

thought, and social living. Przywara thought it naïve and unrealistic to interpret reality as simply a beautiful harmony of order and positive complementarity. He saw the fractured character of his own world, a world in transition to an unpredictable future, as rather a dynamic tension and struggle between opposites that could not always be easily reconciled; the tension must be recognized, lived with, and worked through creatively. Thus his aim was not to construct a new original system of thought, but rather to live as a thinker in his own time and for his own time, devoted to a creative, open-minded, but critical dialogue with all the great intellectual and artistic movements of his day, trying to draw them as far as possible into a positive complementarity with the Christian vision. Inevitably this led to not a few controversies and suspicions on the part of other more cautious Catholic thinkers, who, lacking his breadth of vision, felt he went too far sometimes in his effort at creative dialogue. Another guiding inspiration in his work was the spirituality of the *Spiritual Exercises*, on which he wrote extensively, and in particular, the characteristic Ignatian disposition “to find God in all things,” which he interpreted for his own work as the readiness to discern the good and the true wherever possible in all the cultural movements of his time.

Chapter 4, “A Theologian and His Contemporaries,” is especially interesting and enlightening. It reports Przywara’s contacts, directly in person or through his writings, with such leading contemporary theologians and philosophers as Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Leo Baeck (the influential Jewish thinker), Edith Stein, Martin Heidegger (born in the same year as Przywara), Karl Rahner, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. From early on, in reviews and other direct responses to Heidegger’s thought, Przywara was more critical than many of the contemporary Catholic thinkers and judged it—very insightfully, to my mind—to be ultimately irreconcilable with the Christian vision of life. He was sympathetic but critical toward the two Protestant theologians; and although he greatly influenced and inspired the three Catholic thinkers, he did not always approve of the directions they were taking, nor did they exactly follow his.

We should be grateful to Thomas O’Meara for his remarkable achievement in recreating so vividly and insightfully the whole contemporary intellectual world and significant historical influence of this uniquely talented and inspiring, but now almost forgotten, Jesuit thinker.

Fordham University

W. Norris Clarke, S.J.

*Problems from Kant.* By James Van Cleve. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 352. \$49.95.

*Problems from Kant* is a clear and rigorously-argued commentary on Kant’s thought in epistemology and metaphysics, insofar as this can be gleaned (mainly) from the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The bulk of the book (eleven out of thirteen chapters) is dedicated to analyzing and evaluating Kant’s claims about transcendental idealism; the synthetic *a priori*; space, time, and matter; the Transcendental Deduction of the categories; the first two Analogies of Experience; and the distinction between noumena and phenomena, or things-in-themselves and appearances. Van Cleve spends considerably less time on major themes from the Dialectic section of the First Critique, dedicating just one chapter to the problems of rational psychology, and one to issues in rational theology. He spends almost no time at all on the

Metaphysical Deduction, the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the third Analogy of Experience, or the Antinomies (although he does discuss the antinomy of infinite divisibility in the midst of his analysis of Kant's theory of matter). The book, then, is aptly named. It is not so much an interpretation of Kant's whole *Critique of Pure Reason* as an examination of a series of problems that have been selected from the First Critique for extended analysis as philosophically interesting in their own right.

What is perhaps most striking and refreshing about Van Cleve's effort is the degree of clarity he has been able to achieve in his analyses. Throughout the book Van Cleve shows how philosophical precision has eluded both Kant and Kant-commentators on a number of crucial issues, and he makes a valiant start at remedying the problem by showing how some of the requisite distinctions and clarifications might be made. Thus—to give just one example—Van Cleve identifies no fewer than eight different meanings that might be implied by the term “experience” in Kant's Transcendental Deduction (p. 74); he then goes on to speculate about which of the eight different meanings Kant may have intended, and he shows how different commentators have opted for different senses of the term in their various analyses (p. 76).

Throughout, Van Cleve demonstrates admirable patience and care, refusing to allow the rigor of his investigations to be subordinated to or compromised by any “grand unifying theory” of the First Critique as a whole. Accordingly, Van Cleve is able to tackle problems that some of the more “holistic” commentators have failed to address, let alone even notice. For example, Van Cleve notes that Kant's theory of time may actually be much more radical than many commentators have allowed since it seems to imply not only that things-in-themselves are a-temporal, but furthermore that “no items whatsoever stand in temporal relation, not even our own mental episodes” (p. 54).

In another original gesture, Van Cleve argues that Kant's transcendental deduction does not succeed, not just because it fails to show the necessity of all the categories (as other commentators have complained), but because it fails to demonstrate the necessity of any single category at all. The problem, Van Cleve argues, is that Kant's chain of reasoning depends on a premise that is not argued for—and not even mentioned—in the deduction, namely, the premise “that any categories used in judging are *actually exemplified* by the items judged about” (p. 89). Thus, Van Cleve observes, even if I judge that the shining of the sun has caused the warming of the stone, “there is no guarantee that the category of cause applies to the events connected in my judgment—*my judgment may not be true*” (p. 89).

Van Cleve also shows how his reformulated Kant can be brought into fruitful philosophical dialogue with some influential twentieth-century thinkers. For example, he defends Kant's analytic-synthetic discussion against Quine's attack on analyticity; he illuminates the meaning of Kant's transcendental idealism by contrasting it with Dummett's anti-realism and Putnam's internal realism; and in a challenge to one of the three Kant-commentators who has most influenced him (the other two are Beck and Bennett), he shows that Strawson's reconstruction of Kant's transcendental deduction actually proves much less than Strawson would have us believe (pp. 103–04). Van Cleve also evaluates some contemporary Kant-interpretations and shows—among other things—that Allison's very influential reading of Kant implausibly reduces Kant's transcendental idealism to a tautology. For according to Allison's “one-world” or “double-aspect” view, objects—when considered as appearances or in relation to our sensibility—have spatial and temporal form; but when considered in themselves, they lack spatial and temporal form. But “to say that things considered apart from our forms of sensibility (space and time) are non-spatial would

be to say this: *if* things had no spatial characteristics, then they would have no spatial characteristics” (p. 8).

As an alternative to Allison’s “one-world” view, Van Cleve proposes what he calls “a qualified two-worlds view.” On this view, appearances for Kant are “virtual objects” or intentionalia, that is, “logical constructions out of states of perceivers. It follows that appearances do not, strictly speaking, form a second class of existents alongside things in themselves, since they are only constructions out of noumenal beings and their states” (p. 150). This approach allows Van Cleve to take Kant’s transcendental idealism seriously (as more than a tautology), while avoiding some of the more obvious problems associated with the “two-worlds view” in its more traditional form. But this approach also commits Van Cleve to the view that the relation between “a noumenal being” and “its states” is essentially a relation of “ground” to “consequent.” And as G. E. Schulze pointed out over 200 years ago (in his *Aenesidemus* book of 1792), Kant’s own transcendental idealism would disallow such a view insofar as it rests on an illegitimate application of the categories. Thus the final lesson to be drawn from Van Cleve’s book may be that Kant’s transcendental idealism is a mere tautology, or harbors within itself an embarrassing inconsistency, or perhaps rests on certain comprehensive methodological or systematic commitments that cannot be captured adequately in any piecemeal analysis of “problems from Kant.”

Fordham University

Michael Baur

*John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica.* An annotated translation, with a philosophical introduction by Gyula Klima. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Pp. lxii + 1032. \$120.00.

This book is an English translation of the *Summulae de Dialectica* (Little Summa or Compendium of Dialectic) of John Buridan (ca. 1295–1361), one of the most important philosophers of the later medieval period. The *Summulae* is Buridan’s masterwork: a comprehensive, systematic treatment of the whole of medieval learning in logic, written for both students and their masters. It became authoritative over the teaching of logic within a generation of its composition, and it continued to be used in European universities well into the sixteenth century.

The *Summulae* begins unassumingly as a commentary on an earlier text, the *Summulae Logicales* of Peter of Spain (probably written before 1230). In the prologue Buridan writes,

[W]ishing to learn something in general about logic in its entirety without an excessively detailed investigation, I have chosen to deal in particular with that short treatise of logic which the venerable professor, master Peter of Spain, composed a while ago, by commenting on and supplementing it; indeed, occasionally I am going to have to say and write things which differ from what he has said and written, whenever it appears to me suitable to do so.” (p. 4)

This is the understatement of the fourteenth century. Buridan proceeds to make so many changes and additions to Peter’s brief text—even rejecting an entire treatise at one point and replacing it with his own—that the result is a new text: a magisterial account of the science and practice of logic more than ten times longer than Peter’s original *Summulae*. Buridan designs his Little *Summa* so that it exemplifies an orderly progression of teachings beginning with propositions (*Treatise I*), moving down to the significative and referential