

Improving Practical Reasoning and Argumentation

Michael David Baumtrog

Doctoral Thesis in Philosophy

June, 2015

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This thesis is presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for degree of Doctor in Philosophy, prepared under the supervision of Prof. Dr. João de Deus Santos Sàágua.

I hereby declare that this is my own work.

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is the result of my individual and independent research. The content within is original and all of the sources consulted have been properly cited in the footnotes and bibliography.

The Candidate,

Lisboa, of,

I declare that this dissertation meets the conditions to be evaluated by the designated jury.

The Supervisor,

Lisboa, of,

For Omi and Opi,

*In recognition that
this dissertation is as
as much a gift from you
as it is a gift for you.*

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Thank you for holding me during the toughest parts and for making the not so tough parts so very wonderful. Xo

With my utmost gratitude to all,



Michael/Bommer
Lisboa
24th June, 2015

IMPROVING PRACTICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION

MICHAEL D. BAUMTROG

ABSTRACT

This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able to conclude that his reasoning to mass murder is reasonable – which is understood to be an unacceptable result. Causes for the model to allow such a conclusion are identified as conceptual confusions ingrained in the model, a tension in how values function within the model, and a lack of creativity from Breivik. Distinguishing between dialectical and dialogical, reasoning and argumentation, for individual and multiple participants, chapter 3 addresses these conceptual confusions and helps lay the foundation for the design of a new integrated model for practical reasoning and argumentation (chapter 4). After laying out the theoretical aspects of the new model, it is then used to re-test Breivik’s reasoning in light of a developed discussion regarding the motivation for the new place and role of moral considerations (chapter 5). The application of the new model shows ways that Breivik could have been able to conclude that his practical argumentation was unreasonable and is thus argued to have improved upon the Fairclough and Fairclough model. It is acknowledged, however, that since the model cannot guarantee a reasonable conclusion, improving the critical creative capacity of the individual using it is also of paramount importance (chapter 6). The thesis concludes by discussing the contemporary importance of improving practical reasoning and by pointing to areas for further research (chapter 7).

KEYWORDS: practical reasoning, practical argumentation, values, morals, Anders Behring Breivik

APERFEIÇOANDO O RACIOCÍNIO E ARGUMENTAÇÃO PRÁTICO

MICHAEL D. BAUMTROG

RESUMO

Esta tese desenvolve um novo modelo integrado de raciocínio prático e argumentação, cuja necessidade justifica. Após contextualizar o trabalho em termos do que é razoável em lugar do que é racional (capítulo 1), um caso paradigmático de uma argumentação prática individual não razoável, como acontece com o assassino em massa Anders Behring Breivik, é aplicado ao modelo de análise e avaliação da argumentação prática proposto por Fairclough e Fairclough (2012) (capítulo 2). A aplicação mostra que seguindo este modelo Breivik chega facilmente à conclusão de que o seu raciocínio com vista a cometer um assassinio em massa é razoável. As causas para que o modelo permita uma tal conclusão são identificadas como confusões conceituais arraigadas no modelo, uma tensão no modo como os valores funcionam dentro do modelo, e uma falta de criatividade de Breivik. Distinguindo entre raciocínio e argumentação dialética e dialógica, para participantes individuais ou múltiplos, o capítulo 3 aborda estas confusões conceituais e ajuda a estabelecer os fundamentos do desenho de um novo modelo integrado de raciocínio prático e argumentação (capítulo 4). Após a apresentação dos aspetos teóricos do novo modelo, este é utilizado para reapreciar o raciocínio de Breivik, à luz de uma discussão desenvolvida a propósito da motivação para um novo posicionamento e um novo papel das considerações morais (capítulo 5). A aplicação do novo modelo mostra modos como Breivik poderia ter concluído que a sua argumentação prática não era razoável e defende-se assim que este modelo implica um melhoramento em relação ao proposto por Fairclough e Fairclough. Reconhece-se, contudo, que, como o modelo não é capaz de garantir uma conclusão razoável, melhorar a capacidade crítica e criativa do indivíduo que o usa assume importância decisiva (capítulo 6). A tese conclui discutindo a importância contemporânea de melhorar o raciocínio prático e apontando para áreas de futura pesquisa (capítulo 7).

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: raciocínio prático, argumentação prática, valores, moral, Anders Behring Breivik

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1. THE REASONABLE AND THE RATIONAL

“Reason has always existed, but not always in a reasonable form”

~Karl Marx

1.1. Introduction

This is a work in philosophy, specifically, in practical reasoning and argumentation. While the discussion which follows has clear overlap with other disciplines, perhaps communication studies and psychology most predominantly, what follows is an attempt to get at what is involved in determining reasonableness from a philosophical perspective. I cannot overemphasise the limited scope of this work. Unfortunately, what follows raises and leaves unanswered far more than it addresses. You will see that I cannot provide a full account of what it is reasonable to do. I would need a lot more knowledge and help from others who specialize in other disciplines to ever hope to achieve that. For now, I hope only to contribute to some existing discussions and to begin others, by presenting my philosophical thoughts on what I consider to be a very interesting and important aspect of the human experience - practical reasoning and argumentation.

Practical reasoning is often contrasted with theoretical reasoning (Wallace, 2014). Theoretical reasoning is reasoning about beliefs and facts. Practical reasoning is reasoning about actions - about what to do. There are a number of ways in which people acquire beliefs and perform actions which are not clearly conscious to them. People do not usually reason through every belief they hold or direct focused attention to each of their reasons for crossing a street. Nor does this make them irrational (Kahneman, 2011). As interesting as these phenomena are in their own right, they are not the focus of my attention here. In this work I am interested in the reasoning and argumentation that occurs when the reasoner(s) and/or arguer(s) care about their reasoning and are interested in doing it carefully. I am interested in what Broome calls active reasoning and which is sometimes made explicit (Broome, 2013, p. 206ff).

Further, I am interested in practical reasoning being conducted with the aim of coming to a reasonable conclusion; I am concerned with reasoners and arguers who care about being reasonable. As a book concerned with reasonableness, an appropriate starting point is to talk about what reasonableness is and why we should be concerned with it. At

such an early stage of the work, however, this is not such an easy task since one of the aims of this book is to point to some ways to determine when practical reasoning and argumentation are reasonable. Despite this problem, however, some preliminary remarks on the notion remain important.

As van Eemeren and Grootendorst have pointed out, “[w]ords like “rational” and “reasonable” are used in and out of season in ordinary language. It is often unclear exactly what they are supposed to mean, and even if it is clear, the meaning is not always consistent” (2004, p. 123). Accordingly, to begin this dissertation I would like to investigate some of the differences between the ideas of the reasonable and rational from a philosophical perspective, but in terms that I hope will also sound sensible to the non-philosopher. The main aim in providing this discussion is to frame the rest of the dissertation by identifying what I will not be doing in the rest of the work – conducting a study in strict rationality.

In the rest of this chapter I will argue that there is some consistency in the two related but distinct ideas of rationality and reasonableness which emerge across a variety of texts. I will further argue that the notion of the rational is typically narrower than the notion of the reasonable and that those interested in investigating human reasoning and argumentation ought to focus on reasonableness. In order to proceed, I will first review some characterizations of the notion of rationality. This is followed by a discussion of the notion of the reasonable, which is then followed by a comparison of the two ideas. The chapter ends by presenting conclusions revealed by the comparison and a brief description of how the rest of the work will proceed and why.

1.2. The Rational

These days, discussions of the meaning of “rational” and what it is to be rational or to think or act rationally, commonly occur in economic and philosophical circles. While clearly there is not time enough to cover all of the conceptions of rationality which have been offered, in what follows I will use a general discussion provided by Amartya Sen which allows for easy connection to other views.

In his introduction to the book *Rationality and Freedom*, Sen notes that there are three common views of rationality described as “rational choice”. They are 1) internal consistency, 2) self-interest maximization, and 3) maximization in general. Internal consistency is described as the assessment of the relation between choices in different situations, comparing what are chosen from different sets of alternatives entirely in terms

of the choices themselves (Sen, 2002, pp. 19-20). In other words, they are internal “in the sense that they require correspondence between different parts of a choice function, without invoking anything outside choice (such as motivations, objectives and substantive properties)” (Sen, 2002, p. 122).

Consistency is crucial for some explanations of rationality found in philosophy. For example, consistency is a dominant idea in what has been referred to as formal deductive logic, mathematical logic, or the introductory level of these topics, ‘baby logic’. All of these views support the notion that an argument is considered rational to the extent that the premises are true and the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises (Johnson, 2012, p. 121). This consistency, that if a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises then its negation cannot also be true, is ensured through the application of formally valid rules of logic.

In terms of dialogue logic, rationality is also evaluated according to consistency. In the basic case of a simple question and answer dialogue that only permits ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers, “[t]he questioner’s objective is to force the answerer to affirm a proposition that implies the denial of some proposition that he or she had earlier asserted” (Blair, 1998, p. 327). In other words, the questioner attempts to have the answerer provide inconsistent answers.

Finally, John Broome also highlights the importance of consistency to rationality as a matter of requirement. For Broome, the property of rationality is defined by the requirements of rationality, so listing those requirements is the way to describe it (Broome, 2013, p. 149). Importantly, while he admits to providing only an incomplete list of requirements, his first four requirements of synchronic rationality (attitudes at a single time) have to do with consistency and deduction (Broome, 2013, p. 149ff). For example, the requirement of No Contradictory Beliefs says that “rationality requires of N that N does not believe at t that p and also believe at t that not p” (Broome, 2013, p. 155).¹ As well, the Modus Ponens Requirement states that “[r]ationality requires of N that, if N believes at t that p, and N believes at t that if p then q, and if N cares at t whether q, then N believes at t that q” - in short, that Modus Ponens holds (Broome, 2013, p. 157).

¹ In addition to the admitted incompleteness of the list, it is also important to note Broome’s flexibility on the formulation of the differing requirements. For example he says about this requirement “... I would not object to weakening the formulae in some suitable way” (2013, p. 155).

Returning now to Sen's discussion, in light of the difficulties he sees assessing internal consistency without invoking anything outside choice, Sen claims that it is the second view of rationality that has dominated contemporary economics (Sen, 2002, p. 22). Rationality on this view is the "intelligent pursuit of self-interest" wherein "the individual may value anything, but in this view he chooses entirely according to his reading of his own interests" (Sen, 2002, p. 23). One main difficulty with this view is its conflict with the fact that people often work in situations counter to self-interest. For example, people often refrain from littering even if no one is around who might judge them if they were seen. A further problem is that such a view of rationality, because it comes from economic models, is focused on behaviour and action, i.e. practical reasoning, and it says very little about the beliefs people come to, or their theoretical reasoning.

The third commonly held view, maximization in general, allows for people to act in cooperative and morally good ways - for example, by working toward a maximization of social welfare (Sen, 2002, p. 37). Such morality is, however, far from guaranteed. As Sen points out, "maximizing behavior can sometimes be patently stupid and lacking in reason assessment depending on what is being maximized" (Sen, 2002, p. 39). This is because there is nothing in maximization in general that specifies appropriate things to be maximized. The selection of the ends remains unscrutinised. Sen provides the example of a man who desires to cut off all of his toes. Asked if he has considered the consequences of cutting off his toes, the man replies, "No, I have not, and I am not going to, because cutting off my toes is definitely what I desire; it is my principal objective and I understand I am entirely rational so long as I pursue my objective intelligently and systematically" (Sen, 2002, p. 39). For this reason, as well as the reasons above,² Sen rejects these three views as providing a sufficient account of rationality, even though he grants maximization in general the role of a necessary condition.

Instead, Sen champions a much broader view of rationality, interpreted "as the discipline of subjecting one's choices – of actions as well as of objectives, values and priorities – to reasoned scrutiny [...] as the need to subject one's choices to the demands of reason." (Sen, 2002, p. 4). On this view, rationality is not a formula or an essentialist doctrine, but rather uses "reasoning to understand and assess goals and values, and it also

² As well as a number of others which are not crucial for our purposes here but are worthwhile nonetheless. See, (Sen, 2002).

involves the use of these goals and values to make systematic choices” (Sen, 2002, p. 46). Thus, for Sen, rationality extends as far as, and into, all the domains that reason does.

Placing reason and reasons at the centre of rationality is relatable to another description of rationality found in argumentation theory, namely Johnson’s theory of Manifest Rationality. Building upon Siegel’s view that “[w]e need an account of rationality which recognizes various sorts of reasons and which provides insight into the nature and epistemic force of reasons, and which affords the possibility of the rational scrutiny of ends” (Siegel, 1988, p. 131), Johnson describes rationality as “the disposition to, and the action of, using, giving, and-or acting on the basis of reasons” (Johnson R. , 2000, p. 161). Providing reasons, for example as a premise conclusion complex, is what Johnson calls the illative core. The correct employment of the illative core, however, is not by itself sufficient for rationality (Johnson, 2000, p. 165). The important role of scrutiny referred to by both Sen and Siegel also appears in Johnson’s conception under the title of the dialectical tier. Both the illative core and the dialectical tier are a part of argumentation and rationality becomes manifest through argumentation.

Argumentation on this view is teleological and dialectical, that is, is aimed at the rational persuasion of another. Argumentation, then, embraces, increases, and exhibits rationality while depending on the mutual rationality of an Other. This Other is the source of reasoned scrutiny and responding to them is a central feature of manifest rationality (Johnson R. , 2000, pp. 159-164). Although Johnson does not say it explicitly, it seems that on this view one can be considered rational to the extent to which one accurately functions with both the illative core and dialectical tier of argumentation.

Both Siegel (1988, p. 127ff) and Johnson (2000, p. 14) explicitly highlight that understanding rationality in this way is important for allowing moral considerations into descriptions of rationality and thus overcoming the instrumental conceptions of rationality outlined earlier (internal consistency, self-interest maximization, maximization in general). For them, rationality is more than finding the most efficient means to your end. It is about the appropriate use and appropriate scrutiny of reasons and reasoning in all of the fields within which they may be used.

The notion of the critical scrutiny of another provides a nice link with one of the most prominent views of reasonableness found in argumentation theory, the Pragma-dialectical view developed by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, the topic to which we now turn.

1.3. The Reasonable

As one of the most well-known theories of argumentation in the world, the Pragma-dialectical theory places the notion of reasonableness at its core. After rejecting the “geometrical” (formally logical) approach and “anthropological” (audience relative) approach, van Eemeren and Grootendorst defend the “critical-rationalist” view of reasonableness. This view “proceeds on the basis of the fundamental fallibility of all human thought” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 131) and attributes “value both to the formal properties of arguments and to the shared knowledge that is necessary to achieve consensus” (2004, p. 129). On this view, reasonableness is achieved through conducting a critical discussion aimed at the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits. Together, these characteristics mean that any topic of disagreement is open for discussion and reasonableness is determined according to how well or poorly the ideal model for a critical discussion is followed. Thus, reasonableness is viewed as a gradual concept (2004, p. 16) and does not concern the content of reasons or conclusions, but only the procedure used to arrive at them.

Further, critical-rationalists hold that “the dialectical scrutiny of claims in a critical discussion boils down to the exposure of (logical and pragmatic) inconsistencies” (2004, p. 132). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are clear, however, that “[a] procedure that promotes the resolution of differences of opinion cannot be exclusively confined to the logical relations by which conclusions are inferred from premises. It must consist of a system of regulations that cover all speech acts that need to be carried out in a critical discussion to resolve a difference of opinion” (2004, p. 134). Broadening the ground for regulations to all speech acts allows for the consideration of extra-logical instances of unreasonableness, sometimes known as informal fallacies, such as the use of force.

The discussion on rationality above touched on what van Eemeren and Grootendorst referred to as the “geometrical” view. We have also now just reviewed the basics of the “critical-rationalist” position, leaving us still to review what has been called the “anthropological” view. This view, attributed most commonly to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca places the audience at the center of the notion of reasonableness, thus earning it the title “anthropological”. What counts as reasonable, then, is audience dependant. Perelman states, “a rule of action defined as reasonable or even as self-evident at one moment or in a given situation can seem arbitrary and even ridiculous at another moment and in a different situation” (Perelman, 1979, p. 119). As we can also gather from

this quote, in addition to the flexibility of the audience as the determiner of reasonableness, the speaker must also be flexible with any rules of reasonableness. Thus, both rules and audience are context sensitive while playing their roles in determinations of reasonableness. On this view, the reasonable man, says Perelman, “is a man who in his judgements and conduct is influenced by common sense” (1979, p. 118).

Nevertheless, this view reasonableness is not so relativistic as to remain empty, since if everyone is reasonable, or has common sense, then to be reasonable is to “search, in all domains...for what should be accepted by all” (ibid). Reasonableness carries across instances because “what is reasonable must be a precedent which can inspire everyone in analogous circumstances” (1979, p. 119).³

1.4. Comparison

After reviewing such an array of viewpoints, a few comparative observations can be made. First, the first view of rationality, internal consistency, seems to be in hard opposition to the last view of reasonableness, dubbed the anthropological view. Indeed, Perelman seems to have had this view of rationality in mind when he declared that, “[t]he rational corresponds to mathematical reason, for some a reflection of divine reasons, which grasps necessary relations” (1979, p. 117). However, the two middle views presented, manifest rationality and critical-rationalist reasonableness, do not seem nearly as far apart.

What then are the characteristics of comparison from which we can assess the distance in views? Given this literature review a few characteristics stand out more clearly than others. The first is consistency. While a whole book (or more!) could be written about the role of consistency in notions of the rational and reasonable, I will limit that discussion here to only say that it seems to me that consistency is the ‘God’ of rationality, but only a ‘god’⁴ for reasonableness. In other words, on the far side of notions of rationality, if consistency is violated, then immediately so too is rationality. On the far

³ See (Tindale, 2010) for a full development of this view.


⁴ The small “g” here is purposeful and is meant to connote importance, but not supreme importance. Further, I am not here stipulating that argumentation need be strictly rational or reasonable – though as will be indicated below, I broadly side with preference for the reasonable. I am only pointing to observations that arise from an overview of the above mentioned literature. Different approaches are more or less rational and more or less reasonable.

side of reasonableness, however, if consistency is violated, it may constitute pause for concern or questioning, but it far from immediately dismisses a positive evaluation of reasonableness.

The second characteristic is humanity. On the far side of rationality, humanity makes no appearance. In strict rationality, logic is true regardless of whether there is a human mind to think it, or err in it. One of rationality’s greatest advantages is its independence from human fallibility. In this realm, calculations trump creativity and deduction holds in all possible worlds. On the other side, “reasonableness should contribute to the idea of the human” (Tindale, 1999, p. 202) and the idea of the human involves moral considerations crucial to reasonableness but nearly absent in rationality.⁵

When we move in from the ends, however, things are not so clear. Indeed there are aspects of Johnson’s theory of Manifest Rationality which clearly overlap with what has here been described as reasonableness. On the other side, the pragma-dialectical critical-rationalist view of reasonableness shares some clear overlap with some aspects which have here been identified under the title of rationality. For Johnson, manifest rationality calls for scrutiny which opens the door for morality, both of which are foreign to the far side of rationality but welcomed in reasonableness. For pragma-dialectics, the rigid dictate to attempt to meet ideal rules and the focus on consistency, rings closer to the notions of rationality we have discussed than to those found on the far side of reasonableness.⁶ Accordingly, we can visualise a sort of sliding linear scale:

Figure 1-1 Reasonable and Rational Scale



⁵ For an enlightening discussion of humanity and the philosophy of argument see (Boyer, 2006).

⁶ This point is made explicit in the pragma-dialectical literature. See (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 16, 132).

One might wonder why this comparison and contrast matters for those working on reasoning and argumentation. Part of my interest in the topic began as response to the questions I received after telling people I was working on practical reasoning evaluation. For some, that meant I was working on topics like decision theory as found in economics. On this view, clearly the universal reach of mathematical reason holds the superior position for evaluating decisions over the fallibility of mere human thought. For others, it meant I was studying psychology, and how dare I feel pompous enough to offer advice on what counts as reasonable, especially across a variety of contexts! One of the lessons I took from these sorts of comments is that the same words indicate for people very different ideas.⁷

I then thought, given that argumentation theorists call their theories, or at least describe the results of argumentation evaluation, “rational” and/or “reasonable,” perhaps there is some consensus there. As I hope to have shown, that is not entirely the case. While I have argued that a few general trends can be identified, many of the authors seem content to either use the terms interchangeably or to offer stipulative definitions meant only to hold for that individual work. Although I acknowledge the big gray area in between the terms, I still think that as a community we can be at least a little more precise and consistent. For example, if our work is more focused on human aspects, we can try to stick to the term “reasonable” and its variations. If we are less concerned with the human experience and more concerned with consistency, we stick with variations of “rational”.

One main reason for holding this position is because the human component of reasonableness means that “we implicitly recognize a moral dimension to reasonableness that is absent from pure rationality” (Cohen, 2011, p. 3). As Cohen poetically captures the point, “[i]rrationality is a cognitive defect; unreasonableness is a moral one. If you are irrational, there is something wrong with your brain; if you are unreasonable, there is something wrong with your soul” (Ibid). This shared insight is the main motivation for addressing the role of morals in practical reasoning in later chapters. If this were a

⁷ Indeed, another meaning for these terms comes from Choice Theory where there is a distinction between reasonable, covering, roughly, all patterns of choices that satisfy conditions of expansion and contraction, and rational, meaning a pattern of choices that meets the condition of revealed preference. See (Allingham, 2002, pp. 12-18).

dissertation on strict rationality, a discussion of morals might be considered an unneeded but interesting periphery component. For reasonableness, I consider it central.

To be clear, reasonableness and rationality are not always in conflict. Rather, they seem to work together more often than not. I think this is in part because, as Rigotti and Greco Morasso claim, reasonableness “exceeds rationality, as it also involves a more comprehensive and more articulated attitude of the human reason” (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2009, p. 22). Indeed, I also agree with Perelman’s sentiment that when the rational and the reasonable mutually support each other there is no problem. But when fidelity to the spirit of a system leads to an unacceptable conclusion, accounting for the human components of the system may justify rejection of its suggestion in favour of a more reasonable alternative (Perelman, 1979, pp. 121-122).

These observations are meant to support the following conclusions. First, that two distinct but related notions of the rational and the reasonable exist. Further, because of how different these ideas can be, it would be helpful to consistently distinguish between them, which I will do my best to do in the remainder of this work. Comparing core components of the ideas has revealed that while consistency can be viewed as the God of rationality, it is only one (though still important) of many contributing factors to a notion of reasonableness. The other main observation has been that reasonableness is predominantly a human characteristic involving moral considerations while rationality remains largely technical and abstract.

1.5. Layout of the Remainder of the Book

At this point one might be wondering how this discussion of the reasonable and rational relates to what follows. As mentioned in the opening paragraph, I hope to get at some ways to determine what it is reasonable to do. Thus, while I admittedly do not have a precise definition of the reasonable, I only aim to align myself with that broad side of the spectrum and I will not pay any detailed attention in this work to what it is strictly rational to do. However, in line with the idea that the reasonable can include the rational, I will not avoid dealing with aspects of rationality altogether, nor claim that they are unimportant. I will instead focus on the place identified by Scanlon as “[i]n between the minimum standards marked out by the idea of irrationality and the ideal of what it would be (most) rational to believe or do, [where we find] the notions of what is reasonable and unreasonable” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 32). With the above study and this caveat, I hope to

have sufficiently framed the view through which the rest of the work will proceed and will now move to explain the plan ahead.

The next chapter, focuses on why the current work is needed. To do so, I will address contemporary models of value-based practical reasoning and argumentation. The heart of the chapter applies a leading contemporary model of practical reasoning and argumentation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), to a real world instance of what I take to be a paradigm case of unreasonable value practical reasoning - the reasoning of mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik. The application is used to see how the model deals with his reasoning and argumentation and what might have happened if Breivik had used it. I will argue that if he had used the model, Breivik would have reason to believe his practical reasoning was reasonable and as such, the model needs to be strengthened. The chapter concludes by identifying the areas where I see improvement possible and which will be developed throughout the rest of the dissertation.

In chapter 3, I will address the conceptual distinctions which when articulated help clarify what practical reasoning and practical argumentation can and cannot account for. In my view these distinctions are often overlooked in the literature, leading to confusion that when clarified can be used to strengthen the model. Thus, I will separate and discuss the three pairs of interrelated notions of reasoning and argumentation, dialectical and dialogical, and individual and multiple participants.

After making these distinctions, in chapter 4 I will present a new model for practical reasoning and argumentation, which was developed together with João Sàágua. This model benefits from and builds off of the models discussed in chapter two but is also informed and influenced, and consequently designed, in light of the ideas articulated throughout all of the other chapters as well.

The 5th chapter will serve a double function. First, I will point to how and why the role of value considerations has been changed in the new model through a critique of their role in the Fairclough and Fairclough model. With the new model in place and the place and role of values clarified, I then apply the new model to Breivik's reasoning and argumentation to see if it has indeed been strengthened. The chapter concludes by arguing that, although the model provides ways Breivik could have seen his reasoning and argumentation was unreasonable, and thus has indeed been strengthened, regardless of how well designed a model is, there is no guarantee that a reasoner will come to a reasonable intention to act.

The 6th chapter will point to a potential way to help the problem we are left with at the end of chapter five. Looking to tools from critical thinking, I argue that a scheme is only as good as the agent using it. Accordingly, using lessons from critical thinking to improve our critical creative capacities can be as important as having a well formulated scheme for making reasonable decisions to act.

The 7th and final chapter summarizes the arguments and conclusions drawn throughout the work and points to directions for further research.

2. CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF PRACTICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION

I consider myself to be an anti-racist, anti-fascist and anti-Nazi.

~Anders Behring Breivik

2.1. Introduction

There has been a recent reinvigoration into the study of practical reasoning in a number of fields. Scholars working in fields, as diverse as moral and ethical philosophy (Chang, Forthcoming; Parfit, 2011; Raz, 2005) computer science (Atkinson & Bench-Capon, 2008), argumentation studies (Walton, 2007; 2013; Hitchcock, 2011), and discourse analysis (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012) have all raised important questions and made valuable contributions to the study of practical reasoning. The main objectives for this chapter are to provide a discussion of some of the current views of the structure of practical reasoning found in the argumentation literature (which borrow from other domains) and to review their proposals for its evaluation. Accordingly, the chapter begins with a discussion of what practical reasoning is. I then move on to a discussion of the current dominant evaluation strategy in argumentation theory of using critical questions. Selecting the currently most developed model and set of critical questions provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), I apply them to the reasoning Anders Behring Breivik used to decide to commit his crimes in 2011. Worryingly, it will be shown that by using the model and critical questions, Breivik would still somewhat easily be able to conclude to commit his crimes, thus showing that the evaluative mechanism has failed. Reflecting on the application of his reasoning to the scheme and critical questions I highlight the places where the biggest problems seem to lie and introduce them for further discussion in later chapters. The concluding section will summarize the results from this chapter and outline the plan for the remainder of the dissertation.

2.2. Characterization of Practical Reasoning

Practical reasoning is commonly contrasted with theoretical reasoning, wherein, broadly, the latter concerns reasoning about beliefs, and the former concerns reasoning about actions. Although characterizations of practical reasoning differ in their presentation, they all maintain roughly the same general form, even when originating

from the differing Commitment Model and Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) Model. For example, Walton (2007), from the commitment camp, provides the following basic scheme:

I have a goal *G*.
Bringing about *A* is necessary (or sufficient) for me to bring about *G*.
Therefore, I should (practically ought to) bring about *A*. (p. 233)

John Broome (2002), a main proponent from the BDI camp, articulates a description of practical reasoning as the following;

I(Chris will buy a boat)
and B(For Chris to buy a boat, a necessary means is for Chris to borrow money)
so I(Chris will borrow money).

Where I stands for “you intend that” and B stands for “you believe that”.
(p. 2)

While there are interesting questions concerning the differences between these two presentations, the comparison here is only meant to illustrate that despite their differences, both approaches seem at heart to be after the same thing – a simplified characterization of how people reason about what to do.

This basic outline of practical reasoning is commonly referred to as instrumental practical reasoning⁸ - getting from an assumed goal through the means to achieve it. In addition to instrumental reasoning, scholars from both camps have noted that practical reasoning often has a close and important connection with values.⁹ Walton (2007) argues that, “[v]alues are often in the background in practical reasoning, or in some cases may not need to be taken into account at all. For these cases the basic scheme can be used to evaluate the practical reasoning. In other cases, like those typical in electronic democracy, values are important factors that need to be taken into account” (p. 234). In cases of value-based practical reasoning, Walton adds a value premise to his basic scheme and presents it as;

⁸ Though there are many other types see Hitchcock (2011).

⁹ From the commitment camp: Walton, D., (2007), Atkinson, K., & Bench-Capon, T., (2008), and Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N., (2012). From the BDI camp: Bratman, M., (1987) and Broome, J., (2004). Some other important views, which do not explicitly align themselves with one camp or the other, are presented by Audi, R, (2006) and Scanlon, T.M., (1998).

I have a goal *G*.
G is supported by my set of values, *V*.
Bringing about *A* is necessary (or sufficient) for me to bring about *G*.
Therefore, I should (practically ought to) bring about *A*. (ibid)

It is worth noting that some authors see all practical reasoning as involving values (Eg. Raz, 2005). Even Walton has hinted at this possibility a number of times (2013).¹⁰ While I also think that practical reasoning always involves values, whether they are more or less acknowledged or explicit, I cannot engage that debate fully here. I only want to add that aside from philosophical reasons for this view, there is also a pragmatic consideration in support of holding a default view that all practical reasoning involves values. If we treat an instance of practical reasoning as containing values and it turns out not to be the case, our analysis and evaluation do not lose anything. On the other hand, if we treat an instance of practical reasoning as purely instrumental when it does actually contain values, our analysis and evaluation will miss this important value component.

Continuing with our discussion of value practical reasoning, most recently, Walton (Walton, 2013b) has forwarded an adjusted scheme from Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2007) (which was based on his own earlier scheme (Walton, 2007)): This new scheme, he claims, “is a useful way of designing a theory of practical reasoning as a form of argument that can be applied to real cases of argumentation because the simpler purely instrumental version of the scheme can be applied when values are not at issue” (Walton, 2013b, p. 15).

Conclusion: Action *A* should be performed.

Premises:


- *S1* is the case in the current circumstances.
- Performing *A* in *S1* would bring about *S2*.
- *G* would be realized in *S2*.
- Achieving the goal *G* would promote the value *V*. (Walton, 2013b, p. 14)

In addition to the Walton/Atkinson, Bench-Capon, and McBurney view, Isabela and Norman Fairclough have also addressed theoretical issues involved with practical

¹⁰ For example: “The question is whether the potential negative consequences of the medication are “negative” (bad) because they have a negative value for the agent. If so, then the side effects critical question cannot be purely instrumental in nature. It has to be a value-based consideration. If so, then all practical reasoning has to be value-based practical reasoning.” (Walton, 2013b, p. 15)

reasoning in their book *Political Discourse Analysis* (2012). They present their view of the structure of practical reasoning through the use of the following model:

Figure 2-1 Fairclough and Fairclough Model of Practical Reasoning



(Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 48)

As can be seen, their view is inspired by Walton and is thus also closely in line with Atkinson, Bench-Capon, and McBurney. All of these views include a consideration of the current circumstances¹¹ and see practical reasoning as aimed at taking us from a current situation to a future state of affairs where a currently unachieved goal becomes achieved. They both also use a “means” premise to articulate the method by which the current situation will be transformed into the envisioned state of affairs wherein the goal is achieved. Further, they all see values at the base supporting the goal with the achievement of the goal manifesting or promoting the values.


Fairclough and Fairclough develop the notion of the circumstance premise by distinguishing between natural and social facts. They also develop the notion of a value premise by distinguishing between values an agent is concerned with and the values an

¹¹ Fairclough and Fairclough rightly point out that at the time of publication, Walton had not included a circumstance premise in his articulation of the structure of practical reasoning. They incorrectly claim, however, that they provide a circumstantial premise “that is not present in existing accounts” (p. 40) since the inclusion of a factual circumstantial premise can be found in a number of works by Atkinson et al., as early as Greenwood [Atkinson], Bench-Capon & McBurney (2003), but including Atkinson (2005); Atkinson, Bench-Capon, & McBurney (2006); and Atkinson & Bench-Capon (2007; 2008) some of which are cited in Walton (2007).

agent ought to be concerned with. They explain values an agent ought to be concerned with in terms of the Searlian notion of ‘institutional facts’ included in their “social facts” of the circumstance premise. Institutional facts, for them, function “as reasons that people have, whether they act on them or not.” (2012, p. 55). For example, “[o]nce you make a promise, you have a reason to act accordingly, whatever your desires, and the same can be said about duties, obligations and other forms of commitments people undertake which constrain their action” (ibid). Thus, if you make a promise to help a friend move, but when the day comes and it is raining and you no longer desire to help, the fact that you promised still gives you a reason to help with the move. In addition to promises, constraining institutional facts can also be found in legal or moral norms an agent is bound to. Institutionally, if you desire to drive faster than the speed limit, the fact that the law has a fine for such an action gives you a reason to follow the limit. Even if you may not act on that reason, and do in fact speed, the reason not to remains. I will reserve a discussion about moral norms for the section on values below and for further development in chapter 5.

In addition to their model for practical reasoning, Fairclough and Fairclough also provide a model for deliberation:

Figure 2-2 Fairclough and Fairclough Model of Deliberation



I do not, however, find the relationship between the model for reasoning and the model for deliberation is not clear, however. In their view, “[i]n both single-agent and

multi-agent contexts, deliberation involves balancing considerations in favour of one proposal for action against considerations that support various alternatives (minimally, the alternative of *not doing* the proposed action, but also *other* actions)” (2012, p. 50). Regarding reasoning, they admit that “[s]aying practical reasoning is ‘conductive’ (as we said earlier) already involves seeing practical reasoning as a form of deliberation” (pp. 50-51). Indeed, earlier they argue that “[a]s a conductive argument, practical reasoning involves the ‘weighing’ of *pros* and *cons*, of various considerations that are thought to have a bearing on the claim, and the conclusion is drawn ‘on balance’” (p. 38). Thus, the description of both practical reasoning and deliberation seem to be the same. In the visual model provided, the difference is that deliberation includes counter considerations – even though in their written description (rather the model) they also ascribe this role to practical reasoning. The other way they include counter considerations involves the asking and answering of critical questions, which apply to both the model for reasoning and deliberation.

Another important difference resulting from the presentation of the two models is that it appears only the model for practical reasoning results in a conclusion. In the model for deliberation the claim and counter claim remain in tension since there is no higher box for a final claim to action or to the counter claim. Fairclough and Fairclough repeatedly appeal to the notion of weighing in their descriptions of both practical reasoning and deliberation, but do not provide any advice for how such weighing takes place or how it is resolved.

Further, although the model for deliberation only indicates that the negative consequences which underlie the counter-claim will make the goal impossible to achieve, in the text Fairclough and Fairclough point to other considerations that may not have to do with the goal in question which could impact the deliberation: “Considering the probable impact of a proposed action on *other* goals – not just the stated goal of action, but other goals that might be affected, including other agents’ goals - involves *deliberation over goals, not just over means*” (p. 51). As such, the notion of a counter-claim should be understood quite broadly, as it can include all of the goals an agent has or should have as well as all of the goals another agent has.

It should also be noted that they think that “for any individual agent, deliberation results in a *normative judgement* (a normative proposition about what one ought to do or what it would be good to do)” (p. 201) whereas “multi-agent deliberation is incomplete unless a decision is arrived at, not just a normative judgement. This is precisely because

there are several agents involved and they might come to *different* normative judgements, and this multiplicity cannot close the deliberation” (p. 205). But, as mentioned, considering the closure of deliberation, the model does not indicate a final decision but leaves the two options in tension without indicating how a resolution to the tension can be achieved. As such, it is unclear how single and multi-agent deliberation differ regarding conclusions.

Aside from these tensions, one last general note about the character of practical reasoning is important before moving on. For all three of the above characterizations (and many others) practical reasoning can operate in chains and deploy over long periods of time. Michael Bratman (1987) provides the most developed version of this notion through his planning theory. The basic idea is that practical reasoning is never isolated; rather, it is always a part of a larger action. For example, I go to sleep so I can be rested for tomorrow, so I can get lots of my dissertation written, so I can become a professor, etc. On this view different *levels of zoom* can be seen in practical reasoning. We can zoom way out and take the perspective of the just mentioned chain, or we can zoom way in on a specific point, for example, on what it takes to write a dissertation. Literally, to write a dissertation I have to move my fingers on the keyboard, typing letters, to produce paragraphs, etc., With enough attention to detail we could explicitly reason to quite a fine point – though how fine is uncertain. Thus, what is seen as a goal on one level of zoom can be seen as a means on another. Finishing this dissertation is a goal, but it is also a means to a career as a philosopher.

2.3. Values

Values, conceptualized in these models as being at the base of practical reasoning and functioning as a legitimizing and motivating force for it, are deserving of special attention. In argumentation theory,¹² the two most developed discussions of the role of values in the form, analysis, and evaluation of practical reasoning come from Atkinson (2005) and Fairclough and Fairclough (2012).

In her dissertation, Atkinson (2005) notes that,

¹² The role of values in practical reasoning is discussed much more fully in the literature on moral and ethical philosophy (e.g. Parfit, 2011; Dancy, 2004; Chang, 1998; Scanlon, 1998). Since, however, these models do not offer discussion of the analysis or evaluation of practical reasoning or, importantly, argumentation, they are not considered in full in this dissertation.

values can be wide ranging and could span anything from values held within a particular group or community, to more personal, individual values. In this sense values can direct human behaviour (either consciously or subconsciously) as part of the practical reasoning process, whereby people adopt goals that are intended to endorse the values held by the individual. (p. 11)

Fairclough and Fairclough comment that in practical reasoning, “[t]he action that emerges as (presumably) the right action, is supposed to transform the present set of circumstances so that they match the agent’s goal, which is itself informed by the agent’s values (either his actual values or the values that he – or some other arguer – thinks he ought to have)” (p. 44). As we will see, in their schemes both Atkinson and Fairclough and Fairclough have been influenced by Searle’s contention that we can,

[a]ssume universally valid and accepted standards of rationality, assume perfectly rational agents operating with perfect information, and you will find that rational disagreement will still occur; because, for example, the rational agents are likely to have different and inconsistent values and interests, each of which may be rationally acceptable. (2001, p. xv.)¹³

Accepting this mentality leads the authors to allow the possibility of maintained rational disagreement between agents - a state of agreeing-to-disagree – under the notion of value pluralism. In other words, both authors allow for *value pluralism*. Atkinson is explicit on this point: “But it must also be noted that the model presented here should and does allow for the possibility of rational disagreement; it is often a difficult task to persuade others to change their ranking of personal values, and thus such arguments could terminate in conflict” (Atkinson, 2005, p. 86). The allowance of sustained disagreement is at the core of these views.

Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, p. 60) want to explicitly avoid taking value pluralism to the end, however, and suggest that,

some values are indefensible from a purely instrumental point of view, because they contradict the agent’s goals: valuing a life of leisure is not reasonable if your goals is to get high grades. But some value differences are unreasonable in a deeper, non-instrumental sense: a racist conception cannot remain indefinitely in play alongside one which rejects racism. Disagreement over this issue is unreasonable and a reasonable resolution can be legitimately expected.

¹³ This exact passage is quoted in Atkinson (2005, p. 12). Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), echo the idea when the claim that, “Confronted with the same choice and even with exactly the same range of considerations, different people may arrive at different conclusions, depending on what they care about most, what hierarchies of goals and values they have, or what reasons matter comparatively more or override other reasons for them.” (p. 38)

In order to reach a reasonable resolution, an immoral argument - such as one supporting racism – “can be conclusively rejected by questioning its various premises, and its proponent cannot defend himself by invoking value pluralism or his legitimate right to differ.” (p. 59). Referencing Isaiah Berlin, they refer to this stance as *reasonable value pluralism* and hold that “agreeing on the existence of a reasonable value pluralism does not therefore entail a relativist stance” (ibid).

Wanting to further separate themselves from a relativist position they agree with Lukes that, “[t]he fact that there is no one worldview and set of values that everyone adheres to ‘does not render us unable to make universally applicable judgements’” (ibid). A reasonable disagreement for them is “generated by conflicting but reasonable values and goals or by different rankings of the same values and goals” (p. 60). Addressing what unreasonable values are, Fairclough and Fairclough describe the normative foundations of Critical Discourse Analysis which is founded upon the notion of human rights or duties to fellow humans which contribute to their flourishing. Accordingly, “[n]ot any difference should be given recognition: in particular those that infringe human rights, hinder human capabilities, or violate fundamental duties we have toward each other should not be among those that can ground good practical arguments” (ibid). Thus, it seems that their aim is allow any individual to hold any value in any rank and reasonably never change that view, unless that value is internally contradictory or goes against what have been called universal human rights or duties to protect and encourage human capability. After noting the existence of alternative moral frameworks, they then admit that “fundamental moral considerations can conflict with each other and [...] and deciding what to do in such cases will involve deciding which one should be given priority, which should override others.” (p. 61). However, a characterization of how these decision procedures should work is left unarticulated.

2.4. Evaluation Strategies

The main idea behind the evaluative strategies of Walton, Atkinson, and Fairclough and Fairclough is that of dialectical reasonableness (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 131-135) which sees the test of reasonableness as decided through discussion. Walton’s appreciation for the role of dialectical reasonableness has led him to develop fundamental pioneering work on argumentation schemes. He describes argumentation schemes as “forms of argument (structures of inference) that represent structures of common types of arguments used in every day discourse as well as in special

contexts like those of legal argumentation and scientific argumentation” (2008, p. 1). The discussion aspect of argumentation schemes is developed using the notion of critical questions.

Walton, Atkinson, and Fairclough and Fairclough (and to a lesser extent, van Eemeren and Grootendorst) all champion the use of critical questions for the evaluation of practical reasoning. In part because, as Walton rightly points out, practical reasoning is most often (but not always) a defeasible form of reasoning (2007, p. 198) the idea behind the critical questions is that they can point to weakness(es) in the reasoning. However, the reasoning, “can be accepted provisionally if it has withstood critical questioning.” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, 67). In computational models, if a critical question is asked to which there is no response, the decision should be suspended until a response is provided.

Moving chronologically, in 2005 Atkinson, developing earlier work by Walton, suggested critical questions focused explicitly on both the circumstances and the values included in the reasoning. Her list of 16 questions remains the most extensive to date for this scheme. It includes:

- CQ1: Are the believed circumstances true?
- CQ2: Assuming the circumstances, does the action have the stated consequences?
- CQ3: Assuming the circumstances and that the action has the stated consequences, will the action bring about the desired goal?
- CQ4: Does the goal realise the value stated?
- CQ5: Are there alternative ways of realising the same consequences?
- CQ6: Are there alternative ways of realising the same goal?
- CQ7: Are there alternative ways of promoting the same value?
- CQ8: Does doing the action have a side effect which demotes the value?
- CQ9: Does doing the action have a side effect which demotes some other value?
- CQ10: Does doing the action promote some other value?
- CQ11: Does doing the action preclude some other action which would promote some other value?
- CQ12: Are the circumstances as described possible?
- CQ13: Is the action possible?
- CQ14: Are the consequences as described possible?
- CQ15: Can the desired goal be realised?
- CQ16: Is the value indeed a legitimate value? (p. 64)

In his paper “Evaluating Practical Reasoning,” Walton (2007, p. 234) proposes this condensed list of 7 questions:

- (CQ1) What other goals do I have that might conflict with *G*?
- (CQ2) How well is *G* supported by (or at least consistent with) my values *V*?

- (CQ3) What alternative actions¹⁴ to my bringing about *A* that would also bring about *G* should be considered?
- (CQ4) Among bringing about *A* and these alternative actions, which is arguably the best of the whole set, in light of considerations of efficiency in bringing about *G*?
- (CQ5) Among bringing about *A* and these alternative actions, which is arguably the best of the whole set, in light of my values *V*?
- (CQ6) What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to bring about *A*?
- (CQ7) What consequences of my bringing about *A* that might have even greater negative value than the positive value of *G* should be taken into account?¹⁵

In Fairclough and Fairclough's 2012 proposal, while keep Walton's list of critical questions, they also aim to develop it. They see critical questions as falling into two types: those that challenge the argument and those that rebut the claim. They are adamant that in terms of evaluation, "whether the argument itself is valid or not does not ultimately matter" (2012, p. 65). For instance, even if an argument is unsound, "it does not necessarily mean the conclusion should be rejected as unreasonable" (ibid). Rather, "[t]he one thing that matters is whether the conclusion is true or not, and it is only examination of the consequences of action and their impact on goals that agents are otherwise committed to that can rebut the conclusion" (ibid). To assess the conclusion they suggest that, "questioning whether the action being proposed will have *negative consequences* that will undermine the stated goal (or other goals the agent wants to pursue, or other agents' goals) is the only really interesting critical question, as it is the only one that can rebut the argument's claim (and also defeat the argument's validity)" (pp. 63-64). Interestingly, however, they do not propose this exact question. This could be because they view Walton's CQ7 as addressing this concern but just wanted point out its importance.

In addition to Walton's list they suggest adding four more critical questions. First, noticing the absence of the circumstances in the scheme and list of critical questions, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) also call for its inclusion. They then suggest three questions focused explicitly on values:

¹⁴ Strictly speaking, if the means are necessary, there is no need to consider alternatives; one can be considered to be normatively required to take the means (see Broome, 1999). In such cases, critical questions 3-5 do not need to be asked. But as an average person reasoning, asking these question will help determine and/or confirm if the means are necessary, if such information is not already certain.

¹⁵ Interestingly and without explanation, despite referencing other works by Atkinson and her colleagues, in this list Walton chooses to omit any question focused on the circumstances.

1. Is the situation described in a rationally acceptable way? (Definition of Circumstances Question)
2. Are the values that underlie the action rationally acceptable (Acceptable Value Question)
3. Should the agent consider other values? (Other Values Question)
4. Do the stated values conflict with other values of the agent (Agent's Multiple Values Question) (p. 67)

Last, and most recently, Walton has taken up and adjusted a scheme put forward by Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2007) (shown above), which includes a set of assumptions and exceptions that can function in a similar fashion to critical questions. Walton explains,

The ordinary premises are the ones explicitly stated in the argumentation scheme are classified as assumptions. But there are also assumptions in the form of additional premises that are assumed to hold, just like the ordinary premises, but if questioned automatically fail to hold unless the proponent of the argument gives some evidence to support the premise. Exceptions are also additional premises, but they are assumed not to hold as exceptions unless evidence to back them up is given by the critical questioner. They do not defeat the argument unless the questioner gives backup evidence to support the question. (2013, p. 12)

Given that this structure is based on an earlier structure and set of questions proposed by Atkinson and Bench-Capon, the assumptions and exceptions are also based on the long list of critical questions proposed by Atkinson (2005) listed above. Interestingly, however, the circumstances are not a part of the scheme, assumptions, or exceptions in Walton's new scheme.

id: practical-reasoning
strict: false
direction: pro
conclusion: Action *A* should be performed.
premises:
S1 is the case in the current circumstances.
Performing *A* in *S1* would bring about *S2*.
G would be realized in *S2*.
Achieving the goal *G* would promote the value *V*.
assumptions:
V is a legitimate value.
G is possible.
G is a worthy goal.
Action *A* is possible.
exceptions:
There exists an action that would bring about *S1* more effectively than *A*.
There exists an action that would realize the goal *G* more effectively than *A*.
There are intervening actions required to move from the action *A* to the goal *G*.
There exists an action that would promote the value *V* more effectively than *A*.
Performing *A* in *S1* would have side-effects which demote *V* or some other value.
There is another goal *G'* that is incompatible with *G*. (2013, pp. 14-15)

Part of the reasons behind the formality of these schemes is that only Fairclough and Fairclough are primarily concerned with human practical reasoning. Atkinson is primarily concerned with an autonomous software agents, and Walton has heavy interest in both artificial intelligence and human practical reasoning (2007, 2013). Despite these varying interests, since the three schemes reference each other and are thus relatively closely related, in what follows we will concentrate on the scheme presented by Fairclough and Fairclough. This is also because their articulation of their model addresses values most fully and also includes consideration of the circumstances. Further, since they include and expand upon Walton's questions, which have been developed in light of the work by Atkinson, they constitute a strong list for evaluation. Given their general similarities, however, the results of the work done here on the Fairclough and Fairclough model will also impact the work by Walton and Atkinson et al.

2.5. Anders Behring Breivik

In what follows we will apply the Fairclough and Fairclough model and collected critical questions to the reasoning and argumentation of Anders Behring Breivik. On the 22nd of July, 2011, Breivik detonated a bomb outside the Office of the Prime Minister of Norway killing 8 people before proceeding to the island of Utøya where he killed 69 others, two thirds of whom were people under the age of 18 attending a Worker's Youth League (AUF) summer camp.

After his 75-minute killing spree on the island, Breivik was arrested by Norwegian police and was eventually found guilty of killing 77 people. As a part of the court proceedings Breivik was subjected to two psychiatric assessments. The first, conducted by Husby and Sørheim (2011), concluded that Breivik was insane – suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. This report, however, was immediately subject to scrutiny and a second report was commissioned from Tørrissen and Aspaas¹⁶ who concluded that:

¹⁶ I originally misread the beginning of the Tørrissen and Aspaas report to believe that they did not conduct any new interviews with Breivik. This was an error on my part. The experts did conduct new interviews with Breivik, summaries of which are provided in section 17. However, as Tørrissen and Aspaas also note, "The available documentation indicates that [Breivik], after he gained access to the media, has moderated his statements, perhaps as a strategic adaptation to what he believes make his case" (2012, Sec. 2.1). As such, using only his quotes from the original interviews helps to minimize the inclusion of changed statements, influenced not by his reasoning but in response to media attention, and I have only used his quotes from the first set of interviews in what follows.

1. Subject was not psychotic, unconscious or mentally retarded at high degree (§ 44) at the time of the accused actions.
2. Subject does not have a serious mental disorder with significantly impaired ability to realistic assessment of its relationship with the outside world, and he was not under a strong disturbance of consciousness at the time of the impugned acts. Subject is not mentally retarded (§ 56 c).
3. Subject was not psychotic at the time of the surveys.
4. Mandate Section 7 when the experts have concluded negative terms states covered by the Penal Code § 44
5. There is a high risk of repeated violent action. (Tørrissen & Aspaas, 2012, Sec. 24)

The court sided with Tørrissen and Aspaas, finding Breivik sane and criminally responsible (Oslo District Court, 2012, sec. 6).

The underlying assumption in choosing this example is an intuitive one - that Breivik's practical reasoning was unreasonable. While such an assumption puts "the cart before the horse" by assuming the reasoning to be unreasonable before testing it, it does not do so needlessly. To take as a default that the reasoning leading to mass murder is reasonable, thus placing the burden of proof on theories of reasoning to show the contrary, empties humanity of any non-technical notion of reasonableness. While there is perhaps room for this level of philosophical discussion elsewhere, I will ask my readers for charity in presuming that Breivik's actions work as a paradigm of unreasonableness.

The results of this application are important because in the best case scenario Breivik's reasoning will be deemed unreasonable, and the scheme and critical questions will have done their jobs. If, however, the application returns a result of "reasonable" we will have to either adjust the model for practical reasoning or seriously reconsider the aforementioned notion of reasonableness to allow for Breivik's example to be included under that umbrella title.

2.5.1. Data

One problem with studying practical reasoning is accessing other people's thoughts. While we have yet to invent the technology to be able to read people's minds, instantly and flawlessly (whatever that may mean), which is the ideal, certain facts about Breivik's situation give us access to his reasoning which is seldom available in comparable cases. First of all, he is still alive. While other people in his situation may commit suicide or be killed by the police in the process of apprehension, Breivik avoided both. This means that we have access to a plethora of documents produced through his participation in the judicial process, including psychological reports, full transcripts of the court proceedings, and the judge's written articulation of the verdict.

Most uniquely, however, in Breivik's case we have self-written documents from *before* his actions. This is because, under his chosen alter English name – Andrew Berwick - Breivik wrote a 1518-page manifesto¹⁷ which he distributed just hours before detonating the bomb in central Oslo. While much of the “compendium”¹⁸ consists of plagiarized writings exalting the ‘problem’ of the ‘Islamization’ of Europe, in his “Book 3”, Breivik conducts an interview with himself spanning some 64 pages, which is followed by a 59-page personal diary (log) of some of his thoughts and struggles during the days leading up to the attacks. His last entry in the log is a mere 2 hours and 26 minutes before his van-sized, self-made bomb explodes.

This self-interview and log are uniquely valuable to this research for a number of reasons. First of all they function as a summary of the larger work (Borchgrevink, 2013, p. 162). Second, the interview, “conducted over three sessions” (Berwick & [Breivik, 2011, p. 1349) covers a plethora of topics ranging from denying accusations of religious fundamentalism, to a discussion of Breivik's childhood, to an inclusion of his curriculum vitae. Third, the log acts like a personal diary, expressing events, emotions, thoughts, etc. Fourth, since the self-interview takes the form of a dialogue it is highly compatible with how the above-mentioned scholars conceive of practical argumentation. Further, as Zittoun and Gillespie (2012, pp. 2-5) have argued, “self-writings offer very useful data since they allow us access to an individual's externalized stream of consciousness as it evolves over time and interacts with perceived others.” These factors combined provide us with (albeit limited) access to Breivik's mind.

Some will rightfully point out that there are interesting complications and limits to the use of self-writings depending on the researcher's aim. For example, “writing a self-text requires a selection of some aspects of the stream of consciousness which will become an external, communicable form, while the rest of the stream takes place as an undercurrent” (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2012, pp. 8-9). This undercurrent can contain a myriad of things as imaginative as the mind, such as pictures, sounds, smells, or an individual's multiple simultaneous lines of thought. For the present purpose, however, Breivik's expression of the linguistic form of his thoughts coincides very well with the contemporary theories of practical reasoning from both commitment and belief-desire-

¹⁷ The fact that Breivik wrote the entire compendium in English is valuable for this study since it eliminates the possibility of translator influence or error.

¹⁸ As he prefers to call it (Husby & Sørheim, 2011, Sec 2.1).

intention scholars. While there may be interesting studies regarding the impact of pre-expressed (linguistically, visually, or otherwise) thoughts on practical reasoning, they cannot be addressed here. As was mentioned in the introduction, my current focus is on explicit reasoning regarding decisions made with careful thought. As such, the expression of Breivik's thoughts in his self-writings seems acceptably both sincere and adequate to be used in this study.

One more consideration to take into general account regarding Breivik's writings is who he might have imagined he was writing to. During an interview with Husby & Sørheim (2011, Sec. 5.4) Breivik states, "*Utøya island and the government building was all about publishing the manifest, to reach the 350,000 militant nationalists who are the audience.*" As Zittoun and Gillespie have pointed out, "the writer's imagination of the other to whom the writing is addressed enables and constrains the actual writing" (2012, p. 11). While militant nationalists might have been his imagined audience overall, for the self-interview and log we are reviewing here we can decipher two other broad imaginary audiences. The phrasing of the questions in the self-interview begins in a way that maintains at least the appearance of being critical before eventually softening into phrasing which invite elaboration and explanation. Even in answering the more openly phrased questions, however, Breivik often responds as though he is being challenged. To illustrate, early in his interview Breivik asks himself, "Q: Some will claim that you are Christian fanatics, just as hateful and intolerant as Al Qaeda. How would you react to accusations like that?" (Berwick, 2011, p. 1352). Later he asks more information-seeking questions such as "What should be our civilisational objectives, how do you envision a perfect Europe?" (p. 1386). The critical nature of the questions and style of response indicate that Breivik has at least an unacknowledged concern with writing for people who are not already militant nationalists.

The audience for the log seems to be envisioned as in prior agreement with Breivik, i.e. uncritical, and there to support him during his difficulties. Since Breivik refused to talk to anyone else about his plans, for both fear of being caught and fear of incriminating his friends¹⁹ (pp. 1381-1382), the log was also a way for him to release his

¹⁹ He explains: "At first it was extremely hard to avoid the temptation to tell your closest friends. I decided however to withhold all relevant information from them and everyone, not because I didn't trust them, but rather because I wanted to avoid incriminating them. Revealing sensitive information to any of them would put them in a difficult spot, because they would be required by law to report this info to the authorities. It would also pose a serious threat to me if they decided to tell anyone" (p. 1381)

thoughts. He writes in the log as though he is learning but also with the expressed intent of having followers avoid his mistakes. One way this is shown is through his common shifts to the second-person “you”, in the usually first-person entries:

It's essential to create as much goodwill you can [sic] from the neighbours. Use any opportunity to generate goodwill from them. This goodwill will be returned indirectly by them not probing and investigating. If you get a visit from neighbours, be polite and friendly, offer them sandwiches and coffee, unless it will jeopardize the operation. The goodwill generated is likely to be to your benefit later on. (p. 1456)

Another way it is shown is at the end of the log when he offers explicit advice to followers:

If I had known then, what I know today, by following this guide, I would have managed to complete the operation within 30 days instead of using almost 80 days. By following my guide, anyone can create the foundation for a spectacular operation with only 1 person in less than a month even if adding 2 "resting" days!:-)" (p. 1470).

He then provides a list of what to do on each of 30 days to achieve the results he achieved in 80. One interesting side note pertains to his use of emoticons throughout the text such as the one above :-). Using these symbols also demonstrates that he is writing to those who are familiar with them, a sort of common internet vernacular aimed at those who often communicate in such a fashion.

He ends his log with more advice to followers:

The old saying; "if you want something done, then do it yourself" is as relevant now as it was then. More than one "chef" does not mean that you will do tasks twice as fast. In many cases; you could do it all yourself, it will just take a little more time. AND, without taking unacceptable risks. The conclusion is undeniable.

I believe this will be my last entry. It is now Fri July 22nd, 12.51.

Sincere regards,

Andrew Berwick
Justiciar Knight Commander
Knights Templar Europe
Knights Templar Norway (pp. 1471-72)

The combined facts that Breivik writes personally, to both supporters and potential critics, in an attempt to explain his position as well as overcome potential objections gives us an indication that he is concerned to express his reasoning, that it is genuine, and appropriate to be analyzed by a practical reasoning model.

Accordingly, in what follows I apply the Fairclough and Fairclough model to Breivik's reasoning. For clarity of reading and in congruence with his first psychological

report,²⁰ I will use italics instead of quotation marks to indicate direct quotes written (or said) by Breivik himself. I will do so by using exact quotes from his self-writing whenever possible, if need be complemented by quotes from his psychological interviews. Appendix A contains the scheme with the unedited quotes used for this reconstruction.

Of special interest is Breivik's determination of his goal. As will be shown, his primary goal was not to carry out his attacks as we might suppose. Rather, he generally sees the attacks as a step in his larger goal of spreading the message of his compendium. As mentioned, however, depending on the level of zoom with which you are reviewing the reasoning and argumentation, the goals and means may change. I hope the quotes in the appendix help justify why I have selected this level and why I see it as closest to how Breivik was thinking. After filling out the scheme, I will then continue using his words to answer the critical questions raised against it. Taken together, this approach will illustrate one view of how Breivik conducted and evaluated his practical reasoning.

It should be noted that such a strategy is not without its potential problems. As far as I am aware there is no established efficient method for combing such a large quantity of text for argument scheme/structure premises. Thus, my individual judgement in selecting specific sentences will have to play a larger part than I would like as a researcher. I would prefer to be able to rely upon an established method which would minimize the incorporation of my judgements. However, the best I can do now is encourage others to read the source texts and assess my interpretation of Breivik's reasoning extracted from them in this application as well as the application conducted in chapter 5.


2.5.2. *Breivik's Practical Reasoning and Argumentation*

Since, as Fairclough and Fairclough note regarding deliberation, it "is what agents reasoning practically on their own are often doing, when they are trying to make a reasonable decision by considering reasons that support various possible courses of action, or count *against* the proposal they originally thought of" (50) it is most fitting to apply their deliberative model to Breivik's case. This is also because, as we have seen, it

²⁰ Husby & Sørheim (2011, Sec. 1.3) first used this convention, which I find helpful. They explain, "In the following, direct quotes from interviews and excerpts from documents are set in *italics*. If text is omitted from quotes, this will be marked by (...)."

includes the model for reasoning in its entirety and we are thus not losing anything by selecting the more expansive model.

Figure 2-3 The Fairclough and Fairclough Model Applied to Breivik’s Reasoning



Walton’s Questions:

(CQ1) What other goals do I have that might conflict with G?

I can choose to live a normal life if I want to, just like my friends are doing. Get a cute girlfriend, get married, have kids, continue my career and earn 50 000-60 000+ Euro per year.

(CQ2) How well is G supported by (or at least consistent with) my values V?

My goal of *spreading the compendium [to] create awareness about the truth [of the Islamization of Europe] and contribute to consolidation/recruitment [of people to fight against it]* is highly consistent with my valuing logic, rationality, and the preservation of pan-European Christendom.

(CQ3) What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also bring about G should be considered?

In addition to distributing the compendium²¹ and *performing a spectacular deadly shock attack*, I also considered having *as many children as possible*, being a *blogger* and *spreading the truth about the topics listed in this book*, *influence[ing] the democratical process by infiltrating the MA100 political parties (parties supporting multiculturalism) [to] weaken their resolve from the inside*, *joining the police force or the military*, seeking *a career in any media organisations, particularly the broadcast media*, and infiltrating academic institutions.

(CQ4) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the best of the whole set, in light of considerations of efficiency in bringing about G?

Distributing the compendium and performing the shock attack are the most efficient because *we have tried protest through dialogue for 50 years now and that approach has been a disaster. Furthermore, creating a religious order would be counter-productive as a majority of Europe's armed resistance fighters are agnostics, atheists or relatively secular Christians*. It is also more efficient than attempting democratic means because, *how can we democratically compete with a regime that is mass-importing hundreds of thousands of new voters?* Thus, *armed struggle appears futile at this point but it is the only way forward*.

(CQ5) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the best of the whole set, in light of my values V?

Risking my life during a shock attack best fits the value of preserving European Christendom because no other option succeeds in promoting the values of logic and rationality and pan-European Christian cultural preservation.

²¹ For the application to the model a distinction between “spreading the compendium” and “distributing the compendium” needs to be made. By “spreading” Breivik means having people encounter the message and content of the compendium. This is more involved than merely having it in their possession, which is what “distributing” accounts for.

(CQ6) What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to bring about A?

Performing the shock attack is practically possible because although, there is a risk of mental breakdown, *I have an extremely strong psyche and I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters.*

(CQ7) What consequences of my bringing about A that might have even greater negative value than the positive value of G should be taken into account?

Innocent deaths as a result of bringing about the shock attack might be thought to have a greater negative value, *but it is still better than the alternative; millions of dead Europeans.*

Fairclough and Fairclough Additional Questions:

1. Is the situation described in a rationally acceptable way?

Yes. I have written more than 486 pages, predominantly in “*Europe Burning*”, *book 2 of the compendium: “2083”* which provides a *complete overview of the current European situation.*

2. Are the values that underlie the action rationally acceptable?

Valuing logic and rationality are by definition rationally acceptable. Cultural preservation is not racist or fascist, and protecting ... *dignity, culture and heritage* are rationally acceptable.

3. Should the agent consider other values?

I have written over a thousand pages explaining why not to value multiculturalism. As for personal values, I do value living a normal life and *I would rather focus on starting a family and focus on my career again.* But *by being a silent bystander to this I will be as guilty as our corrupt elites.*

4. Do the stated values conflict with other values of the agent?

The values underlying my goal (rationality, logic, and cultural preservation) do not conflict with any of my other values. But, I value my life and that could conflict with carrying out the shock attack if I die. However, *I have prepared mentally for a very long*

time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters. My love for them exceeds my own self serving interests.

2.6. Analysis of the Application

2.6.1. General Comments

Before pointing to some specific aspects of the above example, some general comments will help. One might wonder why the action is not worded more precisely than performing a “spectacular deadly shock attack”. One reason is because during the composition of the compendium Breivik did not want to detail his plans in case the work was confiscated or he was “found out”. Not providing details, he thought, would help prevent him from incrimination if he were exposed before conducting his operation. Although it was clear in his writing that he was building a bomb, he never explicitly says where it will be detonated, nor does he ever mention the name Utøya.

The second reason is because the attack on Utøya was not something Breivik was sure he would do. As Husby & Sørheim describe,

The subject says that when plans for the operation became firm, he always envisioned a gigantic detonation by the government building. The ultimate target in Norway was the government building, he says. It was a goal to kill as many as possible, but I was delayed, and it turned out to be a failure. 200 to 500 deaths would be the "best case". Less than 12 was a failure. I expected to be able to listen to the P4 radio channel afterwards, he adds, then I would soon learn if the operation had been a success.

If I had heard on P4 afterwards that there were several hundred dead, I could have driven to Grønland (police station) to surrender, the subject says.” (2011, Sec. 5.7)

Accordingly, the spectacular, deadly, and shocking nature of the action were the main concerns for his original practical reasoning, and only when he “zoomed in” did he expand on how that would take place. Further, following Bratman, we could say that Breivik had bracketed (Bratman 1987 p. 43) his plans for the attack on Utøya until he had the information regarding the results of the bomb he detonated at the government building.²²

²²There are clearly a lot of “what ifs?” involved in Breivik’s story, but one worth mentioning here is that if Breivik had not had trouble with his computer earlier in the day (Borchgrevink, 2013, p. 161), causing him to be late at the government building, he might have arrived before so many employees left the building and killed 20 more people. If so, and if we take him at his word regarding a 12 person minimum target level, then he might have turned himself in and not killed the 69 that he did on Utøya. I mention this ‘what if?’ only to highlight the importance of bracketed plans which would be a worthwhile object of study.

In regards to the application of his reasoning to the model, although Breivik did consider negative consequences of performing his shock attack, he in fact ended up concluding to do it. We can see here an example of the results of the lack of clarity between the model for reasoning and the model for deliberation mentioned above. It would be possible and might be more accurate to use Fairclough and Fairclough's model for practical reasoning rather than deliberation. Given that the consideration of the negative consequences is also addressed through the critical questions, removing the "COUNTER CLAIM" branch from the model for deliberation would not mean counter considerations are left unrecognized, but would mean that they are recognized elsewhere. Switching to the model for practical reasoning would also have the positive effect that the model would show the conclusion Breivik came to rather than implying that he was left in a state of indecision between the two options.

Nevertheless, most importantly, Breivik was able to follow the scheme and address all of the critical questions before being able to conclude to perform his spectacular deadly shock attack. It is important to acknowledge, however, that since it is a matter of fact that he concluded to perform the attacks, no matter which model we use, the conclusion will be to perform the attacks, or as Fairclough and Fairclough say, a normative decision that performing the attacks is right.²³ The problem then is not simply that he reached that conclusion, but that he actually addressed every part of the model and considered and provided answers to all of the critical questions in coming to his conclusion. It was pointed out above that the critical questions are supposed to stop a practical reasoner from coming to an unreasonable conclusion. Using this scheme and responding to the critical questions, however, did not lead to this conclusion for Breivik nor did it provide him with a way for him to see weakness in his reasoning. Rather, he provided complex reasoning supporting the reasonableness of his decisions and with equal rigour, anticipated and responded to critical questions.

It is not that the critical questions should have prevented Breivik from his performing his acts in this application. The model cannot change historical fact and a question cannot have such power over an action since people can act despite

²³ I disagree with the claim that practical deliberation results in a belief. I think that reasoning and argumentation concluding in a belief is better characterized as theoretical (see Streumer, 2010; Broome, 2002) but cannot engage that discussion here.

acknowledging unreasonableness. However, the questions should have at least left him with the knowledge that the reasoning leading to his intentions is, at least potentially, unreasonable. If this would have happened he may well have acted anyway, but it would have at least been under the acknowledgement that his so doing is unreasonable. Instead, Breivik had just cause to believe he was reasonable – he successfully responded to the questions asked (and more).²⁴ We are now left to ask, “Why?”

2.6.2. *Specific Observations Regarding Breivik’s Reasoning*

To me, three major, interrelated factors stand out as contributing to the failure of the scheme and critical questions to identify how Breivik is unreasonable. These three factors can be seen as fundamental areas for improvement on the Fairclough and Fairclough model of practical reasoning. Here I will only address each one briefly, leaving them to be developed more fully in later chapters.

The first factor involves a distinction between reasoning and argumentation (and as pointed to above, deliberation). Fairclough and Fairclough are not clear about any difference between the two and eventually use them interchangeably. I think the reason they do this could be because of how the terms are handled in other places. Fairclough and Fairclough explain, “[i]n pragma-dialectics, practical reasoning is subsumed under causal argumentation schemes, as *means-end*, *instrumental* or *pragmatic* argumentation, in which a certain act is presented as the means to reach a given goal” (2012, p. 61). As was noted above, Breivik, for fear of incriminating himself and his friends, kept his plans to himself. He did not engage in an actual argumentative dialogue with anyone about his plans. His anticipated critical questions, while perhaps inspired by the imagining of a critical other, were created by Breivik. Left to his own devices, Breivik’s reasoning and our analysis and evaluation of it, must take very different shape than if it had been conducted in dialogue with an actual other person. In the next chapter I will address the importance of the distinction between reasoning and argumentation, as well as other related distinctions, which will remain important throughout the rest of the work.

The second, most complicated factor contributing to Breivik reaching his conclusion, has to do with the role of values. Valuing logic, rationality, and the

²⁴ In this study I have applied an established scheme to Breivik’s reasoning/argumentation. A different and worthwhile work might turn Breivik’s reasoning into a scheme, revealing a number of other critical questions which for him were important for testing his practical reasoning.

preservation of one's culture are not normally regarded as controversial values. They would also fit within Fairclough and Fairclough's idea of reasonable value pluralism. Further, Breivik directly addresses concerns regarding the consequences of his actions, recognized by Fairclough and Fairclough as the most important of the critical questions. Thus, using his base values, further supported by in-depth arguments for the description of dire circumstances and the ability to perform instrumental means, Breivik concluded his intentions were reasonable. A discussion of values will thus have to focus on two aspects – where in the structure of practical reasoning they should appear and the impact that a substantive understanding of values has on evaluations of reasonableness. This work is taken up in chapter 5.

The third aspect, has to do with what I call the critical creative capacity. From our outside perspective, we can most likely see a plethora of ways to argue against Breivik, a plethora of reasons for him not to conclude in his intention to perform a deadly shock attack – let us be honest – to kill as many human beings as possible when blowing up the prime minister of Norway's office and/or gunning down hundreds of youth on a secluded island at close range. But that's from our perspective, which Breivik did not have. Since, however, we do not reason in a vacuum, something tells us we should expect Breivik to 'see' our reasons despite our physical inability to express them to him. This ability to imagine counter reasons is at the heart of the critical creative capacity. Indeed, Fairclough and Fairclough also recognize this need, when they rightfully point out that "practical reasoning involves an imaginative effort to think of as many considerations that might have a bearing on the situation as possible" (2012, p. 35).²⁵ As I will argue in chapter 6, however, the ability to imagine counter considerations is not by itself enough. The capacity must also involve an ability to recognize the relevance (or irrelevance) of the imagined considerations as well as to attribute them with an appropriate weight. In my view Breivik failed spectacularly especially in these last two respects.

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter began with an outline of the structure of what has been referred to as value based practical reasoning/argumentation. I then gave an overview of the current perspective on the place and substance of the role of values within the structure. With the

²⁵ They also mention the role of imagination in a number of other places (cf. pp. 41, 46, 58-59).

structure and understanding of values in hand, a discussion of contemporary suggestions for evaluation was provided.

Using a contemporary model of evaluation, I then used direct quotes from Breivik to reconstruct his reasoning in terms of the model and demonstrated one interpretation for how he could have concluded with the intention to carry out his attacks. Using observations from the application of Breivik's reasoning, I then pointed to areas which contributed to his failure to deem his reasoning unreasonable which will be developed in further detail in forthcoming chapters.

This main point of this chapter has been to demonstrate that our current thinking regarding how practical reasoning should be evaluated, especially concerning its value-laden aspects, leaves important room for improvement. If I have accomplished this, I hope the considerations contained in rest of this work function as justified contributions to the resolution of the problem.

3. CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS

for, if he embrace the opinions of Xenophon and Plato, by his own reason, they will no more be theirs, but become his own.

~ Michel de Montaigne

3.1. Introduction

In the last chapter I showed how Anders Behring Breivik, using the model proposed by Fairclough and Fairclough, was relatively easily able to conclude to commit his mass murder. In my view, *part* of the reason he was able to do so is because of some conceptual ambiguities which influenced the design of the model. In this theoretical chapter I would like to draw out these conceptual distinctions and discuss some of their relations. The hope is that by doing so we can get clearer on what we are talking about and use that clarity to help focus efforts to strengthen the model. Greater conceptual precision will also help specify future areas for improvement in this and other approaches to reasoning and argumentation. The interrelated concepts for discussion here can be thought of in terms of three pairs of distinctions. The members of each pair are interrelated, but there are also important relationships between the pairs. They are 1) dialogical and dialectical, 2) reasoning and argumentation, and 3) individual and multiple participants.

3.2. The Dominance of the Dialogical

The first distinction to make impacts all the rest. It is the distinction between “dialectical” and “dialogical”. Some of the most widely appreciated theories of argumentation identify themselves as ‘dialectical’ approaches. This is clearly the case with van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s Pragma-dialectical model, but is also explicitly stated in Johnson’s theory of Manifest Rationality (2000, pp. 159-161). Even the Rhetorical Model of argumentation most currently developed by Christopher Tindale, provides a prominent place for dialectical considerations (2004, p. 89).²⁶ To address the distinction between dialectical and dialogical, we must also already touch on the

²⁶ One notable exception to the dominant dialectical approach is the epistemological approach developed and advocated for by Biro and Siegel (2006a; 2006b).

distinction between individual and multiple participants. In dialectical theories, the notion of individual argumentation or arguing with one's self is given little attention and is typically argued to be able to be subsumed within the dialectical approach they support. In the next section I will provide a brief overview of how the notion of individual argumentation is addressed by the leading dialectical theories. We begin first with the Pragma-dialectical theory developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, which is also endorsed by Fairclough and Fairclough. We then move to the Informal-Logical approach as developed by Ralph Johnson, followed by the Rhetorical approach as developed by Christopher Tindale.

3.2.1. Theoretical Background

Pragma-dialectics

One of the most well-known theories of argumentation, the Pragma-dialectical theory, defines argumentation as “a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint” (2004, p. 1). As a social activity, they claim that argumentation is “as a rule directed at other people” (p. 2). Attached to this quote, however, is a footnote which quickly points out that “[e]ven seemingly “monological” argumentation as used in self-deliberation can be considered social because it is part of a “dialogue intérieur”” (p. 2. n. 3). Thus, in the pragma-dialectical view, “monological” argumentation can still be considered a dialogue, and accordingly, be dealt with from a dialectical perspective.

Noticeably, however, after this brief address of monological argumentation the wording in the extrapolation of the rest of the theory predominantly changes from argumentation being directed at other “people” to concerning different “parties”. Indeed this change in terminology is crucial for accommodating a monological perspective into a dialogical (dialectical) framework. Because monological and dialogical cannot both account for the same number of individuals, the more abstract notion of a party is required to account for more than one standpoint regardless of the number of interlocutors. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst write:

The pragma-dialectical argumentation theory assumes that, in principle, argumentative language use is always part of an exchange of views between two parties that do not hold the same opinion, even when the exchange of views takes place by way of a monologue. The monologue is then taken to be a specific kind of critical discussion where the protagonist is speaking (or writing) and the role of the

antagonist remains implicit. Even if the role of the antagonist is not actively and explicitly performed, the discourse of the protagonist can still be analyzed as a contribution to a critical discussion: The protagonist makes an attempt to counter (potential) doubt or criticism of a specific or non-specific audience or readership. (2004, p. 59)

The notion of a party rather than a person moves the focus from people to disagreements. A “party” could then be any given number of people advocating the same standpoint. In short, a party is a representation of a position rather than a referent for a person holding a position. In this way, one person could also have multiple parties in mind which (who) disagree.

The separation of party from person is not, however, always clearly made in the text and it seems that different people, rather than different abstract parties, are the assumed main focus. For example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst emphasise the institutional and non-institutional settings where “the inhabitants of the realm can have their exchanges - from official deliberations in law courts and political gatherings to unofficial get-togethers and encounters in offices, pubs, at home, or at the proverbial village pump” (pp. 31-32). Reference to gatherings, get-togethers, and encounters, combined with a lack of mentioning situations where an individual is isolated, points to the subtly but deeply ingrained notion that argumentation is conducted via multiple people, even if theoretically this does not necessarily have to be the case.

It might be expected that a procedural theory of argumentation typically involves multiple participants. But what about a product-oriented approach? Johnson’s theory of Manifest Rationality is one such approach and is the topic to which we now turn.

Informal Logic

For Johnson, who works within the field of Informal Logic, argumentation is a practice which leads to the production of the product, an argument. The practice of argumentation, on his account, is “the sociocultural activity of constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing, and revising arguments” (p. 12). As a practice, argumentation is conducted by an agent or agents. When discussing the agents involved in the practice of argumentation, Johnson states that “arguing involves two participants; or if you prefer, it has two poles and the process takes place between those poles” (p. 157). He then separates the two poles into “the arguer” and “the Other” - the critic. Even more forcefully, he argues that “the agent of the argument - the arguer - cannot really be understood as apart from the receiver of the argument - the Other. Both are essential participants in the

process, and both have an active role to play” (pp. 158-159). He is quick to point out, however, that “[i]t may be the case that the same individual plays the role of both arguer and critic. The arguer puts forward an argument, then steps back and criticizes it” (p. 157). In this way, one agent can represent both “poles” – function as arguer and critic - or in pragma-dialectical terms, represent both parties.

Things become less clear, however, when, after discussing the agents involved in argumentation, Johnson moves on to characterize the practices of argumentation along the lines of three central features. The practice is characterised as being teleological, dialectical, and manifestly rational (pp. 159-161). Discussing the dialectical character Johnson makes a direct link to the dialogical and separates them both from monological speech:

The root meaning of dialectical is dialogue - a logos (which I take to mean "reasoned discourse") that is between two (or more) people. That requires more than just speech between two parties because as we all know, such talking may be nothing more than a monologue conducted in the presence of another. Genuine dialogue requires not merely the presence of the Other, or speech between the two, but the real possibility that the logos of the Other will influence one's own logos. An exchange is dialectical when, as a result of the intervention of the Other, one's own logos (discourse, reasoning, or thinking) has the potential of being affected in some way. (p. 161)

The possibility of one logos influencing another, when applied to an individual playing both roles of arguer and critic, requires an explanation for how one individual can maintain more than one logos. One common answer is to argue that every individual can think of another individual and argue with themselves as though that Other was there – a sort of role playing.²⁷ In this way the individual would have their own logos as well as a representation of what another's might be. However, this line of thought is problematic for a number of reasons, one of which Johnson also addresses.

Even if we grant one individual multiple logoi, it is unclear how well stepping back and performing both roles can be done. Johnson recognizes that, “it is also known full well that intellectual imaginations may be limited, that there may be a failure to see certain limitations in the arguments produced. In eagerness, certain items of evidence may be overrated and others may be underrated or ignored. And it does not matter how fertile imaginations are; there will be objections that cannot be imagined or anticipated. These

²⁷ See Jacquette (2007) for a discussion of this activity.

are the limitations for which the Other can compensate” (p. 158). Indeed, work done on cognitive biases provides confirming empirical evidence for such a worry. Consider for example the confirmation bias which describes the human tendency to confirm the views we hold rather than be critical of them (Ross, L & Anderson, C 1982: 149-150).

Thus, there is a tension in the theory regarding how many participants are required to participate in the practice of argumentation. On the one hand, Johnson specifically states that we can conduct individual argumentation by stepping back, by thinking of two poles rather than two people. On the other hand, since individuals have limited imaginations, more than one individual is required to compensate for this limitation. There does not seem to be a point in aiming my argumentation at the Other in my mind if through no fault of my own (say just by natural imaginative limitation)²⁸ that Other can only agree with me.

At this point it should also be noted that individual’s differing imaginative abilities also remain an important issue for the Pragma-dialectical theory mentioned above. Although they provide useful suggestions for how to mine the context of an instance of argumentation for clues regarding the standpoints and reasons of the real and/or imagined party/ies in conflict (van Eemeren, 2011), addressing the limitations of human imagination in the construction of another party would strengthen the case that single-participant argumentation can be subsumed within a dialectical/logic framework in both theories.

Rhetorical Argumentation

Along with the pragma-dialectical and informal logical perspectives, a third major stream of argumentation deserves our attention, namely, the rhetorical view most recently developed by Christopher Tindale. Rhetoric, which classically evokes images of one speaker (a rhetorician) reciting a persuasion piece to a listening group of others, has also undergone theoretical developments which highlight its multi-participant aspects (Tindale, 2004).

²⁸ It should be noted that Robinson (2011) refutes the possibility of a natural lack of creativity. He does not, however, diminish the impact of training on poor creative thinking ability and as such we could also say here, “a lack of creative thinking training provided to an arguer through no fault of their own”.

In agreement with and building upon insights from Bakhtin, Tindale declares that audience, against the traditional view, “is not a passive consumer of arguments but plays an *active* role in the argumentation. The nature of the audience sets the terms of the premises, which are formulated in light of theses accepted by those to be addressed” (2004, p. 21-22). Thus, unequivocally, “[r]hetorical argumentation is dialogical” (p. 89).

It should be noted, however, that this dialogical sense and the accompanying idea of the monological are different from both views presented above. First, on this view, the dialogical nature of argumentation permeates below the level of argumentative turns as indicated by sentences or propositions. Rather, for Bakhtin, “every word is directed toward an *answer* and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates” (cited in Tindale, 2004, p. 97). Building up from the level of the word, an utterance too “has essentially both an author and an addressee; it cannot exist in isolation” (Tindale, 2004, p. 96). Thus, rather than identifying the number of participants, this notion of dialogical highlights interaction and cooperation and is contrasted with monological, which rather than meaning “single” means uncooperative, dominating, and aimed at victory (p. 98. See also, p. 91, 101).

Does this dialogical view, however, leave room for arguing with one’s self, or does it require more than one interlocutor? In some places, Tindale’s discussion of participants appears quite close to the views presented above. For example, he accredits Bakhtin with enabling us to see that “the argumentative context is alive with the contributions of two (or more) parties” (p. 115). The use of a term such as “parties” seems to allow that the imagination of one individual could account for two parties without attaching people to them, as we saw with pragma-dialectics. As will be argued below, however, it is no easy task to answer the question, “what constitutes a party?” Further, as was mentioned above, claiming that every word is directed toward an *answer*, leaves open the possibility that the answer can come from one’s self. Tindale addresses the issue of the personification of the Other in a footnote advising that “[w]here an interlocutor is not present, ‘one is presupposed in the person of a normal representative, so to speak, of the social group to which the speaker belongs’” (p. 114, n. 4). This “person of a normal representative (...) of the social group to which the speaker belongs” is then further elaborated using Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of a universal audience (127-130). Without digressing into a discussion of the universal audience, it is sufficient to say that also in the rhetorical model, it seems argumentation requires at least the imagining

of a separate other person, be it a real individual or a hypothetically constructed universal audience derived from an actual audience.

3.3. Dialectical and Dialogical

There is a consistent thread of an imagined Other that runs through the above three approaches to argumentation. The Other is used to explicate the “dialectical” aspect of the theory and Johnson even explicitly links the term “dialectical” with “dialogue”. However, at the end of his discussion of the limits of the dialogue model of argument, Blair expressed a wish that the terms “dialogical” and “dialectical” be consistently distinguished. “It would be nice” he suggested, “if the term ‘dialectical’ were reserved for the properties of all arguments related to their involving doubts or disagreements with at least two sides, and the term ‘dialogical’ were reserved for those belonging exclusively to turn-taking verbal exchanges” (Blair, 1998, p. 338). In short, I agree with Blair and would like to take his suggestion seriously because it provides important clarity to a discussion of where and how to improve practical reasoning, argumentation, and their evaluations. I think that the clearer we can get on what we are trying to deal with, the more efficient our efforts will be at identifying and improving upon weaknesses.

So how does Blair reach the conclusion to separate “dialogical” and “dialectical”? He begins his discussion by critiquing Walton’s view “that dialogue is a necessary condition of argument, that arguments always occur in a context of dialogue” (p. 326). His argument proceeds by following dialogical argumentation from what he sees as its most basic to its most complex form. Classifying dialogical argumentation into 12 types, he characterizes the first, simplest type, as a dialogue wherein “the typical objective is for one party to force the other into conceding a proposition that contradicts some other proposition that the other party had earlier endorsed” (p. 327). With each type, the participants gain new permissions and abilities. Type 8, he observes, marks the beginning of a sea change in that “[o]nce an interlocutor in a dialogue is permitted to offer, and in turn support, several lines of argument for a proposition, he or she is no longer responding to a single question or challenge from the other party.” (p. 330) The most complicated type of turn, type 12, is characterized as a single turn wherein the interlocutor can present all of the characteristics comprising the lesser complicated dialogues, such as two or more arguments for a given query that also contain two or more lines of argument in support of propositions, as well as “(a) arguments intended as refutations of alternatives to the main proposition, and (b) arguments intended as refutations of arguments aimed at

refuting the main proposition.” (p. 330). As examples of these types, Blair cites a paper and response paper presented together at a conference, two books that are said to contain an “exchange”, as well as scholarly journals and monographs in general. Arguments approaching type 12 dialogue turns, Blair argues, differ in kind from the other types because while turns in this type of argument are addressed to another side, they are solo performances that are non-engaged or are quasi-engaged, as opposed to the first 7 types of argument which are engaged by necessity (p. 332).

Why does he find it important to note the difference between engaged and non-engaged arguments? For clarity let’s just think about type 12 cases. Blair notes that in non-engaged cases the respondent is typically absent. This means that the argument must be developed without directly questioning the respondent, leaving doubts about how they would reply. Also, in some cases the identity and opinions of the audience are not even known, leaving the arguer free to choose which audience to address. Further, in regards to the norms of argumentation, Blair notes that “in non-engaged dialogues in real life, the arguer has no such guidance as to the norms he or she is expected to satisfy. In some cases, the arguer’s best recourse is to examine the current practice in the context and try to meet the norms exhibited therein” (p. 334).

He then points to a number of the rules provided in the pragma-dialectical theory and questions their application to solo argumentation.²⁹ For example, he points out rule 6 which states “[a] party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point or deny a premise representing an accepted starting point” (p. 335). His concern here is that “[i]n solo arguments, just what the audience accepts as starting-point premises will often not be known, and when the audience’s own arguments are not known, *eo ipso* neither can be their premises” (ibid). He also points out rule 9, which “says that ‘a failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense in the other party retracting his doubt about the standpoint’” (ibid). He doubts the applicability of this rule to solo argumentation because used “in solo arguments, the speaker will tend not to recognize a failed defense of his or her position, and certainly cannot be expected to do so, nor can the arguer have any assurance that arguments which conclusively establish points the audience initially doubted will

²⁹ Blair addresses 9 rules in total. It should be noted that I do not fully subscribe to all of his thoughts on each of the rules he discusses, but addressing all of our differences on these points does not add to the point being made here. For illustrative purposes I limit this discussion to two of the rules he mentions.

successfully persuade the audience” (pp. 335-336). His main point through these illustrations is to question the applicability of rules designed for ideal dialogues to instances of solo arguments in non-engaged dialogues (pp. 334-335).

3.4. Quasi-dialogical and Dialectical

To continue along the train of thought Blair initiated, I would now like to consider a hypothetical example of a turn in individual practical argumentation to see how it relates to his observations. The aim here is to use this example to point to observations useful for the aim mentioned at the outset – providing conceptual clarity to help understand what happened in the Breivik example presented in the last chapter.

Here, as an example of an instance of individual practical argumentation let’s consider the case of deciding what I will eat for breakfast. To make the situation simpler let’s pretend I have narrowed it down to eggs or cereal.³⁰ Thus, in my mind there are two sides and I have a dialectical argument about to occur. I could make a line of reasoning supporting a decision to eat eggs and make a line of reasoning supporting a decision to eat cereal. Those lines would then come into conflict, creating argumentation. For now, let us pretend that the first turn/thought I have is, “I will eat cereal because it is quick and easy” and that the possibility of eggs remains in mind although no line of reasoning supporting it has yet been extrapolated.

At this point we can already make our first important observation. Whereas Blair notes that in cases of non-engaged dialogue the respondent is typically absent, in the breakfast example, this is not the case. Rather than being called absent, it might be said either 1) that there is no respondent who could be absent or 2) that the respondent is not absent at all, but rather, is fully present. Taking the first position, that there is no respondent, one might cite the fact that what I eat for breakfast does not involve anyone else. When I think or say my turn regarding eating cereal, even if eggs are an option, no one is around to defend such a position. In such a situation Blair’s observations hold. If, however, we take the, I think, more accurate second position, and I am considered the protagonist and antagonist for the positions “I will eat cereal” and “I will eat eggs”, then the respondent is not absent at all. The respondent *can* be questioned directly (because it

³⁰ Since I do not yet have a preference without having argued through the conflict, preference utility calculus is not applicable here. Part of the consequence of arguing with myself is the generation of a preference.

is me!) and any doubts about how they (I) will respond are only a product of the fact that they have to be thought about, i.e. they have yet to be created.

A similar point also becomes clear when considering how Blair deals with the sixth pragma-dialectical rule about falsely presenting premises. How can one knowingly falsely present a premise to one's self? Blair's concern here clearly indicates a dialectical but yet still imagined dialogical argument with a separate person, in that his concern is with the imagined other's acceptance or rejection of premises. In this sense, the arguer is proceeding semi-dialogically rather than non-dialogically or totally in the solo realm. In a full solo sense, where I am arguing with myself about what to do, all the premises are known. Thus, the problem is not about the certainty of the premise being falsely presented, as Blair was concerned with in a quasi-dialogical situation, but rather about the benefit of such a rule to the case at all.

Further, his concern about the ninth rule, that "in solo arguments, the speaker will tend not to recognize a failed defense of his or her position, and certainly cannot be expected to do so", seems problematic applied to our example. When I settle on an intention to eat either the eggs or the cereal, the failure of the defence of the other position becomes immediately clear. It does not seem problematic to say I am expected to recognize this failure. Such uncertainty is more likely to occur in situations of quasi-dialogical theoretical arguing than in solo practical arguing.

Recognizing these differences highlights that there are at least two notions of "solo". Solo in Blair's sense means "without an independent respondent *but* imagining one". This seems to be what is envisioned with the three above-mentioned theories as well as in all of Blair's examples. Despite his wish to separate the dialectical and dialogical, Blair also posits an individual physically alone but imagining a separate interlocutor. However, solo can also mean "*without* an independent respondent". When I am arguing with myself about breakfast, I may not be concerned with anyone else at all, real or imagined. I ask myself "Do I want eggs?" and I answer myself "Yes, because..." or "No, because..." then I ask myself "Do I want cereal?" and I formulate similar answers to this question. I then go on to juxtapose the answers and settle on an intention to have one or the other. In such individual practical deliberation, no one else *need* enter the deliberation.

Of course, sometimes another person *does* enter this conversation. For example, while I am trying to decide, I might think, "my mother would tell me to eat eggs". In such an instance it could be argued that this shows the dialogical character of all, even solo,

argumentation.³¹ I am not convinced it does, however, based on the following few responses. First, this does not happen in every instance and thus the qualifier “all” needs stronger proof. Second, when it does, Blair’s observations once again become pertinent. If I imagine my mother, the assumption then would be that I am arguing with my mother about what to eat even though she is not there. As has been argued, this situation would be better described as quasi-dialogical, if indeed it was an argument with my imagined mother about what she believes I should do. But that is not what is happening here. Instead, I am arguing with myself about what I intend to do, and my guess at a reason my mother might give could count simply as one reason in support of one option rather than as a discussion with her as a critical “Other”. The content of her suggestion becomes a reason of my own. This is the point the quote at the beginning of the chapter attempts to capture.

Further, as Blair pointed out, there is an important distinction between a person being represented in my thoughts and being present in the argumentation. Just because there are two sides to a disagreement, eggs or cereal, does not mean that two separate entities have to represent each side, nor that we should treat the situation as though that is the case – in other words, there is a difference between the dialectical and dialogical. Even if we use the depersonalized expression “party”, we need to create a persona of that party in order to be able to argue with it. A party cannot simply be an opposing conclusion. The party still has to have reasons and standpoints unto itself. But which reasons and why? If we did go to the end of making up a web of reasons and beliefs for this party, then all we would have to do is call the party “Jane” and the same concerns regarding the separate other apply. So it does not seem as though the depersonalised notion of a party can save us.

When a separate someone is present in an argument they bring all of the creativity and knowledge another full person can bring. When someone is only represented in my mind, however, it may spur new thoughts in us to try to think like them, but it cannot compete with the new creativity in reason-giving or objection-responding an actual interlocutor would bring. Here rises again our concern with the imaginative ability of an individual arguer mentioned above. Recall Johnson’s concern that our imaginations are limited, no matter how fertile they are. We will return to this topic in chapter 6.

³¹ See: Dascal (2005) and Greco-Morasso (2011).

Of course we also do not “reason in a vacuum”. Indeed we are influenced by all sorts of factors, including other individuals. At what point, however, does a piece of information I have learned elsewhere become mine? If we follow the Bakhtinian line presented by Tindale above, every word I use has an Other associated with it. While this may be the case, it does not seem that stopping to identify that Other for every word would be possible or useful for argumentation analysis or evaluation. Instead, in instances of quasi-dialogical argumentation, recognizing that I am arguing with a *represented* other, and in instances of individual practical argumentation, recognizing that I am arguing with *myself* dialectically, seem like more accurate descriptions of the phenomenon and starting points for analysis and evaluation. In short, although argumentation may be built up from, and only possible because of, social factors like those that are required to learn language more generally, it does not always seem to be of value to try to reduce it back down to its social origins when analyzing or evaluating individual practical argumentation.

We have addressed the distinctions between dialectical and dialogical in view of a distinction between individual and multiple participants. The next two sections will address the distinction between reasoning and argumentation and then relate all of the distinctions back to the separation of individual and multiple participants.

3.5. Reasoning and Argumentation

Fairclough and Fairclough are clear about the sources of their conceptual starting points. They take their inspiration for developing their model from Audi (2006) and Walton (2007) and their notion of reasonableness from van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004). The latter two sources maintain declared dialectical positions, though the former does not.³² This could be because Walton and van Eemeren and Grootendorst are primarily interested in argumentation while Audi is primarily interested in reasoning. So although Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, p. 36) claim “[i]n this book we are using practical reasoning in the sense in which it is used in contemporary argumentation theory and philosophy, for instance in the work of Audi (2006), Walton (1990, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) and Millgram (2005)” their singular identification of “*the sense*” to cover all these authors’ views is problematic because they do not all share the same sense of practical

³² Neither “dialectical” nor “dialogical”, nor any of their variants, appear at all in Audi (2006).

reasoning (or argumentation). Undoubtedly there are close relations between reasoning and argumentation, but there are also valuable differences to be kept clear.

I generally agree with Broome's characterization of reasoning (2002, 2013). For Broome, reasoning is a phenomenon that occurs in the mind.³³ As mentioned in the introduction, for this work we are focused on active reasoning, a conscious activity that we do. In Breivik's case, this active reasoning has also been made explicit by putting it into words (Broome, 2013, p. 222). As a mental activity, "reasoning is a process whereby some of your attitudes cause you to have a new attitude" (Broome, 2013, p. 221). For theoretical reasoning, some belief attitudes, in the process of reasoning, can cause a new belief attitude. For practical reasoning, some belief and intention attitudes, in the process of reasoning, can cause a new intention attitude.

This account of reasoning is also in basic agreement with Walton³⁴ (who is in basic agreement with Govier), that reasoning can be identified "as a kind of abstract structure, which can nevertheless be dynamic and interactive in some cases, as well as static and solitary in other cases. In this account, reasoning is characteristically used in argument, but it can be used in other pragmatic contexts as well" (Walton, 1990, p. 401). Two important aspects of this characterization are the interactivity and places of use. While I think it is most common for reasoning to be conducted in the silence of one's own mind (even if actively using words), there is no reason why this has to be so. Reasoning can be conducted with multiple participants and is quite often done so. Think of working out a mathematical problem with a colleague, or coming to a conclusion regarding if it is going to rain with a friend. The sources of the attitudes in these examples can come from different people, but nonetheless cause you to conclude with an intention or a belief without having to have involved argumentation. What then is argumentation?

³³ Leaving aside considerations of processes occurring in computers and the extent to which a computer could be considered a mind, which, although I cannot argue for it here, has the possibility of fitting with this characterization.

³⁴ This is not to overlook the important differences between the "Belief-Desire-Intention camp" and the "Commitment camp". Rather, I only wish to circumvent such discussion by pointing out that whether a publicly expressed commitment or an internally created belief or intention, both theories share much overlap in how they view the process occurring.

I take argumentation to turn on the notion of conflict.³⁵ In the above description of reasoning, the emphasis was on getting to a conclusion from a starting point. A conflict occurs when there is disagreement or doubt about the conclusion or any of the steps used to get to the conclusion of reasoning. As such, conflict is extra to reasoning (or an unreasoned conclusion) and can thus be thought of as something theoretically separate. In practice the two are often intertwined.

For example, the notion of an argumentation scheme combines reasoning and argumentation. The scheme in isolation can be thought of as a pattern of reasoning. Only when the pattern of reasoning is accompanied by corresponding critical questions, which by their nature of being critical involve doubt or disagreement, does it turn from a pattern of reasoning into an argumentation scheme.³⁶

Using this distinction provides one way to separate the conflation that Fairclough and Fairclough make between practical reasoning and deliberation which was noted in the last chapter. Practical reasoning, strictly speaking, does not involve counter considerations. Indeed this is what their model for practical reasoning shows, even though their explication says something else. Also, as they say, deliberation does involve counter considerations and as such it is better characterized as argumentation rather than reasoning. Practical reasoning is reasoning that produces a line of reasoning. Line(s) of reasoning for an action can be put to test against lines of reasoning for alternate actions resulting in argumentation/deliberation.

Centering on the notion of conflict is also congruent with Blair's distinction between the dialogical and dialectical. Recall that for Blair, "dialectical" can be "reserved for the properties of all arguments related to their involving *doubts or disagreements* with at least two sides" (Emphasis mine). Taking his suggestion seriously, then, we can say that all argument(ation)s are necessarily dialectical, but are not necessarily dialogical.

As is perhaps noticeable from this discussion, I thus prefer to avoid the expression "an argument" – to indicate the abstract object- whenever possible. Most often, "a line of reasoning" can be used in its place to indicate reasoning supporting a conclusion. Where

³⁵ A number of scholars recognize the importance of conflict to argument(ation) albeit in varying ways and degrees (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; Johnson, 2000; Walton 1990).


³⁶ This characterization is not explicitly spelled out in the literature but does not seem opposed to it. I am grateful to Fabrizio Macagno for discussion on this point. See also, Macagno and Walton (2015) and Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008).

reasons are used to support a conclusion which is in opposition to another claim or which is produced as a result of doubt, “argumentation” can be used.

3.6. Individual and Multiple participants

Having addressed much of the discussion regarding the number of people involved in reasoning and argumentation above, I wish to highlight only a few points here. In my view, given the power of imagination, an individual can conduct monological reasoning and argumentation as well as quasi-dialogical reasoning and argumentation. Given that the term “solo argumentation” can be ambiguous between only dialectical and quasi-dialogical argumentation, I think it should be abandoned. Further, more than one person can conduct dialogical reasoning, which does not have to involve conflict. The following chart can help summarize the above discussion and a few examples of each activity (the bottom row of the chart) might serve as useful illustrations. Since argumentation is always dialectical, where it is also dialogical I have indicated dialectical in brackets.

Figure 3-1 Conceptual Distinctions Chart



Individual Participant:

Monological Reasoning – Thinking the common “Socrates is a man” example; Reasoning (although perhaps incorrectly) that “if the streets are wet it must have rained.”

Dialectical Argumentation: Deciding what to eat for breakfast; Thinking of my reasons for and against a sports team winning or losing.

Quasi-Dialogical Argumentation: Imagining a disagreement with Descartes about his proof for the existence of God. Imagining how my girlfriend would argue against buying a new television.

Multiple Participants:

Dialogical Reasoning: Jointly providing the solution to a math problem with a teacher. Figuring out what time the train leaves with a friend.

Dialogical Argumentation: The standard cases regarding what one should believe or do.

3.7. Conclusion

In this chapter I have drawn some distinctions which were not made clear in Fairclough and Fairclough's articulation of practical reasoning. Their model, inspired by pragma-dialectics, seems to have been designed for dialogical argumentation. Part of the reason why it might not have done so well when applied to Breivik's case is because he only conducted quasi-dialogical argumentation. In the next chapter I will discuss some of the ways I think this impacted the design of the model and how recognizing it can provide advice for a stronger model.

In sum, I have developed the idea that reasoning is a process that takes an individual from one mental attitude to another. I have further argued that argumentation turns on conflict and indicates a dialectical challenge to a claim or instance of reasoning. Separating an individual participant and multiple participants, I have also argued for consistency in distinguishing between dialogues and quasi-dialogues. Using these distinctions we can now appropriately characterize Breivik's argumentation in his self-interview as quasi-dialogical argument. Although he decided to withhold discussion of his plans from everyone (Berwick, 1381), he was answering "critical" questions and was admittedly targeting his compendium (at minimum) at "the 350,000 militant nationalists who are the audience" (Husby & Sørheim, 2011, sec. 5.4).

4. A NEW MODEL FOR INTEGRATED PRACTICAL REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION

And tho' the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic Quantities, yet when each is thus considered separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less likely to take a rash Step; and in fact I have found great Advantage from this kind of Equation, in what may be called Moral or Prudential Algebra.

~ Benjamin Franklin

4.1. Introduction

In the last chapter I provided some conceptual distinctions with the aim of providing clarity and precision with which to improve a model for practical reasoning and argumentation. In this chapter I will use those distinctions and the justifications for them to lay out a new integrated model for practical reasoning and argumentation which was originally developed with João Sàágua (Sàágua & Baumtrog, forthcoming) over the course of the first three years of my doctoral studies, but which I have independently developed further here. Our many joint conversations regarding how we experience practical reasoning in light of our mutual concern to consider the factors which ought to be a part of good practical reasoning and reaching a good conclusion, in combination with our general appreciation of many aspects of the models already on offer, led us to conceptualize and articulate the current model. Sàágua's expertise in formal logics combined well with my attention to conceptual distinctions and concerns for the inclusion of moral considerations, to produce an overall and detailed model of practical reasoning and argumentation. The places where I have substantially developed the model beyond what is included in our forthcoming publication will be indicated using footnotes.

4.2. Background and Assumptions

4.2.1. Background

In the previous chapter I took up Broome's characterization of reasoning as "a process whereby some of your attitudes cause you to have a new attitude" (Broome, 2013, p. 221) and that for practical reasoning the new attitude is an intention. Accordingly, in

designing this model we have conceived of practical reasoning as an activity of the human mind aiming at forming an intention to complete the actions required to alter the state of the world. In light of the theoretical separation of reasoning and argumentation, where argumentation turns on the notion of conflict, we conceive of practical argumentation as a dialectical, dialogical, or polylogical situation through which human agents support or criticise a given line of practical reasoning, or a step of that reasoning. They are differentiated by the nature of the activity that each one carries out. Practical reasoning is a mental and individual process. It is an activity of the mind through which an individual, starting from certain mental states – propositional attitudes – and following a rational process according to rules, leads his mind into a new mental state that concludes the process (Broome, 2004).³⁷ Practical argumentation begins when one or more parts of the process of practical reasoning come into conflict. This can happen with another individual if practical reasoning is externalized, or can happen within an individual who “argues with himself”. If argumentation from another is successful, its receiver can interiorize that recommendation and make it his own intention. Only when someone reasons or argues with himself, does the argumentation immediately result in an intention to perform the action (or not).³⁸ Practical reasoning and argumentation have the following purpose in common: to serve as rational support for an intention to realize an action and/or a sequence of actions consisting of the means chosen to achieve that action.

4.2.2. Assumptions:

In order to philosophically frame the integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation that we present, it is first necessary to explain the main assumptions from which we start.

A) Practical reasoning and argumentation:

(A1) *Objectives are intentions*. Objectives are nothing other than intentions linguistically expressed and sufficiently stable to serve as the base for practical reasoning and practical argumentation. Since objectives can be more general or more specific, so too can intentions. In some cases it is helpful to distinguish more precisely between an

³⁷ Though, as mentioned in the last chapter, the input of the reasoning may come from an Other, in which case both participants help each other through their mental processing.

³⁸ Thanks to Dima Mohammed for this suggestion.

objective which can be achieved through a traceable causal sequence and a broader objective such as “being a good person”, which is better thought of as an aim or policy (Bratman 1987) - the achievement of which is not generally traceable (at least not in the same way). Since both are intentions we consider them both objectives, but I will try to use the word “aim” where it applies and is helpful to clarify.³⁹ In what follows, and for simplicity, we shall use “G” (or variants) to refer to the common content of the intention or the objective.

(A2) *Complex objectives give rise to plans.* When a certain objective assumed by x is sufficiently complex and for that reason *involves a progressive execution over time*, it gives rise to a *plan*. Plans, among other things, influence our actions beyond the present (Bratman, 1987). In what follows, we shall use “M” (or variants) to refer to the content of any means or sequence of means, whether they belong to a plan over time or to simpler practical reasoning.

(A3) *The relation between Objective and Mean is contextual.* The first objective of a plan can be a means for another, more inclusive, plan. But it should also be obvious that, for example, x can have as an objective “to be in a place of power” and use the sub-plan “to be Prime-Minister” as a means (and that other means/sub-plans would eventually also be needed). Hence, it becomes apparent that being a means and an objective (end) often depends on the context and can be conceived of differently depending on the level of zoom with which the reasoning or argumentation is viewed.⁴⁰

B) Human Agents

(B1) *The relation “is a reason for” is considered primitive and pro tanto.* To justify the objectives and the means they choose for realizing them, human agents reason and argue in *terms of reasons*. At this point we will not go beyond the intuitive notion of “a reason” that Thomas Scanlon articulates as “a consideration that counts in favor of it” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 17). For example, that “x is thirsty” is a reason (a consideration that counts in favour) for x to (intend to) drink water. Along with Dancy (2004) we recognize

³⁹ This distinction is new to this articulation of the model. Many thanks to David Hitchcock for bringing the difference between goals and aims to our attention. We acknowledge that further work is needed regarding how this might impact our view of practical reasoning and argumentation overall.

⁴⁰ The notion of the “level of zoom” was originally raised in chapter 2 (p. 18) and will appear again in chapter 5.

that reasons may count in favour of and/or against the assumption of an objective and we are therefore talking about *contributing* reasons or reasons *pro tanto*.⁴¹ In what follows, if we wish to distinguish between reasons, we will number them, writing: R1, R2, and so on. To qualify reasons, we will write R+ or R-, depending on whether these contribute in a positive or negative way, respectively, for the assumption of an objective, G (or for the adoption of a mean, M). Taking this notation a little further, we will accept that '(R±1, ..., R±n)G*' represents the set of reasons, positive or negative, associated to the assumption of an objective G and that '(R±1, ..., R±n)M*' represents the set of reasons, positive or negative, associated to the adoption of a mean or set of means. Accordingly G* is used in short to stand for Goal and M* is used in short to stand for Means.

(B2) *Situation, Circumstance, and Context*. We can describe practical reasoning and argumentation in relation to the baseline situation, S', and to a situation of arrival, S*, also called a future state of affairs (Hitchcock, 2011; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012): x is in situation S', S' has some aspect that leaves x unsatisfied, let us call that aspect 'the absence of G*', and x assumes G* as an objective, whose realization will turn S' into S*. x considers that to realize G*, he should mobilize the means M*. Finally, the beliefs and valuations the agents hold about a given situation determine what is relevant for a given occurrence of practical reasoning or argumentation. Accordingly, we call the context of practical reasoning and argumentation the set of relevant circumstances.


(B3) *Plausible Justifications and Defeasible Rules*. Given that incompatibilities exist between objectives, means for objectives, and the means for one objective impacting a different objective, etc., combined with the ever evolving (perceived) knowledge of the agent, it follows that the rules the agents can use to infer a certain conclusion from certain premises are rules of plausible inference and, therefore, remain defeasible and sensitive to context.⁴² Although they are never deductive or inductive (or statistical) inferences (even if these enter as components of plausible inferences), plausible justifications and defeasible rules should not be seen as a defect or limitation, but rather the condition of the exercise of practical reasoning and argumentation.

⁴¹ The literature on reasons is vast and very complex. Some of our favourite texts are (in alphabetical order) Broome (2000, 2004); Dancy (2004); and Scanlon (1998).

⁴² As convincingly argued by Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008). Along the same lines, though more moral, see: Dancy (2004, pp. 111-17, 184-7).

With this background and these assumptions in mind, we now move to our view of practical reasoning and argumentation illustrated through a flowchart and accompanying explanation:

Figure 4-1 Integrated Model for Practical Reasoning and Argumentation⁴³



⁴³ Many thanks to Jacky Visser for suggestions on improving the visual layout of the model which are new here compared to the model in the forthcoming publication.

4.3. Overview of the New Model

Our model is an *integrative, realistic,⁴⁴ and normative model*. In a single representation, our model integrates the structure of both practical reasoning and practical argumentation, including the variants usually differentiated in both – i.e., instrumental, normative, and value based. It is realistic in the sense that following the model generally corresponds to the real practice of reasoners and arguers. It is normative in the sense that it prescribes a chain of inferences⁴⁵ (for reasoning) or a chain of primitive argumentative schemes⁴⁶ (for argumentation) that should occur, and in a certain order, for both to provide maximally plausible formulations, conclusions, and decisions.

4.3.1. Stages and Topics

The model has 5 *Stages*. Stage one addresses the agent's motivation for action; Stage two is concerned with the proposed goal and other goals; Stage three concerns the available means for achieving the proposed goal; Stage four deals with the relation between the means and between the means and other goals; and Stage five is the decision to act, not act, or make a modification to the reasoning or argumentation and start the process over. Given that our model is integrative and that, simultaneously, we consider that the assumption of the objectives themselves should be an object of reasoning and argumentation – and not only the choice of means, our model includes two initial *Stages* about objectives, two about means, and one for the decision.

In order to licence moving from one *Stage* to the next, the reasoner must answer one or two yes or no *Topic* questions. In any case, an affirmative answer results in a “green light” to move to the next *Stage*. In some cases, a negative answer or “red light” will lead to another *Topic* and thus a second chance to move to the next *Stage*. In other cases, a negative answer leads straight to a conclusion not to act.

⁴⁴ Originally, we called the model “descriptive” instead of “realistic”. I am grateful to Eugen Poppa for pointing out that since we have not empirically tested the model, “realistic” is a more accurate term for the point we are trying to convey and is new here compared to the model in the forthcoming publication.

⁴⁵ Identifiable as patterns of reasoning as discussed in chapter 3.

⁴⁶ Patterns of reasoning with accompanying critical questions as discussed in chapter 3.

Each Topic questions an aspect of the general theme of the Stage and conditions the specific practical reasoning and argumentation associated with it. Thus, each topic's problem serves as an interface between the reasoning that can be carried out in the first person ('I') and the argumentation that can be carried out in the third person ('x'). The answer to each Topic boils down to "Yes" or "No". Ideally, that answer should be properly justified through argumentation and left as mere reasoning. Such argumentation should be an instantiation of one or more primitive argumentation schemes (AS), together with responses to their respective critical questions (CQ). These together determine the basic argumentation structure of the Topic. Discussing (arguing about) those primitive argumentative schemes may require (several) other argumentation schemes.⁴⁷ It is not possible to anticipate which schemes those might be, given that they can vary from case to case. We can thus only provide a complete string of primitive schemes.

4.3.2. Tracks

Given the possibility of providing differing answers to the Topic questions, there are different paths one can take through the model. The "fast path" (shortest path)⁴⁸ can be most readily applied to resemble routine reasoning and involves only "Yes" answers to the Topic questions. In such a case the arguer only addresses Topics 1, 2, 4, and 6. In the most involved cases, the arguer has to address all of the Topics – weighing the reasons for and against the acceptance of both the goal and the means.

4.3.3. Schemes and Critical Questions

Many of the schemes we include in our primitive list are based on schemes already articulated by others, especially Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008). We have, however, made efforts to systematize the schemes by including only one term with inferential power per premise. For example, the first argumentation scheme for the argument from

⁴⁷ The distinction between primitive and derived schemes is contextual and was a suggestion made by Fabrizio Macagno.

⁴⁸ There is, however, nothing which guarantees a reasoner or arguer will be able to address all of the "short" track Topics quickly or quicker than perhaps all of the long track Topics. Although there are fewer steps along the short track, how long it takes an agent/s to work through the accompanying argumentation schemes is dependent upon the agent/s and not the model.

teleology includes as the first premise: x has G+ as its finality. In this case “finality” is the sole term with inferential power.

Ensuring there is only one term with inferential power per premise also helps us to systematize the creation of the corresponding critical questions. This is because the role of the critical question is to scrutinize the inferential term. For example, the critical question focused on the first premise mentioned above is “How does G+ really correspond to the finality of x? How can G+ not correspond to the finality of x?” Accordingly, if the pattern of reasoning uses two premises, there will usually be two critical questions.⁴⁹

Beyond systematizing the schemes and critical questions, the inspiration for the wording of the questions is partly a result of recognizing how easily Breivik could respond to the critical questions posed by Walton and Fairclough and Fairclough (See Ch. 2). In our view one of the main reasons he was able to do so was because the critical questions have the assumption of a second, independent interlocutor built into them. As argued in chapter 3, the subtly ingrained assumption that argumentation involves more than one individual can influence the design of the model, and this is one example of how. If you have a separate, critical, Other asking the critical questions, then the wording of the questions can be less stringent in light of the opportunity for the Other to “press harder” - so to speak - if the answerer does not provide a satisfactory answer. Recall that this is exactly the job Johnson assigns to the Other. In the case where you are the only one responsible for asking and answering the critical questions, however, a more carefully worded question will make it harder to provide an unsatisfactory answer. As such, the wording of the questions is of great importance.

One problem that we noticed with the formulation of the questions added by Fairclough and Fairclough was that they all allowed for “Yes” or “No” answers.⁵⁰ Without assuming the presence of a critical Other, it is unclear why an individual would all of a sudden become critical of their prior thinking during questioning just because the question is called a “critical question”. In our view, there is nothing particularly critical

⁴⁹ There is one important exception for the critical question associated with Argument Scheme 10, which will be addressed in the appropriate place below.

⁵⁰ Interestingly, the questions they adopt from Walton are not worded to allow for “Yes” or “No” answers, but they opted to depart from his stylistic choice when creating their own.

about a question which can be answered in such a simple yes or no fashion and nothing in the question presses the answerer to be especially critical.

Accordingly, we asked ourselves “what makes a critical question, critical?” If you envisage the question being asked by a critical Other, then part of the answer would be “The disposition with which the question is being asked”. When you are alone and conducting individual dialectical or quasi-dialogical argumentation, however, that critical attitude may be nearly absent. Thus, another part of the motivation for the way we have formulated the critical questions was in an effort to make the questions themselves as critical as possible, while relying less on the person asking them.

Taking the above two considerations into account – avoiding Yes/No questions and making the questions critical - we have designed the questions as a pair of questions, the first of which asks for an explanation of the inferential term’s use and the second of which challenges it.⁵¹ Both parts are necessary, in our view, for the critical questioning of the inferential term to be adequate. Walton’s questions also avoid the “Yes” or “No” dichotomy but do not include what we consider to be the most critical, challenging aspect of the question. Thus, in our model, the second (part of the) question ensures the question contains a critical component in every case and regardless of the questioner or their disposition.

4.3.4. Closure

Unlike the Fairclough and Fairclough model for deliberation, our model always ends in a traceably justified decision to act or not act. Whereas Fairclough and Fairclough left considerations and counter considerations as the end stage of their model with instructions that an agent perform a weighing, we have provided a way to rationally justify the selection of one of the alternatives that includes a proposal for what happens when an agent does indeed weigh the alternatives. This is provided in argumentation scheme 10 below. Providing this explanation has allowed for the model to always end in a decision to act or not rather than ending with considerations and counter considerations in tension.

⁵¹ This conceptualization of critical questioning is a new addition to the original articulation which, nonetheless, both Sàágua and I have developed.

4.4. The Structure of Practical Reasoning and Practical Argumentation

Let us now address the problem regarding each Topic, how this problem can motivate practical reasoning, and the primitive argumentative schemes (and respective critical questions) that should be used to justify a response to each problem.

Stage 1, containing only Topic 1, consists in answering the problem: “Does X or should X have (at least) one reason to aim at goal G*?” It should be noted that a reason here does not have to be a pro-attitude. I can suppose that I should assume G* for another type of reason: maybe G* involves some sacrifice that I have to make (hence, my not having a pro-attitude towards G*), but, if I assume G*, perhaps I feel that I am contributing to realize a certain value (“social equity”) that I cherish. We can also include here reasons deriving from “institutional facts” (Searle, 1995; 2001, p. 56-7).

The rational justification of the answer to the question of Topic 1 seem to depend on 3 main considerations, articulated through 4 argumentation schemes.⁵²

1. *Teleological Considerations.* Practical reasoning and argumentation are teleological in that goals are instantiations or manifestations of a general purpose or aim. If, for example, x is an institution created with the mission G+, we consider that G* can be a manifestation of G+. By arguing that G* results from that objective, one attributes to x a reason for assuming G*. To illustrate:

Major Premise: NATO’s mission is to actively contribute to world peace and security (G+)

Minor Premise: Helping Ukraine increase its defensive power (G*) will actively contribute to world peace and security

Therefore, it is plausible to suppose that,

Conclusion: NATO has a reason to help Ukraine increase its defensive power.

More formalized we arrive at:

Argumentative Scheme 1. Assumption of Objectives by Teleology⁵³ (AS1)

Premise 1: x has G+ as its finality

⁵² For reasoning, consider only the pattern of reasoning without the critical questions

⁵³ We agree with Fabrizio Macagno, who suggested that AS1 can be considered a variant of “Argument from Commitment” (Cf. Walton, Reed, and Macagno 2008: 335).

Premise 2: G* belongs to G+
Therefore, plausibly
Conclusion: There is a reason for x to assume G*

By definition, the decision about CQs in plausible argumentation is essentially contextual: it depends on the circumstances (in the sense of “circumstance” explained above).

Satisfactorily answering the following critical questions provides a plausible justification:

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 1

CQ1: How does G+ really correspond to the finality of x?

How can G+ not correspond to the finality of x?⁵⁴

CQ2: How is G* really a particular case of G+?

How could G* not be a particular case of G+?

2. *Valuative Considerations.* These are considerations involving moral or social values, *sensu lato*, regarding both individual and collective behaviour (e.g. “Individual Well-Being”, “Collective Well-Being”, “Keeping a Promise”, “Honesty”, etc.)

For this consideration we have two types of cases in mind. The first regards the assumption of your value as positive (V+). For example, if you are a political leader who values fairness (V+), it can be positively promoted by taxing the rich to help fund a free national public health system (G*). In the second type, G* may not directly promote any obvious value, for example simply drinking water.⁵⁵ It may, however have consequences positively valued by x, for instance, to quench thirst, thus giving x another kind of reason to assume G*.

In the first case, the argumentative scheme from positive values (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 321), generally applies, but with two caveats. First, there are no critical questions associated with the scheme in the literature so, using the method

⁵⁴ For this and all critical questions we assume there can be more than one response/reason. We use the singular wording only for the sake of simplicity of presentation.

⁵⁵ I use “obvious” because as mentioned in 2.2 I think all practical reasoning and argumentation involves values.

described above, we have taken the liberty of formulating them ourselves. Second, since we formulated these questions to focus on the correct application, in a given context, of the essential term with inferential power, we will propose a slightly modified, simplified version of the scheme that clearly isolates the (only) expressions we consider essential for the scheme.

Argumentative Scheme 2. Argument from Positive Values

(AS2)

Premise 1: value V is positive (= V+)

Premise 2: V+ positively values G*

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for x to assume G*

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 2

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a positive value to V?

What would be a reason for not attributing a positive value to V?

CQ2: What is the reason for the positive valuation of G* by V+?

What would be a reason for G* not to be positively valued by V+?

The answer to CQ1 will likely involve the participants in a *substantial* discussion regarding *values*. The answer to CQ2 most likely consists in the demonstration of the *relevant relation between V+ and G**, which may require sub-argumentation. For instance, if V+ is “to promote peace” and G* is “to reinforce military power in Ukraine” there is definitely room for sub-argumentation.

Argumentative Scheme 3. Argument from Positive Consequences

(AS3)

Premise 1: If G* is realized by x, then the consequences K1, ..., Kn will occur.

Premise 2: K1, ..., Kn are to be valued positively.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for x to assume G*

We’ve “unfolded” the single premise put forward by Walton, Reed & Macagno (2008, pp. 332-3; cf. Walton, 2013a, p. 102) into two premises to permit a critical question to specifically focus on two issues in two premises. This is because in the actual argumentative process it is possible to accept one of the premises and deny the other, deny both, or accept both. The use of the infinitive in the second premise is deliberate, for it allows a discussion (CQ2) on the positive valuation: x, the proponent, can positively

value K_1, \dots, K_n , but in argumentation, y , the opponent, can value them negatively or be neutral. If we indexed the valuation to x , the second premise would become undisputable (it would consist in the truism, stated by x , that x values K_1, \dots, K_n positively) and we think that it should be able to be discussed. We have also suppressed the original version's CQ3, because we think that it should be carried out in Topic 3 (where pro and con reasons are pondered), as we shall show below.

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 3

CQ1: What makes it plausible that G^* has K_1, \dots, K_n as consequences?

How could G^* not have K_1, \dots, K_n as consequences?

CQ2: Why should K_1, \dots, K_n be positively valued?

How could K_1, \dots, K_n not be positively valued?

3) *Operational Consideration*. One last aspect to be evaluated in order to enable us to answer if x has or should have a reason to assume G^* is to know if x has the ability to (contribute to) realize G^* and, also, if his assumption of G^* is or is not idle regarding the realization of that objective. At this stage it is important to note that we are not here addressing the ability of x to carry out the means. This argument scheme will appear again later in the model where it can be appropriately used for that purpose. For its use in providing a reason to aim at the goal, "ability" is to be understood more broadly as "in a position". For example, consider a husband who needs to pick his wife up from the train station. His having a driver's licence that his children do not have could be an ability reason that enables him to realize the goal of picking her up. This ability, however, says nothing about the car being functional or otherwise available for him to perform the means of driving to get there. We recognize that if hard pressed, the ability reason does indeed boil down to an ability to perform the means, but think an important part of early practical reasoning rests on a preliminary consideration of an agent's being in a position – having the ability – to achieve the goal. Since this scheme is used again later while addressing the means, it is not crucial to follow the ability chain all the way to the end of the performance of the means here. Its second instantiation functions as an appropriate

check on the means at that point.⁵⁶ The argumentation to that effect should instantiate the following scheme:

Argumentative Scheme 4. Argument from Ability⁵⁷
(AS4a)

- Premise 1: G* should be positively valued
Premise 2: x has the ability to realize G*
Premise 3: x's ability to realize G* is a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of G*
- Therefore, plausibly,
Conclusion: There is a reason for x to assume G*

In this scheme, the agent goes from the existence of a reason to carry out G* (Premise 1) to the existence of a reason for *x*, *and not any other agent*, to carry out G* (Premises 2 and 3). If *x* were not in a position to realize G*, or if the assumption of G* by *x* was unnecessary, in the sense that G* would occur anyway even if *x* would not assume it, then there would not be this reason for *x* assuming G*. The two reasons are not the same. Going back to the NATO example, the reason to carry out G* (NATO helping Ukraine increase its defensive power) can be, for example, because it “Promotes Peace”, which is considered to be a positive value (V+), while the reason for *x* assuming G* (and not any other agent) can be, for example, because NATO is in a better position to negotiate with the quarrelling parties, an *operational* reason.

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 4a

CQ1: How does *x* have the ability to realize G*?

What could prevent *x* from realizing G*?

CQ2: To what extent is the assumption of G* by *x* a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of G*?

Which *y* exists (such that $y \neq x$) whose ability to realize G* is a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of G*?

⁵⁶ Changing AS4 to appear in two places is new in this articulation as compared to the forthcoming publication, but has been added in consultation with João Sãágua who maintains reservations about such a decision.

⁵⁷ Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this constitutes a modest contribution to the field.

Since we think that, normatively, it only makes sense to argue through the instantiation of AS4 if its Premise 1 has already been proven by *another type* of argumentation (AS1-AS3), we consider Premise 1 as assumed. For that reason, it does not need the association of a CQ. Further, this illustrates the importance of following the argumentation schemes in order since if AS4 were used first, it would be unsupported.

Let us imagine that all four schemes were employed on real argumentation and that all of the CQs were answered successfully. While it may mean there are reasons to assume G*, it does not yet mean that x should assume G*. This is because the reasons x has for assuming G* are *pro tanto* and not *pro toto*. We thus have now to consider “the other side of the scale”.

Stage 2. Topic 2

Topic 2 involves argumentation aimed at founding an answer (positive or negative) to the problem: “Is G* compatible with other goals, G1,Gn, that x has or should have?” As stated, the problem seems to lead to the idea that x has to consider the compatibility of G* with virtually *every* objective (including aims) that x *has*, as well as with *all* those that x *should have*. To complicate the situation further, we assume that there is no safe and sound method for the calculation of (in)compatibilities! Although seemingly extremely complex, this is not an intractable situation. It will be sufficient *to use the Principle of Charity* and, in a sense, *to reverse the Burden of Proof*. Given that we are speaking of human reasoning, using the principle of charity we shall assume from the outset that x is 1) usually not (knowingly) self-contradictory and 2) is not an inherently evil person. Obviously, there is place for a margin of error: x can overlook conflicting goals, or accidentally contradict himself and x can have instances of evil. Generally, however, we take x to be consistent and morally neutral or good by default, thus reversing the Burden of Proof and leaving it to the opponent to build an argument to challenge a positive answer to Topic 2.

With these qualifications in mind, we consider the argumentation supporting an answer to the topic to rest on the four following argumentation schemes: the first argues against the assumption of G* because this objective promotes a negative value; the second argues against the assumption of G* because this objective contradicts or inhibits a positive value; the third argues against the assumption of G* because the enactment of this objective has negative consequences; the fourth is neutral regarding values and valuations and simply argues that there is an operational incompatibility between G*, if

assumed by x, and other objectives x has *already assumed*. The first three schemes thus concern objectives that x *should have*, while the fourth concerns the objectives x *has*. Since these schemes occur in the overall model twice - here as applied to the goal and later as applied to the means - on the flowchart they have been labelled “a” and “b” respectively, as was done with AS4 above. This double applicability is represented in each scheme with G*/M*. Assumptions A2 and A3 above address our view on the flux between means and goals.

Argumentative Scheme 5. Argument from Negative Values⁵⁸

(AS5)

Premise 1: the value V is negative (= V-)

Premise 2: V- negatively values G*/M*

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 5

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a negative value to V?

How could V not have a negative value?

CQ2: What is the reason for the negative valuation of G*/M* by V-?

How could G*/M* not be negatively valued by V-?

Argumentative Scheme 6. Argument Contradicting Positive Values⁵⁹

(AS6)

Premise 1: Value V is positive (V+)

Premise 2: G*/M* contradicts (or inhibits) V+

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M*

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 6

CQ1: What is the reason for the positive character of V?

How could V not be valued positively?

CQ2: What is the reason for G*/M* contradicting (inhibiting) V+?

⁵⁸ See, Argument from Negative Value (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, p 321; Walton, 2013a, p. 103). The two remarks made above regarding the argumentative scheme on positive values apply, *mutatis mutandis*, also here, hence, we will not repeat them.

⁵⁹ Although this scheme cannot be found as such in Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008), or in Walton (2013a), it is considered a variant of the “Argument from Values”, easily manageable out of the two schemes that are “traditionally” included in it.

In which ways might G^*/M^* be congruent with $V+$?

Argumentative Scheme 7. Argument from Negative Consequences

(AS7)

Premise 1: If G^*/M^* is realized by x , the consequences K_1, \dots, K_n will occur

Premise 2: K_1, \dots, K_n are to be negatively valued

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G^*/M^*

Similar remarks to those made for AS3 are applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, here – with the exception of the ones regarding the existence of a second premise, which, in this case, already appear in the original formulation of the scheme (see Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008, p. 332-3; Walton, 2013a, p. 102).

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 7

CQ1: What makes it plausible that G^*/M^* has K_1, \dots, K_n as consequences?

How could G^*/M^* not have K_1, \dots, K_n as consequences?

CQ2: Why should K_1, \dots, K_n be negatively valued?

How could K_1, \dots, K_n not be negatively valued?

Other schemes related to AS7 are rightly described by Walton, Reed & Macagno (2008, pp. 318-344) as in the realm of practical reasoning, but are not primitive. A discussion of how they relate to the primitive scheme would be an excellent topic for a further paper.

Argumentative Scheme 8. Argument from Operational incompatibility⁶⁰

(AS8)

Premise 1: G is an objective already assumed by x

Premise 2: G and G^*/M^* are operationally incompatible

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G^*/M^*

⁶⁰ Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this constitutes a modest contribution to the field.

It is noteworthy that in premise 1, the objectives of x are restricted to *those already assumed by x* and *do not* include those that the opponent considers x should assume. If the latter were included, the reference to values and valuations would be unavoidable (and, for that, we already have AS5, AS6, and AS7). This scheme aims at situations in which the existence of a contradiction between the realization of certain objectives already assumed by x and the new objective x is considering to assume, G^* , is “pointed out”. In this way it remains focused on operational incompatibility rather than ideological incompatibility.

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 8

CQ1: What reasons are there for taking G as an objective already assumed by x ?

What reasons are there for doubting x already assumed G ?

CQ2: What makes G and G^*/M^* operationally incompatible?

How could G and G^*/M^* not be operationally incompatible?

Let us imagine that AS5, AS6, AS7, and AS8 were actually instantiated in a concrete argumentation and that they passed their respective CQs; or that at least one of them did. In that case, the practical argumentation that took place guaranteed that x , has up to four, but at least one reason, for *not* assuming G^* . Does this mean that x should not assume G^* ? Not yet. The reasons x has for not assuming G^* are *pro tanto*, and not *pro toto*, so we have to decide between the two sides – we have to weigh the pros and cons. That is the purpose of Topic 3.

Excursus. Negotiation of Objectives

Before analysing the argumentation belonging to Topic 3, it is appropriate to consider a situation in which a contradiction has arisen between an objective to be assumed, G^* , and another objective $\neg G$. Instead of arguing about which objective is preferable (Topic 3), one can argue for a modification of one of those objectives, or both. This is arguing through negotiation. It is important to emphasize precisely this *argumentative aspect of the negotiation*, because negotiation writ large does not have to be rational as in the case of pure threat, blackmail, or bribery.

A simple⁶¹ example. Let us imagine that x already had as an objective, G, “To act in an environmentally-friendly way”. Now, x wins the lottery and can buy the car he always dreamt of. x is considering a new objective, G*, “To buy a Ferrari Testarossa”. Knowing the Testarossa’s high fuel consumption, it is obvious that the second objective is incompatible with G – his aim to be environmentally friendly. To mark the incompatibility of G with G*, we will represent G as !G – in which “!” is used to point out that contradiction with G*. Now, in a certain sense, x can choose between determining which of the two objectives, G* or !G, is preferable, thus going to Topic 3. Or x can try to modify one of the two objectives, or both, in order to make them compatible. Let us imagine that x enters into a process of *argumentative negotiation* in which he will have to determine *how far he can go in the modification of his objectives, G+ and !G, in order to make them compatible, but also to think that he is still assuming that part of those objectives that x considers essential*. Let us imagine, for instance, that at the end of the negotiation (either with y or with himself) x modifies G*, “To buy a Ferrari Testarossa” into, “To buy a Citroën DS5”. There is a clear sense in which the objective, G*, was preserved and modified: x now has the objective of buying a more environmentally-friendly car that, although not a Ferrari, is still a fancy car. This is now, so to speak, the “car of his dreams” insofar as it achieves the assumption of both goals rather than requiring the sacrifice of one.

We consider that the argumentative process just illustrated consists in an instantiation of the following Argumentative Scheme.

Argumentative Scheme 9. Argument Based on Reasonable Negotiation⁶²
(AS9)

AS9.1. Variation on !Gi

Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory

Premise 2: Modifying !G into Gi preserves the essential in !G

Premise 3: Gi is compatible with G*/M*

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: x should assume Gi (instead of !G)

AS9.2. Variation on G*

⁶¹ But it is obvious that this kind of situation can be enormously complex. For example, consider the negotiation between social stakeholders: employers, unions, and government.

⁶² Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this constitutes a modest contribution to the field.

Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2: Modifying G*/M* into G'' preserves the essential in G*/M*
 Premise 3: G'' is compatible with !G
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume G'' (instead of G*/M*)

AS9.3. Variation on G* and !G

Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2: Modifying !G into Gi preserves the essential in !G
 Premise 3: Modifying G*/M* into G'' preserves the essential in G*/M*
 Premise 4: Gi and G'' are compatible
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume Gi and G'' (instead of !G and G*/M*, respectively)

Since premise 1 works as an assumption imported from the previous topic we do no need to question the incompatibility. Accordingly, these are the remaining Critical Questions associated to this Scheme (in any of its variations).

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 9

CQ1: How do the modifications of !Gi into Gi or of G*/M* into G'', respectively, preserve the essential aspect(s) of each of the initial objectives?

How might the modifications of !Gi into Gi or of G*/M* into G'', respectively, diminish/jeopardize the essential aspect(s) of each initial objectives?

CQ2: What makes the schemes resulting from the proposed modifications (Gi!/Gi and G''/G*/M*) compatible?

How might the schemes resulting from the proposed modifications (Gi!/Gi and G''/G*/M*) be incompatible?

CQ3: What incompatibilities with other objectives x has or should have result from the proposed modifications (Gi!/Gi or G''/G*/M*)?

How could one resolve these resulting incompatibilities?

We consider the burden of proof of CQ1 to be on the side of the proponent and the burden of proof in the case of CQ2 and CQ3 to be on the side of the opponent (in line with what was stated about that matter on Topic 2).

Stage 2. Topic 3.

Topic 3 receives a situation of incompatibility (insurmountable, or overlooked, by negotiation) between G* and one or more objectives/aims that x has or should have as

input and has to provide a founded answer to the question: “Is G^* preferable to the goals, $!G_1, \dots !G_n$, with which it is incompatible?”. Intuitively, and simplifying slightly, if G^* is preferable to another objective, $!G$, with which it is incompatible, then that other objective should be abandoned and the reasoning should progress to Topic 4. If $!G$, is preferable, then $!G$ should (continue to) be assumed by x and the practical reasoning on G^* ends here. To found the answer to the question, *an argumentative process in favour of the preference* for G^* or for $!G$ should be carried out. In addition, that argumentative process should take into account the specific results obtained in Topics 1 and 2. Let us see this in greater detail.

Topic 1 allowed for four types of reasons in favour of the assumption of G^* , of which at least one would have been positively associated to G^* . Obviously, we are talking about several types of reasons; this means, and this is an important aspect, that there can be several particular reasons in favour of the assumption of G^* by x that are specimens of each one of those types. Topic 2 allowed for four types of reasons against the assumption of G^* , of which at least one would have been negatively associated to G^* . Here, we are again talking about *types of reasons* and so there can be *several particular reasons* against the assumption of G^* by x , that are specimens of each one of those types. This time, the *particular* reasons positively associated to G^* in Topic 1 are the ones that must be weighed *against* the *particular* reasons negatively associated to G^* in Topic 2. Resolving Topic 3 rationally articulates this process of “weighing” the reasons in favour/against the assumption G^* by x .

Argumentative Scheme 10. Argument Based on Rational Preference I⁶³
(AS10)

10.1 Variation in favour of G^*/M

Premise 1: $!G$ and G^*/M^* are contradictory

Premise 2: $(R^*_{\pm 1}, \dots, R^*_{\pm n})G^*/M^*$

Premise 3: $(!R_{\pm 1}, \dots, !R_{\pm n})!G$

Premise 4: $(R^*_{\pm 1}, \dots, R^*_{\pm n})G^*/M^*$ are preferable to $(!R_{\pm 1}, \dots, !R_{\pm n})!G$

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: x should assume G^*/M^* (and abandon $!G$)

10.2 Variation in favour of $!G$

Premise 1: $!G$ and G^*/M are contradictory

⁶³ Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this constitutes a modest contribution to the field.

Premise 2: $(R^{*±1}, \dots, R^{*±n})G^*/M^*$
 Premise 3: $(!R±1, \dots, !R±n)!G$
 Premise 4: $(!R±1, \dots, !R±n)!G$ are preferable to $(R^{*±1}, \dots, R^{*±n})G^*/M^*$
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume $!G$ (and abandon G^*/M^*)

In theory, the $R^{*±i}$ of Premise 2 were all identified in Topics 1 and 2. In concrete argumentative practice, if the matter is very serious, one can submit G^* to a “second round” of those very same Topics. It is almost certain that the $!R±$ of Premise 3 were not all identified when having G^* and not $!G$ in sight. Hence, one should now go through those two Topics *having !G in sight*. For that we do not need additional Topics or schemes. Thus, the individual reasons $(R^{*±1}, \dots, R^{*±n})$ and in $(!R±1, \dots, !R±n)$ are just those reasons identified, positively in Topic 1 or negatively in Topic 2 for G^* or $!G$.

What is being weighed ($\{R^{*±}\}$ vs. $\{!R±\}$) in Premise 4, when the *relation of preference* is applied?

- 1) All valuations of reasons considered positive vs. all valuations of reasons considered negative. For example, “In this situation, S1, it is preferable to slightly sacrifice the value $V1+$, in order to greatly implement the value $V2+$ ”; or another example, “In the situation, S2, it is preferable to slightly sacrifice $K1+$, to be able (in the future) to enjoy the positive consequence, $K2+$, that will increase the well-being of x in a more sustained way”.
- 2) Ideally, the subjective probabilities (possibly conditional) that x and y believe to be associated to both: (a) the success in realizing G^* or, alternatively, $!G$; and (b) the ‘coming to existence’ of the reasons $\{R^{*±}\}$ and $\{!R±\}$ as a result of the realization of that G^* , or $!G$, respectively. For example: G^* has a 0.9 probability to be realized, its $R+I$ has a 0.7 probability to be implemented if G^* is realized (repeated for each $R+i$) and its $R-I$ has a 0.2 probability of occurring if G^* is realized (repeated for each $R-i$); and a similar reasoning for $!G$ and its associated reasons.
- 3) Most of the time and in alternative to 2), the *subjective ‘plausibilities’* which are equal to 2, but replacing the probabilistic quantification, between 0 and 1, by qualifiers such as “very”, “few”, and so on. We are not often capable of specifying a

probability, even a subjective one, for the success of G^* or of reasons that we believe to be associated to G^* .⁶⁴

4) The *beliefs* regarding the *circumstances* of the situation.

Importing the critical questions from above for the input premises (1-3), let us now see the CQs for premise 4. As noted above, the critical questions for this scheme depart slightly from the usual 1:1 ratio of critical question per term with inferential power. This is because, we believe, the term “preference” entails both aspects of goodness and probability. Thus, the questions here, while focused only on the single term “preference” address both of its component parts.

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 10

CQ1: What makes the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reasons associated with the goals/means, the best for this situation?

Why might the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reason associated with the goals/means not be the best for this situation?

CQ2: What makes the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed the best for this situation?

Why might the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed not be the best for this situation?

In short, these questions are challenging the goodness of the reasons and the accuracy of the probability of success, respectively. These questions are notoriously difficult to formulate because it is at this point where argumentation theory meets choice theory, and both meet moral theory. In light of this intersection, it is now clear how this model extends beyond rationality and into reasonableness as outline in chapter 1.

Stage 3. Topic 4

This stage begins when the objective, G^* , has been rationally founded. We then need to associate one or more means to it. Here is where what has been called instrumental

⁶⁴ How people pick and assign probability and weight to reasons is an interesting and important question, but one which is ultimately a matter for psychologists. Further work could, however, address how one ought to assign probability and weight, but is beyond of the scope of this dissertation.

practical reasoning (Wallace, 2014; Hitchcock, 2011), or “means-ends reasoning” begins. The first question each agent will ask about the means can be vague, of the kind: “Is there any way to realize G^* ?” As an answer to this question, the agent expects that representations of actions he can carry out and whose implementation will bring him closer to the realization of G^* until G^* is realized, will “pop into mind” by a process that he usually does not control well.⁶⁵ The agent might use his experience from similar cases along with other tools, to marshal every means offered to him in any more or less fortuitous, more or less contextual, way. There are also studies pointing out the importance of automated or innate heuristics to “the finding of means”.⁶⁶ Though the creation of reasons is a matter generally investigated within psychology, it also has philosophical implications (Smith, 2009), some of which will be discussed in chapter 6.

From a philosophical point of view, the important work consists in classifying the means into necessary or possible options. Accordingly, the problem of interest to us at Stage 3, Topic 4 is, “Are there means, $M_1, \dots, M_n (M^*)$, to realize G^* which are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for x to achieve G^* ?”. As a matter of fact, this problem includes two questions 1) “are there means that *have* to be used if one intends to realize G^* ?” 2) “are those *all* the means needed to realize G^* ?”

A “Yes” to the first question means that, without the use of those means by x , x is not able to realize G^* . In that case, those means *have to* be used. Imagine a situation where the only way to beat a competitor is to kill them. While perhaps necessary (and say, sufficient) it is not usually something that *should* be done. Here we deal only with what has to be done, with the foresight of knowing that the “should” is addressed shortly (Topics 6+7).

However, a “No” to the first question *does not* necessarily imply that there are no means available to realize G^* . It can also imply that there are several alternative means that x *can choose between*. In that case, there is the problem of knowing if those means are *sufficient*. That is the problem of Topic 5. If they are, and given that x can choose, then the discussion about the “best means” will be opened. That problem will be dealt with in Topic 6 and eventually 7. At present, a “No” to the first question is simply

⁶⁵ This is addressed again in chapter 6. See pg. 141.

⁶⁶ See, e.g., (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)

tantamount to going to Topic 5, where we will deal with the problem of the existence, or not, of sufficient means to realize G*.

Let us now imagine that we answer “Yes” to the question regarding the necessary means (NM). Now we need to know if the set {NM1, ..., NMn} is sufficient to realize G*; or if, *some other means besides* {NM1, ..., NMn} will still be needed. This is the *raison d’être* for our second question in Topic 5: “are the means necessary to realize G* sufficient in conjunction?” If the answer is “Yes”, we go to Topic 6. If we answer “No”, it means that the set {NM1, ..., NMn} has to be *supplemented with more means from which a choice will have to be made*. ‘Supplemented,’ because {NM1, ..., NMn} is not sufficient to realize G* and ‘a choice will have to be made,’ because if there were no choice, the added means would actually be necessary and would belong to {NM1, ..., NMn}. Schematically: to realize G*, x has to use {NM1, ..., NMn} and then still use M1, or M2, or Mn (which don’t belong to {NM1, ..., NMn}), because without at least one of these means, x cannot realize G*.

Schematized, we arrive at:

Argumentative Scheme 11. Necessary Condition Argument⁶⁷
(AS11)

Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*

Premise 2: {NM1, ..., NMn} are necessary means for x realizing G*

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: x has a reason to carry out {NM1, ..., NMn}

There is no CQ for Premise 1 because it works as an assumption, in the sense already explained.

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 11

CQ1: What makes it plausible that {NM1, ..., NMn} are necessary means for x realizing G*?

How could any of these means be suppressed while still allowing for the realization of G*?

⁶⁷ We have distanced ourselves from the “Necessary Condition Schema” (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008, pp. 323-4) for two reasons. The formulation of the “Alternatives Premise” removes the necessity of each of the means by using the expression “at least one of”, making them optional amongst themselves. Also, the formulation of the “Selection Premise” and of the conclusion clearly shows that the scheme’s objective is to select “the best mean” (referred as “Bi”), that will only be dealt with by us in Topics 6+7. These are not meant as criticism to the scheme, but as justification for not considering it primitive and thus not using it here.

Obviously, the argumentation aimed at showing the (defeasible) necessity of any of the means has an extremely high sensitivity to context. Think of the necessary means for becoming President - a detailed discussion of what those means are will involve differing argumentative schemes derived from AS11, in the sense already explained. For that reason, the “course” the argumentation will take in each case is difficult to predict. It also seems reasonable to accept that it is the proponent of the argument instantiating AS11 who has the initial burden of proof of the necessity of {NM1, ..., NMn}, given that it requires the use of those means or the waiving of the realization of G* on reasonable grounds.

Despite this highly contextual character, it is known that an argument in favour of a *necessary* condition (in the present case, a means) ends with a conclusion in the form. “If not {NM1, ..., NMn}, then not G*”, in which the conditional is material, and which is, thus, logically equivalent (by contraposition) to “If G*, then {NM1, ..., MNn}”. Any of those forms of the conclusion can be used to build a *plausible* argument in favour of the necessity of each one of the NMi, an argument whose premises will be, as already stated, strongly dependent on context. To determine if the means are sufficient, we can use the following scheme:

Argumentative Scheme 12. Sufficient Condition Argument⁶⁸
(AS12)

Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*
 Premise 2: If x carries out {NM1, ..., NMn}, then x realizes G*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x has a reason to carry out {NM1, ..., NMn}

There is no CQ for Premise 1 because it works as an assumption in the sense already explained.

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 12

CQ1: How does carrying out all of the necessary means guarantee the realization of G*?

How might G* remain unrealized in spite of carrying out the necessary means?

⁶⁸ See the previous footnote. Similar considerations can be applied here in regard to “22.3. Sufficient Condition Schema”, (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008, pp. 323-4).

The same observations we made regarding the sensitivity to context of AS11 and its CQ are applicable to AS12 and its CQ, therefore we will not repeat them. The same can be said regarding the matter of the burden of proof.

Likewise, and despite this highly contextual character, it is known that an argument in favour of a *sufficient* condition (in the present case, a mean) ends with a conclusion of the form: “If {NM1, ..., NMn}, , then G*”, in which the conditional is material, and which is, thus, logically equivalent (by contraposition) to “If not G*, then not {NM1, ..., NMn}”. Any of these forms of conclusion can be used to build a *plausible* argument in favour of the sufficiency of each means, taken in conjunction - an argument whose premises will be, as already stated, strongly dependent on context.

Finally, it is one thing to recognize necessary and sufficient means, and another to ensure that x has the ability to carry them out. Further, in our view, being the *only* one able to carry out the means can provide an *additional* reason for x to pursue M*. Accordingly, we re-use the scheme for ability from Topic 1 and include it in Topic 4 (and Topic 5 if it should be necessary), in a similar but slightly modified way. The similarity is that, as before, it still only becomes necessary after the other schemes in the Topic have been addressed. In other words, for this Topic, if there are no means then there is no need to consider the agent’s ability to carry out the non-existent means. The modification is that, in this instantiation, ability does not refer to “being in a position” but rather, more directly, to “being able to perform”.⁶⁹

Argumentative Scheme 4b. Argument from Ability
(AS4b)

- Premise 1: M* are necessary and sufficient (or at least sufficient) for G*
- Premise 2: x has the ability to realize M*
- Premise 3: x’s ability to realize M* is a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of G*
- Therefore, plausibly,
- Conclusion: There is a reason for x assuming M*

In this scheme, we go from the existence of a reason to carry out G* (Premise 1) to the existence of a reason for x to carry out M* (Premises 2 and 3). For the same reasons

⁶⁹ As with note 56, changing AS4 to appear in two places is new in this articulation as compared to the forthcoming publication but has been added in consultation with Professor Sàágua who maintains reservations about such a decision.

as presented in Topic 1, if x did not have the ability to realize M*, or if the assumption of G* by x was unnecessary, in the sense that G* would occur anyway even if x would not assume it, then there would not be a reason for x assuming M*.

Also for the same reasons as mentioned with this scheme in Topic 1, there are only two Critical Questions needed for this scheme

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 4b

CQ1: How does x have the ability to realize M*?

What could prevent x from realizing M*?

CQ2: To what extent is the assumption of M* by x a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of M*?

Is there any y (such that $y \neq x$) whose ability to realize M* is a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of M*?

Stage 3. Topic 5

An agent only arrives at this Topic if the prior argumentation leads to a negative answer to the question “Are there means M1, ... Mn which are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for x to achieve G*?” (Topic 4). If the topic reveals that there are necessary but not sufficient conditions, then we are then directed to Topic 5 while bringing with us a set of necessary means (if they were also sufficient we would have gone to Topic 6, without going through Topic 5). However, this difference between having or not having means does not substantially affect the formulation of the scheme, which, in reality, is nothing more than our well-known AS12, now formulated in a more general way: AS12G (here, “G” means “General”).

Argumentative Scheme 12. Sufficient Condition Argument⁷⁰

(AS12G)

Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*

Premise 2: If x carries out {NM1, ..., NMn} and {SM1 or, ..., or SMn}, then x realizes G*

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: x has a reason to carry out {SM1 or, ..., or SMn} (in addition to the reasons x may have to carry out {NM1, ..., NMn})

⁷⁰ See previous footnote.

Since the question “Are there necessary means to realize G*?” would have been positively answered in Topic 4 and since a negative answer would be inconsequential and leave us only to consider the sufficient means, no specific CQ on them is provide here.

The critical question associated to this scheme, then, addresses the sufficient means.

Critical Questions for Argumentative Scheme 12G

CQ1: How does carrying out at least one of SM_i, where SM_i belongs to {SM₁, ..., SM_n} (in addition to {NM₁, ..., NM_n}, if there are such) guarantee the realization of G*?

How might G* remain unrealized in spite of carrying out all of these means?

All of the remarks made in Topic 4 about that version of AS12 are naturally applicable to AS12G and so we will not repeat them.

Further, because any number of new sufficient conditions may have been introduced in this Topic, AS4b applies here as well.

If the concrete argumentation that instantiates AS12G is negatively concluded, that means that there are no sufficient means to realize G* and the reasoning/argumentation stops here.

If the concrete argumentation instantiating AS12G is positively concluded, that means that there is more than one means M₁, ..., M_n (that is sufficient) for x realizing G*. I.e.: there several possible means for x realizing G*. ⁷¹ In this case x may choose the one that he considers *the best means*. As expected, the choice of the best means is a process subjected to argumentation. This takes us to Topics 6 and 7.

Stage 4. Topic 6

Topic 6 involves an argumentative process aimed at founding an answer (positive or negative) to the question: “Are the selected means, M₁, ..., M_n, compatible with the objectives G₁, ..., G_n, that x has or should have?” In this sense, the Argumentative Schemes and respective Critical Questions to be used *are exactly the same as* the ones proposed for Topic 2, as is immediately perceivable if we replace, in the formulation of

⁷¹ Of course, if there are also necessary (but not sufficient) means, it will be necessary to combine them through a distribution of conjunction over disjunction. Thus: {NM₁, ..., NM_n} and SM₁, or {NM₁, ..., NM_n} and ..., or {NM₁, ..., NM_n} and SM_n.

the problem, “the selected means, M1, ..., Mn” by “the objective G*?” (as formulated in Topic 2). In line with what was stated above, we consider that the burden of proof is on the side of the opponent here as well (even if this is x with “second thoughts”, before going into action, on whether he should or should not use the means M1, ..., Mn, to realize G*).

We thus consider the schemes AS5 to AS9 to be reproduced here, along with their respective CQs and what we stated in their regard in Topic 2. The only difference is that the schemes and critical questions here employ the M* side of the G*/M* option where M* indicates “set of selected means”. We now simply need to add an illustration and an explanation.

It suffices to recall our presidential “murderer example” (mentioned in Topic 4): there may not be any incompatibility between the objective “To be President of the Portuguese Republic” and *all the other* objectives that x has or should have. But if, at a given time, the means chosen by x to realize this objective is “To get his most direct rival candidate killed”, then this means will surely clash, no matter how efficient it is, with *several other* objectives or aims x has or *should* have.

Explanation: Three cases to be considered.

Case 1. If, among M1, ..., Mn, only necessary means are to be found (thus resulting from a triple affirmative answer to the questions constituting the problem of Topic 4), then the conclusion that one of those means is incompatible with G1, ..., Gn, immediately leads us to the argumentative process taking place in Topic 7.

Case 2. If, among M1, ..., Mn, several sufficient means are to be found (thus resulting from a list of alternative means corresponding to the affirmative answer to the question of Topic 5), then if *some* of those alternative means, *but not all*, are considered incompatible with G1, ..., Gn, through the argumentative process taking place in Topic 6, that may permit us to select only the compatible ones (given that, hypothetically, any one of them is sufficient to realize G*) which immediately leads us to Stage 5 and a decision to act.

Case 3. In the case of the sufficient means, only if all of them (that is, all possible means) are considered incompatible with G1, ..., Gn, will we be directed to the argumentative process of Topic 7.

Also in regard to Topic 6, it will be possible to try a procedure of negotiation as the one described in the Excursus and associated with AS9. With this supplementary

proviso: the potential modifications to be introduced into M_1, \dots, M_n , cannot remove the effectiveness of any of these means making them *no longer sufficient* to realize G^* .

Stage 4. Topic 7

Topic 7 involves an argumentative process aiming at founding a (positive or negative) answer to the question: “Are the means $M_1 \dots M_m$, preferable to the goals $!G_1, \dots !G_n$, with which they are incompatible?”. AS10 (and variants) with their respective Critical Questions can also be used here, as can be immediately perceived if we replace the occurrences of “ M_1, \dots, M_n ” by “ G^* ” in the formulation of the problem. Likewise, the comments we associated to the presentation of AS10 and its CQ in Topic 3 are applicable here with the same caveat that the M^* option is to be used in this Stage. Hence, nothing else needs to be added at this time.

Stage 5. Decision

In Stage 5, the final stage, there is not exactly a problem to be dealt with and to be answered, so this stage does not contain a Topic. It is only the matter of capitalizing on the reasoning process and on the argumentative course realized in the previous Topics, whether one has gone by all the topics or just some of them. Obviously, the process may be stopped at any time, simply by answering “No” to Topic 1, or from then on answering “No” two consecutive times. If that happens, the agent may decide either not to act, or to make an appropriate modification to the goal or means (depending on where the process was stopped) and begin again with the modification in place. If the process is not stopped, however, and we have arrived at Stage 5, then it is now just the matter of making a decision (practical reasoning) or recommending the action (practical argumentation) founded on all the process, or courses, which started at Topic 1. Therefore, if we consider Γ as the best formulation of the argumentative thread that started at Topic 1 and ended in Stage 5, we can propose:

- For practical reasoning: “Given that I accept Γ , I justifiably (do not) intend to carry out M_1, \dots, M_n , to realize G^* ”.
- For practical argumentation: Γ being given, the recommendation that x carries out M_1, \dots, M_n to realize G^* is (not) justified”.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has used insights from chapter 2 along with the distinctions made in chapter 3 to inform the construction of a new integrated model for practical reasoning and argumentation. Because of the density of the chapter I will here risk repetition for the sake of clarity and provide a summary of the model as a whole.

Imagining a human agent in any given circumstance, the model begins by asking if the agent has a reason to alter the current state of the world. With the aim of providing a model extending beyond mere instrumental reasoning, the model includes consideration of the motivations for aiming at a goal as the first step in explicit practical reasoning and argumentation.

The complete model is composed of five stages: Stage one addresses the agent's motivation for action; Stage two is concerned with the proposed goal and other goals; Stage three concerns available means for achieving the proposed goal; Stage four deals with the relation between the means and other goals; and Stage five is simply the decision to act or not. If the agent progresses through all five Stages, they will have reasonable grounds for deciding to act. If they are stopped at any stage, they will then have reasonable grounds for not acting.

In order to licence moving from one Stage to the next, the agent must answer one or two "Yes" or "No" Topic questions. In any case, an affirmative answer results in a "green light" to move to the next Stage. In some cases, a negative answer or "red light" will lead to another Topic and thus a second chance to move to the next Stage. In other cases, a negative answer leads straight to a conclusion not to act.

Each Topic questions an aspect of the general theme of the Stage. Answering "Yes" or "No" to the Topics is not, however, based merely on the free thinking or intuitions of the agent. In order to reasonably answer the Topic questions, the agent must have reasons supporting their answer. Those reasons can be specified using an appropriate argument scheme. The model indicates what we consider to be the basic, necessary schemes to justify an answer to each one of the Topics, though in practice an agent may of course use schemes over and above the provided list.

Importantly, the reasons which emerge from the schemes are to be considered *pro tanto*, or contributory reasons, in the way that Jonathan Dancy (2004) has characterized them. This consideration is important because of two major implications it carries through the reasoning. First, it means a reason on one side is not, by itself, enough to licence

moving to a conclusion to act or not act. The questions and schemes are set up in oppositional fashion so that contributing reasons from both sides can be weighed. For example, an agent using the schemes associated with Topic 1 could come up with four reasons to pursue the goal. Rather than jumping straight to a conclusion to pursue it, however, Topic 2 is aimed at finding reasons not to pursue it. Only after both reasons for and reasons against have been addressed is the agent free to look for means.

Second, reasons being contributory also means that one reason may outweigh all opposing reasons. In other words, the number of reasons and weight provided to one side of the “Yes” or “No” answer are not in a strict relationship. Thus, even though there may be four reasons for accepting the proposed means and one reason against, that one reason may outweigh the other four.

At the end of chapter 2 I promised to address three topics – conceptual distinctions, the place and impact of value considerations, and the critical creative capacity. Thus far, we have only addressed the first in detail. The latter two will be addressed in the next two chapters respectively. To do so, the next chapter will again employ Breivik’s reasoning, but this time through the model just presented. Using this application will help highlight how I see the role of moral values functioning in and impacting practical reasoning evaluation and will also allow a contrast to be drawn with chapter 2 to see if the new model constitutes an improvement.

5. A DECLARATION OF REASONABLENESS

Moral action is rational action, because the moral law is a law of reason

~ C.M. Korsgaard

Innocent people will die, in the thousands. But it is still better than the alternative; millions of dead Europeans, which is the worst case phase 3 scenario.

~ Anders Behring Breivik

5.1. Introduction

Anders Behring Breivik titled his compendium, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*. Since this chapter will attempt to get at ways to identify Breivik's unreasonableness, I thought it fitting to title the chapter in a similar style. As a consequence of this style, however, the title is now ambiguous and I would like to clarify before proceeding. On one reading, the title indicates that what follows is a declaration - of what it is to be reasonable. On another reading, the title indicates that what will be discussed within the chapter are notions involved in declaring something reasonable. I only intend to proceed by way of this latter interpretation.

In this light the chapter aims to accomplish two interrelated tasks. First, it aims to illustrate the difference between the new model presented in the last chapter and the Fairclough and Fairclough model which was presented in chapter 2. Second, the chapter aims to develop a discussion of the importance that moral content has on full – rather than merely instrumental - evaluations of practical reasonableness.

To accomplish these tasks I begin by providing a critique of Fairclough and Fairclough's discussion of values. Following this discussion, I will explain how the model presented in chapter 4 has been designed to avoid some of the problems Fairclough and Fairclough's model encounters. To see if the new model has been strengthened as a result of not only carefully considering the role of values, but also addressing the other ideas presented thus far, I will apply it to Breivik's case in the same way as was conducted in chapter 2. After the application I will use a short discussion of what seems to me, from the outside, to have gone wrong with his argumentation to motivate a broad survey of the potential impact of differing moral theories on Breivik's example. The penultimate section will address some of the considerations pertinent to the possibility of a single

moral authority on which to ground practical reasoning and argumentation and the concluding section will summarize the results of the chapter.

5.2. Fairclough and Fairclough's discussion of values in practical reasoning

5.2.1. A Tension

As was pointed out in chapter 2, Fairclough and Fairclough are clear that they reject moral relativism while embracing value pluralism. They embrace value pluralism to allow space for arguers to reasonably “agree-to-disagree” about some issues. Reasonable disagreement, they claim, results from “conflicting but reasonable values and goals or by different rankings of the same values and goals” (2012, 60). They are also clear, however, that for them there are unreasonable value disagreements and that some value differences are unreasonable on a deep, non-instrumental level: “a racist argument about how to deal politically with an ethnic minority can be conclusively rejected by questioning its various premises, and its proponent cannot defend himself by invoking value pluralism or his legitimate right to differ” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 59, see also, p. 32).

To explain the difference between reasonable and unreasonable values, they first cite a condition of mutual respect necessary for ‘deliberative disagreements’; reasonable disagreements maintain mutual respect, whereas “[i]f the disagreement were over a proposal to legitimize discrimination against blacks or women, then the same obligation of mutual respect would not arise, and to deliberate over the matter would be inappropriate” (p. 32). In another place they ask “which values can be argumentatively successfully defended in a process of critical discussion/ deliberation?” (p. 60) Appealing to the grounds of critical discourse analysis, their primary areas of expertise, Fairclough and Fairclough state that they

want to ground CDA normatively in a set of values that closely approximate a list of universal human rights, or duties/ obligations that we have towards our fellow beings (rights and duties being two sides of the same coin), and more precisely in a list of human capabilities that define a concept of human flourishing or well-being, such as those envisaged by the 'capabilities' approach in ethics and those versions of social theory inspired by the capabilities approach. (ibid)

This capabilities approach identifies and defends a list of central human capabilities aimed at providing “philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations,

as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity requires” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 5). Accordingly, in the same spirit as Nussbaum, Fairclough and Fairclough argue that “[n]ot any [value] difference should be given recognition: in particular those that infringe human rights, hinder human capabilities or violate fundamental duties we have towards each other should not be among those that can ground good practical arguments” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 60).

Adopting this approach to values amounts to allowing value pluralism within limits.⁷² Reasonable value pluralism then, on this view, seems to allow for any value *within the boundaries* of the capabilities approach to be 1) selected and 2) ranked in anyway the agent sees fit. An Other might disagree with the selection of the value or its ranking, but it would not require the agent to change their view, and the disagreement could be left stagnant as a “reasonable disagreement”.

Somewhat paradoxically, however, Fairclough and Fairclough later state that “values are not beyond the scope of reason, they can be argued about as they are not merely subjective preferences [...]. Reasoning about values, on the view we propose, [...] is grounded in a conception of human well-being: it is (partly) in relation to how the values that underlie the arguments promote or hinder human well-being that those arguments can be evaluated as reasonable” (2012, p. 75). It seems here that Fairclough and Fairclough want to have their cake and eat it too.

Given that they promote the pragma-dialectical notion of reasonableness and also take over its view of argumentation as the reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion (p. 63), it is not clear how Fairclough and Fairclough can allow for a reasonable disagreement. The pragma-dialectical model does not allow for disagreement to be *reasonably* maintained if the model is followed correctly and in full. On the contrary, the point of the model is that if the procedure and rules are followed, the disagreement is reasonably resolved. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are clear: “[t]he difference of opinion can only be considered to be resolved if the parties are, concerning each component of the difference of opinion, in agreement that the protagonist’s standpoint is acceptable and the antagonist’s doubt must be retracted, or that the standpoint of the

⁷² It should be noted that Nussbaum makes an explicit defence of universal values which is only “sensitive to pluralism” (p. 8) and is “designed to leave room for a reasonable pluralism in specification” (p. 77). She also argues that “Pluralism and respect for difference are themselves universal values” (32) but does not consider herself a value pluralist.

protagonist must be retracted” (2004, 61). They do not say that the discussants can reasonably agree-to-disagree. If the procedure and rules are followed, yet one party or another refuses to accept the conclusion, they do so at the expense of being unreasonable, which is explicated through the concept of argumentative fallacy (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 154-55, 173). As such, wanting to employ an argumentative ideal which does not allow for reasonably maintained disagreement and a moral philosophy which does, is incoherent.

For example, imagine a discussion where person A argues that a law should be passed which *sacrifices* some liberty for the sake of security. They argue against person B who maintains the standpoint that the law should not be passed in order to *prioritize* the value of liberty over security. In such a case we can grant that both liberty and security promote human capabilities and are within the boundaries of universal human rights, but that they are in conflict. Accordingly, this could be a reasonable disagreement for Fairclough and Fairclough given they are both reasonable but conflicting values. If, however, values are not beyond the scope of reason and can be argued about, person A and B could ideally follow the pragma-dialectical procedure to resolve this mixed difference of opinion. Person A could propose the standpoint that security and liberty ought to be ranked 1 and 2 respectively, while person B could posit the opposite. Ideally, following the pragma-dialectical procedure would then result in one of the parties retracting their original standpoint. In my view, it is exactly these tough cases where argumentation is most valuable. We don't need argumentation as much for cases clearly unreasonable such as between a democrat and a Nazi – we need argumentation to resolve the differences of opinion of seemingly equal differences of opinion. Argumentation draws out the best available contemporary reasons to side one way or another in these hard cases. If argumentation theory must remain silent on these issues, it loses much of its worth.

Fairclough and Fairclough are right when they point out that “[c]ertainly, we do not claim (and neither does pragma-dialectics) that disagreements are always resolved in practice” (2012, p. 63). If their claim is that in practice people tend to agree-to-disagree, I agree fully. If, on the other hand, the claim is that a model for practical argumentation should allow for the maintenance of disagreement, I do not agree. Different argumentation would be needed to provide justification for why a model of practical argumentation should not end conclude on one side on an outside third option such as a compromise. Person A may not like the fact that he loses the argument regarding the

prioritization of liberty over security, but when faced with the better reasons, the reasonable thing to do is accept the conclusion. If the action can be postponed, and a later instance of argumentation can reverse the decision, then so be it. If not, however, then the force of the better argument should prevail.

Thus, there seems to be two options to resolve this tension – either 1) exclude values as arguable subjects, thereby allowing the maintenance of disagreement or 2) remove the specification of a moral view from the model and allow value disagreements to be argued about and resolved. In short, an ideal model for resolving disagreement cannot be compatible with an ideal model for sustaining disagreement.

5.2.2. *Questions, Consequences, and Values*

Even if we were to bracket this tension, however, and follow Fairclough and Fairclough in sticking to maintaining value pluralism within limits, then that limit should at least be explicit somewhere in the model – most likely in the critical questions. If values which contravene the capabilities approach are a clear indication of being unreasonable, then a critical question ensuring that the values used in the argumentation fit within the capabilities approach is essential. A question such as “How do the values that underlie the action promote human capabilities? How could the values diminish human capabilities?” could work. Or, if wanting to keep the “Yes” or “No” approach, directly asking “Do(es) the value(s) that underlies the action contravene the capabilities approach/violate any human rights?” would address the concern. Instead, the new value questions they propose are vaguer. To refresh, they ask:

- Are the values that underlie the action rationally acceptable? (Acceptable Value Question)
- Should the agent consider other values? (Other Values Question)
- Do the stated values conflict with other values of the agent? (Agent's Multiple Values Question) (2012, p. 67).

Because we have read their work, we know that for Fairclough and Fairclough values are only rationally acceptable if they fit within the capabilities approach. Without being aware of this stipulation, however, a reasoner attempting to use the model might easily say “Yes” based on a different moral (or following the wording of the question, rational) perspective. If the first question really means, “Are the values that underlie the action consistent with human rights and the capabilities approach” I think it would be better to ask that. Indeed, if they had asked that question, Breivik might not have been

able to answer positively and at the least would have had a significantly harder time passing through their model.

One caveat is important here. Focusing on “the values that underlie the action”, as worded, is not fully consistent with the model they provide. In the model, Fairclough and Fairclough locate values as supporting the goal, not the claim for action. So while technically the values underlie the action, they are a step removed. I do not mean to split hairs here. On the contrary, their placement of values under the goal had real consequences for the modeling of Breivik’s argumentation. This is why in Chapter 2 Breivik appealed to logic and rationality as well as cultural preservation as values which support the goal of spreading the compendium. When answering the critical question regarding the rational acceptability of the values, given that these are the only values in the model, they were the values he addressed. In the model there is nowhere to locate values directly supporting the claim for action or the means on which the claim is based.

It should also be noted that Fairclough and Fairclough do not provide a defense of why the capabilities approach is the best or only moral/ethical theory to be paired with good practical argumentation: What about all the other available theories? And what if a situation arises where the capabilities approach does not provide adequate, appropriate, or sufficient insight? Such a situation is likely, especially since the capabilities approach has been designed primarily for policy making and constitutional insight on a *societal* level and does not specifically address how an *individual* ought to act (Nussbaum, 2000, p. xiii, 5; Felice, 2001, p. 201; Robeyns, 2006, pp. 360-61; 2011). Thus, while using the capabilities approach could have stopped Breivik from being able to conclude that his decision to perform a deadly shock attack was reasonable (if the values underlying the action were explicit and explicitly questioned), it might not be used so clearly in every case.

For example, the capabilities approach does not say anything (that I have been able to find at least) about situations of individual or societal self-defence.⁷³ Interestingly, a right to self-defence is also not to be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>). Intuitively, under normal conditions, killing is wrong since it removes the capability of living – “Life” being Nussbaum’s

⁷³ Though, see Dogett (2011) for a useful overview of other moral positions in relation to the self-defence question.

appropriately first identified capability (for the full list, see, Nussbaum 2000, pp. 78-80; 2011, pp. 33-34). In a situation of self-defence, things quickly become less clear in light of the conflict between ensuring the capability of living for both you and your attacker.

They become even more complicated when one has to define when a situation of self-defence has legitimately arisen. One of Breivik's main appeals was to the legitimacy of defending/preserving himself and European culture from the attack he thinks it to be under from Islam. If the capabilities approach and universal human rights do not provide insight into such a situation, we can question the appropriateness of applying such a moral standard to the case.

One further confusion arises when considering how adamant Fairclough and Fairclough are regarding their view that the additional critical questions they propose specifically focused on values, "are only important to the extent that they can be connected to the question about consequences" (2012, p. 67). To recall, they adopt the question regarding consequences from Walton. The question asks, "What negative consequences of the action that might have even greater negative value than the positive value of *G* should be taken into account? (cited in Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 62). In a number of places they highlight the supreme importance of the consideration of consequences for evaluating practical argumentation. For instance: "Basically, we suggest, questioning whether the action being proposed will have *negative consequences* that will undermine the stated goal (or other goals the agent wants to pursue, or other agents' goals) is the only really interesting critical question, as it is the only one that can rebut the argument's claim (and also defeat the argument's validity)" (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, pp. 63-64). They also explain:

Critical questions that can rebut the claim. These focus primarily, we suggest, on the *consequences* of action, consequences that undermine the stated goal of the action or other goals that the agent is or ought to be committed to (such as the legitimate goals of other agents). In light of these consequences, it is not the original proposal for action that should be adopted but its opposite. Negative consequences of this sort are part of a counter-argument supporting a counter-claim. We suggest that, from the point of view of the evaluation of the rationality of action, these are in fact the only interesting questions: if an action undermines the goal of action, then it should not be performed. Similarly, if an action leads to the goal stated in the goal premise (is sufficient) but has negative consequences on *other* goals that are important to the agent or to other agents, then again it might be wise not to go ahead with the action. (p. 66)

First, adopting Walton's question does not address all of the grounds they wish to cover – i.e., addressing other goals the agent wants to pursue, or other agents' goals – and

as such a new question including these aspects would be better. Imagining such a question, however, if the consequences are really the important point and questions of value are only to be subsumed under questions of consequence, we have more than a strong hint that it is really a consequentialist ethic that is at play here rather than a focus on rights. Somewhat oddly again, however, later in the book Fairclough and Fairclough add a footnote stating:

In Fairclough and Fairclough (2011 a) we discussed [negative consequences being able to rebut the claim for action] in terms of distinct cost-benefit premise. So called cost-benefit and efficiency premises are suggested by Bowell and Kemp (2005: 203-204) as necessary in order to make the argument valid. The conclusion of a practical argument will follow from the premises if the costs do not outweigh the benefits and if the proposed action is the most economical or efficient way of bringing about the goal. Not all practical arguments can be discussed in such consequentialist, utilitarian terms. In our view, considerations having to do with moral values, duties, rights, obligations, enter the argument as external constraints (institutional facts) *and they may override any cost-benefit or efficiency calculation*. This is why the framework we present here is different. (2012, p. 126 n.2 (p. 250) emphasis mine)

Admitting that value considerations may over-ride consequentialist considerations seems directly at odds with their earlier claim that value questions “are only important to the extent that they can be connected to the question about consequences”. There are, then, three value perspectives put forward by Fairclough and Fairclough - capabilities/universal rights, value pluralism, and consequentialism - but how they work together or separately and which takes priority is far from clear. By and large, however, they emphasize consequences. While I agree that considering the consequences of the action is important, I would not, however, prioritize it over other considerations.

Consider an example where my claim for action is to steal \$100 dollars from a rich person by slipping it out of her pocket.⁷⁴ The circumstances are that I am poor and could use the money and the rich person is so rich that, if not alerted to my sleight of hand, she would not even notice the money was gone. In this situation my capabilities are greatly improved and the rich person’s are not diminished at all. There is an overall happiness increase and nary a negative consequence to be found. In such a case there still could be a moral reason not to perform the action which is not based on the consequences of the action or the capabilities perspective. As such, separating value questions and consequences seems to be a better approach as we have done in the new model.

⁷⁴ Michael Sandel also points out this objection. See (Sandel, 2009, p. 59).

5.2.3. Summary of the Problems

There seem to be two main problems with Fairclough and Fairclough's discussion of values in practical reasoning and argumentation. First, they want to allow for reasonable disagreement while also maintaining the view that there exists a procedure for the resolution of a difference of opinion. Second, they want to include a moral perspective into the evaluation of practical reasoning but which perspective is unclear and they hesitate to actually do so when providing the model and associated critical questions.

I think that the work they have done captures the way practical argumentation often occurs in the world. I agree that people often agree-to-disagree and that in many situations it is wise to do so. I also sympathize with the capabilities approach for a number of reasons which, unfortunately, are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Further, I can also understand wanting to take the consequences of an action seriously when evaluating practical reasoning and argumentation. I do not, however, think that all of these factors ought to be included in a *model* for practical reasoning and argumentation and the ones that should, are also best included in a different way. The explanation regarding these differences, via a discussion of the place and content of values in the newly presented model, is the topic to which we now turn.

5.3. Moral Values in the New Model for Practical Reasoning and Argumentation

I said above that there seem to be two options to resolve the tension in Fairclough and Fairclough's account – either 1) exclude values as arguable subjects or 2) remove the specification of a moral view from the model and allow values to be argued about. The solution adopted in the new model for practical reasoning and argumentation takes the second route.

In the new model, moral considerations appear in argumentation schemes 2, 5-8, and 10. Since, however, by design, argumentation scheme 10 (AS10) takes schemes 1-8 into account by calling for an “all things considered” comparison, it is the scheme most important for practical reasoning overall (and the most difficult to formulate/capture!).

First, regarding the place of moral considerations, recall that argumentation schemes 4-10 each appear in two places and that AS10 is the only scheme associated with Topics 3 and 7. Appearing in these two topics means the scheme has two different instantiations – one for the goal and one for the means. This is the first noticeable

difference concerning values between the new model and Fairclough and Fairclough's (and Walton's) model. In the latter, values are envisioned as underlying the goal, as they also are here. However, importantly, value considerations also need to be included when considering the means. In Breivik's case, this is crucially important. There may be nothing wrong with valuing logic and cultural preservation - the values supporting the goal of spreading the compendium. The value allowing murder which underlies the means for achieving cultural preservation, is however, in the present case, devastatingly problematic.

As for the content of the moral considerations involved, as mentioned, no moral content is specified in the new model. Rather than specifying a threshold of morality which cannot be crossed – universal human rights or otherwise - and asking reason to work within it, the new model puts all of the pressure on reason not to end up using an immoral view.

The idea behind AS10 is that the arguer has to pick between the option (goal or means) they are pursuing and other options (identified earlier in prior argumentation schemes). Thus, the Topic question asks if the goal/means are preferable to the alternatives. Preference has been identified as involving two key considerations – the value/goodness of the choice and the probability of its successful completion. Accordingly, the two critical questions for the scheme ask about exactly those topics: the first questions the value and the second questions the probability.


However, since the model is not inspired by a specific moral theory, there is no need for a question which asks if such a theory has been contravened. As such, the arguer can bring any value to the argumentation. The idea is that when the choice of pursuing the goal/mean(s) or alternative(s) was made, the options were measured against some “covering value” (Chang, 1998, p. 5). This covering value functions as a standard against which to compare the ‘betterness’ of the proposal vs. its alternatives. The covering value may have been human capability, but it may not. Since so far no clear moral authority has been universally agreed upon, the model proceeds on the assumption that the best a reasonable person can do is argue for the selection of the standard they have employed. As such, the critical question regarding values asks the agent to explain what makes the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reasons associated with the goals/means, the best standard(s) for the situation? And why might the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reason associated with the goals/means not be the best for the situation? If in the situation the capabilities approach is the best for the situation (which in many cases it surely could

be) then that can be defended in answering the critical questions. If in some situation it might not be, however, then that can also come through in the answers to the critical questions and an alternate moral theory can be used and justified. To use Fairclough and Fairclough’s example of racism, if a racist brings a racist standard to the argumentation, the new model allows for an alternative to show itself superior through the critical questioning of the use of the racist standard. The model does not rule out the standard *prima facie* by dictate, but places trust in the power of argumentation to show it unworthy.

Given this explanation of how the new model does not discriminate regarding moral content, let us see how it does dealing with the argumentation provided by Anders Behring Breivik.

5.4. Applying the New Model to Breivik’s Argumentation

Figure 5-1 The New Model Applied to Breivik's Argumentation



TOPIC 1: Do I or should I have (at least) one reason to aim at *spreading the compendium [to contribute to consolidation/recruitment of people to fight against the Islamisation of Europe]*?⁷⁵

Reason 1 - AS1. Assumption of Objectives by Teleology

Premise 1: I have *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country* as a finality.

Premise 2: *Spreading the compendium* belongs to *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country*.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

CQs for AS1

CQ1: How does *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country* really correspond to my finality?

A: *That's not the kind of person I used to be, but it's the type of person I have become.*

How can *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country* not correspond to my finality?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: How is *spreading the compendium* really a particular case of *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country*?

A: *Spreading the compendium* is really a particular case of *loving the country* because it contributes to preventing its demise.

How could *spreading the compendium* not be a particular case of *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country*?

A: [N/A]

Reason 2 - AS2. Argument from Positive Values

Premise 1: *Cultural preservation/self defense* is a positive value.

Premise 2: *Cultural preservation/self defense* values *spreading the compendium*.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

CQs for AS2

⁷⁵ As with the application conducted in chapter 2, in the following application italicised words and phrases indicate words taken directly from Breivik. Otherwise, I have presented a summary grounded in his words. Appendix B contains all of the direct quotes used to justify the application of his reasoning to this model.

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a positive value to Cultural preservation/self defense?

A: *Defending your people and culture from genocide is the most basic and recognised human right.*

What would be a reason for not attributing a positive value to Cultural preservation/self defense?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What is the reason for the positive valuation of spreading the compendium by Cultural preservation/self defense?

A: *By marketing and distributing the compendium: 2083, and similar works, we hope to create more awareness, create reference points and thus contribute to consolidate and further our cause.*

What would be a reason for spreading the compendium not to be positively valued by Cultural preservation/self defense?

A: [N/A]

Reason 3 - AS2. Argument from Positive Values

Premise 1: “Logic” and rationalist thought is a positive value.

Premise 2: “Logic” and rationalist thought value spreading the compendium.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

CQs for AS2

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a positive value to “Logic” and rationalist thought?

A: [N/A]

What would be a reason for not attributing a positive value to “Logic” and rationalist thought?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What is the reason for the positive valuation of spreading the compendium by “Logic” and rationalist thought?

A: *Fighting for your people’s survival, when threatened, is the most logical thing to do to.*

What would be a reason for spreading the compendium not to be positively valued by “Logic” and rationalist thought?

A: [N/A]

Reason 4 - AS3. Argument from Positive Consequences

Premise 1: If *spreading the compendium* is realized by me, then more people will join our cause.

Premise 2: More people joining our cause is to be valued positively.
Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

QCs for AS3

CQ1: What makes it plausible that spreading the compendium has more people joining the cause as a consequence?

A: The compendium will be accessible and is designed to convince by having them *fully understand the situation* and *if you read it from the first word to the end, you will be radicalized*.

How could spreading the compendium not have more people joining the cause as a consequence?

A: Readers could disagree with my reasons or my means.

CQ2: Why should more people joining the cause be positively valued?

A: More people joining our cause should be positively valued because it promotes cultural preservation and inhibits the impending genocide of European people and culture.

How could more people joining the cause not be positively valued?

A: [N/A]

Reason 5 - AS4a. Argument from Ability

Premise 1: *Spreading the compendium* should be positively valued.

Premise 2: I have the ability to spread the compendium.

Premise 3: My ability to realize spreading the compendium is necessary condition for the realization of spreading the compendium.

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is a reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

QCs for AS4

CQ1: How do I have the ability to spread the compendium?

A: I wrote it and am the only one in possession of it.⁷⁶

What could prevent me from spreading the compendium?

A: I could die or be arrested during preparations.

Having provided five reasons to support continuing reasoning toward his goal, Breivik can now address Topic 2 – reasons against pursuing his goal.

TOPIC 2: Is *spreading the compendium* compatible with other goals I have or should have?

Reason 1 - AS5a. Argument from Negative Values

Premise 1: Fascism is a negative value.

Premise 2: Fascism negatively values *spreading the compendium*.

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is a reason for me not assuming *spreading the compendium*.

CQs for AS5

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a negative value to fascism?

A: *A fascist opposes the democratical concept altogether and wants a permanent one party state.*

How could fascism not have a negative value?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What is the reason for the negative valuation of spreading the compendium by fascism?

A: The compendium calls for a suspension of the constitution so spreading it promotes a fascist characteristic.

How could spreading the compendium not be negatively valued by fascism?

A: *The constitution will only be suspended for a limited time, until we have had the opportunity to implement at least some of our principles. These principles can't even be openly discussed at this point in time due to the paralyzing effects of political correctness. After a certain period, the constitution and the rule of democracy will again become the primary standard.*

⁷⁶ Recall that this scheme for ability is focused on being “in a position”. I have inserted this answer based on the facts rather than Breivik’s own words because, given they are the facts, Breivik never says this explicitly.

Reason 2 - AS7a. Argument from Negative Consequences

Premise 1: If I spread the compendium I will have to leave my old life, my friends, behind.

Premise 2: Leaving my old life and friends behind are to be negatively valued.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for me not assuming spreading the compendium.

CQs for AS7a

CQ1: What makes it plausible that spreading the compendium has leaving my old life and friends behind as consequences?

A: There are only two logical steps for people my age; have as many children as possible and prepare for Phase 2 or 3 or fight now in Phase 1. I chose the latter.

How could spreading the compendium not have leaving my old life and friends behind as consequences?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: Why should leaving my old life and friends behind be negatively valued?

A: [N/A]

How could leaving my old life and friends behind not be negatively valued?

A: By choosing to have children and keep my old life, in other words, by being a silent bystander to this I will be as guilty as our corrupt elites.

With two reasons against pursuing his goal and thus a conflict between Topics 1 and 2, Breivik must address the question posed in Topic 3 – choosing the proposed goal or the alternatives.

TOPIC 3: Is spreading the compendium preferable to the alternatives with which it is incompatible?

Reason 1 - AS10a.1. Argument Based on Rational Preference

Premise 1: The alternatives and *spreading the compendium* are contradictory.

Premise 2: Expressing *my love for my own people and country*, promoting the values of cultural preservation/self defense and *logical and rationalist thought*, causing more people to join the cultural preservation mission, along with being the only one with the ability to do so are reasons in support of aiming at *spreading the compendium*.

Premise 3: Not promoting fascism and not *leaving my old life behind* count for alternatives.

Premise 4: The reasons for spreading the compendium are preferable to the reasons for not spreading the compendium.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: I should spread the compendium and abandon the alternatives.

CQs for AS10

CQ1: What makes the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reasons associated with the goals, the best for this situation?

A: It is a duty to sacrifice current personal possibilities for the sake of future generations of Europeans. Following duty is logical and will lead to the best long term outcome instead of short term pleasure.

Why might the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reason associated with the goals not be the best for this situation?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What makes the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed the best for this situation?

A: I have taken three years to complete a compendium that *if you read it from the first word to the end, you will be radicalized.*

Why might the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed not be the best for this situation?

A: [N/A]

Having reasoned through acceptance of the goal, Breivik can now address his proposed means. He does so through addressing Topic 4. Due to the fact that he sees his means and necessary and sufficient, he answers Topic 4 with a “Yes”.

Topic 4: Are there means which are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for me to spread the compendium?

Reason 1 - AS11. Necessary Condition Argument

Premise 1: I have the objective of *spreading the compendium*.

Premise 2: *Distributing*⁷⁷ *the compendium* and performing a *deadly shock attack* are necessary for me to *spread the compendium*.

⁷⁷ As also occurred in chapter 2, in the application to this model a distinction between “spreading the compendium” and “distributing the compendium” needs to be made. By “spreading” Breivik means

Therefore, plausibly
Conclusion: I have a reason to *distribute the compendium* and carry out a *deadly shock attack*.

CQ for AS11

CQ1: What makes it plausible that distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack are necessary means for me to realize spreading the compendium?

A: *Unfortunately, spectacular operations like these are the only way to be heard. Everything else we have tried has failed and yielded nothing. The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard.* Distributing the compendium is necessary so people have it and performing the shock attack is necessary so people read it.

How could any of these means be suppressed while still allowing for the realization of spreading the compendium?

A: [N/A]

Reason 2 - AS12. Sufficient Condition Argument

Premise 1: I have the objective of *spreading the compendium*.

Premise 2: If I carry out *distributing the compendium* and carrying out *the deadly shock attack*, I will spread the compendium.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: I have a reason to *distribute the compendium* and carry out a *deadly shock attack*.

CQ for AS12

CQ1: How does carrying out all of the necessary means guarantee the realization of spreading the compendium?

A: Distributing the compendium is not enough because people might not read it. Performing the deadly shock attack means that people will have it and read it.

How might the compendium remain unspread in spite of carrying out the necessary means?

A: [N/A]

Reason 3 - AS4b. Argument from Ability

Premise 1: Distributing the compendium and performing a *deadly shock attack* are necessary and sufficient for *spreading the compendium*.

having people encounter the message and content of the compendium. This is more involved than merely having it in their possession, which is what "distributing" accounts for.

Premise 2: I have the ability to distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack.

Premise 3: My ability to distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack are necessary conditions for their performance.

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is a reason for me to assume *distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack*.

QCs for AS4

CQ1: How do I have the ability to distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack?

A: I can conduct *email farming* and email the compendium for distribution. As for performing the deadly shock attack, *I have an extremely strong psyche (stronger than anyone I have ever known) and my dehumanization process started already when I wrote the military section of the compendium in 2009... or already in 2002, when I committed to a life of suffering.*

What could prevent me from distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack?

A: *I am seriously contemplating that it is perhaps biologically impossible to survive the mental, perhaps coupled with physical torture, I will be facing without completely breaking down on a psychological level.*

CQ2: To what extent is the assumption of distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack by me a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack?

A: Shock attacks are the only means for spreading the compendium, and I am the only person who can carry out a shock attack, so it is a fully necessary means.

Who else is there whose ability to distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack is a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack?

A: No one.

Since he sees the means as necessary and sufficient and has the ability to perform them, he can skip Topic 5 and proceed to check the compatibility of the means with the goals he has or should have, which is done through providing an answer to Topic 6.

TOPIC 6: Is *distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack* compatible with the alternatives that I have or should have?

Reason 1 - AS5b. Argument from Negative Values

Premise 1: Terrorism/violence is a negative value.

Premise 2: Terrorism/violence negatively values carrying out a *deadly shock attack*.

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is a reason for me not distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack.

CQs for AS5b

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a negative value to terrorism/violence?

A: [N/A]

How could terrorism/violence not have a negative value?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What is the reason for the negative valuation of distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack by terrorism/violence?

A: *Using terror you are undermining your own struggle and hurting the nationalist cause.*

How could distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack not be negatively valued by terrorism/violence?

A: By recognizing there are no alternatives.

Reason 2 - AS7b. Argument from Negative Consequences

Premise 1: If distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack are realized by me, *innocent civilians will die*.

Premise 2: *Innocent civilians dying* is to be negatively valued.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for me not to assume distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack.

CQs for AS7b

CQ1: What makes it plausible that distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack has innocent civilians dying as consequences?

A: *In war there are always civilian casualties, unfortunately.*

How could distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack not have innocent civilians dying?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: Why should innocent civilians dying be negatively valued?

A: Because *some of these* [civilians] *are likely to be a part of your own broader "base"*.

How could innocent civilians dying not be negatively valued?

A: [N/A]

Reason 3 - AS7b. Argument from Negative Consequences

Premise 1: If I carry out a shock attack I will die or live in a nightmare situation.

Premise 2: Me dying or living in a nightmare is to be negatively valued.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for me not to carry out a *deadly shock attack*.

CQ1: What makes it plausible that distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack has dying or living in a nightmare situation consequences?

A: The police will likely shoot me, or if captured I will live in a nightmare situation.

How could distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack not have dying or living in a nightmare situation as consequences?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: Why should dying or living in a nightmare situation be negatively valued?

A: [N/A]

How could dying or living in a nightmare situation not be negatively valued?

A: *I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters.*

Faced with an incompatibility between his proposed means and other goals he should have, Breivik now has to determine if his proposed means and goal are preferable to the other goals with which they are in conflict. He does this by providing a “Yes” answer to Topic 7.

TOPIC 7: Are distributing the compendium and performing a *deadly shock attack* preferable to the alternatives with which it is incompatible?

Reason 1 - AS10b.1. Argument Based on Rational Preference (in favour of M*)

Premise 1: The alternatives and proposed means are contradictory.

Premise 2: Being necessary and sufficient for the goal, along with my ability to perform them, count for distributing the compendium and performing *deadly shock attack*.

Premise 3: Not conducting terrorism, not killing innocent civilians, and not dying myself or living in a nightmare situation count for the alternatives.

Premise 4: The reasons for distributing the compendium and performing a *deadly shock attack* are preferable to the alternatives.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: I should distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack and abandon the alternatives.

CQs for AS10

CQ1: What makes the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reasons associated with the mean, the best for this situation?

A: Performing the means is both a duty and leads to the best consequences. It is the best standard because it *is the only pragmatical way to move forward* and fulfil our duty to help future generations of Europeans by preserving/defending European culture.

Why might the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reason associated with the means not be the best for this situation?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What makes the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed the best for this situation?

A: I can conduct *email farming* and email the compendium for distribution. As for performing the deadly shock attack, *the Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard*. There is a high probability I can carry out the attacks because *I have an extremely strong psyche (stronger than anyone I have ever known)* and my *dehumanization process started already when I wrote the military section of the compendium in 2009... or already in 2002, when I committed to a life of suffering*.

Why might the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed not be the best for this situation?

A: [N/A]

Conclusion: I will distribute the compendium and *perform a deadly shock attack* so as to achieve *spreading the compendium [to contribute to consolidation/recruitment of people to fight against the Islamisation of Europe]*.

5.5. Discussion of the results

As with the application of his reasoning to the Fairclough and Fairclough model presented in chapter 2, applied to the new model, we can see that Breivik was able to conclude to commit his crimes. This is because he did in fact conclude to commit his crimes and I have just inserted his reasoning into the model which demonstrates its applicability - as it also did in chapter 2. What is important here is to highlight a crucial difference between this application and the application conducted there. A main difference is that here Breivik could have seen unanswered critical questions and unaddressed argumentation schemes. Especially given the lack of answers to the critical questions, he can point to those exact spots to extrapolate a critique of what might be

making his argumentation unreasonable. In fact, given the way he chose to conduct his individual argumentation there were at total of 27 applicable critical question - each with two parts - totalling 54 calls for answers. Breivik addressed 31 of the 54 (57%) leaving 23 completely unanswered. As will be addressed shortly, this is not to say that each unanswered question diminishes reasonableness to the same extent. I suspect some questions are more important to answer than others. It is only to say that there is at least a starting point for evaluation.

In the application in chapter 2, a crucial point was that Breivik was able to, and did, address all of the parts of the model and accompanying critical questions. Having successfully navigated both, he had reason to believe his decision was reasonable. Here, he has identifiable reasons to conclude his reasoning may be unreasonable, most notably by acknowledging unaddressed argumentation schemes and unanswered critical questions for employed schemes. Thus, one result of restructuring the model and strengthening the critical questions is that it is now no longer as easy for him, and I think any individual using the model, to conclude to commit obviously unreasonable or immoral actions.

A further result of the application is the demonstration of how crucial the critical questions for AS10b have been. Those questions are the “last stop” before concluding to act. To add to their importance in their positioning within the structure of practical argumentation, in Breivik’s case the questions also happened to concern the acceptability of killing other human beings. Thus, in both place and content they were crucial and Breivik did provide at least a partial answer to the questions. To account for the goodness of his resorting to performing a deadly shock attack, Breivik appealed to the consequentialist notion of sacrificing a few to save the many as well as the duty to defend one’s self and culture. He did not, however, address why such a standard might not have been the best standard for the situation, which from an outside perspective, we might argue more vigorously against.

5.5.1. A View from the Outside

One of the main concerns in this dissertation has been addressing practical argumentation without a present Other interlocutor and the models have been applied to Breivik’s case in that fashion since he did not converse with anyone else. This has also been done under the assumption that if the model can be strengthened in a situation without an independent Other, then that strengthening will be increased in the case where

a critical one is present.⁷⁸ What can we say, however, if we drop this appeal to the reality of his case and do what has no doubt crossed our minds more than once: tell Breivik how he was wrong? The next few paragraphs will touch on some of these considerations but only on a somewhat superficial level. This is because the model provides an objective mode of construction and analysis but does not provide a full theory of evaluation. As I argued above, using the model points to areas where evaluation can occur, but a full theory of evaluation will have to account for how to weigh reasons and provide a full description accounting for the severity of the places where reasoning and argumentation are lacking. Such a theory is worthwhile and is a valuable avenue for a future work but is beyond the scope of what can be achieved here.

Nevertheless, as an outsider I think Breivik's argumentation failed in a few major ways. As was outlined in chapter 4, we envision practical reasoning and argumentation as taking an agent from one situation which leaves him or her unsatisfied to a new situation where the dissatisfaction has been alleviated. Breivik envisioned himself in a situation where he is under the threat of the "Islamisation" of Europe – a hostile takeover of Europe by Islam. As was also mentioned in Chapter 2, most models of practical reasoning and argumentation see fluidity between means and goals. Accordingly, for either the Fairclough and Fairclough model or the new model, one could place "Contribute to stopping the Islamization of Europe" as the goal and move "Spreading the compendium" to the means. This is what I call the level of zoom in practical reasoning – the choice for how broad to make the identified goal. I made the decision to stick to the latter interpretation of the goal for two reasons. First, because Breivik explicitly calls it his goal. Second, because it is the part of the overall argumentation which includes the most controversial means.

His notion, however, that Europe is undergoing "Islamization" is crucially problematic. It leads him to believe he is in a type of "self-defence" situation within which the rest of his theoretical and practical reasoning occurs. The Fairclough and Fairclough model tackles this problem directly, while the new model tackles it indirectly. From an outside perspective, *we can* forcefully answer Fairclough and Fairclough's question "Is the situation described in a rationally acceptable way?" with a "No". In the new model, our outside evaluation of his responses to the critical questions for schemes 1-4 will call

⁷⁸ This assumption is shown to be problematic in the next chapter.

out his view of the circumstances. For example, an outsider could challenge Breivik on his reasons for valuing cultural preservation. Because his value of cultural preservation is tied to his wanting to preserve it from being overrun by Islam he could only need to “preserve” it because it is under threat, not because it is simply fading away. The critical questions for this scheme allow us to challenge him on the notion that he is in a situation of defensive preservation. A different agent who might value cultural preservation for different reasons could pass the same critical questions without problem.

Second, his using consequentialism as a justification for killing the campers and the people near the Prime Minister’s office is abhorrent. Breivik admits that he is not usually “mandated” to execute people like the campers since they are only “category C traitors” (Husby and Sørheim, 2.4).⁷⁹ As we have seen, however, he nevertheless does it in the name of consequentialism with a disregard for any value of the people he killed in themselves. I have already spent time providing a critique of the role of values in the Fairclough and Fairclough model and will not repeat those views here. Using the new model, an outside interlocutor could point to the problem with his application of consequentialist values in Topics 6 and 7.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Breivik does not seriously consider if his means of performing a shock attack is indeed necessary and sufficient. Whether it is, is arguable and I do not dismiss his thinking out of hand. If he would have started a blog, or run for political office etc, it is not certain he would have received the amount of media coverage he has. It can be argued that his plan did actually work to a certain extent, showing that the means are at least sufficient. I am not sure I would know who he is had he not performed his means. Of note, however, is that when shown that his means were incompatible with other aims he has, he did not even attempt to negotiate using AS9. For example, he did not ask himself “What else could I do that is shocking but won’t take innocent lives?” Had he come to an answer, he might have been able to proceed reasonably. Thus, he neglected 2 chances to change his means of killing people: first, in the critical question for AS11 and second during a negotiation between Topics 6 and 7.

⁷⁹ Very interestingly Breivik also explains here that in his “plan A” he would not have killed the campers, but that he had to follow a “Plan B”. We might wonder what plan A was, but it could have been, and I suspect it was, simply his earlier noted aim to kill at least 20 people at the Prime Minister’s office. See chapter 2, note 22.

Even if his means can be considered necessary and sufficient, however, his belief that “*if you read [the compendium] from the first word to the end, you will be radicalized*” is clearly false. His means cannot guarantee that people will read the compendium from the first word to the last (as I have not) nor that if they do they will indeed, with 100% probability, be radicalized. He makes this statement in addressing the probability question for AS10a, to determine if he should pursue the goal at all. Accordingly, we can see a relationship between the certainty in the probability of achieving the goal and the forcefulness of taking up the means. A question for future consideration, which is touched upon again in the next chapter, regards how much immorality should be accepted in the name of ensuring the probability of the success of a goal. In extreme cases the relationship is clear: if an action under consideration is abundantly good, but impossible to achieve, probability outweighs goodness and the action cannot be undertaken. In a reverse situation the extreme case is also clear – if an action is obviously immoral, but fully possible, it should not be performed. In most everyday situations, however, it is exactly this struggle between what it is ideally good to do and what we can do which causes decision-making stress. Breivik did not consider his means obviously immoral which allowed him to make a decision regarding this distribution of weight. I do find his means obviously immoral which excludes it completely regardless of whether they may be necessary and sufficient. If I find his means immoral but he does not, who is right?

In chapter 4 I argued that if there is no universally authoritative moral doctrine, then the best a reasonable person can do is argue for their selection. So, what if Breivik would have made a different selection? To shed some light on this question, the next section briefly addresses what might happen to the argumentation under varying moral standards. It is hoped that reviewing these differences also provides concrete support for my contention that the selection of a moral standard plays a crucial role in a full evaluation of practical reasonableness and that, as such, unlike any model provided up to this point, considering the content of moral theory should be a part of declaring an action as reasonable.

5.6. The Potential Impact of Some Alternate Moral Perspectives

In order to provide an overview of differing moral theories I have chosen to categorize them as broadly as I can. Thus, I have divided the theories between moral relativist and moral objectivist position and will provide some further subdivisions along

the way.⁸⁰ It is, however, useful to first begin with a comparative overview of both broad strands.

A leading proponent of moral relativism, Gilbert Harman, describes it as

a claim about reality. It is a version of moral realism. It is the that (sic) there are many moralities or moral frames of reference and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, virtuous or not is always a relative matter. Something can be right or good or just only in relation to one moral framework and wrong or bad or unjust in relation to another. Nothing is simply right or good or unjust or virtuous (Harman, 2014).

In addition to the descriptive claim that many moralities exist, moral relativists typically also share the view that fundamental moral disagreements between these moralities cannot be rationally resolved (Gowans, 2012, p. 4). Thus, for moral relativists, different moral frameworks may carry equal moral authority.

A relativist approach can appear quite threatening for a number of reasons, three of which have been succinctly pointed out by Thomas Scanlon. The first is that it could stop people from taking basic moral rules, like not committing frivolous murder, as authoritative (1998, pp. 331-334). The “second reason is grounded in the confidence we have or would like to have in our judgment that certain actions are wrong” (pp. 334). If morals are relative, it might undermine any force in a moral condemnation. The third reason is that it can make it seem as though there are no genuine moral disagreements – that the disagreements “disappear” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 335; Gowans, 2012, p. 20).

As serious as these general objections to moral relativism may be, some inspirations for developing it stem from equally as serious objections against moral objectivity. Moral objectivity can be understood as the claim that “moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense, that some of them are true, and that people sometimes are justified in accepting true moral judgments (and rejecting false ones) on the basis of evidence available to any reasonable and well-informed person” (Gowans, 2012, p. 6). Using dichotomous terms like true and false in regards to morality raises a great number of questions (such as how we can access moral truth) and places a

⁸⁰ I am grateful to David Hitchcock for highlighting that I am here speaking about metaethical philosophies which say nothing about the substantive content of what is right or wrong/good or bad. The aim here, as a first approach to including moral content into evaluations of reasonableness, is to cast the net as widely as possible so as to indicate where future research can narrow in. Dividing all of ethical and moral philosophy in half in this way is the best way I can think to do so. In what follows, I have tried when possible to address how different substantive views under these meta titles might respond differently.

huge amount of pressure on the moral agent. Moral objectivity pressures the agent because it seems to restrict human freedom, under the risk of moral condemnation, not to live and organize our lives and societies in what are commonly thought of as differing but equally valuable ways. It seems to lead to an intolerance of those individuals and societies who maintain different values and promote different conceptions of the good. If objectivity is true, it might be that there is only one right way to live (and it's mine!). This absolute universal conception of morality goes against the common notions of cultural tolerance and continuous learning and spurs an impulse away from it for many.

Given their fundamental differences, if normative theories within these approaches are used as evaluative standards in reasoning toward a decision to act, these two perspectives are hypothesised to provide quite different recommendations – in other words, quite different *pro tanto* reasons.

5.6.1. Moral Relativism

Like other broad philosophical topics, moral relativism comes in different flavours. Three of the most predominant are subjective, social/cultural, and naturalistic.

Subjective moral relativism

Subjective moral relativism is the idea that every individual has her or his own viewpoint (Häyry, 2005, p. 9) and that, as noted above, disagreements between viewpoints are irresolvable. Although it is another step to claim that each individual's moral view ought to be authoritative over others, which might better be called "absolute subjectivism" (ibid), if moral disagreements between individuals cannot be resolved then there is nothing preventing one from using their subjective moral view as authoritative.

Accordingly, if in his reasoning Breivik took only his own moral view as authoritative, and that view allowed committing murder, he could quite easily conclude that according to the standard of subjective moral relativism he is licenced to perform his shock attack. The moral component of his AS10b could include implicit argumentation along the lines, "Performing deadly shock attacks is preferable to the alternatives because it is better (or at least no worse) than the alternatives according to my standard of subjective moral relativism."

When the critical question is asked, summarized as "What makes this standard the best standard for the situation and why might it not be?" Breivik could not help but conclude that it is the best standard for this and every situation because it is his and cannot

be shown to be better or worse than any other. Thus, this standard fails our objective of improving the reasonableness of practical reasoning in that it could advise Breivik to commit his murders, and since the critical question cannot safeguard against its use, it would recommend what we have deemed to be an unreasonable action.

Social/cultural moral relativism

Rather than focusing on the self, a social or cultural moral relativist could appeal to societal/cultural norms and values as the authoritative moral force. Indeed, cultural relativism is often proposed as the standard moral relativism (Gowans, 2012, p. 4ff.). According to it, different societies may have different but equally authoritative moral guidelines and it would not be possible to clearly demonstrate the moral superiority of any one to another. This account is appealing for a number of reasons, a major one being that it seems to include the idea of tolerance for different cultures (Lukes, 2008, pp. 38-44), but protects against the dangers of subjective moral relativism by appealing to popularity.

In one way, applying the standard of social relativism might have prevented Breivik from being able to reason to his means. If he thought of Norwegian law as the definition of social moral authority, for example, he could have concluded that murder was not the preferable means—declared unequivocally wrong. In another way, however, because the definitions of “society” and “culture” are notoriously problematic (pp. 112-122), the culture and society of which Breivik considers himself a part – what he would call the “pan-European and national resistance movement” (Berwick, 2011, p. 1352) – could be seen to endorse his means.

Using a social/cultural relativist standard, AS10b could then include implicit reasoning along the lines of either “Performing deadly shock attacks is not preferable to the alternatives because according to the standard of social moral relativism, as indicated by national law, it is not the better choice” or “Performing deadly shock attacks is preferable to the alternatives because according to the standard of social moral relativism, as indicated by the pan-European national resistance movement, it is the better choice.”

After applying the standard of social/cultural relativism, when asking the critical question about what makes it the best standard for the situation, Breivik could again appeal to the irresolvability between fundamental moral differences inherent in the idea of moral relativism. This would make his choice of the standard the best (or at least no worse than) alternative cultural standards. Thus, using this standard carries a chance of

being able to prevent Breivik from concluding to perform what we have *prima facie* declared his unreasonable acts, but it seems to be a slim chance. It seems more likely that he would stick to the momentum in his proposal of means, thus choosing his own relative culture for justification, rather than countering the inertia of his means proposal by identifying with an opposing cultural authority.

Naturalistic moral relativism

One of the most developed self-proclaimed relativist theories comes from David Wong who takes a naturalistic approach to defend what he calls “pluralistic relativism” (Wong, 2006, p. XV). For Wong, while there is no one single true morality there are constraints on what can be considered an adequate morality, which, he claims, are derived “from the functions of morality, human psychology, and the nature of human cooperation” (p. 65). The constraints include:

requiring human beings to seek only that which they have some propensity to seek; inclusion of norms of reciprocity in light of strong self-interest; in specification of norms and reasons, balancing self- and other-concern in ways that include putting less pressure on other-concern through provision of some “payoff ” in terms of self-interest; justifiability of norms and reasons to the governed in terms of their interests when presented without falsification; and finally the value of accommodation of moral disagreement. (ibid).

These constraints set limits on what can count as an adequate morality but do not say anything about the way moralities can take shape within the constraints. Accordingly, different people and societies can share basic values but prioritize them differently. These different orderings allow for more than one adequate moral framework which all fulfil the basic functions of morality such as facilitating social cooperation and articulating “character ideals and conceptions of the good life specifying what is worthwhile for the individual to become and to pursue” (p. 43).

Wong’s pluralistic relativism seems closest to the moral perspective included in Fairclough and Fairclough’s articulation of practical reasoning. Recall, however, that in their articulation of the structure of practical reasoning and their suggestions for how to evaluate it, Fairclough and Fairclough want to allow for a value pluralist approach but specifically deny being moral relativists. They argue:

Some value differences are unreasonable and cannot withstand critical examination. For instance, some values are indefensible from a purely instrumental point of view, because they contradict the agent’s goals: valuing a life of leisure is not reasonable if your goal is to get high grades. But some value differences are unreasonable in a deeper, non-instrumental sense: a racist conception cannot remain indefinitely in play

alongside one which rejects racism. Disagreement over this issue is unreasonable and a reasonable resolution can be legitimately expected. Sometimes, however, people disagree in a reasonable way and the disagreement is also irresolvable. Such disagreements often depend on the way people rank the values and goals that matter to them. Reasonable disagreement, we suggest, is generated by conflicting but reasonable values and goals or by different rankings of the same values and goals. (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 60)

Recalling the discussion above, to define what count as reasonable values which can be disagreed upon, Fairclough and Fairclough pick up the “capabilities” approach advocated by Martha Nussbaum and support a notion of “values that closely approximate a list of universal human rights, or duties/obligations that we have towards our fellow beings” (ibid).

Thus, like Wong, Fairclough and Fairclough see legitimate value disagreements stemming from the way different individuals or groups rank their value preferences within the confines of a conception of universal human rights and human flourishing, or in Wong’s terms, an adequate conception of morality.

Not crucial for present purposes, but important nonetheless is the question of the extent to which Wong’s approach ought to be grouped under relativism at all?⁸¹ If the backbone of the theory posits universal, objective (derived from nature or otherwise) guidelines for morality, and the main difference in moral frameworks is only identifiable via comparison with others within the boundary, then morality is not relative at all. All of the possible moralities – ways for values to be arranged via different ranking combinations – are only relative to the objective guidelines, which do not change. As such, it is really the boundaries, objective and unchanging, which demarcate what counts as right and wrong and which do not change relative to any other boundaries.

Nonetheless, performing a deadly shock attack falls outside the constraints of an adequate morality in a number of ways, some of the most obvious being that it denies reciprocity and fails to balance others’ concerns. Using a naturalistic relativist standard, AS10b could then include implicit reasoning along the lines, “Performing a deadly shock attack is not preferable to the alternatives because it is outside of the constraints of an adequate system of morality.”

When asking the critical question about what makes it the best standard for the situation, Breivik could site Wong’s naturalistic reasons about the function of morality.

⁸¹ Which is why I opened this section by identifying him as a “self-proclaimed” relativist. In this light we may then also ask if Fairclough and Fairclough really do hold a relativist view despite explicitly denying it.

To argue for what might not make it the best standard, Breivik would have to show the weakness or falsity of the argued for constraints.

If I am correct, Wong's view at least comes closest to an objectivist view from the relativist camp. But what about clearly objectivist views? The next sections provides a brief discussion of the two most influential perspectives from this approach.

5.6.2. Moral Objectivism

Consequentialism

There are many importantly different consequentialist theories. The basic theory, known as act utilitarianism, can be summarized with the familiar phrase “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2014, p. 2), but how this utility is calculated varies dramatically among differing theorists. It can be argued that Breivik used one version of this standard in his actual argumentation, as shown by his admittance that “Innocent people will die, in the thousands. But it is still better than the alternative; millions of dead Europeans, which is the worst case phase 3 scenario.” (Berwick, 2011, p. 1360). A very simple calculation, for him, said ‘better a fewer number of innocent people die now than more innocent people dying later.’

While it strikes many, me included, that such a cold calculation is cold precisely because it ignores any intrinsic value of the person, utilitarians have argued that when pressed we can and do attribute a cost-value to everything, including human life. If that is the case, then calculations may work as an appropriate moral standard after all and we just have to face up to the fact that we make and follow more calculations than we might normally admit. Michael Sandel discusses the prospect of a common currency of value and references studies that show how companies calculate the monetary cost of a life as well as a study that documented the average price people would accept to take on suffering (Sandel, 2009, pp. 41-8). In one case the Ford Motor Company priced life at \$200,000, in another case the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency priced a life at \$3.7 million, unless you were over the age of 70 in which case your life was only worth \$2.7 million. As for individuals quoting their own prices to undergo suffering, in 1937 people agreed to have a little toe on one foot cut off for \$57,000 or to eat a 6-inch-long earthworm for \$100,000. Sandel also points out, however, that up to one-third of the participants qualified some of the proposed sufferings as “immeasurably repugnant” and would not put a price on them.

Even if we were to grant Breivik his overly simple calculation of ‘better fewer now than more later,’ we are still left in a position to consider to what extent this is an appropriate *moral* claim. In my view such calculative thinking is the type of thinking that a machine would do, rather than a human being. To recall the broad separation made in chapter 1, this cost-benefit analysis falls much more toward the side of the rational than the reasonable. Even if somehow it was a *fact* that more people might live by sacrificing a few now, it still does not tell us that it is *morally right* for them to be sacrificed – it is a description of a situation not a moral justification.

Eliminating basic consequentialism as the overall moral standard to be used in deciding preference is not to say that the positive or negative consequences of the goal or means are unimportant. Rather, consequences are better understood as one of the *pro tanto* considerations on which an overall moral standard can rule – in the sense that it functions as a last check taking all things into account. This is why in the model outlined above, consequences are specifically addressed in AS3 and AS7 and are not considered *pro toto* considerations of moral value.

Unfortunately, there is not space here to review each available consequentialist theory, and I am under no illusion that other consequentialist approaches might fare far better than the one Breivik used. Indeed, one of my aims in this discussion is to highlight the worth of conducting more research regarding differing moral perspectives and their relation to practical reasonableness. It is my hope that future research could provide a thorough review of how differing consequentialist (and other) perspectives interact with a model for practical reasoning. The point I wish to highlight with this very short discussion of consequentialism is just that considerations beyond the consequences of the proposed goal and means need to be taken into account for an adequate assessment of value and that, though objective, there is a possibility for Breivik to conclude to perform his shock attack using only this approach. This shows again that recommendations for action from morality can conflict with recommendations for action from reasonableness. We can ask ourselves the extent to which we should follow a morality which recommends a paradigm case of unreasonable action.

Deontology

Deontological theories argue that what is right or wrong depends on the kind of action under consideration rather than its consequences. Deontologists point to rules meant to hold across contexts and apply to all (reasonable and rational) people and it is

following the rule, for the sake of the rule, that gives an action moral worth. The most famous deontological position originates from Kant, who proposed multiple formulations of a Categorical Imperative. The first and second formulations are enough to highlight for present purposes. They are, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it become a universal law” (Kant, 1993, p. 421)⁸² and “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (Kant, 1993, p. 429), respectively.

Taking a Kantian perspective, it is not completely clear if Breivik’s argumentation fits. Recall that much of his thinking is within the framework of understanding himself to be in a position of self and cultural defence. There is, however, no clear answer to how a Kantian should respond in a situation of self-defence. On the one hand, there is pressure for the categorical imperative to allow for self-defence both because it could be a universalizable maxim, but also because it is required if you are to treat your own humanity as a valuable end in itself. Not defending yourself could be seen as paramount to suicide, clearly forbidden by the second formulation. On the other hand, however, treating humanity as an end in itself would not allow for the sacrifice of innocent bystanders – their sacrifice would be treating them as mere means to an end.⁸³ Removing the innocent bystander aspect makes the situation only slightly clearer. Without considering innocent bystanders, from a Kantian perspective defending ourselves against an attacker is both morally permissible and ‘indirectly’ morally obligatory, but the act of defending oneself can only have moral worth if our reason for doing so is solely because we (indirectly) ought to and not because it is a result of our instinct.⁸⁴ Breivik does indeed refer to his duty and not a mere instinct in this regard.⁸⁵

⁸² The page numbers here refer to the standard page numbers included in the margins of this particular version of the text.

⁸³ See Dogett (2011) for a useful discussion regarding the role of bystanders in self-defence.

⁸⁴ Many thanks to Kantian scholar Michael Walschots for illuminating discussion on this issue.

⁸⁵ In a telling passage, Breivik provides an analogy which summarizes how he combines consequentialist and deontological thinking with his view of logic: “If you see the ship is burning you don’t ignore it and start cooking noodles do you? You put out the fire even if it endangers your life. You don’t enjoy putting out the fire but it is your duty to yourself and your fellow crewmen. And let’s say your crewmen have been infected with a rare virus that shuts down their rational senses and they try to stop you from putting out the fire. You can’t really allow yourself to be stopped by any of them as it will lead to your collective

There are of course also contemporary theories inspired by Kant which can shed some light on this situation. For instance, Thomas Scanlon (1998) has argued that judgments of right and wrong

are judgments about what would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject. In particular, an act is wrong if and only if any principle that permitted it would be one that could reasonably be rejected by people with the motivation just described (or, equivalently, if and only if it would be disallowed by any principle that such people could not reasonably reject). (p. 4)

Using Scanlon's rule, it does not appear that Breivik could have concluded to conduct his deadly shock attack. This is because any principle permitting it could be reasonably rejected by people motivated to find principles for the general regulation of behaviour - as Scanlon would argue, the most likely people being any one of the innocent bystanders.⁸⁶

There is not space here to see if all, or even the bulk of, contemporary deontological moral theories would prohibit Breivik from conducting his means, but from what we have seen thus far, although self-defence cases generally may not be clearly answerable, the fact that Breivik acknowledged the deaths of innocent bystanders means that two of the core views would condemn his means.

5.7. One Theory to Rule Them All?

Using a paradigm example of unreasonableness is important for a study such as this because it allows us to standardize one variable and thus have a better gauge of the impact that altering the other variables has. In other words, not allowing for variance on reasonableness allows us to be able to see the impact of adjusting the moral perspective more clearly. In my view, it is easier to intuitively find an example of unreasonableness than reasonableness which is in part why I chose this direction. The example was also selected to be not just trivially unreasonable, say, by demonstrating operational incompatibility. With one variable stable, when I started researching differing moral

death. You will do anything to put out that fire despite of the fact that they are trying to stop you. Anything else would be illogical." (Berwick, 2011, p. 1417).

⁸⁶ Scanlon briefly addresses the more general principle that one might be sacrificed to save the many, in (1998, pp. 84-5).

theories and perspectives, it quickly became clear to me that most moral theories argue that they are THE theory (even, paradoxically, relativists). They all attempt to be the stable variable as well.

I have said above that in the absence of an uncontested moral theory accepted as an authoritative guide to action, the best an agent can do is argue about the suitability of applying a selected standard to a given situation. This claim results from the fact that there are no (to my knowledge) available articulations of moral theories that are not seriously objected to by credible Others. In other words, every moral theory articulated so far is maintained in the face of some non-trivial disagreement.

I do not wish to claim that such an uncontested/incontestable theory is impossible, or that such a theory has not already been articulated. I only wish to point out that no such recognition has thus far been granted. As such, argumentation concerning the applicability of a theory to a case is the best to currently be had.

Leaving the model for practical reasoning silent on which moral theory is best fully allows those who hold one theory above all others to apply that theory consistently in every case. They can appeal to what they consider the ultimate moral theory anew every time the model is applied and it may be that such a theory wins the day in every case. However, it also provides equal opportunity for differing moral theories to be considered – all of which may lose every time (and of course may not). The idea here is that a willingness to be persuaded, even if unexpectedly, in the face of argumentation, is a pre-condition of being reasonable. Those who will never be open to the possibility of changing their minds are unreasonable.

It is important to emphasize that this does not mean the model implicitly assumes a moral relativist stance. Although the model allows for differing moral theories to be inserted, and calls for the critical questioning of whichever theory is appealed to, it does not say anything regarding whether one theory can or should always win, or not. However, while there is no substantive moral assumption in the model, the model does assume that morals are a matter of reason.⁸⁷ As such, it expects every perspective to be subject to the realm of reason. Thus, in the case where a moral is presented without reason, say on mere faith (as opposed to reasoned faith which is a different story), any reason supporting an alternate moral would win the day even if only in a “1-0” reason victory.

⁸⁷ In agreement with Korsgaard’s quote at the beginning of this chapter.

Where a conflict of morals occurs, genuine argumentation is expected to bring out the side with the strongest reasons supporting it at the time. Where opposing reasons are presented, the opposition is expected to be resolvable by recognized argumentative means. As such, this new model is clearly separated from the Atkinson and Fairclough and Fairclough position (inspired by Searle) which allows for reasonable disagreement but remains consistent with idea that *ideal* argumentation resolves disagreements.

Finally, it is also important not to forget the limits of the impact of a moral theory generally in this model of practical reasoning and argumentation. Whether or not a moral theory recommends the pursuit of a goal or the means to achieve it, that recommendation alone is not sufficient for providing reasonable grounds for an agent to act. It is, along with the other reasons, a *pro tanto* reason and like the other reasons needs to be considered as one reason among the others. As is clear from the formulation of AS10 and its accompanying critical questions, even if the standard used for the valuation clearly recommends the goal or means, if the probability of achieving it is nil, it would be unreasonable to act.

5.8. Conclusion

This chapter had two main, related, goals. The first was to see if the new model for practical reasoning and argumentation had improved upon the one designed by Fairclough and Fairclough. To find out, I tested the new model in the same way I tested the Fairclough and Fairclough model – by applying it to the reasoning and argumentation of a paradigm case of unreasonableness, that of mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik. The results of the test showed that the model had been improved, most noticeably by not allowing Breivik to navigate through its parts so easily and by providing a way for him to identify problem aspects in his reasoning and argumentation.

The second aim of the chapter was to develop a discussion highlighting the importance of moral considerations in the evaluation of practical reasoning and argumentation. In this pursuit I provided a discussion of the place and role of values in the Fairclough and Fairclough model while pointing to what I see to be some of its problematic components. I then explained how, learning from these problems, the new model attempts to avoid them. The first main problem the new model avoids is the tension between allowing theoretical “agree-to-disagree” situations vs. including all value disagreements as theoretically resolvable. The answer provided was to allow that all value disagreements be considered to be allowed within the normal realm of resolvable issues.

The second, related, problem the new model solved is how to articulate a threshold of acceptable values to guide practical reasoning. The resolution to this problem involves recognizing its relation to the first problem. In sum, a threshold of acceptable values is only required in situations where there is allowance of “agree-to-disagree” situations. In such a case one needs to distinguish between disagreements which are reasonably and unreasonably maintained. If, however, reasonable disagreement is removed, there is no longer a need to articulate a threshold of acceptable values because the unacceptable will be discarded through argumentation rather than dictate.

Much more research is needed regarding the connection between differing moral theories and their applications to practical reasoning and argumentation and their evaluations of reasonableness. I only hope here to have shown that it is important and that while argumentation is often looked to as a method for figuring out the right thing to do, in my view, when conditions permit, the right thing to do is argue.

6. CRITICAL CREATIVITY

The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle requires creative imagination and marks real advances in science.

~ Einstein and Infeld

There are many ways to contribute to the struggle. Becoming a Justiciar Knight is just one out of several manifestations of the struggle

~Anders Behring Breivik

6.1. Introduction

In the last chapter I applied Anders Behring Breivik's reasoning to the new model for practical reasoning and argumentation which was presented in chapter 4. The hope was that the new model would perform better at preventing Breivik from coming to the conclusion that his decision to perform a deadly shock attack is a reasonable decision. I argued that it had indeed done better by pointing to unaddressed schemes and critical questions thus giving Breivik a way to see where there are weakness in his reasoning and argumentation. What was not discussed in that chapter is the other side of the evaluative coin, namely the quality of the content of the answers that were given in the scheme (or that could be given). We might imagine that Breivik, with enough time and with the scheme before him, could make a point to come up with answers for each and every scheme and each and every critical question and still conclude to perform his deadly shock attack. There is nothing in the model that can guarantee he won't. At some point the quality of the answers provided and the choices made for how to answer each scheme has to become a part of the evaluation. In this regard, especially the selection and critique (or lack thereof) of a moral standard can greatly impact evaluations of practical reasonableness, and the model, as a tool, remains highly dependent on the abilities of the person using it.

This chapter will provide some avenues for next research steps in the direction of improving the ability for a person to use the model for practical reasoning and argumentation. The idea is that improving the likelihood of a reasonable decision depends on at least two factors: 1) the quality of the normative model and 2) the abilities of the

agent(s) using the model. To use an analogy, just as a good quality hammer may make nailing a piece of wood easier, if the person using the hammer taps the nail lightly 15 times instead of hitting it hard twice, no matter how well you make the hammer it will not perform as well as it could. This is not to underplay the importance of the quality of the hammer. A hammer will most often perform better than a shoe in the same task. The point is just that, as with any tool, whether used in reasoning and argumentation or carpentry, there is a reciprocal relationship between the tool and its user and best results are incurred when both are improved. Thus, no matter how well we can design a model of practical reasoning, if the agent is unaware of better ways to use it, the model may still be ineffective. Chapters 2-5 have focused on improving the model, which has been the main aim of the dissertation. In this chapter I can only point to some considerations for improving the user and acknowledge the need for further research. In line with the distinctions produced in chapter 3, the discussion here will begin with the individual before moving on to discuss Others.

6.2. Individuals

It is no secret that individuals err in their reasoning. The influential line of research on cognitive biases and heuristics has powerfully demonstrated that even the most intelligent people, without corrective interference, tend to conduct their reasoning and argumentation in predictably biased ways (Kahneman, 2011, p. 234ff.). Whether succumbing to these biases is reasonable or unreasonable, rational or irrational is, in my view, context dependant and is outside the scope of this discussion. Here, I would only like to provide a brief overview of how some cognitive biases might diminish the quality of individual practical reasoning and argumentation. Given the fact that it takes individuals to comprise groups, the discussion here will also impact the subsequent discussion of Others.

For example, consider the long established availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; 1974, pp. 1127-8). The availability heuristic identifies people's tendency to reason using information that is most readily available to them. In 'Western' society, mass media are responsible for much of this selection. How the information comes to them is also important – the more salient the more likely the information is to be recalled first. Seeing a terrorist attack or an earthquake on TV will have a greater effect than reading about it in the newspaper (Sunstein and Hastie, 2015, p. 45). As Chappell explains, one can identify “a bias towards vivid arguments that consist of imagery that is

easy to understand and assigns causality to specific actors when the true state of the world is best described by opaque arguments, which are difficult to understand and make use of invisible hand mechanisms” (2011, 94). Thus, if information is readily available, simple, and salient, it is more likely to be used in reasoning and provided a heavier weight - appropriately or not.

In Breivik’s case, there are a number of instances where he tells stories of how he and his friends were mistreated by Muslims (for a list see, Berwick, 2011, pp. 1393-1395). Taking the prominence with which ‘Western’ media highlights terrorist attacks conducted by Islamic extremists, combined with the salience Breivik attaches to his own experiences, could help explain why he so forcefully holds his views and neglects accurate or careful statistical analysis which would significantly counter his view of the probability of a future Islamic takeover of Europe.

We can also consider the planning fallacy, which is especially important for practical reasoning given that one of the most famous, influential, and well-articulated theories of practical reasoning is called the “the planning theory” (Bratman, 1987). This fallacy describes plans and forecasts that are “unrealistically close to best case scenarios [and/or] could be improved by consulting the statistics of similar cases” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 250). As Sunstein and Hastie describe it, “[t]he planning fallacy is a form of myopia, focusing on one streamlined scenario” (2015, p. 139). Such myopic thinking has the consequence of leaving counter considerations unconsidered and/or underappreciated. To say that Breivik’s overall vision of winning “the current Western European civil war” (Berwick, 2011, 1350-51) by 2083 suffers from the planning fallacy would be an understatement. Displaying a prime example of the fallacy, Breivik predicts the seemingly simple, dichotomous possible future: “We are going to win this war eventually no matter how they chose to act. If they comply with all our demands (and deport all Muslims from Europe) we will win. If they don’t, then Islam will bring us to power in phase 3 (2070- 2083) when the Muslims reach 50%. At this point, the peoples of Europe will scream for any group or individual who can come and solve their problems...” (Berwick, 2011, p. 1352).

Any individual using the model provided in Chapter 4 could use it while succumbing to the availability bias or planning fallacy. The topical choice of reasons used to fill in the argumentation schemes and the answers given to the critical questions can all be selected disproportionately according to availability and salience, and counter examples and reasons can all be overlooked due to the planning fallacy. While the critical

questions have been designed to try and lessen this effect by explicitly open-endedly calling for both considerations and counter considerations, there is no guarantee any individual will actually be able to achieve it.

The list of recognized biases and errors in individual reasoning is long and growing and there is neither need nor space here to provide a full overview of them. What I wish to highlight with just these two examples is that no matter how well constructed a model for practical reasoning and argumentation is, any given individual using it could still do so poorly. If there is no way to foolproof the model, how can the abilities of those using it be improved? The remainder of this chapter attempts to shed some light on this question.

6.3. Unequal Others

It is often thought that one way to help counter individual errors in reasoning is to submit it to an interlocutor. This Other will help alert us to the mistakes we are making that we cannot see ourselves. We can recall the discussion from section 3.2 where I showed how the notion of an Other is at the heart of many of the main contemporary models of argumentation. In that chapter I also raised Ralph Johnson's observation that "it does not matter how fertile imaginations are; there will be objections that cannot be imagined or anticipated. These are the limitations for which the Other can compensate" (p. 158). The Other, then, is expected to help in at least two ways: to critically test the available reasoning and argumentation as well as imaginatively contribute to it.

There is no doubt that *an* Other can fulfil this role, but can *every* Other do so? If not, what might make one Other better or worse than another? Further if an Other is helpful, would more than one Other be even more helpful? Finally, what are we to do if there is no Other around but a decision still has to be made? The remainder of this chapter will provide some starting points for answers to these sorts of questions.

6.3.1. Theoretically Best Others

In this section the aim is to shed some light on the first two above mentioned questions: can anyone fulfil the role of an Other in argumentation and what makes an Other better or worse for practical argumentative purposes? There have been both theoretical and empirical approaches to answering this question which will be addressed in turn below.

Two of the most recognizable characterizations of theoretically best interlocutors are Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's universal audience (1969) and Blair and Johnson's community of model interlocutors (1987).

For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, there is no doubt that argumentation is aimed at a real audience. Given, however, the varying compositions of real audience members, along with their fallibilities, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca develop the hypothetical "universal audience" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 30-35, 66-73) which can be imagined out of the real audience. The motivation for creating the universal audience is to avert an arguer relying "on arguments that are foreign or even directly opposed to what is acceptable to persons other than those he is presently addressing" (p. 35). As an extrapolation from a real audience, the universal audience is a hypothetical but not an ideal (Tindale, 2004, p. 128). The universal audience can be characterized as "the distillation of the concrete audience, comprised of the common features as imagined by the arguer (speaker)" (Tindale, 1999, p. 90) and in this way is grounded in reality.

There are different ways for an arguer to construct the universal audience. As mentioned, the arguer can identify the common features of the particular audience, but they can also select the most reasonable elements among the members and universalize them, or imagine the audience across vast distances of time. However constructed, the role of the universal audience is to act as a standard of reasonableness. Along with their unique individual characteristics, the members of the audience are conceived of as reasonable and thus when universalized, embody reasonableness as a standard. Accordingly, the premises of any argument should be universalizable, without contradiction, to all members of the universal audience (Tindale 1999, p. 118; 2004, p. 144). Thus, once constructed, the universal audience can then perform at least three functions: they can be question askers, perspective providers, and reasonableness developers (Tindale, 1999, pp. 119-120).

A related, but still noticeably different approach is taken by Blair and Johnson (1987) who articulate the idea of a community of model interlocutors. This community is characterized as (at least) knowledgeable, reflective, open, and dialectally astute (pp. 50-51). Their knowledge is associated with them as a community of experts whose composition changes, but nevertheless all embody the ideal of reasonableness. They are not, however, the final source of knowledge - a place to find all the answers. Rather they are open to changing their opinion on the basis of reasons. Since they are dialectically astute, the community are comfortable with argumentation and "alert to possible

problems of relevance, to the need for enough evidence of the right kinds, and to the possibilities of counter arguments and conflicting evidence” (p. 51).

Blair and Johnson also point to five features of the community’s operation. First, there is a particular group of model interlocutors for each proposition. Second, “[t]he membership of the community of model interlocutors will vary from proposition to proposition” (ibid). Third, the members would be real people – role models – with high but attainable standards. Fourth, it is a collection of role models, rather than an individual. Finally, fifth, the interlocutors are recognized as in a historical place in time, rather than being universal.

There is not space or need here for a full comparison between the two views.⁸⁸ The point I most want to highlight is the requirement for the use of imagination in both cases. Imagination is defined by Ken Robinson as “the process of bringing to mind things that are not present to our senses” (Robinson, 2011, p. 2). In the case of the universal audience, it is up to the arguer to construct, that is imagine, the universal audience. Such imagination is constrained in this case by the actual audience to which the argumentation is addressed (Tindale, 2004, p. 140). But as we have seen, since there are a number of ways to go about constructing the universal audience the arguer’s imagination still plays a central role. In the case of the community of model interlocutors, Blair and Johnson write, “[w]e wish to advance the *hypothesis* that in the paradigmatic case of argumentation, those occupying the two dialectical roles conceive themselves as trying to satisfy the demands of a community of interlocutors characterized by features which establish certain standards of objectivity as a goal in the argumentative interchange” (1987, p. 50). Insofar as an arguer is only conceiving the demands of the model community, they are imagining it. It is clear that since it is a model, the expectation is not that any arguer is actually arguing with this community (even if in fact they do exist in the world) but that they remain an imaginative construction based on real existing experts.

One way to highlight the way I see the importance of imagination as entering into these two situations is to think about the prospect that two real arguers, faced with the same real audience and wanting to make the same point, would imagine an identical universal audience or community of model interlocutors. Though an empirical question, I think it is uncontroversial to posit that if they would not construct the exact same

⁸⁸For some comparative insights see (Tindale, 1999, pp. 115-117; 2004; 127, 128).

audience, then we have a clear indication that their respective imaginative abilities come into play. As such, an arguer's imaginative ability will be crucial for both the production of their own quality argumentation as well as the evaluation of others'. Tindale says as much when he asserts, "[t]he ability to imagine counterarguments is synonymous with the ability to evaluate one's own arguments" (2004, 112; cf. Mizrahi, 2014). If the source of the imagined counter arguments comes from an imagined universal audience or model community,⁸⁹ then the ability to evaluate one's own arguments is synonymous with the ability to imagine such an audience or community - and if any two arguers are unlikely to create identical audiences they are unlikely to provide the same quality evaluations. The more imaginative one will produce the better argumentation and evaluation. Thus, improving the imaginative ability of an arguer is one of the most crucial aspects to improving the quality of argumentation. It seems, however, to unfortunately be one of the least discussed. One reason might be the difficulty involved in characterizing and measuring it.

Indeed, as Tindale notes, "[a]ll this requires a developed and sophisticated mind" (1999, p. 117) and it could be the challenge involved in developing such a sophisticated mind that leads Johnson to later question "just how much mileage one can get from such constructs" (2000, p. 192). I think that the more imaginative the arguer, the more mileage they can get. More on imagination and creativity will be discussed below.

6.3.2. *Empirically Better Others*

Aside from these theoretical constructs, recent research has investigated who makes for better or worse interlocutors in the real world. Sunstein and Hastie (2015), based on Sunstein's real world experience working in the White House, but also congruent with their extensive scientific research, distinguish between complacent and anxious leaders (though the more general "decision maker" could easily replace "leader"). Complacent people, they explain, "are full of energy, excitement, enthusiasm, and optimism" (Sunstein & Hastie, 2015, p. 10). Although complacent people are often full of good ideas, they are also more prone to be overconfident in those ideas and prefer "happy talk" over "rocking the boat". Anxious people, on the other hand, "may be optimistic, nice, even enthusiastic and full of smiles, but they are also troubled by

⁸⁹ Though as noted in chapter 3 and addressed again below, this does not need to be the case.

concern, skepticism, and doubt [...they...] see obstacles, downsides, and challenges everywhere” (pp. 10-11). Anxious people “ask probing questions along the lines of, ‘what could go wrong? Did you think of this? Why haven’t you planned for that?’” (p. 11). In other words, anxious people are critical. Sunstein and Hastie are unequivocal in promoting anxious people as better interlocutors for decision making.

Such findings are also congruent with the study conducted by Schulz-Hardt, et al. (2002) which found that disagreement between interlocutors counteracted the confirmation bias and contributed to improved information seeking, which helps counter the availability bias. Most interestingly, they also found a difference between genuine and contrived dissent. Information seeking improved more in situations of genuine dissent than when in a situation of devil’s advocate, though importantly both were effective in countering the confirmation bias.

A common theme between the theoretical and empirical work is one of character, rather than ability. The best Others with whom to conduct practical reasoning and argumentation need to disagree with you. What is needed is dissent, skepticism, and challenge. This may sound like somewhat of an obvious point, but as will be discussed briefly below it is far from a standard situation. Social dynamics may silence dissent on both epistemic and non-epistemic grounds, not to mention the possibility of a mere lack of motivation to use a critical imagination. Further, arguers with similar stocks of shared knowledge, or similar “cognitive environments” (Tindale, 2004) may not be able to disagree with each other as readily as others. Accordingly, even a group of highly skilled argumentation and/or critical thinking scholars could find themselves debilitated by agreement. In sum, whether by yourself or imagining another, whoever it might be, a critical intent is one crucial component to improved practical argumentation.

6.4. The More the Merrier?

6.4.1. Theoretically the More the Merrier

If one Other can help improve reasoning, does more than one help even more? Going back to the ideas of the universal audience and community of model interlocutors, just by their names alone we can see an ingrained notion that the more interlocutors the better. Indeed universal meaning “all to whom the argument applies or could ever apply” would only in very rare cases be isolated to an individual. Also, recall from above that Blair and Johnson explicitly call for more than one individual: “We emphasize the

collective nature of the norm we are proposing by speaking of a ‘community’ and not of an ideal individual. The point is that the ideal of argumentation conceives of a range of critical questions and a variety of critical points of view as needing responses.” (52) The theoretical assumption is that more people provide more imagination and corrective ability.

6.4.2. Empirically the More the Merrier

Although it seems to make sense that the more people with whom argumentation is exchanged the better, this is not always the case. The results from empirical studies can be said to answer the hypothetical question “Do more participants in decision making procedures produce better results?” with a resoundingly hesitant “Sometimes”. Indeed Sunstein and Hastie have pointed out a number of ways in which groups can negatively impact argumentation and decision making. Groups can amplify errors, meaning that they can encourage each other to increase commitment to a poor decision even in the face of evidence that it is failing (Sunstein & Hastie, 2015, p. 52). They can be subject to cascades, which means being influenced by the choices others have made before them on the same question (pp. 57ff). They can become more polarized than before discussion began, defeating the purpose of discussion (pp. 78ff). Most interestingly, groups are also more likely to emphasize information that is broadly shared rather than emphasize the information most important to making the best decision (pp. 89ff), i.e., they are more likely to be cooperative than critical.

Despite these serious problems, groups do not always make worse decisions than individuals. Sunstein and Hastie are also clear that “[f]or some biases, groups repeat the individual error but do not increase it, and for others they might even decrease it. Compared with individuals, groups have been found to demonstrate a slightly lower level of reliance on the availability heuristic [...] And people’s tendency to anchor on salient numbers (‘anchoring bias’) is somewhat reduced by group deliberation as are the hindsight and egocentric biases” (p. 53). The general motto they use for predicting the quality of group decisions is “garbage in, garbage out”.

Of course, even if many members of the group might embody a certain bias which negatively impacts the group, it does not mean that every member does. One might think that the individual group member with the correction would stop the group from falling victim to the bias. Such corrective behaviour is more rare than not, however, and Sunstein

and Hastie point to two reasons why people might be self-silenced (33). The first is epistemological. Using the example of a firm making a decision, in the face of a majority opposition, the majority's "optimism might lead the firm's skeptics to silence themselves on the ground that their own judgments must be ill informed or wrong" (34). When facing majority opposition, especially about factual matters, we could reasonably enough suspect that it might be us who is wrong and thus not raise (or press) any opposition. But this situation might also occur in the face of expertise. If I am with my supervisor and I think he might be making some sort of logical error, precisely because he has a Doctorate in Logic and I do not, I could reasonably enough suspect that he has not made a mistake, but that I have misunderstood. Placing more confidence in the possibility of my misunderstanding could readily cause me to not speak up.

The supervisor example can also be used under a different light to point out the second reason for self-silencing: social incentives and the avoidance of social punishment (36). If my supervisor were to be the kind of person who might punish me for disagreeing with him (which bless his heart he is not!), say by avoiding a next meeting or delaying reading another chapter, these consequences might also cause me to stay silent in a case where I think he might be making an error or overlooking an important consideration.

In perhaps a perfect illustration of how group decision making can fall victim to exactly the problems Sunstein and Hastie discuss, the beer brand Bud Light has very recently come under fire for including the slogan, "The perfect beer for removing the word 'no' from your vocabulary for the night". Such a slogan is in direct opposition to the worldwide "no means no" campaign aimed at combating rape culture.

In a Newsweek article, professor of advertising Edward Boshes from Boston University recognized that, "it was not a spontaneous sentence published with a few taps on the keyboard and without much thought by a careless social media editor. 'It absolutely had to go through some committees of some sort, which comes back to how could it happen'" (Ziv, 2015). Indeed, according to popular HBO host John Oliver, the decision had to go through no fewer than five committees.⁹⁰ While the exact cause of the blunder has not been made public,

⁹⁰ From the HBO television show "Last Week Tonight with John Oliver" Season 2, Episode 12. Clip available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KjN2Bff-AXs>

One possibility, Boches says, is that the connection between the tag line and consent never occurred to anyone throughout the process, which happens sometimes when excitement surrounds an idea. Lee Ahern, a professor of advertising and public relations at Penn State, says this kind of phenomenon, called “groupthink,” can “lead to tunnel vision” and “make you blind to things that to other people will be offensive.” It’s also possible that someone in the room raised the concern but it was silenced since it was seen as the interpretation of a minority of people. The brand might have assumed that “anybody who interprets that way is crazy, they’re obviously going to know what we mean,” says Boches. The most cynical point of view, he says, is that the company anticipated the tag line could kick up a storm but wanted the media attention. (Ziv, 2015)

I would find it doubtful that through five layers of approval, not one individual thought the slogan was a bad idea. If true, it means either the dissenting person did not speak up, or did speak up but was overruled. In addition, given that the logo was a part of the brand’s “Up for whatever” campaign, the shared information and vision of the company could have blinded them to its opposition.

6.5. Critical Thinking and the Critical Creative Capacity

In accordance with the “garbage in, garbage out” mentality, improving the ability of the individual using the model will create less “garbage in” which would in turn lead to less “garbage out”. Thus, in my view, inward focus is at least as important as outward focus. In other words, in addition to, and perhaps before, imagining a model interlocutor or aiming at a semi-imaginary universal audience, all arguers would do just as well to improve their own critical and creative thinking skills and dispositions. Better critical thinkers will be better able to help themselves and perform better as interlocutors for others.

I do not in any way think that improving individual critical thinking and imagining a universal audience or community of model interlocutors are mutually exclusive. Indeed, critical and creative thinking are closely related and there is a reciprocal relationship between improving critical thinking and being able to better imagine an appropriate (group of) Other(s). I only wish to highlight the importance of self-improvement which seems to be underemphasized in the theoretical argumentation literature which instead places unequal focus on the abilities of Others. Indeed Johnson is right that no matter how fertile our imaginations are an Other is important, but especially in situations where there is no Other present, improving our individual abilities should be given equal importance. What then is to be improved? The following section provides an outline to this answer through a discussion of critical and creative thinking.

6.5.1. Critical and Creative Thinking

Critical thinking is widely understood to involve both skills and dispositions (Siegel, 1988; Tiruneh, Verburch, & Elen, 2014; Bailin & Siegel, 2003). As Siegel argues,

One who has the critical attitude has a certain *character* as well as certain skills: a character which is inclined to seek, and to base judgement and action upon, reasons; which rejects partiality and arbitrariness; which is committed to the objective evaluation of relevant evidence; and which values such aspects of critical thinking as intellectual honesty, justice to evidence, sympathetic and impartial consideration of interests, objectivity, and impartiality (emphasis in original) (1988, p. 39)

The skills component focuses on the ability to assess reasons and reasoning. It is the “ability to ascertain the goodness of candidate reasons” (Bailin & Siegel, 2003, p. 182), to “critically evaluate beliefs, their underlying assumptions, and the world views in which they are embodied” (Paul, 1990, cited in Bailin & Siegel, 2003, p. 181). Thus, “[t]eaching critical thinking, accordingly, seems to involve teaching various kinds of reflective questioning, interpretation and evaluation strategies.” (Blair & Johnson, 2009, p. 3)

To teach these skills, critical thinking textbooks include discussions of argument analysis, fallacies, deductive and inductive logic, argumentation schemes, scientific reasoning, biases and debiasing, and argument diagramming – to name but only a few.⁹¹ In most recent textbooks, these skills are taught through the use of contemporary real-world examples and illustrations. In the classroom, critical thinking instruction may occur as its own subject or be infused into a differing subject matter, or involve a mixture.⁹² For example, in high school I took a course entitled “media literacy” wherein critical thinking skills were taught through the lens of the production and consumption of mass media. Whereas in university, I took a course entitled “reasoning skills” where the contents and subject matter of the textbook *Critical Thinking 3rd ed.* (Hughes, 2000) were the primary focus and differing real world examples were only used for illustration. In general, critical thinking instruction has been shown to improve students’ critical thinking abilities,

⁹¹ Catherine Hundleby has put together an excellent wide-ranging database that breaks down critical thinking textbook contents. See: <http://chundleby.com/critical-thinking/>.

⁹² Ennis (1989) identifies four approaches – general, infusion, immersion, and mixed.

though differing instruction methods have differing effectiveness (Tiruneh, Verburgh, & Elen, 2014).⁹³

While theoretically critical thinking also has a creative component, very few textbooks address creative thinking. In Catherine Hundleby's wide-ranging database which breaks down critical thinking textbook contents, of the 74 textbooks analyzed, only 4 textbooks fully, and 3 partially, address creative thinking. This demonstrates the majority focus that critical thinking instruction maintains on evaluation, rather than creation, despite the fact that one of the most well-known tests for critical thinking, the Ennis-Weir test, also involves evaluating students' creative ability (Ennis & Weir, 1985, p. 1). The lack of emphasis placed on creative thinking could in part be due to some scholars holding the view that the two activities are inherently opposed: critical thinking being focused on rules of thinking in a way that is "strictly analytic and evaluative, an algorithmic process that consists in arriving at the correct evaluation of ideas, arguments, or products" while creative thinking attempts to break the rules, transcend frameworks, and creates novel products (Bailin & Siegel, 2003, p. 186; Misset, 2012, p. 12).

As I hope has become apparent by this point, I do not think the two types of thinking are opposed at all, but rather, are complementary. I agree with critical thinking experts Bailin and Siegel that "[t]here are evaluative, analytic, logical, aspects to creating new ideas or products", and as mentioned twice above, I also see "an imaginative, constructive dimension to their assessment" (Bailin and Siegel, 2003, 186). Experts in creative thinking are also supportive of the relationship. As Robinson contends regarding creative thinking,

[c]ritics think of children running wild and knocking down furniture rather than getting on with serious work. Being creative does usually involve playing with ideas and having fun; enjoyment and imagination. But creativity is also about working in a highly focused way on ideas and projects, crafting them into their best forms and making critical judgements along the way about which work best and why. In every discipline, creativity also draws on skill, knowledge and control. It's not only about letting go, it's also about holding on. (2011, 5)

Creative thinking enhancement research has thus far mostly focused on divergent thinking (Missett, 2012, p. 9-10). Divergent thinking is listed in the *Creative Encyclopedia* (2009, p. 577) as "cognition that leads in various directions. Some of these

⁹³ The systematic review conducted by Tiruneh, Verburgh, & Elen (2014) takes the full text of 33 empirical studies into account and for that reason I have only cited their review rather than a collection of the individual studies.

are conventional, and some original. Because some of the resulting ideas are original, divergent thinking represents the potential for creative thinking and problem solving.” Unfortunately, psychological, social, and philosophical research regarding the connection between critical and creative thinking remains drastically underdeveloped (Missett, 2012; Baker et al., 2001). Independently, however, instruction in both has been shown to be effective (Tiruneh, et al, 2014; Missett, 2012; Foos & Boone, 2008). Philosophically, if Tindale is right and “[t]he ability to imagine counterarguments is synonymous with the ability to evaluate one’s own arguments” (2004, 112) then investigating the creation/imagination of reasons and counterarguments, etc., should be of high philosophical interest. If philosophers are the ones who declare the conditions for what is reasonable and unreasonable, they need to account for the creative/imaginative ability of the reasoner. They need to determine if an individual who makes a poor decision because of a natural lack of creativity should be declared unreasonable in the same way another more imaginative person could be.⁹⁴ Further, should all individual decision-making be exempt from evaluations of reasonableness if there is no Other with him to have it compete? I obviously do not have answers to these questions, but only ask them in an attempt to show that questions of creativity and imagination have philosophical interest and should not only be relegated to the psychological domain.

While thinking about the overarching question for this chapter, how to improve the user of the model, I have used much of the information above to develop the idea of the critical creative capacity. The concept is not in any way meant to be a “reinvention of the wheel” but I think it organizes some areas for further research in a simple manner. The concept is developed in the next section.

6.5.2. The Critical Creative Capacity

In my view, improving an agent’s ability to use the model for practical reasoning and argumentation (or any argumentation scheme for that matter) involves improving the agent’s critical creative capacity (CCC). The CCC identifies an individual’s ability to create/imagine/think up 1) the appropriate number and diversity of considerations and

⁹⁴ As with footnote 28, we could also say here, “a lack of creative thinking training provided to an arguer through no fault of their own”.

counter considerations; 2) which are appropriately relevant to the occurring reasoning or argumentation; while 3) attributing the appropriate role and weight to each.

The overarching ability is imaginative, but creation without any constraint is chaos. Creativity in its critical thinking capacity is guided by its role in argumentation to come up with and scrutinize considerations for a given practical or theoretical question. Thinking of what an Other or Others might say about the issue is *one* way to help creativity, but there are many, many more.⁹⁵ Creating considerations writ large is not enough, the three pillars of the CCC are meant to help the creativity effectively focus on argumentation.

The first factor concerning the number and diversity of considerations is meant to signify that a well-functioning CCC will not needlessly dwell in or skip over an area of inquiry, but will actively seek a diversity of (counter) considerations. For example, imagine an agent thinking about where to construct a new water dam who only focuses on economic benefits and comes up with a hugely long, we might say redundant, list of them. Such an instance would be an inappropriate number of considerations which lack diversity.

The second factor, concerning relevance, helps function as a rein on the first factor. One way to ensure that we do not have too many considerations is to discard the irrelevant ones. While the aim of keeping the considerations relevant can help avoid having too many, it cannot, however, provide advice regarding if there may be too few. This is why I have separated the first two factors.

The third factor is perhaps the hardest to work out theoretically. It involves appreciating the weight of each of the imagined, relevant, considerations. Such a stipulation is important because it is easy to mis-calculate the importance of reasons we have – what should be a knock-down reason might be given too little weight, or a consideration of minor importance may appear debilitating. Determining how much weight a reason should carry is a topic currently under investigation by some prominent philosophers who have contributed to a forthcoming book I am highly eager to read (Lord & Maguire, Forthcoming).

When in a group, a fourth characteristic to the CCC becomes important: 4) the confidence to speak up and appropriately press a point. Alone, our thoughts often come

⁹⁵ Here are just 30 more: <http://www.opencolleges.edu.au/informed/features/divergent-thinking/>

to us whether we want them to or not⁹⁶ and not having a thought, when attempting explicitly to reason, is a lack of creation not generally a lack of confidence. In a group, however, as we saw above, we may have thoughts and not mention them or may let them go too early, which could negatively impact the outcome of group argumentation and decision making. Thus, confidence to express becomes much more important in a group than for an individual.⁹⁷

At least the first three of these characteristics can be improved through effective critical and creative thinking instruction (Tiruneh, Verburgh, & Elen, 2014; Robinson, 2011) and doing so will measurably improve an agent's or agents' ability to effectively use the new model for practical reasoning and argumentation along with any other argumentation scheme.

6.6. Breivik and the Critical Creative Capacity

Before concluding, a brief discussion of how improving the CCC could have helped Breivik will help illustrate the idea and address the concern raised above regarding his taking enough time to come up with answers to all the schemes and questions in the new model.

In my view, Breivik demonstrated critical creativity and I do not wish to pretend that it was simply an overwhelming lack of it that caused him to reach his conclusion. The situation is more complicated than that. One of the clearest passages demonstrating his creativity occurs in the answer to his last question of his self-conducted interview, “Q:

⁹⁶ This is not to say that humans have no control over their thought process. That is a psychological topic which I am unqualified to engage. Without intending to take a position on Dennett's views writ large, I mean here something like the indeterminateness of his “consideration-generator”. He explains, “[t]he model of decision making I am proposing, has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously)” (Dennett, 1978, p. 295).

⁹⁷ Since developing this idea I have come to see that the notion of the CCC can be likened to the conditions for relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability (RSA) articulated by Johnson & Blair (1994, p. 55ff). A few important differences, however, make it worthwhile as a complementary concept not to be subsumed under the notion of RSA. First, while RSA concerns arguments, the CCC concerns arguers. This is most notable through the fourth C since an argument cannot have confidence. Relatedly, as a human capacity, the CCC is connected to both skills and dispositions as outlined by Siegel (1988). Thus, the aim is for an arguer to have both the skills and disposition to think critically and creatively. In short, improving an individual's CCC would increase their ability to create and critique arguments on the basis of notions like RSA, but the criterion of RSA says nothing about improving an individual's use of them.

What would you say to your European brothers and sisters?” In answer he provides alternatives to becoming a ‘Justiciar Knight’ that will still contribute to the cause. He identifies 9 other activities ranging from starting a blog to “infiltrating the MA100 political parties” to simply procreating (Berwick, 2011, pp. 1411-12).

To start with relevance, at least in this list Breivik makes a point to explain the relevance of his suggestions, and overall, I think he succeeds. On the other hand, while 9 alternatives may seem like a lot, there are surely far more ways one could contribute to preserving their culture than becoming a ‘Justiciar Knight’. It may be that he did indeed think up some other consideration, but if so he did not list them here. The biggest problem with Breivik’s argumentation is how he handles the weight of the considerations he comes up with. His misappropriation of weight is most evident in two places. First, deeming a shock attack to be *necessary*, and second, to be worth the lives of innocent people. Placing less weight on the necessity to perform a shock attack to contribute to cultural preservation and granting more weight to alternatives, and placing more weight on the lives of innocent people and less weight on the probability that their sacrifice would achieve the grander goal would have significantly lessened the likelihood of Breivik’s thinking reaching the conclusion to perform a shock attack.

6.7. Conclusion

This chapter has aimed at discussing how a given agent may use a model for practical reasoning and argumentation, for better or worse. The point has been to acknowledge that while improving a model for practical reasoning and argumentation is important for improving the practice, it is not and cannot be sufficient. In other words there is no (and I am doubtful there can be a) “fool proof” model for practical reasoning and argumentation. At the end of the day, the model maintains a reciprocal relationship with its user – a better model can help improve an agent’s ability and the better the ability of the agent, the better she can use the model.

The notion of “ability” – the thing to be improved - has been characterised through the idea of the critical creative capacity of the agent. Improving an individual’s critical creative capacity means improving their ability to imagine the appropriate number, of the appropriately relevant and appropriately weighted considerations and counter considerations called for in the model. I am aware that what counts as “appropriate” is vague and needs an explanation, but hope at this point that the intuitive understanding of this notion is enough to ground the overall idea and justify further research in this regard.

Finally, I also hope to have highlighted the importance of the creative, imaginative, part of critical thinking. I see a foundational relationship between imagination and argumentation that does not seem to have been emphasised in the literature to the degree of its importance thus far. I agree with Bailin and Siegel that it is tough to separate critical and creative thinking, but I think much more research in argumentation has thus far focused on the critical rather than the creative part and adding the word “creative” to the title better represents the importance it has. Critical thinking is not only about scrutinizing existing reasoning and argumentation, it is also about ingenuity, creation, and imagination. It can help in, among other things, 1) constructing an audience (whether a single interlocutor, or community of model interlocutors, or universal audience), 2) determining which and how many reasons (argument schemes) to employ, 3) answering the critical questions, 4) countering the availability bias – coming up with consideration not immediately available, and 5) countering the planning fallacy by imagining worst case rather than best case scenarios.

To conclude, we can now provide rough answers to the questions set out at the beginning of the chapter:

Q: There is no doubt that *an* Other can fulfil this role, but can *every* Other do so?

A: No. There are a number of ways that an Other may end up agreeing with you or stay silent when they should not.

Q: If not, what might make one Other better or worse than another?

A: A key component is that the Other be critical – genuinely if possible, but even contrived dissent will help.

Q: Further if an Other is helpful, would more than one Other be even more helpful?

A: Sometimes. Groups can help alleviate the availability bias and contribute with imagination, but if not worked with carefully, can actually amplify individual errors.

Q: Finally, what are we to do if there is no Other around but a decision still has to be made?

A: Do your best to improve your critical creative capacity and avoid heuristics and biases that are controllable and which may impact your decision.

7. CONCLUSION

You shouldn't try to answer all of philosophy in one book.

~ J. Sàágua (to me)

7.1. Sociological Note and Summary

I find nothing extraordinary about Breivik's thinking. The only extraordinary thing about him I can think of is his ability to mechanize himself. In his very first court ordered psychiatric interview, the first comment Breivik makes is "that he assumed that all forensic psychiatrists in the world envied the experts the task of evaluating him" (Husby and Sørheim, Sec. 5.1). As we have also seen, his main goal through all of his killing was to have people read his compendium. And because he killed all those people, I ended up reading his compendium. Had he not committed such a heinous, heartless crime, I'd likely never have known his name. Combined, these factors had me on the brink of disengaging with his writing. I did not want to satisfy him.

While I struggled with the decision, news from Germany regarding weekly anti-Islamization protests in Dresden emerged,⁹⁸ and the British political party UKIP had been coming under fire for some of its members publicly expressing their anti-Islamic views.⁹⁹ At the same time, Boko Haram had abducted hundreds of young girls in the name of Islam¹⁰⁰ and the group now known as ISIS was capturing land at incredible rates and at the cost of unspeakable human suffering in its efforts to establish a caliphate.¹⁰¹ Extremist thinking and acting seemed to be all around and from Breivik to Boko Haram, children remain far too often the victims on both sides of the extreme. Disengaging from the thinking involved in these issues just because of one murderer's ego no longer seemed an option.

Breivik's case worked for the study not just because it provided a fitting example that has very important contemporary implications, but also because of how much

⁹⁸ <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/12/europe/germany-anti-islam-marches/>

⁹⁹ <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/watch-ukip-candidates-spouting-vile-5526503>

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/schoolgirls-kidnapped-suspected-islamists-nigeria>

¹⁰¹ <http://www.foreignpolicy.org/iraq-timeline>

primary information was available. In the age of the internet and mass media, his compendium, psychological interviews, court transcripts, private letters, and more were all available and accessible through a single “Breivik Archive”.¹⁰² There was so much primary material available that careful consideration had to be given regarding what to exclude. Despite the availability of such a large quantity of resources, academic commentary and secondary literature about his case was, and remains, minimal. It remains minimal despite there being a huge number of interesting aspects to extremist thinking. I find one of the most interesting aspects of Breivik’s thinking to be the fact that he cared so much about his reasoning and argumentation. He cared about making a reasonable decision, about being found sane.

To open this dissertation I made two overarching qualifications: first, that I was interested in conscious, explicit reasoning and second, by people who cared about it. Breivik fits both. How then, could someone who cares about rationality¹⁰³ come to such an extreme conclusion? While in this dissertation I use Breivik’s case as a paradigm example of the unreasonable, I could not do so without a worry that I might be putting the cart before the horse. Throughout the project I kept an open mind to the possibility that perhaps Breivik was right - perhaps it is our intuitive notions of unreasonableness which needs changing. Fearing what he had done is not a sufficient reason for deeming him unreasonable, so what are the other reasons? Entertaining these thoughts was difficult. In addition to reading his primary texts and the texts listed above, I also read an excellent non-academic book about him and his crimes (Borchgrevink, 2013) and watched 3 professionally produced documentaries chronicling the events of 22 July, 2011. I even listened to the music he recommends while reading through his compendium.¹⁰⁴ These resources, I believe, helped me “hear” his voice in the compendium. One aim I had was that, if the models constructed in Chapters 2 and 5 were presented to Breivik, he would be more likely than not to agree that I had represented his

¹⁰² <https://sites.google.com/site/breivikreport/>

¹⁰³ It is interesting to note that in his self-writing, Breivik never characterizes himself or his reasoning as reasonable, but only as rational. I sent him a letter asking if he thinks there is a difference between the two and if so, if he considered his actions reasonable, but have yet to receive a reply.

¹⁰⁴ Breivik talks about the music which inspires him in (Berwick, 2011, p. 847-88). The most popular song from his selection is “Ode to a Dying People” by “Saga”. I spent most time listening to music from Helene Bøksle which I too can recommend to help you focus.

reasoning appropriately. I do not doubt that he would disagree with the evaluation. If at any point I thought that using his case as a paradigm of unreasonableness was a weak or questionable assumption, this whole dissertation would have been about exactly that instead.

In search of the reasons for which his case is a demonstration of unreasonableness, when I started investigating how Walton's and Fairclough and Fairclough's model would apply to Breivik's reasoning and argumentation is when I started to see the areas where improvements could be made (Baumtrog, 2013). Accordingly, in this dissertation I have primarily engaged with their work. Using their work as central to my own may have left the impression that I disagree with much of their views. The truth, however, is quite the opposite. In what Daniel Cohen (1995) describes as the dominant adversarial model of argumentation, it is to be expected that I "shoot down" their positions or that I write a dissertation which triumphs over their views. Unfortunately, the point of a dissertation is not to provide an exposé of all the ways you agree with others. Rather, I have been told that it is to advance knowledge in the field (although it also seems to have a large number of other, more direct purposes). In this work I have not wanted to be an opponent to either Fairclough and Fairclough or Walton in the adversarial sense. I feel we share too many interests and have too similar main goals to be justly thought of as oppositional. This work has only been intended to help develop and hopefully theoretically strengthen work done, not oppose it, even if through the course of my presentation I have been unable to fully say so.

A common feature between all of us is a concern with reasonableness. In chapter one I discussed some differing features between the notions of the reasonable and the rational. This was in part to acknowledge what I wouldn't be talking about – the huge and important realm of research in what is known as "decision theory". It was also meant, however, as a foreshadowing nod to Walton and Fairclough and Fairclough in joining them in pursuit of reasonableness. The third reason which was not made explicit was to encourage the reader at every stage to be comfortable asking "is this reasonable?" While my focus has been on helping other's make reasonable decisions, I have tried to be aware of the reasonableness in my own work.

With the frame of reasonableness in place, in Chapter 2 I combed through Breivik's words to extract the reasoning and argumentation he used as applied to the model of practical reasoning (argumentation) articulated by Fairclough and Fairclough. The results left me unsatisfied because it appeared that Breivik was relatively easily able

to fill in the model as well as address the critical questions. Without an outside interlocutor, I think using their model he could have concluded his decision was reasonable. I ended the chapter by pointing to the areas I thought were most likely the cause of such an outcome and which would be developed throughout the dissertation: 1) some conceptual/terminological confusion, 2) some confusion in the place and role of moral considerations, and 3) a lack of imagination on Breivik's part.

Taking up these issues, chapter 3 attempted to address the first problem by arguing for some conceptual distinctions, which when clarified pointed to substantial ways to adjust a model for practical reasoning and argumentation. Those clarifications were between: a) dialectical, dialogical, and quasi-dialogical, b) reasoning and argumentation, c) for individual and multiple participants.

Making use of these distinctions lead to the introduction of a new model for practical reasoning and argumentation in chapter 4 which provided theoretical clarity in regards to the distinctions provided in chapter 3, as well as strengthened the critical questions and significantly altered the place and role of moral considerations.

Chapter 5 served a dual purpose. The first purpose was theoretical. It was to address the second problem identified in chapter 2 regarding conceptual confusion in the place and role of morals in the Fairclough and Fairclough account. I tried in this chapter to describe what made the Fairclough and Fairclough account confusing and to show how its best theoretical aspects were not apparent in the construction of their model. The second purpose of chapter 5 was to apply the new model to Breivik's reasoning and argumentation see if the new model constituted an improvement and to explain how it avoided the confusion regarding morals in the Fairclough and Fairclough account.

Given the overall aim of the dissertation to help improve practical reasoning and argumentation, Chapter 6 needed to address why improving the model alone is not sufficient for achieving this goal. This discussion was inspired by the third problem identified in chapter two. I argued that the imagination of the agent using the model is a crucial component of the quality of the reasoning and argumentation and provided the concept of the critical creative capacity as a simplified way to identify what an agent can improve to be able to make better use of this model or any argumentation scheme in general.

Completing this work has led to the following theoretical conclusions:

1. Practical reasoning and practical argumentation are related, but are not the same.
2. An individual determining the reasonableness of a proposed action alone faces substantially different challenges than would occur with a critical interlocutor.
3. Even a critical interlocutor or group of interlocutors cannot, however, guarantee a reasonable conclusion.
4. Considerations of moral content play an important part in full evaluations of practical reasonableness.
5. Since all instances of practical reasoning and argumentation contain a goal and means, questioning the value(s) that underlie each is of crucial importance.
6. In light of the fact that humanity is still absent an uncontested authoritative moral philosophy to dictate right/good human action, the best we can do is argue about the moral standards we have chosen to employ.
7. Improving practical reasoning and argumentation entails at least two factors: the improvement of a guiding normative model and the improvement of its user(s).
8. A model for practical argumentation needs to articulate a way to decide between the pros and cons of a situation “all things considered” - in this case by articulating a way to decide the most preferable action.

7.2. Future Work

I have tried to be conscious to take the advice of my supervisor indicated in the quote at the beginning of this chapter – don’t try to answer all of philosophy in one book. The goal has been to present a coherent picture of an identifiable problem, followed by a justification for, and application of, a solution. The problem identified was that the most developed model for analysing and evaluating human practical reasoning too easily allowed a paradigm instance of unreasonableness to be evaluated as reasonable. To be as clear as possible, ***I took it as an assumption that Breivik’s reasoning and argumentation is unreasonable.*** I have not attempted to prove it was or it was not reasonable or unreasonable. Proving either would defeat the use of it as an assumption. What I have tried to prove is that the Fairclough and Fairclough model, which explicitly aims to be a

more developed and better version of the Walton (2007) model, fails to provide a way for Breivik to have seen he was being unreasonable.

I share a worry that was raised at the defence of this dissertation, the worry that “many might take the example to show that the argumentation scheme for practical reasoning used by philosophers to model rational thinking can lead to horrible conclusions, showing the foolishness of this argumentation scheme as a model of rational thinking. This is hardly the right message to send to the public if we are supposed to take our field seriously.” This worry was a large part of the motivation for improving the model and evaluative mechanism in the model. I tried to show that indeed, using the available model and its evaluative mechanism as presented via Walton and Fairclough and Fairclough leaves too much room for Breivik to be evaluated as reasonable. Evaluating Breivik’s example as reasonable is, I think, unacceptable. Thus, their models were unacceptable. Instead, however, of fearing public response, I could be seen to be siding with it – agreeing that a model for a standard of reasonableness needs to do better than let the Breivik example pass. I do want the public to take our profession seriously, and I think that improving upon each other’s work is a better way to have them do so than shielding them from discussion of where we can improve.

I am also aware that this dissertation is, for the most part, theoretically focused but that it also employs more empirical application than most philosophy theses. I make no apologies for these facts, however, given that philosophy is a theoretically focused discipline and as I said in the very first line of the introduction – this is a work in philosophy. I am also, however, under no illusion regarding the importance of empirical work and the myriad of ways it can improve philosophical thinking and research: there is a role for pure theory and a role for integrated theory and application. I do not in any way see the philosophical and empirical as oppositional. The main point in acknowledging these divisions is to point out that areas for future research are open in terms of both breadth and depth on both the theoretical and empirical planes.

The first place I see for future work is theoretical in nature and involves conducting deeper research on the argumentation scheme for rational preference - AS10 in the new model. One line of research for this scheme involves clarifying the relationship between goodness and probability. As touched upon in chapter 5, in extreme cases the relationship is clear: if an action under consideration is abundantly good, but impossible to achieve, probability outweighs goodness and the action cannot be undertaken. In a reverse situation the extreme case is also clear – if an action is obviously immoral, but

fully possible, it should not be performed. In most everyday situations, however, it is exactly this struggle between what it is ideally good to do and what we can do which causes decision making stress. Should I donate to charity which I can easily do, but which may not help the needy very much, or should I volunteer time to work directly with the needy which would be immensely helpful even though I have very little time available? It would help to provide an answer regarding how much ideal goodness it is reasonable to sacrifice for the sake of achievability.¹⁰⁵

The second avenue for further research is empirical and involves conducting more applications of the model to real world cases. These applications will provide feedback which would help strengthen the model. In this dissertation I have used an extreme case of practical reasoning. Applying the model to more “everyday” cases would provide valuable feedback for places to adjust and further nuance the model which could help address the questions raised in the first proposed area of future research.

Relatedly, reviewing a large number of applications could help reveal if any unintentional bias may have been built into the model. Conducting a quantitative review of a multitude of application results would help reveal trends in this regard and inspire work toward their corrections.

Also in terms of empirical work, it would be interesting to work with psychologists or sociologists to use the model to provide a fuller analysis of Breivik’s reasoning. I addressed his thinking here in a less detailed way than a book dedicated to just that topic could have. Conducting interdisciplinary research to apply the new model at differing levels of zoom – i.e., by adjusting what counts as the goal and what counts as the means - would allow for a much finer-grained analysis which would be worthwhile for philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists alike (which may then also be useful for policy makers). As a(n aspiring) philosopher conducting individual work, my aim here was to use his example to draw out philosophical problems and solutions, leaving a detailed application for joint work with scholars from a different profession for a later time.

Finally, as has been mentioned numerous times, more research is required regarding the nature of the relationship between morality and reasonableness. Which should take priority in guiding action and why? What is the extent of their congruence or

¹⁰⁵ I am knowingly at this point bypassing the problem of scale for both factors separately and together.


incongruence? Should a moral authority meet the demands of rationality? How do differing moral theories interact with evaluations of reasonableness? – are there similarities across them all? What is the nature and cause of the different ways they interact (if they do indeed have differences)? Answering these questions will take a career (or a few), but I am happy to have taken a first step in that direction.

7.3. Conclusion

As the title of this dissertation indicates, the aim has been to help improve practical reasoning and argumentation. In short, it has been to help people make better decisions. I hope the work is of interest to those in philosophy, but that at least parts of it are accessible and beneficial to those outside philosophy as well. Finally, if I am lucky, something within these pages will also help some of those who are working toward countering the hatred spewing from extremists of all sorts all over the world.

The decisions we make matter. As Carl Sagan powerfully demonstrated, we are (for the time being at least) stuck here together on our “pale blue dot”¹⁰⁶ and everyone’s experience of the time we spend here depends crucially on each of our decisions.

Figure 7-1 "Pale Blue Dot"



Look again at that dot. That's here. That's home. That's us. On it everyone you love, everyone you know, everyone you ever heard of, every human being who ever was, lived

¹⁰⁶ “Pale Blue Dot” [pictured] is the name of a photograph of the earth taken from about 6 billion kilometers away. In the photo, the earth hangs within a sunbeam and takes up less than 1 pixel against the vast black background of space. Carl Sagan entitled one of his books, *Pale Blue Dot* (1994) and reflects on the photo in the quoted passage. The Library of Congress maintains an audio recording of Sagan reading this passage: <http://www.loc.gov/item/cosmos000110/>

out their lives. The aggregate of our joy and suffering, thousands of confident religions, ideologies, and economic doctrines, every hunter and forager, every hero and coward, every creator and destroyer of civilization, every king and peasant, every young couple in love, every mother and father, hopeful child, inventor and explorer, every teacher of morals, every corrupt politician, every "superstar," every "supreme leader," every saint and sinner in the history of our species lived there—on a mote of dust suspended in a sunbeam.

The Earth is a very small stage in a vast cosmic arena. Think of the rivers of blood spilled by all those generals and emperors so that, in glory and triumph, they could become momentary masters of a fraction of a dot. Think of the endless cruelties visited by the inhabitants of one corner of this pixel on the scarcely distinguishable inhabitants of some other corner, how frequent their misunderstandings, how eager they are to kill one another, how fervent their hatreds.

Our posturings, our imagined self-importance, the delusion that we have some privileged position in the Universe, are challenged by this point of pale light. Our planet is a lonely speck in the great enveloping cosmic dark. In our obscurity, in all this vastness, there is no hint that help will come from elsewhere to save us from ourselves.

The Earth is the only world known so far to harbor life. There is nowhere else, at least in the near future, to which our species could migrate. Visit, yes. Settle, not yet. Like it or not, for the moment the Earth is where we make our stand.

It has been said that astronomy is a humbling and character-building experience. There is perhaps no better demonstration of the folly of human conceits than this distant image of our tiny world. To me, it underscores our responsibility to deal more kindly with one another, and to preserve and cherish the pale blue dot, the only home we've ever known (Sagan, 1997, pp. 12-13).

Let's make our decisions better.

Breivik's victims of 22 July, 2011:

Anne Lise Holter, Hanne Ekroll Løvlie, Ida Marie Hill, Jon Vegard Lervåg, Hanna Endresen, Tove Åshill Knutsen, Kjersti Sandberg, Kai Hauge, Monica Elisabeth Bøsei, Christopher Perreau, Tore Eikeland, Havard Vederhus, Hanne Kristine Fridtun, Anders Kristiansen, Tarald Kuven Mjelde, Guro Vartdal Håvoll, Jamil Rafal Yasin, Ismail Haji Ahmed, Karar Mustafa Qasim, Bano Abobakar Rashid, Mona Abdinur, Gizem Dogan, Lejla Selaci, Henrik André Pedersen, Sverre Flåte Bjørkavåg, Gunnar Linaker, Tamta Lipartelliani, Diderik Aamodt Olsen, Lene Maria Bergum, Andreas Edvardsen, Henrik Rasmussen, Simon Sæbø, Carina Borgund, Ingrid Berg Heggelund, Monica Iselin Didriksen, Tina Sukuvara, Espen Jørgensen, Sondre Furseth Dale, Sondre Kjøren, Syvert Knudsen, Torjus Jakobsen Blattmann, Håkon Ødegaard, Ronja Søttar Johansen, Eva Kathinka Lütken, Isabel Victoria, Green Sogn, Silje Merete Fjellbu, Aleksander Aas Eriksen, Steinar Jessen, Andrine hills Espeland, Margrethe Bøyum Kløven, Elisabeth Trønnes Lie, Kevin Daae Berland, Karin Elena Holst, Johannes Buø, Trond Berntsen, Rune Havdal, Hanne Balch Fjalestad, Porntip Ardam, Bendik Rosnæs Ellingsen, Even Flugstad Malmedal, Fredrik Lund Schjetne, Silje Stamneshagen, Synne Røyneland, Andreas Dalby Grønnesby, Ida Beathe Rogne, Maria Maagerø Johannesen, Victoria Stenberg, Thomas Margido Antonsen, Åsta Sofie Helland Dahl, Marianne Sandvik, Eivind Hovden, Emil Okkenhaug, Birgitte Smetbak, Modupe Ellen Awoyemi, Ruth Benedicte Vatndal Nilsen, Sharidyn Svebakk-Bøhn, and Snorre Haller.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A – Breivik Quotes used in the Fairclough and Fairclough Model

*Page numbers refer to Breivik's compendium. Section numbers refer to the first psychological report prepared by Husby and Sørheim.

Berwick, Andrew, and Anders Behring] [Breivik. 2011. *2083 - A European Declaration of Independence*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2011/07/24/National-Politics/Graphics/2083+-+A+European+Declaration+of+Independence.pdf>.

Husby, Torgeir, and Synne Sørheim. 2011. "Court Psychiatric Report to the Oslo District Court (First Report)." Oslo. <https://sites.google.com/site/breivikreport/documents/anders-breivik-psychiatric-report-of-2011>.

CLAIM:

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: I (presumably) ought to distribute the compendium and perform a spectacular deadly shock attack/performing these acts is the right thing to do.

Unfortunately, spectacular operations like these are the only way to be heard. Everything else we have tried has failed and yielded nothing. The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard. p. 1351

Around year 2000 I realised that the democratic struggle against the Islamisation of Europe, European multiculturalism was lost. It had gone too far. It is simply not possible to compete democratically with regimes who import millions of voters. 40 years of dialogue with the cultural Marxists/multiculturalists had ended up as a disaster. It would now only take 50-70 years before we, the Europeans are in a minority. As soon as I realised this I decided to explore alternative forms of opposition. Protesting is saying that you disagree. Resistance is saying you will put a stop to this.¹⁰⁷ I decided I wanted to join the resistance movement. p. 1378

I don't want to do what I do, I would rather focus on starting a family and focus on my career again. But I can't do that as long as I feel like a person caught in a burning spaceship with nowhere to go. If you see the ship is burning you don't ignore it and start cooking noodles do you? You put out the fire even if it endangers your life. You don't enjoy putting out the fire but it is your duty to yourself and your fellow crewmen. p. 1417

[NOTE: Since in this model, the claim is just to enact the proposed means, the material supporting the reconstruction of the means premise below can also be considered applicable here].

¹⁰⁷ Aage Borchgrevink, learning from Hans Rustad, points out that this quote is citing left wing militant Ulrike Marie Meinhof: "Protest is when I say that and that does not suit me. Resistance is when I see to it that the thing I do not like no longer happens" - Originally in German - "Protest ist, wenn ich sage, das und das paßt mir nicht. Widerstand ist, wenn ich dafür Sorge, daß das, was mir nicht paßt, nicht länger geschieh"

COUNTER CLAIM – NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES:

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: *Innocent people will die, or I will end up living in a nightmare situation.*

Innocent people will die, in the thousands. But it is still better than the alternative; millions of dead Europeans, which is the worst case phase 3 scenario. p. 1360

Not only will all my friends and family detest me and call me a monster; the united global multiculturalist media will have their hands full figuring out multiple ways to character assassinate, vilify and demonize. They will possibly do everything they can to distort the truth about me, KT and our true objectives, and attempt to make even revolutionary conservatives detest me. They will label me as a racist, fascist, Nazi-monster as they usually do with everyone who opposes multiculturalism/cultural Marxism. However, since I manifest their worst nightmare (systematical and organized executions of multiculturalist traitors), they will probably just give me the full propaganda rape package and propagate the following accusations: pedophile, engaged in incest activities, homosexual, psycho, ADHD, thief, non-educated, inbred, maniac, insane, monster etc. I will be labeled as the biggest (Nazi-)monster ever witnessed since WW2. p. 1435

MEANS:

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: *Using deadly shock attacks ... will give the launch of the compendium world press and guarantee that our voice is heard, creat[ing] awareness about the truth and contribut[ing] to consolidation/recruitment.*

Our only objective in this phase is to create awareness about the truth and contribute to consolidation/recruitment. p. 1351

Unfortunately, spectacular operations like these are the only way to be heard. Everything else we have tried has failed and yielded nothing. The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard. By forcing them to acknowledge our presence and explaining our agenda to everyone we are making it very hard for the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist media establishment to ignore the call of the free people of Europe. p. 1351

Our phase 1 strategy is a simple strategy of repeated pin-pricks and bleedings that, though small in proportion to the total force strength, sap the will of the current EU regimes to continue the fight or at least will force them to open their eyes to reality earlier (and identify the Islamisation of Europe as a threat to all Europeans). p. 1352

Q: How did you proceed after these sessions in 2002-2004?

A: I understood early that in order to be able to work full time with what you want, you need to gain economical independence. I was not rich at the time and I had to somehow find a way to earn enough funds to be able to contribute. p. 1380

As noted, this, the financing stage, was as you may know a sub-task of a bigger operation, which is still in progress. The creation of this compendium is actually a larger and more central task in this process, as I would never have had enough funds to create it if wasn't for my earlier financial/business ventures. The actual military operation is also a sub-task as well as it is a marketing method for the distribution of this compendium among other things. pp. 1408-9

The experts ask what the subject was thinking as he was walking around shooting. He says: *Had a pragmatic approach, wanted to kill enough to give the launch of the compendium world press. The operation was just a formality.* Sec. 5.8

GOAL:

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: My goal is the *spreading [of] the compendium [to] create awareness about the truth [of the Islamization of Europe] and contribute to consolidation/recruitment [of people to fight against it]*.

By marketing and distributing the compendium: 2083, and similar works, we hope to create more awareness, create reference points and thus contribute to consolidate and further our cause. 1350

Our only objective in this phase is to create awareness about the truth and contribute to consolidation/recruitment. p. 1351

By forcing them to acknowledge our presence and explaining our agenda to everyone we are making it very hard for the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist media establishment to ignore the call of the free people of Europe. The message is simple: "WE DO NOT WANT AND WILL NOT TOLERATE ISLAM IN EUROPE!" Any individual or organisation that actively supports or are participating (directly or indirectly as silent bystanders) in the Islamisation of Europe are flagged as valid targets, starting with the MA 100 political parties and media organisations themselves. p. 1351

By propagating and defending Christendom we simply mean that we want to halt the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist attacks and systematic deconstruction on our Christian cultures and the Church itself and to reverse the de-Christianisation of Europe. p. 1352

As noted, this, the financing stage, was as you may know a sub-task of a bigger operation, which is still in progress. The creation of this compendium is actually a larger and more central task in this process, as I would never have had enough funds to create it if wasn't for my earlier financial/business ventures. The actual military operation is also a sub-task as well as it is a marketing method for the distribution of this compendium among other things. pp. 1408-9

Certain long term tasks are delegated and I am one of two who are asked to create a compendium based on the information I have acquired from the other founders during our sessions. Our primary objective is to develop PCCTS, Knights Templar into becoming the foremost conservative revolutionary movement in Western Europe the next few decades. 1414

I am required to build a capital base in order to fund the creation of the compendium. I don't know if I will ever proceed with a martyrdom operation at this point as it simply seems too radical. 1415

If I fail to generate the specified amount I will move forward with the operation, in order to market the compendium that way. 1415

Utøya island and the government building was all about publishing the manifest, to reach the 350,000 militant nationalists who are the audience. Sec. 5.4

The experts ask what the subject was thinking as he was walking around shooting. He says: *Had a pragmatic approach, wanted to kill enough to give the launch of the compendium world press. The operation was just a formality. Sec. 5.8*

Spreading the compendium is the goal of the operations, he says, and the operation's success is measured by the spreading of the compendium. Sec. 5.8

The compendium is the project, not the killing. Sec. 5.9

CIRCUMSTANCES:

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: *The Muslims in many parts of Europe will make up the majority within 2080. The free people of Europe have lost any hope of reversing the current development in Europe democratically. The current internationalist elites (cultural Marxists, suicidal humanists, globalists) are [...] deliberately collaborating with the Muslims [so as to] deconstruct everything European so we will become neutralised minorities in our own countries. [Uninterrupted,] this course leads to a certain Islamic takeover of Europe [which will] completely annihilate European Christendom within the next hundred years.*

While it is true that we currently enjoy wealth and many freedoms this will not be the case in 50 or 100 years. The Muslims in many parts of Europe will make up the majority within 2080. You must study the case of Lebanon and similar cases in order to comprehend what is going on. Lebanon was a Christian territory once with 80% Christians in 1911. Now, in today's Lebanon, there are less than 25% Christians left. The Muslims won the war and Europe just let it happen. The remaining Christians live under harsh Dhimmitude and everyone in their right mind are attempting to flee the country. To fully understand the situation I urge everyone to read "Europe Burning", book 2 of the compendium: "2083". It is a complete overview of the current European situation and it explains how we, the free people of Europe have lost any hope of reversing the current development in Europe democratically. In other words, it explains why armed resistance is the only option we have left to save Europe from the same fate as Lebanon. p. 1350

The current internationalist elites (cultural Marxists, suicidal humanists, globalists) are the Nazis of our age and deliberately collaborating with the Muslims. They are the Quislings who are trying to transfer political powers from our sovereign nations to a foreign political entity – the EUSSR/UN. Their intention is to deconstruct everything European so we will become neutralised minorities in our own countries. p. 1354

At the moment, approximately 60% of Europeans (excluding Muslims) support our fundamental political doctrines but obviously not necessarily the means. p. 1356

I prayed for the first time in a very long time today. I explained to God that unless he wanted the Marxist-Islamic alliance and the certain Islamic takeover of Europe to completely annihilate European Christendom within the next hundred years he must ensure that the warriors fighting for the preservation of European Christendom prevail. p. 1459

VALUES:

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: *I first and foremost value logic and rationality. I also value cultural preservation/self defence and given the social facts of the circumstances, I am bound to value pan-European Christian cultural preservation.*

By propagating and defending Christendom we simply mean that we want to halt the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist attacks and systematic deconstruction on our Christian cultures and the Church itself and to reverse the de-Christianisation of Europe. p. 1352

We on the other hand are a defensive military organisation who only seek to protect the peoples of Europe and our cultures from genocide. p. 1352

We on the other hand are a defensive military organisation who only seek to protect the peoples of Europe and our cultures from genocide p. 1353

The word "nationalist" has been tainted by history so I prefer the word "cultural conservative". Cultural conservatism has obviously nothing to do with Toryism (traditional conservatism) but rather from the words true meaning: to conserve. p. 1356

As rational creatures we will go to great lengths to prevent our own demise and secure our success. p. 1356

I have no moral reservations whatsoever against participating or leading military operations against Norwegian Category A and B traitors as it is the most basic of human rights to defend your people against genocide. p. 1357

I consider myself to be an anti-racist, anti-fascist and anti-Nazi. p. 1358

As a cultural Christian, I believe Christendom is essential for cultural reasons. After all, Christianity is the ONLY cultural platform that can unite all Europeans, which will be needed in the coming period during the third expulsion of the Muslims. p. 1361

A person unwilling to martyr himself for a greater cause can never call himself a Knight and a Christian individual unwilling to martyr himself for the preservation of European Christendom can never call himself a Knight of Christ. p. 1363

Fighting for your people's survival, when threatened, is the most logical thing to do to. Defending your people and culture from genocide is the most basic and recognised human right and one of few causes actually worth dying for. p. 1382

"Logic" and rationalist thought (a certain degree of national Darwinism) should be the fundament of our societies. I support the propagation of collective rational thought but not necessarily on a personal level. p. 1386

Q: Why did you choose an allegiance to a group with Christian values and pan- European goals instead of a purely national/regional group?

A: Many have asked this question. My choice has nothing to do with the fact that I am not proud of my own traditions and heritage. My choice was based purely pragmatism.

All Europeans are in this boat together so we must choose a more moderate platform that can appeal to a great number of Europeans – preferably up to 50% (realistically up to 35%). Choosing a local/national group would be counterproductive as all the groups I am familiar with are Odinist orientated and not Christian identity groups. It is essential that we choose a banner that has the potential to appeal towards central and southern Europeans as well. I understand that many nationalists oppose Christianity and do not wish to fight under the banner of a cross. Furthermore, I understand that many nationalists only care for their own nation and culture. However, all Western Europeans are in the same situation, facing the same problems so it would be illogical not to cooperate and focus on pan-European organizations. Pooling resources and especially knowledge is essential. Obviously, this cannot be achieved if you require that your potential members follow un-appealing principles and codes such as that of the national anarchists (at least many of them). A hateful ideology (white supremacist), death metal, Odinism, conspiracy theories does NOT have mass appeal. Some of the local nationalist factions have very controversial views and lifestyles that do not appeal to a broad specter of people. This is in a way understandable as it can be viewed as indirect cultural defensive mechanisms as a result of decades of persecution from local authorities. Yet, so called national anarchists will never be potent enough unless they pool their knowledge base with pan-European organisations. Mass appeal should be the most essential factor in this strategy. Obviously, the PCCTS, Knights Templar does not have mass appeal as we are a relatively cynical/cruel/goal oriented armed resistance group. However, our primary foundational principles (a majority of them) still have mass appeal and are supported by as many as 50-60% of all Europeans. The reason for this is due to the fact that we oppose ALL hate ideologies and we consider it illogical to fight hate with hate. Of course, this does not mean that we will use less brutal methods in our operations. It only means that our foundational ideological principles will have mass appeal to a majority of Europeans. pp. 1380-81

Regarding my personal relationship with God, I guess I'm not an excessively religious man. I am first and foremost a man of logic. However, I am a supporter of a monocultural Christian Europe. p. 1404

(CQ1) What other goals do I have that might conflict with G?

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: *I can choose to live a normal life if I want to, just like my friends are doing. Get a cute girlfriend, get married, have kids, continue my career and earn 50 000-60 000+ Euro per year.*

In this regard I felt I had two choices. Create a large family (3-5 children) or completely focus on my tasks as a part of the European resistance movement. p. 1358

I can choose to live a normal life if I want to, just like my friends are doing. Get a cute girlfriend, get married, have kids, continue my career and earn 50 000-60 000+ Euro per year. p. 1359

There are only two logical steps for people my age; have as many children as possible and prepare for Phase 2 or 3 or fight now in Phase 1. I chose the latter. p. 1359

(CQ2) How well is G supported by (or at least consistent with) my values V?

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: My goal of *spreading the compendium [to] create awareness about the truth [of the Islamization of Europe] and contribute to consolidation/recruitment [of people to fight against it]* is highly consistent with my valuing logic, rationality, and the preservation of pan-European Christendom.

A person unwilling to martyr himself for a greater cause can never call himself a Knight and a Christian individual unwilling to martyr himself for the preservation of European Christendom can never call himself a Knight of Christ. p. 1363

Choosing a local/national group would be counterproductive as all the groups I am familiar with are Odinist orientated and not Christian identity groups. It is essential that we choose a banner that has the potential to appeal towards central and southern Europeans as well. I understand that many nationalists oppose Christianity and do not wish to fight under the banner of a cross. Furthermore, I understand that many nationalists only care for their own nation and culture. However, all Western Europeans are in the same situation, facing the same problems so it would be illogical not to cooperate and focus on pan-European organizations. p. 1381

(CQ3) What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also bring about G should be considered?

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: In addition to distributing the compendium and *performing a spectacular deadly shock attack*, I also considered, *having as many children as possible, being a blogger and spreading the truth about the topics listed in this book, influence[ing] the democratical process by infiltrating the MA100 political parties (parties supporting multiculturalism) [to] weaken their resolve from the inside, joining the police force or the military, seeking a career in any media organisations, particularly the broadcast media, and infiltrating academic institutions.*

Everything else we have tried has failed and yielded nothing. The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard. p. 1351
In this regard I felt I had two choices. Create a large family (3-5 children) or completely focus on my tasks as a part of the European resistance movement. I don't understand why so many people can simply ignore the current situation without doing anything. How can they look their kids in the eyes in the future knowing that they have done nothing? p. 1359

There are only two logical steps for people my age; have as many children as possible and prepare for Phase 2 or 3 or fight now in Phase 1. I chose the latter. p. 1359

There are many ways to contribute to the struggle. Becoming a Justiciar Knight is just one out of several manifestations of the struggle:

- Front 1-7 (all non-military), any career/effort that lets you influence others and society
- You can be a blogger, spreading the truth about the topics listed in this book.
- Create a blog today and spread the Conservative Revolution; Wordpress.com, Blogger.com. Register your blog with nationalist/patriotic/conservative blog networks so you can stay in touch with others like you. Create a channel on Youtube or join other patriotic channels. You can publish your videos by creating an account.
- You can infiltrate multiculturalist blogs and forums spreading the same arguments and documentation which will contribute to recruit more and sow doubt in the hearts of our enemies. Our enemies have thousands of "internet apologists" doing the same to us.
- You may try to influence the democratical process by infiltrating the MA100 political parties (parties supporting multiculturalism) and weaken their resolve from the inside.
- You can seek a career in the police force or the military with the goal of reaching positions where you gain influence when the window of opportunity opens up within a few decades. The military command is perhaps the most important arena as it will be extremely important in phase 2 and 3.
- You can seek a career in any media organisations, particularly the broadcast media.
- Academic infiltration is just as important as joining the guerrilla movement in phase 1. You might not see immediate results but you are playing a crucial role.
- Another much underestimated task is procreation. By having as many children as possible and "moulding them into conservative warriors; to fight with the pen or the sword" will be the key to our future victory. We need a new generation who has been shielded from the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist indoctrination campaigns and we need brothers and sisters who parent these future Europeans heroes. If you are not willing to sacrifice your own life, then I would strongly advise you to make babies and ensure that they will be willing to sacrifice theirs when the time is right. p. 1412

The subject says that in January and February 2011, *he considered taking over the NRK (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation) to broadcast propaganda, but many more people would be needed to do that. Thought about detonating the Halden nuclear reactor. Also thought about blowing up the royal castle, but Europe's royal families should not be executed until 2020.*

The subject says that already a year earlier, *he thought about setting off a bomb at the congress of SV (Socialist Left Party) or the Labor Party. Considered it again at the beginning of 2011. Sec. 5.7*

(CQ4) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the best of the whole set, in light of considerations of efficiency in bringing about G?

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: Distributing the compendium and performing the shock attack are the most efficient because *we have tried protest through dialogue for 50 years now and that approach has been a disaster. Furthermore, creating a religious order would be counter-productive as a majority of Europe's armed resistance fighters are agnostics, atheists or relatively secular Christians.* It is also more efficient than attempting democratic means because, *How can we democratically compete with a regime that is mass-importing hundreds of thousands of new voters? Thus, armed struggle appears futile at this point but it is the only way forward.*

We have tried protest through dialogue for 50 years now and that approach has been a disaster for us. The phase of dialogue has now ended. p. 1352

But the main problem is that a great majority of these operations are not “spectacular” enough to break media censorship. p. 1363

Furthermore, creating a religious order would be counter-productive as a majority of Europe’s armed resistance fighters are agnostics, atheists or relatively secular Christians. The organisation is therefore considered a moderate Christian identity organisation and not a religious order. p. 1363

How can we democratically compete with a regime that is mass-importing hundreds of thousands of new voters?Armed struggle appears futile at this point but it is the only way forward. p. 1415

(CQ5) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the best of the whole set, in light of my values V?

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: Risking my life during a shock attack best fits best the value of preserving European Christendom because no other option succeeds in promoting the value.

We will act as exemplary role models for our less organised brothers and sisters across Europe in the decades to come. p. 1352

Q: How would you argue against criticism from other so called European chivalric organisations like the Freemasons, the OSMTH and similar?

A: They claim to be Knights of Christ yet they are not willing to sacrifice their life for the preservation of European Christendom. They do not even acknowledge that European Christendom is in the process of being deconstructed. They claim to be Knights but they are not even warriors. How can they claim to be today’s manifestation of a pious chivalric order when the core doctrine of the Knights Templar was to submit to voluntary poverty? All I see is a group of decadent individuals who are not willing to make any substantial sacrifices for anyone or anything. Furthermore, Knighthood is directly linked to martyrdom. Taking martyrdom out of knighthood would be like taking elections out of a democracy. A person unwilling to martyr himself for a greater cause can never call himself a Knight and a Christian individual unwilling to martyr himself for the preservation of European Christendom can never call himself a Knight of Christ. We, the PCCTS, Knights Templar, can, and we are currently the most genuine successors to their legacy. It is, however, not our goal to completely mimic the order. Demanding that our members undergo a theological education would be pointless as today’s curriculum has been corrupted by Christian pacifists and suicidal humanists. Furthermore, creating a religious order would be counter-productive as a majority of Europe’s armed resistance fighters are agnostics, atheists or relatively secular Christians. The organisation is therefore considered a moderate Christian identity organisation and not a religious order. p. 1363

Around year 2000 I realised that the democratic struggle against the Islamisation of Europe, European multiculturalism was lost. It had gone too far. It is simply not possible to compete democratically with regimes who import millions of voters. 40 years of dialogue with the cultural Marxists/multiculturalists had ended up as a disaster. It would now only take 50-70 years before we, the Europeans are in a minority. As soon as I realised this I decided to explore alternative forms of opposition. Protesting is saying that you disagree. Resistance is saying you will put a stop to this. I decided I wanted to join the resistance movement. p. 1378

Q: Some “Ghandist/pacifist” members of the conservative resistance will claim that violence will not solve anything and will instead only give our enemies more rhetorical ammunition and make it easier for them to gain the moral ground. They will finally be able to say; “terrorism has no religion”. “By using terror you are undermining your own struggle and hurting the nationalist cause”. How would you react to statements like this?

A great majority of the European conservatives have chosen dialogue and pacifism since 1955 until today. And what exactly has it gotten us...? During the last 55 years of pacifist dialogue, the multiculturalists have been allowed to open the gates and flooded our ancestral lands with 30 million Muslims and they even continue to do so today. Should we perhaps try dialogue for another 40 years and see what that brings us...? Only a suicidal individual would accept this. Not acting would be the biggest of all crimes. pp. 1375-76

You will do anything to put out that fire despite of the fact that they are trying to stop you. Anything else would be illogical. p. 1418

(CQ6) What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to bring about

A?

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: Performing the shock attack is practically possible because although, there is a risk of mental breakdown, *I have an extremely strong psyche and I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters.*

There are no effective counter-measures against our phase 1 strategy. It is the most efficient way of modern warfare. We are going to win this war eventually no matter how they chose to act. p. 1352

It's human nature to be selfish, to seek admiration, love and affection. This is why very few people will have the self insight, the ideological and moral confidence and strength to act selflessly on behalf of their own countrymen on their own initiative without a solid hierarchical organisation or country supporting and encouraging them. We have taken these thankless tasks upon ourselves because we possess these traits; the self insight, the ideological and moral confidence and strength and we are willing to sacrifice our lives for our brothers and sisters, even though they will openly detest us. p. 1383

Overcoming your fear is the most difficult task. It's essential to prepare yourself mentally for this. p. 1384

I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters. My love for them exceeds my own self serving interests. p. 1403

To be honest, if I felt that other people could do my job I would not do what I do, that I can guarantee you. p. 1418

I have an extremely strong psyche (stronger than anyone I have ever known) but I am seriously contemplating that it is perhaps biologically impossible to survive the mental, perhaps coupled with physical torture, I will be facing without completely breaking down on a psychological level. I guess I will have to wait and find out. p. 1435

(CQ7) What consequences of my bringing about A that might have even greater negative value than the positive value of G should be taken into account?

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: Innocent deaths as a result of bringing about the shock attack might be thought to have a greater negative value, *but it is still better than the alternative; millions of dead Europeans, which is the worst case phase 3 scenario.*

Q: Can significant indirect damage against civilians be justified?

A: Yes and no. It can be justified in the sense that it is the only pragmatical way to move forward. When someone blows up a government building it is obviously not with the intention to kill the cleaning lady or the janitor. The target has been selected after careful consideration because it will yield the wanted results.

There are extreme and moderate forces. We are all cultural conservatives even though we use different means. We have taken it upon ourselves to use brute, cynical force so other people don't have to. The other political fronts should welcome it as a necessary evil in order to rid ourselves of a much greater evil.

Innocent people will die, in the thousands. But it is still better than the alternative; millions of dead Europeans, which is the worst case phase 3 scenario. p. 1360 [This and the above 2 paragraphs appear together as such in the compendium]

The accused claims that they do not want to hit civilian targets. They want to hit extreme Marxists who wish to Islamize the country or who support multiculturalism. They would like that less than 50 percent of those hit will be accidental civilian targets. Sec. 2.4.1

The subject is asked how he sees the development of the ideology he presents in his compendium after 22 July 2011. He says: *We shall not execute civilian brethren, but many civilians will die anyway. The purpose is to take power, but it must be done in consultation with the police.* The subject explains that a civilian is someone who is not a *political activist*. He regards political activists as *legitimate targets*. Sec 5.4

New Question 1: Is the situation described in a rationally acceptable way? (Definition of Circumstances Question)

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: Yes. I have written more than 486 pages, predominantly in *"Europe Burning", book 2 of the compendium: "2083"* which provides a *complete overview of the current European situation.*

To fully understand the situation I urge everyone to read *"Europe Burning", book 2 of the compendium: "2083"*. It is a complete overview of the current European situation and it explains how we, the free people of Europe have lost any hope of reversing the current development in Europe democratically. In other words, it explains why armed resistance is the only option we have left to save Europe from the same fate as Lebanon. p. 1350

I do, however, acknowledge that only a small proportion of Muslims are so called "Jihadi youth" but this argument is defeated by the mere fact that the same thing can be said about the Taliban in Pakistan. The Taliban only makes out 1-3% of the population, yet they have caused a civil war. p. 1394

New Question 2. Are the values that underlie the action rationally acceptable? (Acceptable Value Question)

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: Valuing logic and rationality are by definition rationally acceptable. Cultural preservation is not racist or fascist, and protecting ... *dignity, culture and heritage* are rationally acceptable.

The thinking seems to be that there are only two versions of Europeans. If you do not support multiculturalism 100% you are a Nazi. You're also a fascist pig, a racist, a homophobe – in other words a sub-human. This attitude betrays an all-pervasive hatred that demonises absolutely anything Europeans do to protect their dignity, culture and heritage. p. 1357

I consider myself to be an anti-racist, anti-fascist and anti-Nazi. p. 1358

New Question 3. Should the agent consider other values? (Other Values Question)

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: I have written over a thousand pages explaining why not to value multiculturalism. As for personal values, I do value living a normal life and *I would*

rather focus on starting a family and focus on my career again. But by being a silent bystander to this I will be as guilty as our corrupt elites.

I consider myself to be an anti-racist, anti-fascist and anti-Nazi. p. 1358

I can choose to live a normal life if I want to, just like my friends are doing. Get a cute girlfriend, get married, have kids, continue my career and earn 50 000-60 000+ Euro per year. The problem as I see it is that I truly fear for the future of Europe. How can I procreate knowing that we are heading for cultural suicide? By being a silent bystander to this I will be as guilty as our corrupt elites. How could I silently watch while Islamic demographic warfare is being waged against our societies, diminishing our numbers and the influence over our very own lives? I feel compelled to act, even though I know that very few will dare to become one of the pioneers, one of the first martyrs in Phase 1. There are only two logical steps for people my age; have as many children as possible and prepare for Phase 2 or 3 or fight now in Phase 1. I chose the latter. p. 1359

I don't want to do what I do, I would rather focus on starting a family and focus on my career again. But I can't do that as long as I feel like a person caught in a burning spaceship with nowhere to go. If you see the ship is burning you don't ignore it and start cooking noodles do you? You put out the fire even if it endangers your life. You don't enjoy putting out the fire but it is your duty to yourself and your fellow crewmen. And let's say your crewmen have been infected with a rare virus that shuts down their rational senses and they try to stop you from putting out the fire. You can't really allow yourself to be stopped by any of them as it will lead to your collective death. You will do anything to put out that fire despite of the fact that they are trying to stop you. Anything else would be illogical. p. 1417

Not only will all my friends and family detest me and call me a monster; the united global multiculturalist media will have their hands full figuring out multiple ways to character assassinate, vilify and demonize. They will possibly do everything they can to distort the truth about me, KT and our true objectives, and attempt to make even revolutionary conservatives detest me. They will label me as a racist, fascist, Nazi-monster as they usually do with everyone who opposes multiculturalism/cultural Marxism. However, since I manifest their worst nightmare (systematical and organized executions of multiculturalist traitors), they will probably just give me the full propaganda rape package and propagate the following accusations: pedophile, engaged in incest activities, homosexual, psycho, ADHD, thief, non-educated, inbred, maniac, insane, monster etc. I will be labeled as the biggest (Nazi-)monster ever witnessed since WW2. p. 1435

New Question 4. Do the stated values conflict with other values of the agent? (Agent's Multiple Values Question)

RECONSTRUCTION USED IN THE MODEL: The values underlying my goal (rationality, logic, and cultural preservation) do not conflict with any of my other values. But, I value my life and that could conflict with carrying out the shock attack if I die. However, *I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters. My love for them exceeds my own self serving interests.*

I know I will die fighting the overwhelming cultural Marxists/multiculturalist forces in phase 1 and that's not a problem for me at all. I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters. My love for them exceeds my own self serving interests. p. 1403

He emphasizes that the main motive for the killings was *that the operation expresses my love for my people and country* and will contribute to getting rid of the evil in the country. Sec. 5.7

Appendix B – Breivik Quotes used in the New Model

*Page numbers refer to Breivik's compendium. Section numbers refer to the first psychological report prepared by Husby and Sørheim.

Berwick, Andrew, and Anders Behring] [Breivik. 2011. *2083 - A European Declaration of Independance*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2011/07/24/National-Politics/Graphics/2083+-+A+European+Declaration+of+Independence.pdf>.

Husby, Torgeir, and Synne Sørheim. 2011. "Court Psychiatric Report to the Oslo District Court (First Report)." Oslo. <https://sites.google.com/site/breivikreport/documents/anders-breivik-psychiatric-report-of-2011>.

Topic 1:¹⁰⁸ Do I or should I have (at least) one reason to aim at *spreading the compendium* [to *contribute to consolidation/recruitment* of people to fight against the *Islamisation of Europe*]?

By marketing and distributing the compendium: 2083, and similar works, we hope to create more awareness, create reference points and thus contribute to consolidate and further our cause. p. 1350

Our only objective in this phase is to create awareness about the truth and contribute to consolidation/recruitment. p. 1351

The creation of this compendium is actually a larger and more central task in this process, as I would never have had enough funds to create it if wasn't for my earlier financial/business ventures. The actual military operation is also a sub-task as well as it is a marketing method for the distribution of this compendium among other things. p. 1408-1409

Certain long term tasks are delegated and I am one of two who are asked to create a compendium based on the information I have acquired from the other founders during our sessions. Our primary objective is to develop PCCTS, Knights Templar into becoming the foremost conservative revolutionary movement in Western Europe the next few decades. p. 1414

My plan A is to attempt to acquire 3 million Euro, in which case I plan to establish a pan- European organizational platform that will attempt to grow organically as a support organization which will distribute a "legal version" of the compendium. If I fail to generate the specified amount I will move forward with the operation, in order to market the compendium that way. p. 1415

Because I think focusing solely on distributing the compendium to patriots would be a mistake as they have little to no political influence in the EUSSR/USASSR hegemony. It is important that our enemies know "how we see what they are doing". The national intelligence agencies of Europe will do everything they can to limit its distribution. They will not allow the parliament members of any nation to read it, so we must send it directly to them. p. 1418

Utøya island and the government building was all about publishing the manifest, to reach the 350,000 militant nationalists who are the audience. Sec. 5.4

The experts ask what the subject was thinking as he was walking around shooting. He says: *Had a pragmatic approach, wanted to kill enough to give the launch of the compendium world press. The operation was just a formality. Sec. 5.8*

¹⁰⁸ This is the only topic which requires justification for its construction. The rest are either derived from previous Topics or from schemes where the justification is provided.

Spreading the compendium is the goal of the operations, he says, and the operation's success is measured by the spreading of the compendium. Sec. 5.8

The compendium is the project, not the killing. Sec. 5.9

AS1. Assumption of Objectives by Teleology

Premise 1: I have *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country* as a finality.

Premise 2: *Spreading the compendium* belongs to *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country*.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a teleological reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

CQs for AS1

CQ1: How does *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country* really correspond to my finality?

A: *That's not the kind of person I used to be, but it's the type of person I have become*

How can *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country* not correspond to my finality?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: How is *spreading the compendium* really a particular case of *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country*?

A: *Spreading the compendium* is really a particular case of *loving the country* because it contributes to preventing its demise

How could *spreading the compendium* not be a particular case of *expressing my love for my own people and country and getting rid of the evil in the country*?

A: [N/A]

By propagating and defending Christendom we simply mean that we want to halt the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist attacks and systematic deconstruction on our Christian cultures and the Church itself and to reverse the de-Christianisation of Europe. p. 1352

We on the other hand are a defensive military organisation who only seek to protect the peoples of Europe and our cultures from genocide. p. 1352

I have no moral reservations whatsoever against participating or leading military operations against Norwegian Category A and B traitors as it is the most basic of human rights to defend your people against genocide. p. 1357

Although I do admit that I am disgusted by the current development, I would rather say I'm driven by my love for Europe, European culture and all Europeans. This does not mean that I oppose diversity. But appreciating diversity does not mean that you support genocide of your own culture and people by accepting for example Islamic Demographic Warfare. p. 1382

Fighting for your people's survival, when threatened, is the most logical thing to do to. Defending your people and culture from genocide is the most basic and recognised human right and one of few causes actually worth dying for. p. 1382

I know I will die fighting the overwhelming cultural Marxists/multiculturalist forces in phase 1 and that's not a problem for me at all. I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters. My love for them exceeds my own self serving interests. That's not the kind of person I used to be, but it's the type of person I have

become. My hate and contempt for the cultural Marxists/multiculturalist doctrines is definitely there. However, as with most individuals, love and hate fuels us. p. 1403

He emphasizes that the main motive for the killings was *that the operation expresses my love for my people and country* and will contribute to getting rid of the evil in the country. Sec. 5.7

AS2. Argument from Positive Values

Premise 1: *Cultural preservation/self defense* is a positive value.

Premise 2: *Cultural preservation/self defense* values *spreading the compendium*.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a second reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

CQs for AS2

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a positive value to Cultural preservation/self defense?

A: *Defending your people and culture from genocide is the most basic and recognised human right.*

What would be a reason for not attributing a positive value to Cultural preservation/self defense?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What is the reason for the positive valuation of spreading the compendium by Cultural preservation/self defense?

A: *By marketing and distributing the compendium: 2083, and similar works, we hope to create more awareness, create reference points and thus contribute to consolidate and further our cause.*

What would be a reason for spreading the compendium not to be positively valued by Cultural preservation/self defense?

A: [N/A]

Reason 3 - AS2. Argument from Positive Values

Premise 1: *"Logic" and rationalist thought* is a positive value.

Premise 2: *"Logic" and rationalist thought* value *spreading the compendium*.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a third reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

CQs for AS2

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a positive value to "Logic" and rationalist thought?

A: [N/A]

What would be a reason for not attributing a positive value to "Logic" and rationalist thought?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What is the reason for the positive valuation of spreading the compendium by "Logic" and rationalist thought?

A: *Fighting for your people's survival, when threatened, is the most logical thing to do to.*

What would be a reason for spreading the compendium not to be positively valued by "Logic" and rationalist thought?

A: [N/A]

By marketing and distributing the compendium: 2083, and similar works, we hope to create more awareness, create reference points and thus contribute to consolidate and further our cause. p. 1350

We will act as exemplary role models for our less organised brothers and sisters across Europe in the decades to come. p. 1351

We are a defensive military organisation who only seek to protect the peoples of Europe and our cultures from genocide. In order for us to effectively protect ourselves from Islam and Islamisation we

must first defeat the Western European multiculturalist regimes who are facilitating the ongoing colonisation. p. 1352

There are only two logical steps for people my age; have as many children as possible and prepare for Phase 2 or 3 or fight now in Phase 1. I chose the latter. p. 1359

We share the same anti -EU, -UN and -immigration/multiculturalism (Muslim immigration at least) sentiments and the goal of "preserving European traditions, culture etc" which is the primary reason why more and more ex-NS people are conforming and joining the new "European right". p. 1374

Fighting for your people's survival, when threatened, is the most logical thing to do to. Defending your people and culture from genocide is the most basic and recognised human right and one of few causes actually worth dying for. I do not regret any of my actions or major life choices. In fact, I would do it all again, without any hesitation, if I was given the chance. p. 1382

Defending your people and culture from genocide is the most basic and recognised human right and one of few causes actually worth dying for. p. 1382

"Logic" and rationalist thought (a certain degree of national Darwinism) should be the fundament of our societies. I support the propagation of collective rational thought but not necessarily on a personal level. p. 1386

I am first and foremost a man of logic. 1404

We fight for the free indigenous peoples of Europe, for those not yet born and for the memory and wishes of our forefathers, our martyrs. We fight to preserve our culture, our identity, our country and for Christendom. p. 1412

AS3. Argument from Positive Consequences

Premise 1: If *spreading the compendium* is realized by me, then more people will join our cause.

Premise 2: More people joining our cause is to be valued positively.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a fourth reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

QCs for AS3

CQ1: What makes it plausible that spreading the compendium has more people joining the cause as a consequence?

A: The compendium will be accessible and is designed to convince by having them *fully understand the situation* and it *if you read it from the first word to the end, you will be radicalized*.

How could spreading the compendium not have more people joining the cause as a consequence?

A: Readers could disagree with my reasons or my means.

CQ2: Why should more people joining the cause be positively valued?

A: More people joining our cause should be positively valued because it promotes cultural preservation and inhibits the impending genocide of European people and culture.

How could more people joining the cause not be positively valued?

A: [N/A]

[All quotes from AS2 can also be included here]

I can totally understand that most people will condemn people like us simply because they do not "yet" understand what is going on. And even if they do understand our reasons they might disagree with our "means", thinking that democracy can solve this problem as well just like democracy have solved many of the challenges we have faced in the past. p. 1349-50

By marketing and distributing the compendium: 2083, and similar works, we hope to create more awareness, create reference points and thus contribute to consolidate and further our cause. p. 1351

Our only objective in this phase is to create awareness about the truth and contribute to consolidation/recruitment. p. 1351

The objective is that all their supporters join our cause. This is why it's important to argue against the NS ideology instead of ignoring them. p. 1364

As a message to those hardcore NS's who are simply unable to compromise; Conform and join our armed struggle against the European cultural Marxists/multiculturalists (the enablers of the Islamisation of Europe), or continue to be sidelined and marginalised. Multiculturalism is the hole in the dike. Islam is the water pouring in. Everything else should be irrelevant. Your "Jew" obsession is undermining your own struggle against multiculturalism. p. 1374

This is not possible as long as the authors on the field trademark their intellectual work and do whatever they can to limit the distribution. I can understand that they need to earn enough for food and rent etc. However, if they want to make a real difference instead of being viewed as "intellectual war profiteers and opportunists" they will have to contribute by making their intellectual property available for all Europeans p. 1405

The subject smiles: *From now on, all it takes is access to the compendium, he says. If you read it from the first word to the end, you will be radicalized. The manifest is both a tool and an application. The entire standard difficult recruitment process is being replaced. Sec 5.4*

AS4a. Argument from Ability

Premise 1: *Spreading the compendium* should be positively valued.

Premise 2: I have the ability to spread the compendium.

Premise 3: My ability to realize spreading the compendium is necessary condition for the realization of spreading the compendium.

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is an ability reason for me to assume *spreading the compendium*.

QCs for AS4

CQ1: How do I have the ability to spread the compendium?

A: I wrote it and am the only one in possession of it.¹⁰⁹

What could prevent me from spreading the compendium?

A: I could die or be arrested during preparations.

By marketing and distributing the compendium: 2083, and similar works, we hope to create more awareness, create reference points and thus contribute to consolidate and further our cause. p. 1350

I was asked, not only once but twice, by my mentor; let's call him Richard, to write a second edition of his compendium about the new European Knighthood. As such, I spent several years to create an economic platform which would allow me to study and write a second edition. And as of now, I have spent more than three years completing this second edition. Perhaps, someone out there will be able to contribute by creating a third edition one day. p. 1379

I spent three years were I focused on writing the compendium, 2083. p. 1380

¹⁰⁹ Recall that this scheme for ability is focused on being "in a position". I have inserted this answer based on the facts rather than Breivik's own words because, given they are the facts, Breivik never says this explicitly.

As noted, this, the financing stage, was as you may know a sub-task of a bigger operation, which is still in progress. The creation of this compendium is actually a larger and more central task in this process, as I would never have had enough funds to create it if wasn't for my earlier financial/business ventures. The actual military operation is also a sub-task as well as it is a marketing method for the distribution of this compendium among other things. pp. 1408-9

TOPIC 2: *Is spreading the compendium compatible with other goals I have or should have?*

AS5a. Argument from Negative Values

Premise 1: Fascism is a negative value.

Premise 2: Fascism negatively values *spreading the compendium*.

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is a first reason for me not assuming *spreading the compendium*.

CQs for AS5

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a negative value to fascism?

A: *A fascist opposes the democratical concept altogether and wants a permanent one party state.*

How could fascism not have a negative value?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What is the reason for the negative valuation of spreading the compendium by fascism?

A: The compendium calls for a suspension of the constitution so spreading it promotes a fascist characteristic.

How could spreading the compendium not be negatively valued by fascism?

A: *The constitution will only be suspended for a limited time, until we have had the opportunity to implement at least some of our principles. These principles can't even be openly discussed at this point in time due to the paralyzing effects of political correctness. After a certain period, the constitution and the rule of democracy will again become the primary standard.*

Q: Why do you say you're not fascists when you support the suspension of the constitution during a coup? 1353

A fascist opposes the democratical concept altogether and wants a permanent one party state, while we do NOT want this. In order to secure democracy we are forced to imbue and strengthen it from its current downward spiral towards the abyss. This can only be achieved through a temporary suspension of the constitution.

The constitution will only be suspended for a limited time, until we have had the opportunity to implement at least some of our principles. These principles can't even be openly discussed at this point in time due to the paralyzing effects of political correctness. p. 1354

The thinking seems to be that there are only two versions of Europeans. If you do not support multiculturalism 100% you are a Nazi. You're also a fascist pig, a racist, a homophobe – in other words a sub-human. p. 1358

AS7a. Argument from Negative Consequences

Premise 1: If I spread the compendium I will have to leave my old life, my friends, behind.

Premise 2: Leaving my old life and friends behind are to be negatively valued.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a consequential reason for me not assuming spreading the compendium.

CQs for AS7a

CQ1: What makes it plausible that spreading the compendium has leaving my old life and friends behind as consequences?

A: *There are only two logical steps for people my age; have as many children as possible and prepare for Phase 2 or 3 or fight now in Phase 1. I chose the latter.*

How could spreading the compendium not have Leaving my old life and friends behind as consequences?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: Why should leaving my old life and friends behind be negatively valued?

A: [N/A]

How could leaving my old life and friends behind not be negatively valued?

A: By choosing to have children and keep my old life, in other words, *by being a silent bystander to this I will be as guilty as our corrupt elites.*

In this regard I felt I had two choices. Create a large family (3-5 children) or completely focus on my tasks as a part of the European resistance movement. I don't understand why so many people can simply ignore the current situation without doing anything. How can they look their kids in the eyes in the future knowing that they have done nothing? How can they even act so suicidal and continue to vote for political parties who support multiculturalism? Their children are the ones who will have to fight in the coming civil war against the Islamist/cultural Marxist alliance. They will ask their parents; "why didn't you do anything, how could you allow this to happen?" They are the ones who have to fight and perhaps die in Phase 3 because my generation (and my parents generation) didn't have the guts to stop the current development. p. 1358

It has always been very tempting to just go with the flow, sticking your head in the sand and deal with problems as they arise. Having passed the age of 30, I'm now in a situation where I have to decide whether I want to get married and start a family. I can choose to live a normal life if I want to, just like my friends are doing. Get a cute girlfriend, get married, have kids, continue my career and earn 50 000-60 000+ Euro per year. The problem as I see it is that I truly fear for the future of Europe. How can I procreate knowing that we are heading for cultural suicide? By being a silent bystander to this I will be as guilty as our corrupt elites. How could I silently watch while Islamic demographic warfare is being waged against our societies, diminishing our numbers and the influence over our very own lives? I feel compelled to act, even though I know that very few will dare to become one of the pioneers, one of the first martyrs in Phase 1. There are only two logical steps for people my age; have as many children as possible and prepare for Phase 2 or 3 or fight now in Phase 1. I chose the latter. p. 1359

Q: I guess you wanted to tell your friends about this. Has it been hard to live a "double life", hiding your true political conservative revolutionary convictions?

A: At first it was extremely hard to avoid the temptation to tell your closest friends. I decided however to withhold all relevant information from them and everyone, not because I didn't trust them, but rather because I wanted to avoid incriminating them. Revealing sensitive information to any of them would put them in a difficult spot, because they would be required by law to report his info to the authorities. It would also pose a serious threat to me if they decided to tell anyone. Adding any cell commanders on MSN or other online networks would be completely idiotic and reckless and would violate my oath. As such, I therefore only corresponded with moderate people who had no clue whatsoever about my clandestine activities. After all, a Justiciar Knight is not an ideologically insecure individual. A Justiciar Knight does not rely on constant babysitting or "patting on the back". He is self driven and ideologically confident with proven daily rituals/meditation which keeps him going.

A couple of my friends have their suspicions though. However, I have managed to channel these suspicions far away from relating to my political convictions. Instead they suspect that I am playing WoW (and trying to hide it) and a couple of them believe that I have chosen semi-isolation because of some alleged homosexual relationship which they suspect I am trying to hide, LOL. Quite hilarious, as I am 100% hetero, but they may continue to believe what they want as it prevents them from asking more questions;)) My goal is obviously to prevent my closest network from asking specific questions, and it has worked perfectly so far. pp. 1381-82

I had to pay a high price though. I left several aspects of my old life behind and had to completely re-establish myself on an existential level. It was hard because everyone I used to know felt I had abandoned them. I never burned any bridges though which might explain why many of them are still

pressuring me to “come back”. Obviously, I do not intend to. If they knew my real intentions my cover would be blown and I would risk being exposed. I cannot allow that to happen. p. 1406

TOPIC 3: Is spreading the compendium preferable to the alternatives with which it is incompatible?

Reason 1 - AS10a.1. Argument Based on Rational Preference

Premise 1: The alternatives and *spreading the compendium* are contradictory.

Premise 2: Expressing *my love for my own people and country*, promoting the values of cultural preservation/self defense and *logical and rationalist thought*, causing more people to join the cultural preservation mission, along with being the only one with the ability to do so are reasons in support of aiming at *spreading the compendium*.

Premise 3: Not promoting fascism and not *leaving my old life behind* count for alternatives

Premise 4: The reasons for spreading the compendium are preferable to the reasons for not spreading the compendium.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: I should spread the compendium and abandon the alternatives.

CQs for AS10

CQ1: What makes the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reasons associated with the goals, the best for this situation?

A: It is a duty to sacrifice current personal possibilities for the sake of future generations of Europeans. Following duty is logical and will lead to the best long term outcome instead of short term pleasure.

Why might the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reason associated with the goals not be the best for this situation?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What makes the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed the best for this situation?

A: I have taken three years to complete a compendium that *if you read it from the first word to the end, you will be radicalized*.

Why might the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed not be the best for this situation?

A: [N/A]

It's our responsibility to change the very base code of society's corruption. It's our duty to destroy the fundamental political doctrines of cultural Marxism. p. 1402

This is exactly what my family and friends have implored me to do for years now. They have pressured me and I must admit I have been somewhat ridden by guilt in this regard. At the same time I know what has to be done. I could never ignore the current situation without doing anything. In this regard I felt I had two choices. Create a large family (3-5 children) or completely focus on my tasks as a part of the European resistance movement. I don't understand why so many people can simply ignore the current situation without doing anything. How can they look their kids in the eyes in the future knowing that they have done nothing? How can they even act so suicidal and continue to vote for political parties who support multiculturalism? Their children are the ones who will have to fight in the coming civil war against the Islamist/cultural Marxist alliance. They will ask their parents; “why didn't you do anything, how could you allow this to happen?” They are the ones who have to fight and perhaps die in Phase 3 because my generation (and my parents generation) didn't have the guts to stop the current

development. It's not right. I feel a strong obligation to contribute in Phase 1 even if I succumb in the process. p. 1358

It has always been very tempting to just go with the flow, sticking your head in the sand and deal with problems as they arise. Having passed the age of 30, I'm now in a situation where I have to decide whether I want to get married and start a family. I can choose to live a normal life if I want to, just like my friends are doing. Get a cute girlfriend, get married, have kids, continue my career and earn 50 000-60 000+ Euro per year. The problem as I see it is that I truly fear for the future of Europe. How can I procreate knowing that we are heading for cultural suicide? By being a silent bystander to this I will be as guilty as our corrupt elites. How could I silently watch while Islamic demographic warfare is being waged against our societies, diminishing our numbers and the influence over our very own lives? I feel compelled to act, even though I know that very few will dare to become one of the pioneers, one of the first martyrs in Phase 1. There are only two logical steps for people my age; have as many children as possible and prepare for Phase 2 or 3 or fight now in Phase 1. I chose the latter. p. 1359

And as of now, I have spent more than three years completing this second edition. p. 1379

I spent three years were I focused on writing the compendium, 2083. p. 1380

The subject smiles: *From now on, all it takes is access to the compendium, he says. If you read it from the first word to the end, you will be radicalized. The manifest is both a tool and an application. The entire standard difficult recruitment process is being replaced. Sec 5.4*

Topic 4: Are there means which are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for me to spread the compendium?

AS11. Necessary Condition Argument

Premise 1: I have the objective of *spreading the compendium*.

Premise 2: *Distributing the compendium* and performing a *deadly shock attack* are necessary for me to *spread the compendium*.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: I have a reason to *distribute the compendium* and carry out a *deadly shock attack*.

CQ for AS11

CQ1: What makes it plausible that distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack are necessary means for me to realize spreading the compendium?

A: *Unfortunately, spectacular operations like these are the only way to be heard. Everything else we have tried has failed and yielded nothing. The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard. Distributing the compendium is necessary so people have it and performing the shock attack is necessary so people read it.*

How could any of these means be suppressed while still allowing for the realization of spreading the compendium?

A: [N/A]

To fully understand the situation I urge everyone to read "Europe Burning", book 2 of the compendium: "2083". It is a complete overview of the current European situation and it explains how we, the free people of Europe have lost any hope of reversing the current development in Europe democratically. In other words, it explains why armed resistance is the only option we have left to save Europe from the same fate as Lebanon. p. 1350

Unfortunately, spectacular operations like these are the only way to be heard. Everything else we have tried has failed and yielded nothing. The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard. p. 1351

There are no effective counter-measures against our phase 1 strategy. It is the most efficient way of modern warfare. We are going to win this war eventually no matter how they chose to act. p. 1352

AS12. Sufficient Condition Argument

Premise 1: I have the objective of *spreading the compendium*.

Premise 2: If I carry out *distributing the compendium* and carrying out *the deadly shock attack*, I will spread the compendium.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: I have a reason to *distribute the compendium* and carry out *a deadly shock attack*.

CQ for AS12

CQ1: How does carrying out all of the necessary means guarantee the realization of spreading the compendium?

A: Distributing the compendium is not enough because people might not read it. Performing the deadly shock attack means that people will have it and read it.

How might the compendium remain unspread in spite of carrying out the necessary means?

A: [N/A]

Unfortunately, spectacular operations like these are the only way to be heard. Everything else we have tried has failed and yielded nothing. The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard. p. 1351

My plan A is to attempt to acquire 3 million Euro, in which case I plan to establish a pan-European organizational platform that will attempt to grow organically as a support organization which will distribute a "legal version" of the compendium. If I fail to generate the specified amount I will move forward with the operation, in order to market the compendium that way. p. 1415

I've continued with email farming until now, on a daily basis. The email farming phase is coming towards its end and I will conclude it by at least attempting to acquire as many email addresses to members of parliament in Western European countries as possible. Because I think focusing solely on distributing the compendium to patriots would be a mistake as they have little to no political influence in the EUSSR/USASSR hegemony. It is important that our enemies know "how we see what they are doing". The national intelligence agencies of Europe will do everything they can to limit its distribution. They will not allow the parliament members of any nation to read it, so we must send it directly to them. p. 1418

Feb 15th to Feb 26th: created a 12,5 minute movie trailer (slideshow trailer) promoting the compendium: "2083 – A European Declaration of Independence". All the slides were created in Photoshop. After 12 days of hard work I can say I am somewhat satisfied with the end result. I would love to make it even better but I really can't afford to invest any more time into this trailer which might never see the light of day... Not happy with end resolution but higher res would just make the AVI file too large for efficient distribution. Was planning to hire a low cost Asian movie guy through scriptlance.com but I have to conserve my funds. p. 1431

Reason 3 - AS4b. Argument from Ability

Premise 1: Distributing the compendium and performing a *deadly shock attack* are necessary and sufficient for *spreading the compendium*.

Premise 2: I have the ability to distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack.

Premise 3: My ability to distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack are necessary conditions for their performance.

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is an ability reason for me to assume *distributing the compendium* and *performing a deadly shock attack*.

QCs for AS4

CQ1: How do I have the ability to distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack?

A: I can conduct *email farming* and email the compendium for distribution. As for performing the deadly shock attack, *I have an extremely strong psyche (stronger than anyone I have ever known) and my dehumanization process started already when I wrote the military section of the compendium in 2009... or already in 2002, when I committed to a life of suffering.*

What could prevent me from distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack?

A: *I am seriously contemplating that it is perhaps biologically impossible to survive the mental, perhaps coupled with physical torture, I will be facing without completely breaking down on a psychological level.*

CQ2: To what extent is the assumption of distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack by me a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack?

A: Shock attacks are the only means for spreading the compendium, and I am the only person who can carry out a shock attack, so it is a fully necessary means.

Who else is there whose ability to distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack is a necessary/enabling condition for the realization of distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack?

A: No one

The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard. p. 1351

Around year 2000 I realised that the democratic struggle against the Islamisation of Europe, European multiculturalism was lost. It had gone too far. It is simply not possible to compete democratically with regimes who import millions of voters. 40 years of dialogue with the cultural Marxists/multiculturalists had ended up as a disaster. It would now only take 50-70 years before we, the Europeans are in a minority. As soon as I realised this I decided to explore alternative forms of opposition. Protesting is saying that you disagree. Resistance is saying you will put a stop to this.¹¹⁰ I decided I wanted to join the resistance movement. p. 1378

I don't want to do what I do, I would rather focus on starting a family and focus on my career again. But I can't do that as long as I feel like a person caught in a burning spaceship with nowhere to go. If you see the ship is burning you don't ignore it and start cooking noodles do you? You put out the fire even if it endangers your life. You don't enjoy putting out the fire but it is your duty to yourself and your fellow crewmen. p. 1417

I have an extremely strong psyche (stronger than anyone I have ever known) but I am seriously contemplating that it is perhaps biologically impossible to survive the mental, perhaps coupled with physical torture, I will be facing without completely breaking down on a psychological level. I guess I will have to wait and find out. 1435

The dehumanization process started already when I wrote the military section of the compendium in 2009, the subject says, or already in 2002, when I committed to a life of suffering. The subject says that after this he has not have had pangs of conscience linked to what he calls *executions*. *In war, the rules are different*, he adds. Sec. 5.7

¹¹⁰ Aage Borchgrevink, learning from Hans Rustad, points out that this quote is citing left wing militant Ulrike Marie Meinhof: "Protest is when I say that and that does not suit me. Resistance is when I see to it that the thing I do not like no longer happens"

TOPIC 6: Is *distributing the compendium* and performing a *deadly shock attack* compatible with the alternatives that I have or should have?

AS5b. Argument from Negative Values

Premise 1: Terrorism/violence is a negative value.

Premise 2: Terrorism/violence negatively values carrying out a *deadly shock attack*.

Therefore, plausibly,

Conclusion: There is a reason, for me not distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack.

CQs for AS5b

CQ1: What is the reason for attributing a negative value to terrorism/violence?

A: [N/A]

How could terrorism/violence not having a negative value?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What is the reason for the negative valuation of distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack by terrorism/violence?

A: *Using terror you are undermining your own struggle and hurting the nationalist cause.*

How could distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack not be negatively valued by terrorism/violence?

A: By recognizing there are no alternatives.

Q: Some “Ghandist/pacifist” members of the conservative resistance will claim that violence will not solve anything and will instead only give our enemies more rhetorical ammunition and make it easier for them to gain the moral ground. They will finally be able to say; “terrorism has no religion”. “By using terror you are undermining your own struggle and hurting the nationalist cause”. How would you react to statements like this?

A: Well, first of all, I would tell him he obviously didn't have a clue what he was talking about. Pacifist approaches have been tried in the past; in Lebanon where the Christians waited until the Muslims made up 60% of the population. The Copts in Egypt have been relatively pacifist and look what it got them... They are almost extinct due to their pacifist stance. The same can be said about the Christian Assyrians and Armenians. They waited and waited, like loyal little dhimmis and “hoped” for a better future, until the day the Muslims decided to massacre them. Ghandi pacifism worked against the Brits in India because Christian Europeans aren't primitive barbarians... However, pacifism doesn't work at all against an Islamic entity. As soon as they become a form a majority (and this will happen unless we can start the deportation campaigns in time) they will strike and eventually massacre us as history has shown again and again. Christian Europeans aren't primitive barbarians. p. 1375

AS7b. Argument from Negative Consequences

Premise 1: If distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack are realized by me, *innocent civilians will die*.

Premise 2: *Innocent civilians dying* is to be negatively valued.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a reason for me not to assuming distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack.

CQs for AS7b

CQ1: What makes it plausible that distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack has innocent civilians dying as consequences?

A: *In war there are always civilian casualties, unfortunately.*

How could distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack not have innocent civilians dying?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: Why should innocent civilians dying be negatively valued?

A: Because *some of these are likely to be a part of your own broader "base"*.

How could innocent civilians dying not be negatively valued?

A: [N/A]

Q: Can significant indirect damage against civilians be justified?

The other political fronts should welcome it as a necessary evil in order to rid ourselves of a much greater evil. p. 1360

Innocent people will die, in the thousands. But it is still better than the alternative; millions of dead Europeans, which is the worst case phase 3 scenario. p. 1360

I know I will die fighting the overwhelming cultural Marxists/multiculturalist forces in phase 1 and that's not a problem for me at all. I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters. My love for them exceeds my own self serving interests. p. 1403

Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas (will always try to keep civilian casualties at a minimum as some of these are likely to be a part of your own broader "base". p. 1479

The government building is the place in Norway where there are the fewest civilians, the subject says. There will always be someone, that's just the way it is. The goal was the largest possible number of A- and B-traitors, and the lowest possible number of civilians and police.

The subject adds: *We accept up to 50% dead civilians. It is impossible to determine completely in advance. It's just chosen that way. We have calculated that there would be few civilian deaths at first, but then the objectives will be secured and there will be more because of imprecise attacks.*

The subject smiles: *Am incredibly pleased with the small number of dead civilians in the operation. An ex-policeman and only four civilians. Fewer than 10%. In war there are always civilian casualties, unfortunately. We regard the Labour Party as a terrorist organization, and this hit pretty accurately.. Sec 5.7*

AS7b. Argument from Negative Consequences

Premise 1: If I carry out a shock attack I will die or live in a nightmare situation.

Premise 2: Me dying or living in a nightmare is to be negatively valued.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: There is a second negative consequence reason for me not to carry out a *deadly shock attack*.

CQ1: What makes it plausible that distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack has dying or living in a nightmare situation consequences?

A: The police will likely shoot me.

How could distributing the compendium and performing a deadly shock attack not have dying or living in a nightmare situation as consequences?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: Why should dying or living in a nightmare situation be negatively valued?

A: [N/A]

How could dying or living in a nightmare situation not be negatively valued?

A: *I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters.*

I know I will die fighting the overwhelming cultural Marxists/multiculturalist forces in phase 1 and that's not a problem for me at all. I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters. My love for them exceeds my own self serving interests. That's not the kind of person I used to be, but it's the type of person I have become. p. 1403

I have been thinking about my post-operational situation, in case I survive a successful mission and live to stand a multiculturalist trial. When I wake up at the hospital, after surviving the gunshot wounds inflicted on me, I realize at least for me personally, I will be waking up to a world of shit, a living nightmare. Not only will all my friends and family detest me and call me a monster; the united global multiculturalist media will have their hands full figuring out multiple ways to character assassinate, vilify and demonize. They will possibly do everything they can to distort the truth about me, KT and our true objectives, and attempt to make even revolutionary conservatives detest me. They will label me as a racist, fascist, Nazi-monster as they usually do with everyone who opposes multiculturalism/cultural Marxism. However, since I manifest their worst nightmare (systematical and organized executions of multiculturalist traitors), they will probably just give me the full propaganda rape package and propagate the following accusations: pedophile, engaged in incest activities, homosexual, psycho, ADHD, thief, non-educated, inbred, maniac, insane, monster etc. I will be labeled as the biggest (Nazi-)monster ever witnessed since WW2. pp. 1434-35

The subject says he had expected to die, first by the government building and later at Utøya. *Was not prepared to survive*, he says. *I was surprised and confused and did not know if I wanted to survive.* Thought: *Do I have an obligation to fight on, or have I done the job now? Sec 5.12*

TOPIC 7: Are distributing the compendium and performing a *deadly shock attack* preferable to the alternatives with which it is incompatible?

AS10b.1. Argument Based on Rational Preference (in favour of M*)

- Premise 1: The alternatives and proposed means are contradictory.
- Premise 2: Being necessary and sufficient for the goal, along with my ability to perform them, count for distributing the compendium and performing *deadly shock attack*.
- Premise 3: Not conducting terrorism, not killing innocent civilians, and not dying myself or living in a nightmare situation count for the alternatives.
- Premise 4: The reasons for distributing the compendium and performing a *deadly shock attack* are preferable to the alternatives.

Therefore, plausibly

Conclusion: I should distribute the compendium and perform a deadly shock attack and abandon the alternatives.

CQs for AS10

CQ1: What makes the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reasons associated with the mean, the best for this situation?

A: Performing the means is both a duty and leads to the best consequences. It is the best standard because it *is the only pragmatistical way to move forward* and fulfil our duty to help future generations of Europeans by preserving/defending European culture.

Why might the standard(s) used for the valuation of the reason associated with the means not be the best for this situation?

A: [N/A]

CQ2: What makes the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed the best for this situation?

A: I can conduct *email farming* and email the compendium for distribution. As for performing the deadly shock attack, *the Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard*. There is a high probability I can carry out the attacks because *I have an extremely strong psyche (stronger than anyone I have ever known)* and my *dehumanization process started already when I wrote the military section of the compendium in 2009... or already in 2002, when I committed to a life of suffering*.

Why might the standard(s) used to assess the probability or plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed not be the best for this situation?

A: [N/A]

Conclusion: I will distribute the compendium and *perform a deadly shock attack* so as to achieve *spreading the compendium [to contribute to consolidation/recruitment of people to fight against the Islamisation of Europe]*?

Unfortunately, spectacular operations like these are the only way to be heard. Everything else we have tried has failed and yielded nothing. The Muslims showed us that deadly shock attacks are the only tool we have at the moment which will guarantee that our voice is heard. p. 1351

Q: Can significant indirect damage against civilians be justified?

A: Yes and no. It can be justified in the sense that it is the only pragmatism way to move forward. When someone blows up a government building it is obviously not with the intention to kill the cleaning lady or the janitor. The target has been selected after careful consideration because it will yield the wanted results.

There are extreme and moderate forces. We are all cultural conservatives even though we use different means. We have taken it upon ourselves to use brute, cynical force so other people don't have to. The other political fronts should welcome it as a necessary evil in order to rid ourselves of a much greater evil.

Innocent people will die, in the thousands. But it is still better than the alternative; millions of dead Europeans, which is the worst case phase 3 scenario. p. 1360

Q: Some "Ghandist/pacifist" members of the conservative resistance will claim that violence will not solve anything and will instead only give our enemies more rhetorical ammunition and make it easier for them to gain the moral ground. They will finally be able to say; "terrorism has no religion". "By using terror you are undermining your own struggle and hurting the nationalist cause". How would you react to statements like this?

A: Well, first of all, I would tell him he obviously didn't have a clue what he was talking about. Pacifist approaches have been tried in the past; in Lebanon where the Christians waited until the Muslims made up 60% of the population. The Copts in Egypt have been relatively pacifist and look what it got them... They are almost extinct due to their pacifist stance. The same can be said about the Christian Assyrians and Armenians. They waited and waited, like loyal little dhimmis and "hoped" for a better future, until the day the Muslims decided to massacre them. Ghandi pacifism worked against the Brits in India because Christian Europeans aren't primitive barbarians... However, pacifism doesn't work at all against an Islamic entity. As soon as they become a form a majority (and this will happen unless we can start the deportation campaigns in time) they will strike and eventually massacre us as history has shown again and again. p. 1375

It's our responsibility to change the very base code of society's corruption. It's our duty to destroy the fundamental political doctrines of cultural Marxism. p. 1402

I know I will die fighting the overwhelming cultural Marxists/multiculturalist forces in phase 1 and that's not a problem for me at all. I have prepared mentally for a very long time and I will gladly sacrifice my life for the benefit of my European brothers and sisters. My love for them exceeds my own self serving interests. p. 1403

To be honest, if I felt that other people could do my job I would not do what I do, that I can guarantee you. I don't want to do what I do, I would rather focus on starting a family and focus on my career again. But I can't do that as long as I feel like a person caught in a burning spaceship with nowhere to go. If you see the ship is burning you don't ignore it and start cooking noodles do you? You put out the fire even if it endangers your life. You don't enjoy putting out the fire but it is your duty to yourself and your fellow crewmen. p. 1417

The subject says he had thoughts about possible *executions on Utøya* for the first time in the summer of 2010. He says: *Thought it was a good target, isolated, police would have problems, access to 730 activists at one time, and no civilians present.* The subject says that *civilians* are everybody not politically involved on the left. Sec 5.7