

ETHICS, RATIONALITY, DIALECTIC, and COMMUNITY

by

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I. "Denken und handeln muß aus einem Stück sein." -Fichte

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning...when of a sudden I am surpris'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with ought and ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expressed some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems to be altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be deduced from others, which are entirely different from it."¹

Such is Hume's analysis of what is now called the naturalistic fallacy, or the mistake of drawing conclusions about what ought to be from premises that state only what is. The so-called problem of arguing "from what is to what ought to be" was popularized by G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica (1903), and has received much attention from modern philosophers. I would like to argue that this apparent problem rests on a false dichotomy between our knowing and our doing.

The dichotomy implies that one can strive to know as much as he wants about whatever he wants, but when it comes to concrete prescriptions about what is to be done, he is under no moral obligation to act one way or another. This rationale, however, fails

to notice that knowing is itself a type of doing. Our knowledge is not a given, but often requires a long and laborious succession of acts characterized by attentiveness, inquiry, formulation, conceptualization, defining, imagining, understanding, reflecting, weighing the evidence, and finally affirming or denying. A minor increment in knowledge may be the fruit of a painstaking process of question-asking. Forefathers in the history of science (such as Galileo and Newton) have shown that one's commitment to knowing can lead to just as much pain and self-sacrifice as one's commitment to paradigmatic ethical ideals (such as feeding the hungry or caring for the sick).

If knowing is, in fact, a type of doing, the next move may be to argue that one has no obligation to engage in acts of knowing, either. In fact, one can construe the description of knowing as a type of doing in order to conceive a seemingly vicious circle. For although knowing is a type of doing, one must first come to know what is good before trying to actualize it in outward acts. But if our knowing requires the antecedent activity of inquiry, conceptualization, and reflection, there is no way we can know beforehand that these acts are good. In short, our knowledge requires certain antecedent acts, yet we do not conscientiously undertake certain acts unless we know (or think we know) that they are worthwhile. This apparently vicious circle seems to suggest that any attempted deliberation about our knowing and our doing would lead to paralysis. For why should I seek to know what is good unless I were first convinced that actions leading to such knowledge were also good? If we could not achieve such antecedent assurance, then our acts would appear to be the products of whim and emotion, rather than of deliberate choice. Such are the claims of emotivism, a dominant moral outlook of our age.²

The problem with such an analysis is that it neglects the human subject.³ The vicious circle would apply to a computer, for a computer has to be programmed to follow predetermined guidelines. The human subject, however, does not have to be convinced to pursue knowledge and goodness. The vicious circle lacks force simply because human beings by nature already desire to know and to do what is good. Native curiosity or an

uneasy conscience do not have to be learned. On the contrary, a child's native curiosity is a given, which is stifled only after repeated frustration or humiliation; similarly, an uneasy conscience can be masked only with conscious and subconscious efforts at rationalization, inadvertence, or moral renunciation. One who cares to argue against the basic exigence of human inquisitiveness gives, in his doubting, expression to what he is arguing against. He takes for granted that his doubting is something good. The question, then, is not whether good is what we really intend, but whether an apprehended good is truly good or only apparently so. To ask, for example, whether good is better than evil is simply to appeal to another notion of the good. "In brief, conscious and intentional operations exist, and anyone who cares to deny their existence is merely disqualifying himself as a non-responsible, non-reasonable, non-intelligent somnambulist."⁴

Finally, one may admit that he has an inherent desire to seek knowledge intelligently and reasonably, but that these do not commit him to any overt moral action. This disjunction may be appealing because of the qualitative difference between our private judgments in knowing and our public acts; a mistaken judgment is much easier to repeal than a misdirected course of action. This, however, fails to take account of the consistency to which we are committed in our acts of knowing and our acts of doing. This topic will be treated in greater detail in section III.

II. Yvwol sedutov

-The Oracle at Delphi

In the last section, the roots of emotivist ethics were said to reside in the neglect of the knowing, doing subject. The present section will be dedicated to surveying and criticizing some modern trends in ethical thought which give attention to the subject, but in an incomplete way. In his innovative After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre insists that ethical discourse is essentially empty without an account of the human subject, for the

truth or falsity of moral judgments presupposes true beliefs about "the concept of man understood as having an essential nature and an essential purpose or function."⁵ The question, "What ought I to do?," can be answered only after considering, "What ought I to be?" MacIntyre's insistence on attentiveness to virtue and character clearly follows Aristotle's prescriptions in the Ethics: "Actions then are called just and temperate when they are such as the just and temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them."⁶ One Christian version of the same outlook is found in the work of Stanley Hauerwas: "We can only be virtuous by doing what virtuous people do in the manner that they do it. Therefore, one can only learn how to be virtuous, to be like Jesus, by learning from others how that is done."⁷

This return to the subject marks a significant step beyond contemporary emotivists and decisionists, for it acknowledges the essential links between character and action, knowing and doing. It follows that there is an essential flaw in quandary (or "life boat") ethics; the question should be not so much what I should do, but what I should be. For my character determines not only how I will act in certain dilemmas, but also whether I will regard certain situations as real dilemmas or not. Augustine's phrase, "Ama Deum et fac quod vis," might be better translated: "Be a loving person, and do as you will." The first letter of John, after all, equates love of God with possession of a loving disposition.⁸

While the return to character analysis is a step in the right direction, it cannot, on its own, provide an adequate foundation for overcoming some new problems wrought by it. Cultural and historic relativism seems an inevitable result, for one's view of his own telos is determined to a large extent by his upbringing. MacIntyre is fully aware of the relativity of one's social identity: "I am someone's son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation."⁹ Because of this, Bernstein can claim that "MacIntyre is much closer to Nietzsche than he realizes.... How are we to distinguish true

or correct narrative histories from those which are only fictions or illusions?"¹⁰ The problem remains even if one accepts the brief account of human intelligence and responsibility as outlined in section I. For even if all men desire what is true and good, the true and good appear to each according to his own character and context.

Aristotle realized the same problem and asked how one could be responsible for his own acts. What one does, after all, is determined by what one perceives the good to be; and one's perception of the good (or apparent good) is dependent upon his character. Aristotle's answer, in brief, was that each man makes himself who he is to be, and is therefore responsible for his own character. In turn, one would then be responsible for his perception of the good (or apparent good), and therefore for his particular acts. Aristotle's problem, however, was one of responsibility, and ours is one of epistemology: how do we escape the vicious circle of judging values only in terms of our character, when a judgment of the goodness of our character is only another judgment of value? Where does objectivity come in? While Aristotle did not extend his reflection on this matter into the realm of epistemology, he did provide some hints on how it might be done. But first, let us consider a historical instance that indicates that it can be done.

So far, we have been considering a vicious circle in our judgments of value. All of our judgments of value are made in light of our character, which we acquire largely as a result of our social milieu. In turn, the judgment of the goodness or badness of our character is itself a value judgment. There seems to be no way out of this vicious circle of social conditioning. Karl Marx held a similar view, insisting that, "consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and remains so for as long as men exist at all."¹¹ Because men could not see beyond their class interests, Marx maintained, the vicious circle necessitated world revolution. Because all of men's judgments of value were so tainted by class ideology, violent conflict would be inevitable.

Yet there seems to be something terribly inconsistent in the life and work of Marx. This son of a well-to-do lawyer became sympathetic to the concerns of the working class,

then later wrote that the blinding effect of class ideologies would lead inevitably to world revolution. But if the young Marx could see beyond the one-sided ideology of his own social class, there seems to be a way to escape the vicious circle. As a result, we may not be condemned to wholesale class war after all. While the life of Marx may indicate that a peaceable escape from the vicious circle is possible, it is now time to examine how this is possible.

Let us re-state the vicious circle problem in more general terms. We are aware that our upbringing may bias our judgments of value. While we do not want to act unobjectively or out of bias, the practical exigencies of daily living do require us to act. Good judgment requires maintaining a balance between rashness and indecision. But how does one keep such a balance? One gives further relevant questions a chance to rise, and thereby builds upon one's previous acquisition of correct insights. But the problem is obvious: one does not acquire a store of correct insights unless one first possesses good judgment. In short, one acquires good judgment by already possessing it. It is here that the self-correcting process of learning and reflective understanding become relevant:

So it is the process of learning that breaks the vicious circle. Judgment of the correctness of insights supposes the prior acquisition of a large number of correct insights. But the prior insights are not correct because we judge them to be correct. They occur within a self-correcting process in which the shortcomings of each insight provoke further questions to yield complementary insights. Moreover, this self-correcting process tends to a limit. We become familiar with concrete situations; we know what to expect; when the unexpected occurs, we can spot just what happened and why and what can be done to favor or to prevent such a recurrence; or, if the unexpected is quite novel, we

know enough to recommence the process of learning, and we can recognize when, once more, that self-correcting process reaches its limit in familiarity with the concrete situation and in mastery of it.¹²

Since our knowing is not essentially different from our doing, this self-correcting process is operative in our moral, as well as intellectual orientation. Note that the becoming familiar with concrete situations in ordinary life is equivalent to becoming a man of virtue in the moral life:

One has to uncover and root out one's individual, group, and general bias. One has to keep developing one's knowledge of human reality and potentiality as they are in the existing situation. One has to keep distinct its elements of progress and its elements of decline. One has to keep scrutinizing one's intentional responses to value and their implicit scales of preference. One has to listen to criticism and protest. One has to remain ready to learn from others. For moral knowledge is the proper possession only of morally good men and, until one has merited that title, one has still to advance and to learn.¹³

Hence, the young Marx was capable of transcending the narrow interests of his class. The self-correcting process of learning was efficacious, because the shortcomings in his environment provoked further questions and insights. Yet this is not to say that such self-transcendence is easy; as we have already noted, grasp of objective truth is often purchased only at the cost of personal, economic, or social comfort. Yet we can nevertheless assert the possibility of this self-correcting process, for it presupposes only the reality of the pure desire to know.

In section I, a brief demonstration of the pure desire was attempted. One cannot deny its existence without disqualifying himself as a knower. Furthermore, the pure desire is unrestricted; one desires to know everything about everything.

It will be objected by many that they have no desire to know everything about everything. But how do they know that they do not already know everything about everything? It is because so many questions can be asked. Why do they not effectively will to know everything about everything? Because it is so troublesome to reach even a few answers that they are completely disheartened by the prospect of answering all the questions they could ask.¹⁴

Finally, the pure desire to know contains its own criteria of objectivity. We can come to know what truly is and what truly is good, but not because our judgments are deducible from basic beliefs.¹⁵ This approach merely presupposes our previous judgments to be true, so it leads to Kant's infinite regress of pro-syllogisms, or to uncritical acceptance of certain "truths." Instead, the criteria of objectivity reside in the pure desire to know; in brief, they are one's openness or closedness to further relevant questions.¹⁶ We can be sure of our judgments of fact and value, then, when all relevant questions have been raised and answered. The pure desire to know makes possible the self-correcting process of learning which, in turn, frees us from the relativistic implications of the vicious circle. The solution reminds one of an old proverb:

Solvitur ambulando: the problem of walking is solved by walking. Adaptation is required, however, because we are at the moment incapable of walking, present resources not being sufficient; but present resources are sufficient for learning to walk, and that

possibility is the possibility likewise of escape from the vicious circle.¹⁷

In epistemology, the vicious circle is broken by the critical orientation of the pure desire to know. While Aristotle insisted on one's responsibility for his own character, it is now insisted that one is also responsible for his own knowing. One may still argue that an individual is trapped within the confines of his own environment: how can one believe differently, if all he has ever experienced is what is given to him by his particular environment? This, however, fails to go to the root of the issue, namely man's native ability to ask questions and be critical. The stubborn relativist should consider the legacy of philosophers, who have been able to question the very validity of perceptions, even though that is all that they have supposedly ever experienced.

III. "Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen."

-Hegel

The grasp of the invariant basis of all of our judgments of fact and value--the pure desire to know--opens the possibility of dialectical criticism. Because MacIntyre and Hauerwas lack such a comprehensive basis (to be found only in the cognitional activity of the human subject), both also lack any solid framework for dialectical integration. For this reason, MacIntyre can criticize the Enlightenment as a mistaken project that "should never have been commenced in the first place,"¹⁸ and Hauerwas can claim that Christian and secular ethics are fundamentally incommensurable.¹⁹ But, as Hegel realized, the restlessness of thought" (the pure desire to know) compels one to account not only for his own position, but also for those opposed to it. Dialectical reasoning, therefore, is an attempt to apply one's knowledge of the invariant structure of cognitional process in order

to account for the conflicts of differing viewpoints. The only other alternatives seem to be unproductive name-calling, or mutually chosen avoidance.

Dialectic addresses the fundamental problem of differing horizons. "What in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil."²⁰ Any attempt at dialectic seems to stem from two primary notions given in human consciousness. First of all, there is the exigence to be consistent in one's acts of knowing and doing. If one knows that an evil exists and that he can do something about it, he is naturally impelled to do so. Failure to do so would amount to inconsistency. Of course, one may argue that we are not committed to such consistency in our knowing and doing. After all, we regularly hear of assorted evils about which we do nothing. But such may be only another instance of the exigence of maintaining consistency between our knowing and our doing. For inactivity may stem from our knowledge that we are incapable of making any real change, or that any attempt would involve danger to us. Hence, the consistency is preserved. While we are, by nature, oriented towards such consistency, this in no measure implies that we always maintain it. But since such inconsistency does go contrary to our nature, it can occur only with the simultaneous appearance of various aberrations--inadvertence to self, rationalization, or moral renunciation.²¹

Because of the exigence for consistency between our knowing and our doing, we are obliged to eliminate evil when we can. In terms of dialectic, this means reversing positions contrary to one's own. For a position contrary to one's own is taken to be fallacious, and false belief is an evil to be eliminated. In their respective attacks on the Enlightenment and secularism, MacIntyre and Hauerwas are exercising consistency between their acts of knowing and doing. They take the opposing positions to be wrong, and are therefore urging their reversal. Unfortunately, they lack the critical grounds for implementing such a reversal.

The second notion significant in dialectical method is that of the unity of being. We don't need formal logic to tell us that, if one assertion is true, its negation can't also be

true. This notion accounts for the present trends in modern ethical thought. The relativist grasps the unity of being; but his confusion over the din of conflicting moral outlooks leads him to conclude that, if not all can be correct, then none are.

Yet to argue for a fundamental 'an-archy' is logically and ontologically an impossibility. For any argument has some principle of discerning order if it is not mere unintelligible babble. Ethical agnostics are want to consider themselves intelligent: the better their arguments for a fundamental 'an-archy' regarding the human good, the more their own cognitive performance subverts their intended position.²²

The dogmatist also grasps the unity of being; unlike the relativist, he maintains the meaningfulness of the notion of truth. Yet in order to do so, he believes that any view opposed to his own must be wrong. The problem with such dogmatism is that it neglects the pure desire to know and increases the possibility of violence.²³ The conviction of the dogmatist, combined with his native exigency for consistency between knowing and doing, makes the temptation to use force only too great. Quite often, the dogmatist will call for the silencing of his opponents (who are "evil" from his perspective) through dominative power.²⁴ This approach, however, seems inherently unreasonable; for it makes no sense to assert the "truth" only through the suppression of the necessary condition for any grasp of truth—questioning. The answer, then, lies not in a dogmatism or a relativism of values, but in healthy dialogue between parties mutually committed to their desire to know.

In fundamental differences of opinion, therefore, the effective procedure can hardly be the simple one of showing your adversary that you are right and he is wrong; by hypothesis, he is likely to be

incapable of seeing that. The strategy then will be to ask yourself why he is incapable of seeing what is so clear to you [dialectic], and then proposing to him considerations that may help him grow out of his dwarfed condition (always keeping an open mind to the possibility that you yourself are the dwarf, that you yourself need to grow in order to be able to learn from your adversary).²⁵

This is where community is essential.

IV. "I pray that all may be one as you, Father, are in me, and I in you."

-John 17:21

In light of what has been said so far, it seems that community is the only suitable means for initiating and sustaining the benefits of productive ethical dialogue.

To begin, the basis of community is not merely shared dependence on a common technology, economy, or polity. Man, by nature, is a social animal, and he builds communities because of his sense of belonging with other human beings, his spontaneous intersubjectivity. In spite of the practical and technical benefits of institutions and civilizations, man's spontaneous intersubjectivity still remains the basis of his communal living. "As intersubjective community precedes civilization and underpins it, so also it remains when civilization suffers disintegration and decay. The collapse of Imperial Rome was the resurgence of family and clan, feudal dynasty and nation."²⁶

Yet in spite of its grounds in affectivity, communal living plays a major role in one's moral and intellectual outlook. Communities help us acquire and sustain our beliefs. Furthermore, in spite of the critical orientation of this essay, it is to be affirmed that beliefs are both a fact and a value. Most of what one considers himself to know is not knowledge that one has discovered on his own. The entire repertory of one's store of information, in fact, depends on the insights, reports, and experience of people from

different times and places. If one did not decide to believe a great many things, he could hardly function in our modern world. Furthermore, although science is often contrasted with belief, belief actually plays a large role in modern science. Scientists could make little or no progress if they always felt it necessary to return to and verify the work of their predecessors. As Newton noted, "If I have seen further, it is by standing upon the shoulders of Giants." In short, "Belief is essential to the human good; it has its risks, but it is unquestionably better than regression to primitivism."²⁷

The role of community would then be to foster the right beliefs, and in a way consistent with each member's desire to know. This does not in any way imply any sort of conditioning or indoctrination. On the contrary, as we have already noted, one's desire to know can prevent him from becoming the product of social conditioning. Inasmuch as one is capable of asking questions, he is capable of scrutinizing the beliefs of his particular community. Furthermore, the discovery of one erroneous belief can lead to the purging of many. So far from indoctrinating new members or suppressing pluralism, the nurturing role of community should serve to minimize the effort spent and time wasted on erroneous philosophies. The scientist enters a scientific community which provides him with the "communal" insights and information, so that he can go beyond these to make contributions and discoveries of his own. Scientists would get nowhere if they couldn't draw from the communal store of knowledge. Similarly, it would be highly inefficient in ethical education if each individual was left on his own in the area of ethical reflection. The absence of communities in our modern society has shown what moral chaos this has led to; and it is bound to continue without renewed communal efforts. These, of course, were the points made implicitly by MacIntyre and Hauerwas, but to them we have added the critical element of the self-correcting process of learning.

Furthermore, it must be stressed that correct beliefs should be fostered in a way consistent with each person's pure desire to know. This means allowing doubts and questions--no matter how uncomfortable--to arise and be addressed. The fact is that all

human institutions are created for the good of people, and not the other way around. To maintain homogeneity of belief only by suppressing freedom or the pursuit of truth is to invert this order. For man, by nature, must be free to question, and it makes no sense to claim to serve man by suppressing what is essential to him. In short, achievement of the good for man must be intrinsic to the performance itself;²⁸ for it is good that man should be free to question and inquire, and no ulterior "good" (economic, social, or religious) can claim to be truly good if it violates man's freedom. In turn, sustained inquiry and critical reflection can yield practical answers for realizing man's economic, social, and religious good. The thriving of committed and genuine communities seems to be the best safeguard against the tendency to value human institutions more highly than the people that created them.

The world religions, with their call to transformation and conversion away from man-made idols, provide the groundwork for communal living. In a community where dialogue is lively and sincere, it is unlikely that the value of members will be subordinated to the institutional elements. A genuine community should not be afraid to admit its own faults, and therefore should more easily resist the temptation against which Gandhi warned: attempting to create systems that are so good that humans would no longer have to be good. The Christian message, with its emphasis on transformative religious discipleship, apocalyptic expectation, and supernatural hopefulness, is essentially communal. Christianity, however, became the "iron cage" of Christendom with the decline of the community. "The only way out of these iron cages is through a growing conscious and reflective appropriation of the infrastructural communities, and a concerted concern to promote those heuristics of community which nurture the quests for truth, responsible freedom, and beauty."²⁹

V. Conclusion

A brief conclusion may now be in order, for the road has been long and the terrain diverse. My purpose has been to illuminate and offer solutions to some major problems in contemporary ethical thought. While the approach has been largely intellectualist and critical, it simultaneously affirms the truthfulness of Christian teaching. It has been shown that ethical imperatives need not be consigned to the realm of mere affectivity, and that emotivist theories of ethics fail because of their neglect of the subject. While the subject and his character are absolutely central in any ethical discourse, one is not confined within the boundaries of his own social context. The pure desire to know makes possible a self-correcting process of learning. As a result, Marx's world revolution is not the inevitable means for overcoming class bias. If the basic grounds of our factual and ethical knowledge are understood, integration of dialectically opposed viewpoints becomes possible. Hence, one need not view the Enlightenment or modern secularism as inseparably alien to one's own thought. Finally, the assertion of rationality in ethics need not lead to the imposition of one set of ideals on a weaker minority. It is fundamentally inconsistent, in fact, to try to sustain truth by obscuring and suppressing questions. The role of community, finally, is seen as fundamental to the promotion and maintenance of the human good, especially freedom and inquiry. For freedom and inquiry are the necessary preconditions of anyone's giving an account of what he believes the good to be. No one would give an account if he did not think it was the result of free and intelligent inquiry. While this entire essay has involved repeated appeals to the pure desire to know, no attempt has been made to discuss its origins. This question, I believe, cannot be answered except in terms of the supernatural.

Footnotes

¹David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1896), pp. 455-470.

²Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 21.

³For a concise and original treatment of the neglect of the human subject in modern philosophy, see Bernard Lonergan, The Subject (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968).

⁴Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972), p. 17.

⁵MacIntyre, p. 56.

⁶Lonergan, Method, p. 41.

⁷Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 76.

⁸1 John 4:20: "If someone says, 'I love God,' yet hates his brother, he is a liar. For he cannot love God, whom he has not seen, if he does not love his brother, whom he has seen."

⁹MacIntyre, p. 204.

¹⁰Richard J. Bernstein, "Neitzsche or Aristotle?" Reflections on Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue," Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Spring 1984, p. 22.

¹¹Rpted, in T.B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, eds., Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), P. 71.

¹²Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1958), Pp. 286-287.

¹³Lonergan, Method, p. 240.

¹⁴Lonergan, Insight, p. 351.

¹⁵The "foundationalist approach" in epistemology has been attempted, with less than satisfactory results, by philosophers from Descartes to Plantinga.

¹⁶For a more extensive discussion of judgment and the notion of objectivity, see Bernard Lonergan, Insight, Ch. IX, X, and XIII.

¹⁷Frederick Crowe, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value." Unpublished.

¹⁸MacIntyre, p. 111.

¹⁹For this reason, Hauerwas adheres to a strict church-world dichotomy, and writes as if the church has nothing to learn from the world.

²⁰Lonergan, Method, p. 236.

²¹Lonergan, Insight, pp. 599-600.

²²Matthew Lamb, "Christianity Within the Political Dialectics of Community and Empire," Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, Spring 1983, p. 3.

²³This reiterates a pointed criticism made by Hauerwas (see The Peaceable Kingdom, Ch. 1 and 4). Yet while Hauerwas naively levels indiscriminant attacks upon any attempt at a rational ethics, it has been my purpose to locate the cognitional roots of such dogmatism.

²⁴For a more detailed discussion of dominative power, see Lamb, pp. 1-24.

²⁵Crowe, p. 41.

²⁶Lonergan, Insight, p. 212.

²⁷Lonergan, Method, p. 46.

²⁸Lamb, p. 15.

²⁹Lamb, p. 21.

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