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## **Got to Have Soul**

### **Introduction**

Most theists hold that there is an afterlife. God's plan for his human persons is usually taken to extend beyond simply our short life on earth, so that the death of a person's human body is not the end of the person's existence. On a substance-dualist theory of human persons, there is a clear account of how this survival into an afterlife is possible. When one's body dies, the person continues to exist as a disembodied, immaterial substance. The afterlife is easily entered into without the body, for a person is an immaterial mind that is numerically distinct from, and in no way constituted by, his body.

If, however, one is a physicalist about human persons, then there is a bump in the road. There are at least two ways in which one may be a physicalist about human persons. One may hold that human persons are identical to their bodies. Or, alternatively, one may hold that human persons are essentially constituted by their bodies but not identical to their bodies. On both of these physicalist accounts, however, the death of a person's body entails the nonexistence of the person. Now, it is plausible to deny the possibility of persons having time gaps in their existence. That is, it seems that if a person ceases to exist, then the numerically same person cannot come back into existence. Another, similar person may begin to exist, but that would just be a duplicate, i.e. a second person that is qualitatively similar to, but numerically distinct from, the first

person. The impossibility of human persons beginning to exist more than once yields a bump in the physicalist's road to an afterlife. If human persons cease to exist after the death of their bodies, and they can never again exist once they cease to exist, then how can a human person survive the death of his body?

Kevin Corcoran attempts to answer this question. He offers an account of postmortem survival that is consistent with both a physicalist account of human persons (where human persons are either identical to their bodies or essentially constituted by their bodies) and the claim that the existence of persons cannot have temporal gaps. This paper will provide good reasons for denying the success of this attempt. Corcoran's account, it will be argued, both violates the necessity of metaphysical identity and makes an individual's existence depend on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Corcoran's defense will be considered, as well as Stephen Davis' suggestions on how an account like Corcoran's can defend itself against these concerns. It will be shown, however, that the difficulties remain in full force and, therefore, Corcoran fails to provide a plausible account of how one can be a physicalist about human persons, deny temporal gaps in the existence of persons, and hold that there is an afterlife.

### **Corcoran's Life Fission**

Corcoran states, "By the words *human body* I mean, for starters, to pick out that entity usually associated with the words *physical organism of the species Homo sapiens*."<sup>1</sup> He then adopts a view of physical organisms in which a physical organism is a collection of physical simples that are caught up in a life. Here, "life" is understood as "an individual biological event of a very special sort, a sort that is remarkably stable, well individuated, self-directing, self-maintaining, and homeodynamic."<sup>2</sup> So, an organism is a

collection of physical simples that stand in the relevant causal relations, namely, those causal relations that produce a self-directing biological event. Corcoran adopts the following identity criterion for physical organisms:

If  $x$  and  $y$  are physical organisms, then  $x$  is identical with  $y$  if and only if  $x$  and  $y$  are constituted by (sets of) physical simples whose activities constitute the same continued life.<sup>3</sup>

Now, given that the life of a physical organism essentially involves certain causal relations among a set of physical simples, Corcoran is prompted to formulate the following persistence condition for physical organisms:

If an organism  $O$  at  $t_2$  is the same as an organism  $P$  that exists at  $t_1$  (where  $t_1 < t_2$ ), then the (set of) simples that compose  $P$  at  $t_1$  must be causally related in the life-preserving way to the (set of) simples that compose  $O$  at  $t_2$ .<sup>4</sup>

So, on this view, the persistence of a physical organism does not entail the persistence of the same set of physical simples but, rather, the persistence of the same life. An organism can slough off old cells and have them replaced by new cells, without ceasing to exist. Indeed, an organism can survive a complete replacement of physical simples, so long as the life of that organism persists. And since the human body is simply a specific type of organism, i.e. an organism of the species *Homo sapiens*, the above persistence condition is the same for a human body.

Corcoran concludes with the following necessary and sufficient condition for the persistence of a human body:

A human body B that exists at  $t_2$  is the same as a human body A that exists at  $t_1$  just in case the temporal stages leading up to B at  $t_2$  are immanent-causally connected to the temporal stage of A at  $t_1$ .<sup>5</sup>

As I understand Corcoran, this persistence condition differs from the previous one only by making the previous persistence condition both necessary and sufficient and by spelling out the life-preserving causal relation in terms of immanent causation. I, however, do not want to make my argument rest on Corcoran's, or any other, specific understanding of the life-preserving causal relation. So, I will discuss Corcoran's account in his more general terms of a life-preserving causal relation. That is, I will work with the following understanding of Corcoran's persistence condition:

A human body B that exists at  $t_2$  is the same as a human body A that exists at  $t_1$  if and only if the (set of) simples that compose A at  $t_1$  are causally related in the life-preserving way to the (set of) simples that compose B at  $t_2$ .

With the above account of human bodies and their persistence condition, Corcoran offers the following account of resurrection:

It seems possible that the causal paths traced by the simples caught up in the life of my body just before death can be made by God to fission such that the simples composing my body then are causally related to two different, spatially segregated sets of simples. One of the sets of simples would immediately cease to constitute a life and come instead to compose a corpse, while the other would either continue to constitute a body in heaven or continue to constitute a body in some intermediate state. In other words, the set of simples along one of the branching paths at the instant after fission fails to perpetuate a life while the other set of

simples along the other branch does continue to perpetuate a life. If this is at least possible, as it seems to be, then we have a view of survival compatible with the joint theses that human persons are essentially physical objects and that such objects cannot enjoy gappy existence.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Necessity of Metaphysical Identity**

I take the following principle to be a basic principle in the metaphysics of identity:

NMI: For any  $x$  and  $y$ , if  $x$  is identical to  $y$ , then, necessarily,  $x$  is identical to  $y$ .

This principle applies to numerical identity. It claims that the relation of numerical identity is a necessary relation. That is, if  $x = y$ , then it is not possible that  $x$  not be  $y$  or  $y$  not be  $x$ . Or, in terms of possible worlds, if  $x = y$ , then there is no possible world in which  $x$  is not  $y$  or  $y$  is not  $x$ . I will argue, however, that Corcoran's account of resurrection violates NMI and, therefore, suffers from the absurd consequence of making identity contingent.

Consider a human body, Etta, just before her death, at time  $T_1$ . Suppose that God then performs the fission process described by Corcoran. Immediately following that process, at time  $T_2$ , there are two fission products:

B: A body composed of a set of physical simples that is caught up in a life.

C: A corpse composed of a set of physical simples that is not caught up in a life. C contains the same set of physical simples that was caught up in Etta's life at  $T_1$ . At  $T_2$ , however, the set of physical simples is caught up in no life at all. This causal branch of the fission procedure was not a life-preserving one, leaving the physical simples of C to compose no more than a corpse. On the other hand, the new set of physical simples that

composes B at T2 is causally related in a life-preserving way to the set of physical simples that composes Etta at T1. And, on Corcoran's persistence condition for a human body, this life-preserving causal connection makes B at T2 identical to Etta at T1.

Now, it is possible that both B at T2 and C at T2 survive the fission process. It seems that the same sort of causal relation that occurs between the set of physical simples that composes B at T2 and the set of physical simples that composes Etta at T1 could be made by God to also occur between the set of physical simples that composes C at T2 and the set of physical simples that composes Etta at T1. Suppose, then, that this possibility is actual and that both fission products at T2 are causally related in the life-preserving way to Etta at T1. So, on Corcoran's persistence condition for a human body, both B at T2 and C at T2 have equal claim to being identical to Etta at T1. Hence, either both B at T2 and C at T2 are identical to Etta at T1 or both B at T2 and C at T2 are not identical to Etta at T1. Now, B at T2 is not identical to C at T2. B at T2 and C at T2 are two, numerically distinct bodies composed of two different sets of physical simples. So, it cannot be the case that both B at T2 and C at T2 are identical to Etta at T1, for that would violate the transitivity of identity. That is, Etta at T2 would be numerically identical to two numerically distinct bodies, which is impossible. Therefore, it must be the case that both B at T2 and C at T2 are not identical to Etta at T1. Thus, the possibility that both B at T2 and C at T2 survive the fission process shows that, on Corcoran's persistence condition for a human body, it is possible that B at T2 not be identical to Etta at T1. But in the original fission case, the same persistence condition entails that B at T2 is identical to Etta at T1. Therefore, Corcoran's account of resurrection violates NMI.<sup>7</sup>

Corcoran has an interesting response to the charge that his account renders identity contingent. The theist who wants to reconcile a physicalist account of persons with postmortem survival can, as a theist, reasonably appeal to God. Corcoran suggests the following appeal to God as a plausible one. If God is a necessary being, then God exists in all possible worlds. And if God has, as an essential part of His nature, the will for the good of His human creatures, then God wills the good for His human creatures in all possible worlds in which God exists and creates humans. So, the theist can reply that God is a necessary being and essentially wills the good for His human creatures, and, therefore, there is no possible world in which God creates humans and allows the ultimate demise of His human creatures. But the survival of both fission products would entail the permanent non-existence of a human creature. Hence, there is no possible world in which both fission products survive, for an essential feature of God would always prevent that state of affairs from occurring and God exists in every possible world. Thus, it is not possible for both fission products to survive and, therefore, Corcoran's account of the resurrection does not violate NMI.<sup>8</sup>

One might reply by challenging the premise that God's nature entails that He would never allow one of His creatures to be annihilated. Consider a possible world in which there is a human creature that, due to an incredibly corrupt use of his free will, becomes a source of great evil in the world. Indeed, this individual is so evil that God, as an essentially, morally perfect being, is forced to rid the world of this evil.<sup>9</sup> So, there is a possible world in which God annihilates one of His human creatures. But if there is such a possible world, then it is possible for both fission products to survive. God may just choose to annihilate the evil creature by performing a fission process that results in two

living products. God may even find this method useful, for God is able to both rid the world of an evil and produce two new human creatures at the same time. Thus, the possibility of God being required, by His morally perfect nature, to destroy one of His human creatures entails that it is possible that God allow both fission products to survive.

Now Corcoran could respond by appealing to some moral claims. Perhaps it is the case that human life is so valuable that it is never morally permissible to completely destroy a human life. Or perhaps morality would require God not to create such an evil creature in the first place or to prevent a human creature from ever becoming corrupt to the point that it must be annihilated. The debate, however, has now become a moral one. The debate is now about whether or not it is ever morally good for God to annihilate one of His human creatures. While this issue is both interesting and important, I want to get at a metaphysical difficulty underlying Corcoran's appeal to God.

### **The Metaphysical Difficulty**

In order for God to ensure that we survive into the afterlife, God must prevent the second fission product from constituting a life. But this is not because the second fission product would then somehow causally disrupt the first. Recall the original fission case in which Etta at T1 survives as B at T2. If C at T2 were also allowed to survive the fission process, then Etta at T1 would have ceased to exist by time T2. But the living C at T2 need not, at all, causally affect Etta in order to destroy Etta. The life-preserving causal relation between Etta at T1 and B at T2 and the life-preserving causal relation between Etta at T1 and C at T2 proceed down two, independent paths. And the two resulting bodies do not causally act on one another. So, the production of a living C at T2 makes it the case that Etta does not exist at T2, without the living C at T2 causally affecting Etta.



But this seems wrong. If the living C at T2 is entirely external to and in no way causally affects Etta, then how can the existence of the living C at T2 make it the case that Etta does not exist at T2? A body that is spatially and causally isolated from Etta seems metaphysically irrelevant to whether or not Etta continues to exist. Surely C at T2 must do something to Etta to make it the case that Etta does not exist at T2. Hence, Corcoran's account faces the metaphysical difficulty of entailing that the existence of Etta depends on factors wholly extrinsic to Etta, where to be wholly extrinsic to Etta is to be spatially and causally isolated from Etta. So, even if it is the case that there is no possible world in which God would allow both fission products to survive, the metaphysical problem remains of explaining why allowing both fission products to survive would destroy a human body. And, of course, Corcoran cannot simply answer that the annihilation would result because that is what his persistence condition entails, for that very condition is what is now in question.

Perhaps a defender of Corcoran's view can respond the following way. The survival of C at T2 is not as causally irrelevant as I have portrayed it. Granted, C at T2 does not exert any positive causal force upon Etta at T1 or B at T2. However, there is still a destructive causal link between the survival of C at T2 and Etta at T1. Etta at T1 has only a certain amount of causal force that constitutes her life. When that causal force is directed down only one path to a single fission product, B at T2, Etta's life persists in full strength. But when both fission products survive, the causal force of Etta's life is divided down two separate paths, each product getting only half of Etta's life force. This results in the destruction of Etta because her life no longer has the degree of force it needs to persist. The survival of both fission products, in effect, rips Etta's life apart.

Thus, the existence of a living C at T2 is metaphysically relevant to Etta's survival, even though the former does not exert any causal force upon the latter.

This response, however, is unsatisfying for a couple of reasons. First, it is not clear how one would even begin to measure the relevant life force. The measurement would likely be in terms of causal force, but how does one begin to quantify that force in this context, i.e. one in which the causal force produces a special, self-directing event? Second, even if one were able to quantify a life force, how does one determine the minimal amount required for a life to persist? On the above account, the survival of both fission products divides Etta's life force in half, resulting in the destruction of Etta's life. But why think that the threshold for the persistence of a life is above 50% of its current measure? Why not think that one's life could persist if its life force dropped to 49% or 40% or 25% of its current measure? And if the threshold is above 50%, then how high above 50% is it? Does one's life cease to exist if it is at anything less than 100%? If not, where is the threshold, e.g. 99% or 80% or 51%? In short, it is not clear that one can determine, in a non-arbitrary manner, the minimal amount of life-force required for the persistence of a human life.

I have been arguing that Corcoran's account has the implausible consequence of making an individual's existence depend on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Corcoran, however, considers a similar concern based on Harold Noonan's "only *x* and *y*" principle, which Corcoran elucidates as "the claim that whether or not some objects *x* and *y* compose some concrete individual *F* should have nothing to do with events involving numerically distinct objects that are spatiotemporally segregated from *F*."<sup>10</sup> And Corcoran replies that his account is in line with Noonan's principle:

Since I believe that immanent causal connections are what secure identity across time for material objects, it must be the case (assuming the “only  $x$  and  $y$  principle” is true) that there is something in the nature of immanent causal connections that make cases of fission such that the immanent causal relation goes one way, the other, or neither. In other words, there must be something in the nature of immanent causal connections that prevents the relation from ever going both ways.<sup>11</sup>

First, notice that this reply dispenses with Corcoran’s original argument that God’s goodness would never allow the fission process to result in both  $C$  at  $T_2$  and  $B$  at  $T_2$  being causally related in the life preserving way to  $Etta$  at  $T_1$ . On this new argument, the reason why both fission products cannot possibly survive is not found in God’s will but, rather, in the nature of immanent causation. Second, and more importantly, this new account fails to give any independent reasons for why immanent causation cannot possibly result in two surviving fission products. At least in the possible reply that I considered on behalf of Corcoran’s defense there was an explanation in terms of there being an insufficient transfer of life force. Here, however, there is no such explanation. Indeed, Corcoran admits, “I frankly admit that I cannot say what ingredient in immanent causation accounts for this.”<sup>12</sup> Hence, Corcoran’s reply does not amount to much more than trying to make his theory consistent with Noonan’s principle simply by fiat. That is, Corcoran acknowledges that his theory would conflict with Noonan’s principle if it is possible that both fission products survive and, in defense, simply claims that there must be something in his theory that prevents the possibility of both fission products surviving. This is not a good reply.

### The Uniqueness Criterion

Stephen Davis provides an alternative way of defending Corcoran's view against the possibility of both fission products surviving. Instead of appealing to God's necessary existence and essential will for the good of His human creatures, Davis suggests an additional criterion of personal identity, i.e. the uniqueness criterion. This criterion states that an Etta-like person in the afterlife is identical to the premortem Etta only if the postmortem Etta-like person is unique. This necessary condition for personal identity requires that there be no other "exactly-as-qualified" candidates for Ettahood in the afterlife. Davis further elucidates what it means to be "unique":

A [Etta]-like person in the afterlife is *not* unique just in case there is another qualitatively similar and equally good candidate for [Ettahood] who was brought into existence in the afterlife through exactly the same causal process as was the first [Etta]-like person.<sup>13</sup>

So, with the uniqueness condition, if both fission products survive, then neither fission product is identical to Etta at T1 simply because they both fail to meet this necessary condition for being identical to Etta at T1.

One concern that immediately presents itself is that such a move seems ad hoc. It appears that the only motivation for introducing the uniqueness condition is in order to address the possibility that, on one's criterion of personal identity, there can be two postmortem persons with equal claim to being identical to a single, premortem person. Call this possibility "the possibility of duplication." For Corcoran's account, the possibility of duplication is found in the possibility of both fission products surviving. And as was shown with Corcoran's account, the possibility of duplication is a concern

because it seems to entail that one's criterion of personal identity violates NMI and makes the existence of an individual dependant on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. So, the possibility of duplication is problematic, and the uniqueness condition directly addresses it. Indeed, the uniqueness condition seems custom made to respond to the possibility of duplication. And without any independent reason to posit the uniqueness condition, its adoption is, therefore, ad hoc.

Moreover, the introduction of the uniqueness condition is even worse than your average ad hoc response, for it does not even involve a substantial alteration of the original account. By adopting the uniqueness condition, one's criterion of personal identity will not count either of the equally qualified, postmortem candidates as identical to the premortem person. Why one's criterion, in those cases of duplication, counts neither postmortem candidate as identical to the premortem person is not explained, but simply stipulated by the uniqueness condition. Thus, the uniqueness condition does not involve any substantial alteration of one's original criterion of personal identity and, therefore, appears to be no more than an attempt to make one's criterion correct by fiat.

But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that one could motivate an adoption of the uniqueness condition so that an appeal to it would not be ad hoc. Does the uniqueness condition help Corcoran's account address the difficulties that arise from the possibility of both fission products surviving? The answer, I suggest, is no.

### **The Metaphysical Difficulty Remains**

With the uniqueness condition, Corcoran's account still makes an individual's survival dependant on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Take the case where only fission product B at T2 constitutes a life, resulting in the survival of Etta at T1 as B

at T2. On the uniqueness condition, Etta's survival still depends on whether or not C at T2 constitutes a life. If both C at T2 and B at T2 survive the fission process, then neither fission product will satisfy the uniqueness condition and, therefore, Etta at T1 will not exist at T2 because no candidate at T2 is identical to Etta at T1. But, as we saw earlier, the survival of C at T2 need not causally affect B at T2 or the causal relationship between Etta at T1 and B at T2. Thus, with the uniqueness condition, Corcoran's account still makes an individual's survival dependant on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual.

Davis, however, insists that "identity *can* depend in part on matters that are extrinsic to the persons we are talking about."<sup>14</sup> Factors wholly extrinsic to an individual can, according to Davis, determine, in part, whether or not a person survives, whether or not a person is identical to any other person at a later time.

Davis defends this claim by first distinguishing between nonrelational properties and relational properties:

The first sort are properties like "x is healthy," "x is a carpenter," and "x is forty years old." Intuitively they seem nonrelational because only one property bearer—viz., x—is mentioned in each statement. Relational properties would include "x is wearing a sweater," "x is taller than y," and "x loves y." In such cases, more than one property bearer is mentioned.<sup>15</sup>

He then derives a rule-of-thumb for determining whether a given property F is relational or nonrelational:

[A] property F is relational if it is possible directly to falsify any such claim as "x is F" by showing that the other relevant thing fails (or other relevant things fail) to have the relevant property G (or, in some cases, *have* the relevant property G).<sup>16</sup>

For example, one can show that Barbara is not a widow by showing that her only husband, George, is still living. So, on the above rule, “being a widow” is a relational property. On the other hand, I can have the property of being a male without that property entailing some contingent truth about any other thing and its properties. So, there is no way to directly falsify the claim that I am a male by showing that some other relevant item lacks some relevant property, and, therefore, “being a male” is not a relational property according to the above rule.

With this rule, and the fact that there are relational properties, Davis claims, “It follows that some properties are such that whether a given property bearer has them is in part a function of whether certain other property bearers have (or do not have) certain other properties.”<sup>17</sup> And this conclusion seems correct. Barbara’s being a widow does not depend solely on Barbara’s own, intrinsic properties; it also depends on George’s properties, i.e. whether or not George has the property of being alive. Furthermore, George can have or lack the property of being alive without in anyway causally affecting Barbara. Thus, some properties are such that whether an individual has them or not is in part a function of factors wholly extrinsic to the individual.

Davis then returns to the properties “x is identical to y” and “x has survived death”:

We can now see that they are, contrary to what we might have expected, relational properties. It is possible to falsify claims like “[Etta] has survived death” by showing that two or more afterlife persons share a certain property, viz., “being completely plausible afterlife candidates for [Ettahood].” Whether [Etta] has survived death does not depend merely on the intrinsic properties of [Etta].<sup>18</sup>

Davis thinks he has thus answered the charge that the uniqueness condition absurdly makes the survival of an individual dependent on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. He says, “My reply is that this result is odd but not absurd, that uniqueness is a criterion of personal identity, that properties such as “survives death” and “is identical to [Etta]” are relational properties (which is the cause of the oddness noted above)...”<sup>19</sup> So, the uniqueness condition does make the survival of an individual dependent in part on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual, but that just means that properties like “x is identical to y” and “x has survived death” are relational properties. Consequently, the apparent absurdity of such a dependence is really only an oddness that results from not expecting properties like “x is identical to y” and “x has survived death” to be relational properties.

This reply, however, does not give us any good reason to think that an individual’s survival can depend in part on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Davis grants that the uniqueness condition makes an individual’s survival depend in part on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. He then shows how this consequence of adopting the uniqueness condition can be described in terms of “relational properties.” But the fact remains that this consequence is problematic, and the new terminology only forces one to introduce more terms in order to make the absurdity of the consequence once again obvious.

One can further divide Davis’ relational properties into two groups, which I will call “purely-relational properties” and “semi-relational properties.” Purely-relational properties can be gained or lost without the individual being causally affected by the relevant external-factors. Semi-relational properties cannot be gained or lost without the



individual being causally affected by the relevant external-factors. By “relevant external-factors,” I simply mean the external factors that directly determine, in part, whether or not an individual has a certain relational property. An example of a purely-relational property is “being taller than Mickey Rooney.” An individual that is 6ft. can lose the relational property “being taller than Mickey Rooney” without the relevant external-factor causally affecting the individual. If, for example, Mickey Rooney were to suddenly grow 7ft., then the individual in question would no longer be taller than Mickey Rooney, even though Mickey Rooney and his growth spurt in no way causally affect the individual. An example of a semi-relational property would be “being stabbed by Mickey Rooney.” The relational property “being stabbed by Mickey Rooney” cannot be gained by an individual without that individual being causally affected by the relevant external-factors. Mickey Rooney and his weapon must causally impact an individual in order for that individual to be stabbed by Mickey Rooney.

With this distinction between purely-relational properties and semi-relational properties, let us return to the property “being unique.” B at T2 will lose the property of being unique if C at T2 survives the fission process as well, which can occur without C at T2 causally affecting B at T2. So, B at T2 can lose the property “being unique” without the relevant external-factor, C at T2, causally affecting B at T2.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, the property “being unique” is a purely-relational property. But the uniqueness condition requires that B at T2 be unique in order for Etta at T1 to survive as B at T2. So, the uniqueness condition entails that Etta’s survival depends on a purely-relational property, which gives us the same metaphysical problem, just in different terminology: How can the survival of an individual depend on a purely-relational property? An individual’s possession of a

purely-relational property depends on external factors that do not causally affect the individual. But factors that are wholly extrinsic to an individual seem metaphysically irrelevant to the individual's survival. Thus, we have the exact same problem in its original force.

Perhaps Davis' would respond that he is not claiming that he has proven that an individual's survival depends on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Rather, Davis may argue, he has shown that some properties can in fact depend on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual and, therefore, it is not absurd to claim that the properties "survives death" and "is identical to Etta" depend on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. In short, the concept of a purely-relational property is not an incoherent or absurd concept and, therefore, it is not incoherent or absurd to claim that the properties "survives death" and "is identical to Etta" are purely-relational properties.

The problem, however, is that Davis provides no reason to think that "survives death" and "is identical to Etta" are purely-relational properties. Indeed, we have reason to deny that these properties are purely-relational properties. Such a classification of those properties entails that an individual's existence depends on factors wholly extrinsic to that individual, which seems implausible. Moreover, just because the concept of a purely-rational property is coherent, it does not follow that it is coherent to apply that concept to the properties "survives death" and "is identical to Etta." The concept of a square is coherent, but it is nonetheless absurd to assert that circles are squares.

### **Necessity of Metaphysical Identity Still Violated**

With the uniqueness condition, Corcoran's account still violates NMI. Take the original case in which only fission product B at T2 survives. According to Corcoran's

condition for the persistence of human bodies and the uniqueness condition, Etta at T1 is identical to B at T2. Now, it seems possible that C at T2 survive as well. Corcoran attempted to deny this possibility by appealing to God's necessary existence and God's essential will for the good of God's human creatures. But this attempt suffers from the metaphysical difficulty of making the existence of an individual dependent on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. As for the uniqueness condition, it does not even challenge the possibility of both fission products surviving. Rather, the uniqueness condition just entails that if that possibility were actual, then Etta at T1 would not be identical to B at T2 because B at T2 would not be unique. So, with the uniqueness condition, it is still possible that Etta at T1 not be identical to B at T2. Therefore, Corcoran's persistence condition for a human body, even with the uniqueness condition, still violates NMI.

Davis, however, agrees with NMI and, so, denies that the uniqueness condition violates it. Here is his argument:

Suppose that the Stephen Davis who writes these lines in 1999 (call him SD2) is identical to the Stephen Davis (call him SD1) who saw Claremont for the first time in 1965. Now if "SD1 = SD2," then by the necessity of identity, it follows that "N [SD1 = SD2]." But if that statement is true, doesn't it follow that the statement "God permanently and completely annihilates Stephen Davis in December 1975" is not only false but necessarily false? But that seems false, no? Didn't God have it within God's power, in December 1975, to annihilate me permanently and completely? The lesson that I draw from this argument is that identity of one person with a later person, necessary though it is, depends on

certain contingencies (like God not deciding to annihilate me in December 1975).<sup>21</sup>

With this argument, Davis claims that the uniqueness criterion does not violate the necessity of metaphysical identity, but simply has identity over time dependant on certain contingencies, such as whether or not God makes it the case that a later individual is not unique.

This argument, however, is invalid. The truth of the statement “N [SD1 = SD2]” does not entail that the statement “God permanently and completely annihilates Stephen Davis in December 1975” is necessarily false. The statement “Necessarily, SD1 is identical to SD2” does not entail the statement “Necessarily, SD2 exists.” So, the statement “Necessarily, SD1 is identical to SD2” is consistent with the statement “Possibly, SD2 does not exist.” It follows, then, that the statement, “Necessarily, SD1 is identical to SD2” is consistent with the statement “Possibly, God permanently and completely annihilates Stephen Davis in December 1975.” Hence, “Necessarily, SD1 is identical to SD2” does not entail “Necessarily, it is not the case that God permanently and completely annihilates Stephen Davis in December 1975.” Therefore, Davis invalidly infers from the truth of the statement “N [SD1 = SD2]” that the statement “God permanently and completely annihilates Stephen Davis in December 1975” is necessarily false.

What then of the lesson that Davis draws from his argument? In light of the invalidity of his argument, I think we can take a different lesson. The lesson is that just because the existence of an individual depends on certain contingencies, it does not follow that that individual being identical to a certain, later person (if he is identical to

any later person) depends on those contingencies. If Stephen Davis were destroyed in 1975, then Stephen Davis would not exist in 1999 and, so, would not have written those lines in 1999. Thus, Stephen Davis' existence in 1999 does depend on the contingent fact that God does not permanently annihilate Stephen Davis in December 1975. However, if Stephen Davis were annihilated in December 1975, it remains the case that Stephen Davis, if he is identical to any later person, is identical to the Stephen Davis who actually wrote those lines in 1999 (SD2). What would follow from the 1975 destruction of Stephen Davis is that SD2 does not exist either. There could still be someone named "Stephen Davis" who writes those same lines in 1999. That person, however, would not be SD2 because SD2 is numerically identical to the Stephen Davis who, due to God's destructive act, would not exist in 1999. Thus, Stephen Davis' existence in 1999 clearly depends on the contingent fact that God does not permanently annihilate Stephen Davis in December 1975, but Stephen Davis' being identical to the Stephen Davis who actually wrote those lines in 1999 (if he is identical to any later person) does not depend on that contingency.

### **Conclusion**

This paper has argued that Corcoran's account both violates NMI and makes an individual's existence dependant on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Both of these consequences, I suggest, make the account unacceptable. I have considered not only Corcoran's defense but also Stephen Davis' suggestions on how an account like Corcoran's can defend itself against these concerns. Neither, however, managed to avoid either the above consequences or their implausibility. Therefore, there is good reason to conclude that Corcoran fails to provide a plausible account of how one can be a

physicalist about human persons, deny temporal gaps in the existence of persons, and hold that there is an afterlife. In the end, we just might have to have soul to survive.

### Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Kevin Corcoran, "Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival without Temporal Gaps," in *Body, Soul, And Survival*, ed. Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 206.

<sup>2</sup> Corcoran, 206.

<sup>3</sup> Corcoran, 207.

<sup>4</sup> Corcoran, 209.

<sup>5</sup> Corcoran, 210.

<sup>6</sup> Corcoran, 210.

<sup>7</sup> The violation of NMI can also be shown the following way. According to Corcoran's persistence condition for a human body, if only one fission product survives, then Etta at T1 will be identical to that fission product. However, it is possible that either fission product be the sole survivor. So, if only fission product B at T2 survives, then Etta at T1 is identical to B at T2 and yet could have been identical to a numerically different body (C at T2). Thus, Etta's being identical to B at T2 is contingent and, therefore, Corcoran's persistence condition for a human body violates NMI.

<sup>8</sup> Corcoran, 215.

<sup>9</sup> For those who have difficulty with the notion of moral perfection, the point works just as well if God is essentially, maximally, morally good.

<sup>10</sup> Corcoran, 216.

<sup>11</sup> Corcoran, 216.

<sup>12</sup> Corcoran, 216.

<sup>13</sup> Stephen T. Davis, "Physicalism and Resurrection," in *Body, Soul, And Survival*, ed. Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 240.

<sup>14</sup> Davis, 241.

<sup>15</sup> Davis, 241.

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<sup>16</sup> Davis, 242.

<sup>17</sup> Davis, 242.

<sup>18</sup> Davis, 243.

<sup>19</sup> Davis, 243.

<sup>20</sup> One may think that C at T2 is not the only relevant external-factor for B at T2 being unique. All human bodies at T2 are relevant to B at T2 being unique, for if any one of those bodies share in the same life-preserving causal relation that B at T2 has with Etta at T1, then B at T2 is not unique. Even so, none of this entails that any of those human bodies causally affect B at T2 and, therefore, it is still the case that B at T2 can lose the property “being unique” without the relevant external-factors causally affecting B at T2.

<sup>21</sup> Davis, 243.