Skip to main content
Log in

On the Inflation of Necessities

  • Published:
Metaphysica

Abstract

This paper argues that Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of origin has some implausible consequences.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. We can ignore the complication here that, strictly speaking, it is (according to Kripke) the numerical identity of the gametes and not of the parents which determines identity of origin. We can also ignore the further question, what determines the numerical identity of the gamete: the numerical identity of the molecules it is composed of or something else? Finally, we are assuming that every human (every organism) has ancestors and, more generally, that every ordinary physical object has an origin.

  2. Where what counts as an “object” is anything that is a proper part of the physical universe as well as younger than the physical universe. We can ignore the question here what kinds of origin different kinds of things have (tables might originate in material stuff while organisms originate in genetic material).

  3. We can add that any two organisms which stand in the A relation to each other also stand in the B relation to each other (assuming that there is no such thing as a first organism):

    $$ \forall {\text{x }}\forall {\text{y }}\left[ {{\text{xAy}} \to {\text{xBy}}} \right]. $$
  4. We can add that any two objects which stand in the origin relation OR to each other also stand in the O relation to each other:

    $$ \forall {\text{x}}\forall {\text{y }}[{\text{xORy}} \to {\text{xOy}}]. $$
  5. One would have to assume that there are at least two classes of objects such that no element of one class stands in the O relation to any element of the other class. Metaphorically speaking, there would have to be at least two independent branching trees of origins. If one assumes, for instance, that our universe originated in exactly one big bang (not in more than one), then it is very hard to make sense of the idea of at least two independent branching trees of origins.

References

  • Kripke, Saul 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, Colin 1976, On the Necessity of Origin, in: The Journal of Philosophy 73, 127–135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Timothy 2002, Necessary Existents, in: Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 233–251.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter Baumann.

About this article

Cite this article

Baumann, P. On the Inflation of Necessities. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 51–54 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0092-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0092-z

Keywords

Navigation