Jena lectures, the difference here is with the changes in main and subheadings, the importance given to the objective spirit over the other two. This stems from Hegel's concern to show the continuity of the human spirit, which expands from the individual "psyche" to a transcultural structure that encompasses all of humanity. In Rauch's words, in Hegel's philosophy, "*from the level of the individual intellect to that of culture and beyond, there is one Geist which breathes through all*" (Rauch, 1983a, p. 16). From this perspective, spirit has a more universal structure and, according to Honneth, Hegel interpreted the organization of the ethical field through the model of self-disclosure of spirit, and thus leading to the emergence of a structure in which interpersonal relations were reduced to a secondary status (Honneth, 1995, pp. 58–62). As a result, Honneth claims that, in this process, Hegel abandoned the struggle for recognition, which Honneth saw his "original idea". In the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* the sole function of the formation of self-consciousness is defined as the struggle for recognition (Honneth, 1995, p. 62).

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18 It is the famous Latin phrase of Hobbes, which tells that all human beings are hostile to each other in the state of nature.
19 German. bildung.

A Defense on Hegel: Inter-Subjectivity and Recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit

Sembou defends Hegel against the criticism that he abandoned intersubjectivity and recognition in his philosophy, in the post-Jena period. She claims that these criticisms can be challenged by taking the view that the struggle for recognition was partially resolved in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the section under the title master-slave dialectic. Sembou, beyond this, especially in the V. and VI. chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* which can be named *Jena Phenomenology,* claims that some forms of recognition, even if not perfectly conceived are included in the section, albeit implicitly, and with this, a renewed struggle for recognition comes to the fore. Sembou emphasizes sections in which the struggle for mutual recognition and recognition are revealed explicitly or implicitly, He does this by listing the relevant parts and actions according to the chapters of the book. If we transform these parts into items, the result is the following table (Sembou, 2003, p. 267):

Chapter	Chapter Name	The Situation or Action where the Recognition Occurred
V, B.a.	Pleasure and Necessity	The action manifested in the activities of the pleasure seekers of early modern individualism
V, B.b.	The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit	Action arising in the activities of individuals of the "law of the heart"
V, B.c.	Virtue and the way of the world	The action revealed in the activities of the advocates of virtue
V, C.a.	The spiritual animal kingdom and deceit, or the 'matter in hand' itself	Actions observed in the activities of the perpetrators
VI, A.b.	Ethical action. Human and Divine knowledge. Guilt and Destiny	The action revealed in the conflict between Antigone and Kreon
VI, A.c.	Legal status	The action we encounter in the interactions of atomistic individuals of the Roman Empire
VI, B.I.a	Culture and its realm of actuality	Action embodied in the interactions of "noble" and "ignoble" individuals of the world of self-alienated spirit
VI, B.III	Absolute Freedom and Terror	Actions of the French revolutionaries
VI, C.b.	Dissemblance or duplicity	Action expressed in the dissemblance or duplicity of moral selves
VI, C.c.	Conscience. The 'beautiful soul', evil and its forgiveness	The action is seen in the deeds of the "beautiful soul"*

Table 1: The Situation where Recognition Occurs in the Phenomenology of Spirit or the Parts Corresponding to the Action

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The relationship of recognition in this section is a relation between acting consciousness and judging consciousness, as in the master-slave relationship. In addition to the symbol, the action resulting from the relationship between the acting consciousness and the judging consciousness can also be added here.

Hegel, at the end of chapter VI of the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* does not feel the need to propose a model for human interaction since, as explained in the introduction, "*'phenomenology' consists in a philosophical articulation of the 'experience of consciousness' (and from Chapter VI onwards of the experience of 'spirit') through its different 'shapes.*" (Sembou, 2003, p. 268). In the VI. chapter named "Conscience. The 'beautiful soul', evil and its forgiveness", spirit takes its final form in its phenomenological development (Sembou, 2003, p. 268). Therefore, according to Sembou, Hegel's phenomenological explanation in the section mentioned above should be read as more of an understanding of the experience of "conscience" and the nature of human interaction (Sembou, 2003, p. 268).

According to Sembou, Hegel claims to characterize the words of reconciliation or forgiveness in terms of a mutual recognition that he regards as the absolute spirit (Hegel, 1977a, p. 408). From this structure, Hegel's mind is seen to be shaped in the context of intersubjectivity or self-recognition in the other (Williams, 1992, p. 196). In the same vein, it seems possible to view rationality in the same way as mutual recognition. Hegel expresses an example that shows the intersection of reason and mutual recognition in his philosophy as follows:

> "*For it is the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds. The anti-human, the merely animal, consists in staying within the sphere of feeling, and being able to communicate only at that level*" (Hegel, 1977a, p. 43).

Sembou's argument that Hegel preserves the position of intersubjectivity and recognition in this work, is based on the idea that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* consists of sections, and in identifying these, he can point to the part where the change in the book begins. Another important argument in this regard is that it is erroneous to think that a metaphysical view of spirit occupies the dominant position of intersubjective relations in Hegel's philosophy (Sembou, 2003, p. 280).

Spirit, in this context, is the intersubjective or social framework envisaged by the very experience of consciousness, and the modes in which individuals establish relationships among themselves, within a given political community at a given time in history. Sembou suggests that the struggle for recognition is inherent in human relationships, as each individual tries to impose his own needs or understanding of reality on others, demanding that these be recognized. According to the thinker, what we ultimately understand from *Jena Phenomenology* is related to our perspective on the concept of "absolute knowledge" (Sembou, 2003, pp. 280–281). In this context, Sembou offers us the summary of his defense as follows:

> "*If we take 'absolute knowing' to be some positive doctrine or metaphysical truth about reality, then we clearly come to see interpersonal relations as being relegated to merely a secondary status. By contrast, if, as I have suggested, we understand 'absolute knowing' an attitude to reality that is characterized by a preparedness to give another point of view its due and to 'let go' one's partial perspective, then the intersubjectivity of 'spirit' becomes evident. This, in my view, constitutes one of the most important insights of the Phenomenology of 1807 and accounts for the relevance of Hegel's first major work to social and political theory*" (Sembou, 2003, p. 281).

This means that mutual recognition is not the result of instinct or impulse, but the product of rational beings. Again, Hegel also supported this approach by stating "*self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness*" (Hegel, 1977a, p. 110).

In the light of these arguments, according to Sembou, there are reasons to doubt the validity of Habermas, Siep, Theunissen, and Honneth's critical assessment i.e., that there was a virtual abandonment of recognition and intersubjectivity in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* after the Jena period. The reason for the rejection of these criticisms is that this work, dated to the end of the

Jena period and known as the Phenomenology of Jena, still preserves its relevance and power, at least in the body of Hegel's philosophical work. However, it should be added that Sembou wrote his article in 2003, and thus naturally excluded reference to Honneth's subsequent works. It is possible to observe that reading of Hegel's post-Jena works changed Honneth's views on the place of recognition, as expressed in Honneth's later works.

More precisely, in the *Struggle for Recognition*, one of Honneth's early works, Hegel's insight is said to have been confined to the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* (Phänomenologie des Geistes), rather than playing a systematic role in his philosophy. However, according to Jütten, Neuhouser and others, Honneth's more recent works, such as in the *Pathologies of Individual Freedom*, show his emerging belief that Hegel was tending to show a systematic direction for recognition in his later works (Honneth, 2010). This development can be seen as the reason for Honneth's efforts to reinterpret Hegel's idea of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) by giving a central position to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right in his book Freedom's Right* (Honneth, 2010).

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