

DASEIN'S SHADOW AND THE MOMENT OF ITS DISAPPEARANCE

Abstract: In his 1937 lectures, Heidegger searches for Nietzsche's initial thought of "the Moment". This paper mimics Heidegger's pursuit of Nietzsche's Moment by tracing Heidegger's own early arrival at the Moment in *Being and Time*, published 10 years prior to his lectures on Nietzsche. Both Zarathustra and Dasein are chased in and out of an authentic relationship with the Moment by their own shadows, which disappear at midday. Dasein's shadow is the being that is always closest-at-hand, the being in whom I lose myself in everyday care. Dasein forgets itself in inauthentically securing its identity in that which it cares for and that which it is not, darkness. Yet Dasein also confronts its own finitude in its negative double as it witnesses the daily dwindling of its shadow—the everyday *passing away* of time.

Keywords: Heidegger, Nietzsche, temporality, everydayness, authenticity, The Moment, the Everyone

In his 1937 lecture course on Nietzsche, Heidegger traces the recurrence of "the Moment" in Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings. "The Moment," that midday hour in which all shadows disappear, represents for Nietzsche the possibility of a transformed stance toward beings in the world. While the Moment is a kind of temporal transfiguration, Nietzsche identifies it, not as a positive event in time, but rather as an imperceptible shift occurring between the beats of ordinary time. In this sense, as Heidegger notes, the Moment [*Augenblick*], passing in a glance or a blink of the eye, appears as nothing (1984:140). Because the Moment is experienced as nothing more than a glitch in ordinary time, it would seem to be beyond representation. Nietzsche stresses this in characterizing the Moment negatively by silence and blindness (a blink of the eye). Yet Heidegger nevertheless attempts to retell Nietzsche's own experience of the Moment, locating Nietzsche's initial thought of it in his unfinished notes and personal letters, in its first published appearance in *The Gay Science*, and finally in its most developed recurrence in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Heidegger's task is strained not only because he attempts to explicate a Moment that evades representation but also because of Heidegger's own emphasis on the singularity of Moment: we cannot relive the Moment through another's account of it. The hour of the midday sun does not represent a doctrine that can be learned and reiterated but rather the Moment must strike me in my ownmost [*eigenst*] loneliest loneliness.¹

¹ As John Rose argues (2009), Heidegger desires a shift from the temporal framework that structures our historical epoch, which is dominated by metaphysical thinking, to an epoch structured by a new temporal framework; yet Heidegger himself admits that he cannot think "the moment" of this temporal shift from within time. Rose argues that the interruption of everyday time or the questioning of time is a temporality in itself and must be thought within time. Although I agree with Rose that Heidegger fails to think the Moment of the interruption of everyday from within time, I think this is because there is kind of temporality that cannot be represented in philosophical thought. It is precisely at the edge of philosophical thought—where metaphysical thinking fails—that the Moment is experienced (to say this differently, it is at this edge that Dasein temporalizes itself in such a way as to usher in a

Unlike ordinary time or world time [*Weltzeit*], which I necessarily have in common with everyone—the time of the Everyone [*das Man*—the Moment is my Moment that no one else can share. Yet, as Nietzsche portrays it in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, one often approaches the Moment with the company of another. Even if we cannot enter this Moment together we find ourselves *again* standing before it. As Zarathustra tells the dwarf, “You and I in the gateway: must we not return eternally?” (Nietzsche 2006: 126). From this view it is appropriate for Heidegger to chase after Nietzsche’s most hermitic thoughts in his private notebooks or to be chased by the shadow of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the return in the pursuit of his own Moment. In this spirit, I wish to mimic Heidegger’s pursuit of Nietzsche’s Moment by tracing Heidegger’s own early arrival at the Moment in *Being and Time*, published 10 years prior to his lectures on Nietzsche.

Heidegger’s Moment (or Dasein’s Moment) comes to light in *Being and Time* in the second division in Heidegger’s discussion of the ontological significance of the temporality belonging to everydayness [*Alltäglichkeit*]. One thing that Zarathustra and Dasein have in common is that both are chased in and out of an authentic relationship with the Moment by their own shadow, which disappears in the experience of the midday hour. In both cases, the shadow is the (anti)companion who stands with the self before the gateway. In the following pursuit of Heidegger’s Moment, I explore how Dasein’s shadow is the being that is always closest-at-hand, the being in whom I lose myself in everyday care. In caring for its shadow, which Heidegger identifies with the natural justification for ordinary public time, Dasein loses sight of a more originary temporalization of time, which appears as nothingness or timelessness against the regulated succession of organized time. However, the character of the shadow is double: for while Dasein forgets itself in inauthentically securing its identity in what it cares for, that which it is not, darkness, it also confronts its own finitude in witnessing the daily dwindling of its shadow—the everyday *passing away* of time. In fleeing its finitude in the infinity of the public time of the shadow, Dasein runs into the certain and yet indeterminate possibility of its own death, realized fully in the Moment of the shadow disappearance.²

new relationship to everyday time). Heidegger pushes his own thinking to this edge by taking on the impossible task of representing Nietzsche’s moment. It is impossible to catch a shadow but the chase leads us unexpectedly into a new space that at first appears without definition because it lacks the contrast of darkness and light. It is necessary to try to think the unthinkable, to try (and to fail) to think the Moment from within a temporal framework in which it cannot appear.

² In his recent article “Intersubjectivity of Dasein in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*” (2015), K. M. Stroh explores how Dasein overcomes the view of itself as a discrete individual (over and against other individual Dasein) by experiencing itself in the inauthentic community of the Everyone (or the Anyone/the They). Dasein’s absorption in the Everyone conceals a deeper way that Dasein may authentically speak in the collective first person without

Dasein's Sun King

In the final chapter of *Being and Time*, Heidegger turns to an analysis of everyday time, which he associates with the natural movement of the sun. For Heidegger, common time, which we regulate and measure by the use of "time-reckoning instruments" like calendars and clocks, is linked to an inauthentic relationship to the present. This is so because the regularity of public time ordered by a succession of "nows" [*die Jetztfolge*] conceals a different kind of moment, which cannot be counted (or counted on) in the same way we count the hours of the day. Even so, Heidegger attends to everyday time at the end of *Being and Time* to reveal its ontological and existential necessity in the primordial structure of care [*Sorgestruktur*]. The way we care for time itself, by organizing our time into structured hours of the days, which we often "use up" in advance in planning how we will spend our time, points to the way Dasein takes time and loses time. This is also the way Dasein has time or does not have time for the beings it encounters in the world. While everyday time is shaped by our activity of dividing time into regulated units, it is not grounded in number for Heidegger as it is for Aristotle (see for example, Aristotle 1983: 4.10, 218a7; 4.11, 219b2). As Heidegger puts it, "What is existentially and ontologically decisive about reckoning with time must not be seen in the quantification of time, but must be more primordially conceived in terms of the temporality of Dasein reckoning with time" (2010: 392/412). As we will explore, Heidegger suggests that time reckoning first arises out of a desire to save space in order to have space for that which requires our care. Our care for time reflected in the everyday regulated structure of time is not merely the condition for having time for others, rather the time that we share with others is Dasein's very being-in-the-world-with-others or the Everybody arising from the primordial structure of care.

Heidegger imagines Dasein's relationship to ordinary time prior to the development of time-reckoning instruments to show that the common understanding of public time, although an inauthentic relationship to the present, has justification in the natural world and deeper justification in the ontological structure of care. Heidegger emphasizes Dasein's dependency on the sun, especially prior to the invention of handy objects like lights, which can turn night into "day," and clocks, by which we know the position of the sun without any indication from the natural world. On the most basic level, the sun is important to Dasein because it lights up the world revealing what may be

neutralizing the first person singular; and yet the experience of the everyone is also what allows Dasein to understand its inherent intersubjectivity. I parallel and extend this argument by exploring the temporality belonging to the Everyone: shadow-time. I show how the specific temporality of the Everyone is both the condition of community but also that which conceals the community's being in care.

cared for. As he puts it, "Everyday circumspect being-in-the-world needs the possibility of sight, that is, brightness, if it is to take care of things at hand within what is present" (2010: 392/412). However, the sun not only reveals the individual objects at hand but first and foremost the context in which objects are in relation. In this way, the sun is the condition for the relevance of the objective things in the world, which are presented in a context that lets them be known in their usefulness.

The sun is the condition for the presencing of things in sight but also for the foresight of things not yet present; in anticipating the dawn and the tasks that the new day will bring, Dasein is ahead of itself in its care for the future. Thus, we say to ourselves, "Then, when the sun rises, it is *time for...*" Dasein's dependency on the sun for sight and foresight reveals how Dasein's discovery of its surrounding environment [*öffentliche Umwelt*] and its natural environment [*Umweltnatur*] must correspond (2010: 393/413). Dasein awaits the conditions of the natural world, the rising of the sun, for example, to open up the world as something that may be discovered. For the presencing of things in sight, the sun must be in line with objective innerworldly things. However, the foresight of care also requires Dasein to align its own body with the various positions of the sun throughout the day. This personal correspondence of my own bodily position with the spatial position of this heavenly body furthers the possibility for caring for, not only what is immediately at hand, but also the possibility of being-there-for-others in the future. Heidegger explains:

Like sunrise, sunset and noon are distinctive 'places' that this heavenly body occupies...This dating of thing in terms of the heavenly body giving forth light and warmth, and in terms of its distinctive 'places' in the sky, is a way of giving time which can be done in our being-with-one-another 'under the same sky,' and which can be done for 'everyone' at any time in the same way so that within certain limit everyone is initially agreed upon it. (2010: 393/413)

The constancy of the sun makes possible our own constancy for others. Because we are able to count (on) the regularly recurring passage of the sun and place ourselves in spatial relations to this reliable body, others may count on us to be present for them. We can say, "When the sun rises tomorrow I will meet you here again as I have done today and the day before". *In this way, the sun, which is constant and available to all makes possible not only being-with-one-another in the present, by providing us with the vision of a context to which we both belong and thus belong together, but allows for the promise of being-there-for-another in the future.*

Heidegger's analysis of "primitive" Dasein's dependency on the sun may at first seem only significant in terms of Dasein's ontic experience of the world: the light of the sun makes our surroundings visible; the objective

nature of the sun provides a public point of reference for all who are under the same sky; the regularity of the sun allows for the datability of the future (the possibility of making a date). However, the ontological structure of care and the primacy of the future shows itself even in (perhaps especially in) this most natural understanding of time through the daily ascent and descent of the sun. *When Heidegger turns to primitive Dasein's initial reckoning with time, it is not to point out the underdevelopment of Dasein's crude conception of everyday time prior to a later more sophisticated practice of time-reckoning. Nor is it to reveal primitive Dasein's engagement in the world as ontologically poor. Instead, Heidegger insists that there is something in Dasein's most natural relationship to the sun that has been concealed through the development of the science of time and the technology that has come to replace Dasein's direct attention to the sun.*³

To say that everyday time initially arises from the primordial structure of care is not to deny that primitive Dasein also forgets itself when it temporalizes itself according to the movement of the sun. Perhaps what is most revealing about Dasein's daily reliance on the sun is that it suggests that, even before being absorbed into the business of everyday taking care, Dasein has already forgotten itself while awaiting the dawn. In longing for the light of another, Dasein forgets itself as a great light that also illuminates the world to be discovered in care.

In *Engaging Heidegger*, Richard Capobianco argues that while in his late work Heidegger denies the connection of *lux* with his characterization of Dasein as *die Lichtung*, Heidegger's early work does employ the illustration of light to describe Being. "One of the fundamental features of his mature position of the 1960s," Capobianco argues, "is that *die Lichtung*, thought metaphorically as a spatial clearing in the wood or forest, is emphatically not to be defined in terms of *lux*, that is, 'light' in the sense of 'luminosity' or 'brightness'. What has been largely overlooked is that this is not how Heidegger thought about the matter early on in *Being and Time*" (Capobianco, 2010: 89). The motif of light is significant in *Being and Time* and Heidegger's writings around this time in Heidegger's description of Dasein longing for the light of the sun; but also in his characterization of Dasein

³ James Gilbert-Walsh (2010) offers an insightful discussion of the tension of attempting to think pre-discursive temporality through discursive thought. Gilbert-Walsh argues that Heidegger shows us that this impossible task is also a necessary pursuit if we are to understand the *arché* of time. Our very failure to represent an originary temporality, which evades discursive thought, interrupts our relationship to everyday time. As I argue Heidegger's impossible task of representing Nietzsche's philosophy of the moment—by extension, my own attempt to depict Heidegger's philosophy of the moment—is a project that explores the tension between two temporal orders. A philosophical practice that knowingly sets itself up for failure opens itself to its own experience of the moment that occurs at the edge of these orders. Gilbert-Walsh turns to Heidegger to tease out this temporal glitch in the tension between discursive and pre-discursive being. In the same spirit, I explore the temporal edge where the body and the shadow meet.

itself as a great light that is a condition for the illumination of the world. As Heidegger explains in his *Lectures on the Concept of Time*, "Dasein by itself, by its nature, in what it is, has a light. It is intrinsically defined by a light...the manner of a mere thing stands beyond or before light and dark. By contrast, the idea that the *lumen naturale* belongs to the Dasein of man means that *it is lighted within itself*" (1992: 297/412). While a stone can have no experience of light or darkness but rather stands before it as something that can be illuminated and seen, Dasein recognizes that "day with its brightness gives it the possibility of sight, night takes it away" (Heidegger, 2010: 393/413). While many animals also rely on the sun for sight, human Dasein is different because it understands itself as a seeing being that awaits the sun.

In his discussion of Dasein's reliance on the sun in *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses the concept *lumen naturale*, on one level, in a way that is consistent with the ontotheological tradition reaching from Augustine to Aquinas. Dasein is the kind of being whose natural understanding allows it to bring to light what is objectively present. As in Plato's cave analogy, which the Neoplatonic Latin notion of *lumen naturale* draws on, the human understanding of the things it encounters in the world is possible through the illumination of a greater light. While Heidegger denies the illumination of the divine light, in a quite literal way, he shows how Dasein ontically depends on the sun to fulfill its structure in care. As Capobianco points out, Heidegger is not critical of the traditional metaphor of *lumen naturale* but he considers it to be merely ontic description of Dasein's engagement in the world (2010: 89). The trouble, however, with the traditional interpretation of *lumen naturale* as well as Dasein's inauthentic understanding of its dependency on the sun, is that it neglects the ontological structure of Dasein's own light. As Heidegger explains:

The ontically figurative talk about the *lumen naturale* in the human being means nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this being, that it is in such a way as to be its there. It is 'illuminated' [*erleuchtet*] means that it is lighted [*gelichtet*] in it itself as being-in-the-world, not by another being, but in such a way that it itself is the lighting [*die Lichtung*]. Only for a being that is light in this way existentially does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light, hidden in the dark". (2010: 129/133)⁴

⁴ Trans. Capobianco 89: I use Capobianco's translation because he translates *die Lichtung* as "lighting". Strambaugh's translation of *die Lichtung* as "opening" follows Heidegger's claim in his later works that *die Lichtung* has nothing to do with *lux* even in its etymology. I follow Capobianco's argument that in his early and middle works Heidegger clearly uses the illustration of light to characterize *die Lichtung*. However, I also argue, perhaps against Capobianco, that even if we are to translate Heidegger's early use of *die Lichtung* as lighting, which I think is correct, the importance of clearing and spatiality is already of key importance in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's relationship to the sun and Dasein itself as light.

The illumination of the world requires not only the light of the sun, but also the light of a being that can see and understand the things it encounters in daylight. Heidegger's point, however, is not that Dasein is a type of being that has the faculty of sight and understanding and therefore can experience the disclosure of the world when the sun rises. Ontologically, Dasein is this process of lighting that brings with it wherever it is the possibility of a world to be encountered in care. However, in awaiting the light and constancy of another, Dasein forgets itself as a more originary and constant source of light than the sun.

Heidegger's characterization of Dasein as light in *Being and Time* does not, however, necessarily indicate a traditional privileging of sight in Heidegger's early works before his "turn" to thinking of Dasein in terms of spatiality, as Capobianco suggests. Rather, the ontic and ontological significance of the play of light and shadows in *Being and Time* has as much to do with spatiality as it does sight. While Heidegger emphasizes the sun as the ontic condition for sight and foresight, the deeper significance of the sun, as we have explored, is how its regularly altering placement in the sky allows for the intentional planning of Dasein's own spatial relationships in care. Primitive everyday time includes a sum of natural, social and objective spatial relationships: the sun's spatial relationship to an environment it illuminates, Dasein's spatial relationship to the sun, and individual Dasein's spatial relationship to other Dasein.⁵ Unlike the traditional Neoplatonic association of light/sight with Truth and presence, Heidegger emphasizes sight and seeing, not as connected to knowledge, but rather connected to the possibility of touch/being-in-touch (2010: 330/346). Another significance of primitive Dasein's relationship to the sun is not only that it allows Dasein to see what is present, but that it reveals Dasein as the type of being that clears a space in the future in which it may be in touch with another (the possibility of making time for others by making a date). In this way, Heidegger's use of the figure of the sun is not about what is merely objectively present and at hand—which Heidegger would identify as an inauthentic relationship to time—but about the possibility of clearing a space that holds open the possibility of an uncertain encounter with another. To state this in stronger terms, in temporalizing time according to the movement of the sun, Dasein makes itself this futural space that is held open for the sake of another.⁶

⁵ Heidegger returns to develop the theme of spatial-bodily relationships in his 1949 Bremen Lectures. His lecture "Positionality" specifically explores how authentic and non-authentic existence is the result of the way Dasein stands in a gathering of spatial relationships including the sun, human and nonhuman bodies, and their shadows.

⁶ Kevin Aho identifies this way that Dasein holds itself open as the original space of the play of time [*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*]. Through this daily practice of profound leisure, Dasein actively makes itself the clearing where beings can

Primitive Dasein observes the sun's distinct behavior of appearing regularly in different set places throughout the day. By mimicking the sun, Dasein shapes its day in a similar way. Dasein may plan in advance where it will place itself throughout the day and may repeat this schedule so that others may grow to depend on Dasein's availability. Organizing its time in this way by making a regular schedule is one way Dasein can care for not only what happens to be in its immediate environment but also for one who is immediately absent and may or may not present herself in keeping a date.

The Care of the Shadow

The warmth and light of the sun that saturates Dasein and its environment throughout the day makes Dasein feel as though the sun is a presence that is very near to it. Yet even while Dasein's experiences the sun as touching its own body, it knows of course that this sphere is spatially the most distant object in its horizon. Dasein initially looks to this remote heavenly body in order to de-distance objects that are not immediately at hand. However, as Heidegger often points out, Dasein is the type of being that attends to what is closest at hand, what it can touch. For this reason, Dasein cares for objects that are distant by creating the possibility of bringing objects nearer, by creating a date in the future. However, despite the intensity of the sun's effects, the sun is the primary object in Dasein's horizon that it has no possibility drawing nearer to it and yet it is also the object that Dasein initially relies on in order to draw others near to it. Although the sun is the object that is furthest in Dasein's horizon, it is united with Dasein by the

come into play: "Leisure re-connects us with wonder (*Erstaunen*) as the original temperament of Western thought. In leisurely wonder, the authentic self does not seek to instrumentally control and master being but calmly accepts the unsettledness of being and is, as a result, allowed into the awesome openness of clearing (*Lichtung*) that lets beings emerge-into-presence on their own terms" (2007: 219). Aho sharply argues that our technological busy-ness accelerates our tempo alienating us from this originary sense of leisure. While Heidegger is clearly concerned with the way technologically locks us into a pace that is too rushed for Dasein to be called up into an authentic encounter with another, it is interesting that he also highlights Dasein's busy-ness in pre-technological existence. As we see, everyday time is necessary for relationships of care; yet this way that Dasein holds itself open to encounter another *in time* always risks (and has always risked) concealing the reason for arranging time in such a way that another may depend on us. The *space of play* and *play of time* is originally wrapped in shadows. Noonday leisure can only be born unexpectedly out of the inauthentic frantic play of shadow time. As Aho notes, ontological play must not be conceived as a vacation from the busy-ness of everyday life. Instead the spirit of leisure transforms our stance to everydayness: the way we stand in the everyone and the way we are There for others. One could say that the spirit of leisure is what also enables us to temporalize ourselves in a way that understands the care of time for the sake of the care of the beings we encounter in time.

object that is always nearest to it: its shadow [*Schatten*]. Dasein needn't look directly to the sun to know where it stands. Rather Dasein's own shadow is a constant companion that points to the sun's current location in the sky. As Heidegger explains in division II.VI:

In the shadow that constantly accompanies everyone, we encounter the sun with respect to its changing presence at different places... Thus, for example, when one takes care of making an appointment, one designates the time publicly by saying: 'When the shadow is so many footsteps long, then we will meet each other over there.' Here in being-with-one-another in the more narrow limits of a surrounding world nearest to us, we tacitly presuppose that the 'locations' at which the shadow is paced off are at the same latitude. *Dasein does not even need to wear this clock, in a certain sense it is this clock itself* [*Diese Uhr braucht das Dasein nicht einmal erst bei sich zu tragen, es ist sie in gewisser Weise selbst*]. (Heidegger, 2010: 395-396/1967: 416; italics mine)

Dasein's own body blocks the sun at different angles throughout the day: casting a shadow that is longest at dawn, shrinking into itself by noon and stretching itself back out until it is completely unfolded by dusk. Through this daily recurring ritual involving light, darkness, and Dasein's own body, the shadow shows itself to be a very handy thing that helps Dasein de-distance the sun and aids Dasein's making present that awaits (Heidegger 2010: 393/413). As Heidegger stresses, everyday time is not a numerical system projected onto the world, but rather arises from Dasein's own body, its spatial relationship to the natural world and its desire to draw others near for care.

Of all the bodies that Dasein encounters in the natural world it would seem that the figure of the sun, which illuminates the world for everyday care, ought to represent for Dasein, at least metaphorically, the kind of being it is. However, just as the sun is ontically the furthest being in Dasein's horizon, so is human Dasein's being—the being that we are—that which is ontologically furthest from it in everyday care (Heidegger 2010: 297/311). For this reason, Dasein locates itself in what it is not and that which is closest. As Heidegger explains, Dasein forgets itself in attending to what is nearest at hand. (2010: 324/343). In the busy hustle of making and keeping its appointments, Dasein comes to define itself in the beings for-sake-of-which it is There [*Da*] (Heidegger 2010: 307f./322). And yet that which Dasein cares for has the character of being outstanding, that is, has the character of whatever Dasein is not (Heidegger, 1992: 308).

As I have suggested, the being that is nearest to Dasein is its own shadow, and this is also the being that is initially central for Dasein in making and keeping dates. Thus, in its everyday reckoning with time in order to care for those who are not presently within reach "Dasein constantly gets caught up [*gerät*] in shadows" (Heidegger, 2010: 372/391). Of all the things in the world that Dasein cares for, it forgets itself most deeply in caring for its own shadow (Heidegger 2010: 337/354).

The more absorbed Dasein becomes in the care of its shadow, the more intensely it experiences time as both unlimited and slipping away. According to shadow time, Dasein has *all the time in the world* and *no time at all*. Both are experienced simultaneously as a result of the shadow insofar as my shadow is not truly my own. As we have noted, the daily metamorphosis of my personal shadow is significant because in representing the position of the sun it points to a measure of time that belongs to everyone. As Heidegger explains, this primitive way of measuring time is not as exact as the later time reckoning instruments that come to stand in for it such as the sundial, hourglass, or clock (technological substitutes of the shadow; mechanical shadows of our natural shadow). Yet this way of interpreting time through the length of the shadow is significant because it suggests a more or less uniform way of reading time for everyone under the same sky. The discovery of shadow time is important because it is by this measure that everyday time is accepted as a rule for the manifestation of being-with-one-another. The impersonal character of the shadow is expressed in the misery of Zarathustra's shadow. Zarathustra's shadow longs to belong to him, but because it belongs to Everybody/Everywhere, it can belong to nobody and no place in particular. The shadow explains to Zarathustra, "I am a wanderer, who has already walked much at your heels; always on my way, but without goal, without home too... 'Where is—my home?' I asked, and I search and searched for it, but I have not found it. Oh eternal everywhere, oh eternal nowhere" (2006: 221-222). Even though my shadow, this intimate companion that mirrors my unique body, may seem to be especially my own, it points to a temporalization of time that is exactly not mine but belongs to Everyone. Thus, in caring for its shadow, and for the Everyone, Dasein forgets itself.

On the one hand, the shadow indicates that there is no time. The daily passing away of the time belonging to Everyone is represented initially by the waxing and waning shadow, and later by extension, the slipping sand in the hour glass, and the clock that ticks until it unwinds itself. On the other hand, the shadow indicates that there is all the time in the world. Like the cycle of the sun, when an allotment of time is used up, it is immediately replenished. A new day begins again. As Nietzsche describes the thought of such recurrence in *The Gay Science*: "The eternal hour glass of existence turning over and over—and you with it, speck of dust!" Responding to Nietzsche's concept of eternity as the return of the same, Heidegger explains that as the transition between the end of one hour/day/year and the start the another is seamless so is everyday time unbroken at end of one life and the beginning of a new life: "Seen in terms of our own experienced temporality, no time at all passes between the end of a lifetime and the

beginning of another, even though the duration cannot be grasped 'objectively' even in billions of years" (1984: 138). The time belonging to humanity seems to stretch on without end; one's own time, in comparison, the time to which the shadow of my own living body gives testament, appears to be the length of a fleeting minute and "over against the billions of year that are calculated objectively, one minute of time amounts to no time at all" (Heidegger, 1984: 138).

The thought of one's own miniscule existence in comparison to the vast span of time belonging to Everybody might be terrifying to some. But as Heidegger argues in *Being and Time*, the common belief in the inexhaustible replenishment of each "now" dulls the realization of the certain finitude of a single life. It is true that my time will run out, but with the death of my body, comes the appearance of the shadow of another body that steps into my place. While everyday public time that stretches on eternally belongs to Everybody, death is always singular. Thus, there is no death from the perspective of Everybody (Heidegger, 1992: 315). Time stretches on eternally as long as there are placeholders There and their shadows to stand as a measure for it.

In taking comfort in the infinite renewal of everyday time, Dasein superficially forgets its own certain end, which may occur at any moment. Yet Dasein also knows that this abundance of time is never *its own*. In a certain sense, because *all the time in the world* belongs to Everybody, Dasein has *no time at all* of its own. As a result, even while losing itself in the Infinity of the Everybody, Dasein experiences its own time as always slipping through its grasp. The fear of losing time expresses itself in a frantic mode of making present that does not wait [*ungehaltenen Gegenwärtigen*]. This becomes evident when Dasein devotes greater care to the way it has scheduled its time than for the things for-the-sake-of-which it initially sought to hold open itself in such a way. In awaiting the sun, Dasein anticipates all that will need its attention throughout the day. When the sun rises, the race against time begins as Dasein frantically scurries to keep its dates in order to "be there" as planned.⁷

⁷ At first Dasein makes use of this handy organization of time in order to hold itself open for the unexpected. But in this process of making ourselves available for others in the future, we risk becoming more devoted to upholding our schedule than to those for whom we originally held time open. Our focus becomes the perpetuation of a certain daily organization of time. When others do not appear as planned, or appear as unplanned, they threaten to disrupt this perpetuation of time as scheduled. As Rose explains, time loses its extemporaneous character and becomes driven by both permanence and perpetuation: "Our thinking is locked into this one relation to being. Our own perpetuation and the perpetuity of the world-as-reserve mutually implicate each other in the ground of being permanent" (2009: 174). The contemplation of the first emergence of everyday time—Dasein's discovery of its shadow—allows us to question the way we force beings to appear according to schedule. In Rose's words, to call time into question is to "safeguard the future by not trying to make it like the past" (2009: 173).

The more Dasein explicitly cares for the way it has structured its time according to a predetermined schedule, the more the beings that require care are encountered as a threat. For if each day holds just enough time for Dasein to be there as it committed itself in advance, there is no time for those who may take up any more of Dasein's time, which, in a sense, has already been *used up* in advance. As Heidegger explains, "Busily losing himself in what is taken care of, the irresolute person loses his time in them, too. Hence his characteristic way of talking: 'I have no time'" (2010: 391/410). When Dasein becomes excessively protective of its time that it experiences as slipping away, any time spent on those with whom it comes into touch unexpectedly appears as a waste. For this reason, Heidegger claims that Dasein's fear of those who are closest arises from the fear of the lost present, which may be used up by another (2010: 329/345).

When the sun rises, Dasein's shadow, which it sees as representing itself, is the longest. But as the day begins the shadow immediately starts to shrink. In the passing of everyday time, Dasein confronts the thought of its own death as it witnesses the daily dwindling of its own shadow. At dawn, the long legged shadow was initially a handy friend who aided Dasein in drawing others near in care. But as the shadow shrivels under the rising sun it becomes a figure of disgust, as it is for Zarathustra who flees his shadow before noon. In fleeing one's finitude, those nearest to Dasein become a threat and the dwindling shadow that stands closest to Dasein becomes a wretched reminder of lost time that was never its own.

The Midday Moment

The answer to Heidegger's question "Why do we find something like time at the position that the shadow occupies...?" shows itself in the way celestial, human and nonhuman bodies are spatially oriented toward each other in care. Yet this spatial-bodily orientation, which is nothing other than everyday time or being-with-others-in-the-world, takes on a different character based on Dasein's relationship to its shadow. Dasein initially experiences the shadow as that which enriches everyday care by allowing Dasein to open itself up and extend itself like the afternoon shadow. But Dasein's stance is unstable when anchored in the play of the sun's light and the shadows cast by the body. The desire to hold itself open for the uncertainties of the future can quickly flip into a fear of other beings. Dasein's frantic pursuit of the shadow—the time that it senses as slipping away—leads it into an inauthentic

understanding of the present “now” as that which it must dominate lest another steal it away. However, while Dasein’s absorption in its shadow can make its relationships to others rigid and close itself off to beings who may “take up” any of its time not already used up, the shadow, at the same time, draw Dasein back into an authentic relationship with itself and the present. As Heidegger argues in *Being and Time*, it is only by taking this “detour” through a series of “Nows” that make up shadow time that Dasein can arrive at something like the Moment (2010: 332/348). While Dasein chases its shadow into an inauthentic relationship to the present, it is also chased by its dwindling shadow into a Moment that results in Dasein’s transformed stance toward being-with-others-in-the-world.

The first time Zarathustra stands before the Moment at midnight it is with the dwarf, the spirit of gravity, and while the two glance at the Moment, neither cross through the gateway (Nietzsche, 2006: 123-127). It is not until standing in the gateway with his shadow when it is at its shortest that Zarathustra sees the Moment in such a way that he experiences transformation at high noon when the shadow disappears (Nietzsche, 2006: 220-225). Immediately before the Moment, which is one’s experience of the loneliest loneliness, one has the company of only one’s shadow. “We” who stand eternally before the gateway of the Moment that will determine how I will stand in the infinity of the Everybody is Dasein and its negative double.

Zarathustra experiences the midday Moment precisely when he stops fleeing the shrinking shadow that clings at his heels. When Zarathustra recognizes the shadow’s crisis, the shadow falls silent and Zarathustra is authentically with/by himself. Heidegger follows Nietzsche in emphasizing how a figure, such as the shadow, that appears most fickle in fact pulls Dasein back to its primordial being: “whatever can be observed as having the nature of a fleeting appearance belongs to the primordial constancy of existence” (2010: 325/340). Unlike the sun, which can be concealed by clouds but nevertheless is always constant in itself, the existence of the shadow flickers out both when the sun is hidden and when it is at its brightest. For this reason, in ontic experience it is the fleeting shadow—which is closest to Dasein’s body when Dasein is furthest from its ontological being—that also leads Dasein back to itself.

The disappearance of the shadow signals the momentary disappearance of everyday time as it was once experienced. At noon Zarathustra falls asleep under a tree and dreams that the sun sleeps too, slumbering in the meadows. Lacking the relationship of the shadow, Zarathustra and the sun are unleashed from their relationship of everyday time, and for that moment, fall out of relationship with one another as well. At the same time, the

possibility of a new relationship to the sun emerges. Zarathustra sees the sun now as looking down upon him, admiring his light, as if he were the possibility of *its* sight. This moment echoes the opening section of book one, in which Zarathustra emerges into the sunrise, asking “what would you be if not for those who you shine?” That initial question comes to fulfillment here. Zarathustra, in losing his shadow and all its connection to the goals and cares of the Everyday, shows himself, in a certain way, as the light of the world. And when Zarathustra awakes from his midday slumber, pulls himself from the Moment, the sun still stands over head; no ‘time’ has passed at all (Nietzsche, 2006: 223-225).

In the Moment, Zarathustra and the sun fall out of their familiar relationship in a way that is also a reorientation. When one looks directly at the noonday sun one is blinded and cannot see the sun due to the strength of its light. The moment of reorientation is not yet a new position. We do not know where we stand or where we stand in relation to each other. Our relationship to the sun, which binds us in time, is both at its weakest and strongest. The same can be said of the shadow that seemingly disappears at noontime. The shadow seems to vanish at noonday as it does with the new moon. But, as Alenka Zupančič points out, the shadow is still present at noon despite its invisibility. We do not see our negative double because it is folded over our own body:

“Midday is *not* the moment when the sun embraces everything, makes all shadows disappear, and constitutes an undivided Unity of the world; it is the moment of the shortest shadow. And what is the shortest shadow of a thing, if not this thing itself?...this does not mean that the two become one, but, rather, that one becomes two. Why? The thing (as one) no longer throws its shadow upon another thing; instead, it throws its shadow upon itself, thus becoming, at the same time, the thing and its shadow. When the sun is at its zenith, things are not simply exposed (“naked,” as it were); they are, so to speak, dressed in their own shadows” (Zupančič, 2003: 27).

The sheer finitude of the Moment, which does not have the Infinity of the Everybody to conceal it, is both awesome and terrifying, because, in certain respect, it belongs to Dasein alone. This is the Moment, which was always Dasein’s very own, continually determines how Dasein stands in the Infinity of the Everybody. At yet, my ownmost Moment, my loneliest loneliness, is not about individual Dasein’s fierce independence or freedom from the other bodies to which it was bound in time. Rather this moment of reorientation allows me to see myself as inherently wrapped in shadows. My ownmost moment ironically challenges the idea of the self as a unity that is discrete from others. I am not one amongst many. We are one that is many. Everyday time was never my own because it is precisely that which arises out of the (re)orientations of human, nonhuman, and heavenly bodies.

The Moment is a kind of transfiguration of time that no timepiece can measure (Heidegger, 1984: 140). In his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger points to Nietzsche's description of the Moment as in between the beats of ordinary time. As Nietzsche describes it, "Between the last moment of consciousness and the first glimmer of the new life 'no time' goes by at all. It passes as quickly as a flash of lightning" (Heidegger, 1984:136f.). The Moment, occurring between one kind of temporalization of time and another, is at once the disappearance of place. Dasein does not occupy a new position in the Moment but rather experiences its finite being in such a way that everyday existence is thrown into question (2010: 334/350f.). Although Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's ontic relationship to the sun still connects light and sight, the primordial blinding light of the Moment is in the question. In the flash of light that obliterates the shadow's visibility, and thereby also that blinds and interrupts Dasein's frantic making present, Dasein loses track of time. In Dasein's blindness in its own shadow and own light, Dasein has time without determining time, allowing Dasein to be generous toward a situation that may unexpectedly require its care:

Just as the person who exists inauthentically constantly loses time and never 'has' any, it is in the distinction the temporality of authentic existence that in resoluteness it never loses time and 'always has time.' For the temporality of resoluteness has, in regard to its present, the character of the *Moment*... This kind of temporal existence 'constantly' has its time for that which the situation requires of it. (Heidegger, 2010: 391/410)

When we fully identify ourselves in the negative outline of the Everyone, we never have enough time to do what is required of us; in the Moment Dasein has time in a way that it cannot lose it. And yet one cannot escape entanglements; one cannot jump over one's own shadow into the sun (Heidegger, 1967: 150f.). The *play of time* and the *space of play* is originally wrapped in shadows. Noontime is not a momentary retreat from the frantic pace of everyday life. Instead the Moment—an imperceptible shift in our relationship to everydayness—instills us with a spirit of stillness and expectancy that transforms our stance to everydayness: the way we stand in the everyone and the way we are There for others. In this reorientation towards our own shadow, we temporalize ourselves in a way that makes the care of time always for the sake of those we encounter in time.

Concluding perspectives on the primitivity, negativity, and repetition of the Everyday

Why does Heidegger arrive at his Moment through the mythical character of primitive Dasein at the dawn of time? The story of the shadow is about how primitive Dasein loses its identity in carrying out the schedule, which structures vulgar everyday time (what Heidegger imagines to be "the first" temporalization of ontic life). In his later

work, Heidegger analyzes how modern Dasein loses itself in the accelerated time of capitalist reproduction. The time of capital locks us into a single relationship to Being, one in which the beings we encounter can only appear to us as commodities for the perpetuation of capital time. As Didier Franck points out, when everything that surrounds us appears as standing reserve, we too can only reveal ourselves as such a commodity (2012:5). Dasein becomes reduced to the reproduction of capitalist time for the sake of this single temporality's own perpetuation. Being-in-time becomes inauthentically cyclical: its purpose is turned in on itself and tautological. What is notably missing from this temporality is Being-with-others-in-time. In his analysis of primitive life, however, Heidegger imagines an apolitical and ahistorical picture of Dasein *before* capitalism and *before* technology. In so doing, he is able to explore the way Dasein loses its ontological identity (being-with-others-in-care) even *before* it has acquired an ontic identity. An ontic identity might include gender, race, nationality, class: as Marx claims, predicates of alienated being-with-others. I see Heidegger's use of "primitive" as more utopic than derogatory. Primitive Dasein is an imaginative negative subject, stripped of all ontic features of identity politics. The ontic negativity of primitive Dasein makes the negativity of the shadow all the more interesting. To locate primitive Dasein, Heidegger must image a mythical "before" which is outside of history. This space allows us to explore the fundamental logic of the necessary relationship between the ontic and ontological. Here we see how primitive Dasein confuses its own ontic negativity with the ontological negativity of the shadow. On the one hand, the primitive time of the shadow is the kernel of capitalist time. The parallel becomes apparent when primitive Dasein almost immediately—before the sun has risen—becomes absorbed in keeping up with the way it has organized natural time: the perpetuation of one temporalization of time for its own sake. On the other hand, Heidegger shows that the temptation of Dasein to become devoted to the structure of time rather than those for the sake of which we maintain this structure does not belong to certain political stage of history. Rather the oscillation between the inauthentic care of everyday time and the authentic care of those who show themselves through the former is constitutive of the structure of care. The everyday only becomes problematic when a stage of history makes beings-in-time subservient to the reproduction of a single temporalization of Being.

It is tempting to think about *Alltäglichkeit* and *Augenblick* as simple binaries: the former representing inauthenticity and irresoluteness, the uninspired rituals of the rabble; the latter representing authenticity, a transcendental or revolutionary break with the unreflective reproduction of the status quo. Following this line of

thought, Maurice Blanchot distinguishes everydayness from *real experience*. In his reading, *Alltäglichkeit* is without *Augenblick* (1993: 2410). The event—which is within the world but not of the world—must pierce through the everyday. Through this momentary interruption, but only for this moment, we catch a glimpse of the structure of the everyday, which is otherwise a closed circle that engulfs us. Contrary to Blanchot's bifurcation of the everyday (as an eventless sphere) and the experience of the moment, I have defended the ontological grounding of vulgar time or *Alltäglichkeit*. In my view, the everyday cannot be separated from the events that compose our experience. There is not after all a moment outside of the structure of everydayness nor does the everyday require an extraordinary intervention in order to wake us from our slumber in the *Everybody*. As Eran Dorfman also argues the everyday itself constantly generates reflective moments through its own negativity, which takes many subtle and radical forms. As Dorfman puts it, "[The everyday] is a foundation that constantly founds itself, a moving complex which accompanies every one of our activities and enable its progress while transforming itself throughout this very process" (2014: 2).

We see the range of the negativity of the everyday through the figure of the growing and shrinking shadow. As Eugene Fink has argued, Zarathustra's shadow represents pure negativity: "There is no substance, no halt beyond his negation. He is homeless and without a home...Zarathustra is rooted—his shadow is not" (2003: 104). In Fink's view the shadow is a figure of disgust that Zarathustra must overcome. Gilles Deleuze points out that the shadow is overcome in two ways (as I also mention above): in either the disappearance of the sun or when the sun is fully unconcealed: "The shadow is the activity of man, but it needs light as a higher instance; without light it vanishes; with light it is transformed and disappears in another way, changing in nature when it is midday" (2002: 170). At midnight the negativity of the shadow is obliterated by a greater darkness. And yet, as Fink also suggests, the midday moment, "the abyss of light" is itself a kind of negativity. The interplay between light and darkness can be seen as two kinds of negativity. What is the relationship between the ontological negativity of the shadow and the ontic negativity of "the abyss of light"? And how is the relationship between the negativity of darkness and pure light different than the minimal difference of darkness on darkness? Deleuze and Franck provide strong cases against interpreting midnight or midday as the moment of Hegelian double negation, as tempting as this formulation may be. Instead, Deleuze, as well as Alenka Zupančič, suggest that the double-negative is repeated as a double-affirmation in the midday moment. As Zupančič argues, at midday the shadow is not obliterated but it merely folds

over itself. The everyday affirms itself in its ontological grounding in care. Yet this affirmation is not an obliteration of the negative, but rather a transfigured relationship to the ontic repetition of everydayness. Midday affirmation is not only of what is—of what has been and cannot be changed (necessity)—but also of what is not or what is not yet (possibility). At noon—when the shadow is barely visible—we affirm the tedious repetition of everyday as the condition for the care of what is unexpected. The affirmation of the shadow when it is at its shortest allows the everyday to hold open a space for what is not.

The moment is not a break with the repetition of everydayness, since there is no retreat from ontic life. Rather the question for me is how to develop a relationship to the daily repetition of our lives that reflects everyday's grounding in care. Care requires that we embrace the unexpected, and everyday repetition allows us to prepare ourselves for the unexpected. This is possible because vulgar time allows itself to be organized in a regular way so we can make dates or make ourselves publicly available in a routine and reliable way. The question is not how to break with the Everybody but rather how to stand within the Everybody in a way that is resolute. If one asks herself this question, her relationship to the everyday has already become authentic. Rather than opposing repetition of the everyday to the spontaneous event, we may consider two kinds of everyday repetition.⁸ Inauthentic repetition—even while having the appearance of spontaneity or a break with the past—continues to lock the beings it encounter into a single relationship to Being (a relationship of use or a relationship of burden). Authentic repetition, in contrast, is the ontic condition that allows beings to appear through structured time in a way that is not fully predetermined by how we have structured our time. Everyday time is filled with Moments that allow us to stop chasing after our schedules as something we are falling behind. Instead, we learn to meditatively move through our schedule, which we recognize as a space held open for those who may unexpectedly require our care. Without this perspective, repetition becomes either mundane or dogmatic and we fail to understand the everyday as being-there-for-others-in-care both in the present and future.

⁸ See Dorfman (2014) and Zupančič (2008) for two insightful and complementary accounts of these two kinds of repetition.

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