Two Conceptions of Phenomenology

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Abstract

The phenomenal particularity thesis says that if a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is among the constituents of the perception's phenomenology. Martin (2002a; 2002b), Campbell (2002), Gomes & French (2016) and others defend this thesis. Against them are Mehta (2014), Montague (2016, chp. 6), Schellenberg (2010) and others, who have produced strong arguments that the phenomenal particularity thesis is false. Unfortunately, neither side has persuaded the other, and it seems that the debate between them is now at an impasse. This paper aims to break through this impasse. It argues that we have reached the impasse because two distinct conceptions of phenomenology—a "narrow" conception and a "broad" conception—are compatible with our what-it-is-like characterizations of phenomenology. It also suggests that each of these two conceptions has its own theoretical value and use. Therefore, the paper recommends a pluralistic position, on which we acknowledge that there are two kinds of phenomenology: phenomenology$_{\text{narrow}}$ (an entity conceived according to the narrow conception) and phenomenology$_{\text{broad}}$ (an entity conceived according to the broad conception). The phenomenal particularity thesis is true only with respect to the latter.

1 Introduction

Consider the state of consciously perceiving a mind-independent particular.[1] For example, consider the state of consciously perceiving a mind-independent object, like your laptop; or the state of consciously perceiving a mind-independent state of affairs, like your laptop's being square. When you are in such states, there is something that it is like for you to be in them. Or equivalently, conscious perceptions of particulars have phenomenology.

But what does the phenomenology of a given perception include? More specifically, does it include the perceived particulars? For example, when you consciously perceive your laptop (or your laptop's being square), is the laptop itself included in the perception's phenomenology? These questions have aroused much recent debate. On one side

*This paper has benefitted immeasurably from insightful and generous criticisms and comments made by Neil Mehta and two anonymous referees. The paper has also benefitted greatly from suggestions made by Derek Brown, Craig French, Jack Lyons, Michelle Montague, Keith Wilson and the other participants of Particularity of Perception workshop held at the University of Glasgow in 2017. Final thanks go to Maarten Steenhagen, to the participants of the Cambridge Mind Seminar, to the members of the philosophy faculty at The Open University, UK, and to the participants of the 2019 Conference of the Israeli Philosophy Association.

[1] In this paper, "consciousness" is to mean phenomenal- rather than access-consciousness (see Block, 1995). So, on this paper's use of the term, if you consciously perceive something, then in perceiving it, you are phenomenally conscious of it.

of this debate are those like Martin (2002a; 2002b), Campbell (2002), and Gomes & French (2016), who defend the phenomenal particularity thesis:

(Phenomenal Particularity) If a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is among the constituents of the perception's phenomenology.

On the other side of the debate are those like Mehta (2014), Montague (2016, chp. 6), and Schellenberg (2010), who have produced strong arguments that the phenomenal particularity thesis is false. Unfortunately, neither side has persuaded the other, and it seems that the debate is now at an impasse in which nobody is inclined to give way.

In this paper, I both diagnose why we have reached this impasse, and show how to break through it. My diagnosis is that we have reached the impasse because two distinct conceptions of phenomenology are compatible with our "what it is like" characterizations of the topic. I call these conceptions the "narrow" and the "broad" conceptions of phenomenology. On the narrow conception, the phenomenal particularity thesis is false, just as Mehta, Montague and Schellenberg's arguments suggest. But on the broad conception, the phenomenal particularity thesis is true, and immune to Mehta, Montague and Schellenberg's arguments. Until we decide which of these two conceptions we should accept, we will not be able to decide whether to accept or reject the phenomenal particularity thesis.

If my diagnosis is right, then the way to break through the impasse is to decide whether we should accept the narrow or the broad conception of phenomenology. How should we decide this? I suggest we follow this recipe: We begin by listing the theoretically interesting properties which phenomenology has. Once we know what these properties are, we will be able to determine what phenomenology could and could not be, given that it has those properties. Then, we should decide to accept whichever conception is compatible with phenomenology's having those properties.

Following this recipe can lead to three results. First, if the theoretically interesting properties require phenomenology to be as the narrow conception suggests, then we should accept the narrow conception. In that case, we should also reject the phenomenal particularity thesis. Second, if the theoretically interesting properties require phenomenology to be as the broad conception suggests, then we should accept the broad conception. In that case, we should also accept the phenomenal particularity thesis. Third, if some theoretically interesting properties require phenomenology to be as the narrow conception suggests, while other theoretically interesting properties require phenomenology to be as the broad conception suggests, then we should be pluralists. As pluralists, we would distinguish between $\text{phenomenology}_{\text{narrow}}$, an entity conceived as the narrow conception conceives of phenomenology, and $\text{phenomenology}_{\text{broad}}$, an entity conceived as the broad conception conceives of phenomenology. Each of these entities would have its own theoretically interesting properties. And we would accept the version of the phenomenal particularity thesis in which "phenomenology" is replaced with "$\text{phenomenology}_{\text{broad}}$", but reject the version in which "phenomenology" is replaced with "$\text{phenomenology}_{\text{narrow}}$".

At the end of this paper, I present an argument for the pluralist solution.

The plan for the paper is as follows: In section 2 I present the arguments that Mehta, Montague and Schellenberg have made against the phenomenal particularity thesis. In section 3 I outline the narrow conception of phenomenology which complements those arguments. Then, in sections 4-5, I explain precisely how the narrow conception and arguments jointly lead to the rejection of the phenomenal particularity thesis. Following this, I change gears. Section 6 presents the broad conception of phenomenology, and section 7 explains how the broad conception can plausibly vindicate the phenomenal particularity thesis. Section 8 concludes by presenting the case for pluralism.

2 The arguments

Mehta, Montague and Schellenberg jointly level three arguments against the phenomenal particularity thesis. The first is the *similar perception argument*: Suppose Alice visually and consciously perceives her favorite blue ball, Bounce. Call Alice's perception "p(Bounce)". Alice then closes her eyes, and Bounce is destroyed. A numerically distinct but qualitatively identical blue ball, Roll, is then created, and placed in Bounce's former position. There is no other interference in the scene before Alice, in Alice's viewing conditions, or in Alice's psycho-perceptual state. So when Alice reopens her eyes, she visually and consciously perceives Roll. Call her perception "p(Roll)". Given this description of the case, it is plausible that

(Similar P) p(Bounce)'s phenomenology and p(Roll)'s phenomenology differ in no respect.

The trouble is that (Similar P) is inconsistent with the phenomenal particularity thesis. The thesis says that if a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, then the particular is among the constituents of the perception's phenomenology. It follows from this that Bounce is a constituent of p(Bounce)'s phenomenology, and that Roll is a constituent of p(Roll)'s phenomenology. At the same time, Bounce was destroyed before p(Roll) occurred, and Roll came into existence after p(Bounce) had ended. So, plausibly, Bounce is not a constituent of p(Roll)'s phenomenology, and Roll is not a constituent of p(Bounce)'s phenomenology. This suggests that p(Bounce) and p(Roll)'s phenomenologies have distinct constituents. Now, just as clocks constituted by distinct gear wheels differ in some respect, phenomenologies constituted by distinct particulars differ in some respect.[2] So p(Bounce)'s phenomenology and p(Roll)'s phenomenology differ in some respect. But, as (Similar P) flatly contradicts this consequence of the phenomenal particularity thesis, the phenomenal particularity thesis is undermined.

The second argument is the *similar hallucination argument*: Suppose that after having p(Bounce) and p(Roll), Alice closes her eyes again. Once her eyes are closed, Alice is put in the same intrinsic neuro-computational state that she was in when she had p(Bounce). Owing to this, Alice has a hallucination. Call this hallucination "h". Since Alice's intrinsic neuro-computational state is the same in h and in p(Bounce), it is plausible that

[2] I am indebted to Neil Mehta for a discussion of this point.

(Similar H) p(Bounce)'s phenomenology and h's phenomenology differ in no respect.

As before, the trouble is that (Similar H) is inconsistent with the phenomenal particularity thesis. For according to the thesis, Bounce is a constituent of p(Bounce)'s phenomenology. Furthermore, since Bounce was destroyed before h occurred, it is plausible that Bounce is not a constituent of h's phenomenology. So p(Bounce) and h's phenomenologies have distinct constituents. And this, in turn, entails that p(Bounce)'s phenomenology and h's phenomenology differ in some respect. Since (Similar H) flatly contradicts this last consequence of the phenomenal particularity thesis, the phenomenal particularity thesis is again undermined.

The third argument is the *different perception argument*. It is due to Mehta (2014, pp. 318-320), who writes:

> Suppose that I see a glass of Bordeaux and undergo a corresponding visual experience. Shortly afterwards, while I am looking away, my friend accidentally spills the wine onto my lap, and I undergo a corresponding tactile experience. What it is like to undergo the visual experience is completely different from what it is like to undergo the tactile experience. ...similarly problematic cases can occur within a single sensory modality, as when I see the same person from the front and from the back.

Let's focus on the wine example. To fix terminology, let's call the visual perception of the Bordeaux "p_{v}(Bordeaux)", and the tactile perception of the Bordeaux "p_{t}(Bordeaux)". Let's also stipulate that Alice is the one who has p_{v}(Bordeaux) and p_{t}(Bordeaux). That said, we can express Mehta's suggestion as the suggestion that

(Different P) p_{v}(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology and p_{t}(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology are similar in no respect.

But (Different P) is inconsistent with the phenomenal particularity thesis. After all, both p_{v}(Bordeaux) and p_{t}(Bordeaux) are perceptions of a single mind-independent object - the Bordeaux. So according to the phenomenal particularity thesis, the Bordeaux is a constituent of both p_{v}(Bordeaux) and p_{t}(Bordeaux)'s phenomenologies. It thus follows that p_{v}(Bordeaux) and p_{t}(Bordeaux)'s phenomenologies are similar at least in the following respect: They both have the Bordeaux as a constituent. So phenomenal particularity thesis forces us to accept that p_{v}(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology and p_{t}(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology are similar in some respect. And, as (Different P) flatly contradicts this, the phenomenal particularity thesis is undermined.

If the phenomenal particularity thesis is to survive these three arguments, there must be a way of resisting (Similar P), (Similar H) and (Different P).[3] And yet, (Similar P), (Similar H) and (Different P) seem to many to be eminently plausible claims. Our next task, therefore, is to explore why (Similar P), (Similar H) and (Different P) can seem so plausible. The answer, I believe, has to do with a certain way of conceiving of an experience's phenomenology.

[3] In principle, one could also try to retain the phenomenal particularity thesis by insisting that it is consistent with (Similar P), (Similar H) and (Different P). But as I know of no plausible way of insisting on this, I leave this possibility unexplored.

3 The narrow conception

The phenomenology of an experience is often taken to be a certain set of "phenomenal properties" that the subject has in having the experience. What phenomenal properties are, however, is often left fairly loose, at the level of "what it is like"-talk. Chalmers (2010, p. 341), for instance, writes:

> Consciousness involves the instantiation of phenomenal properties. These properties characterize aspects of what it is like to be a subject (what it is like to be me right now, for example, or what it is like to be a bat), or what it is like to be in a mental state (what it is like to see a certain shade of green, for example, or what it is like to feel a certain sharp pain).

Unfortunately, this loose characterization of phenomenal properties is too vague for present purposes. For suppose you are asked to specify the phenomenal properties that Alice has in *p*(Bounce), i.e., to say what it is like for Alice to have *p*(Bounce). How should you respond? I believe that there are (at least) two reasonable options: On the one hand, you could say that in *p*(Bounce), Alice is appeared to in a roundish way, or in a bluish way. On the other hand, you could say that in *p*(Bounce), Bounce appears roundish to Alice, or that Bounce appears bluish to Alice. These two options are quite different. The first suggests that to have a phenomenal property is merely to be appeared to in a certain way. The second suggests that to have a phenomenal property can amount to being a subject to whom *a certain item* appears a certain way. But which option is preferable? Is the second option more complete than the first, and therefore preferable; or does the second option include too much and the first is preferable?

Our pre-theoretical understanding of "what it is like"-talk does not answer this question. Simply asked, "what it is like for Alice to have *p*(Bounce)?", some of us will reasonably give the first response and resist the second, while others would reasonably give the second response over the first. This suggests that we should distinguish between (at least) two possible conceptions of phenomenal properties, and consequently, of an experience's phenomenology. I call these the "narrow" conception and the "broad" conception. In this section I outline the narrow conception. (I return to the broad conception in section 6.)

To a first approximation, the narrow conception takes phenomenal properties to be "appearance properties". To see what I mean by "appearance properties", consider two examples. First, suppose that Bounce appears roundish to Alice. Then, Alice is appeared to in a roundish way by Bounce. Consequently, Alice is also appeared to in a roundish way *simpliciter*. In being so appeared to, Alice has a certain appearance property - the property of being appeared to in a roundish way. Similarly, suppose that Bounce appears bluish to Alice. Then, Alice is appeared to in a bluish way by Bounce; and consequently she is appeared to in a bluish way *simpliciter*. In being so appeared to, Alice has another appearance property - the property of being appeared to in a bluish way. Importantly, Alice can have both these appearance properties even at a world in which Bounce never exists. For example, Alice can equally be appeared to in a roundish and in a bluish way in having a hallucination in a Bounce-free world. In general, then, if

the expression "*W*" describes a way that a subject can be appeared to (but not a way that a subject can be appeared to by a specific item), then *being appeared to in a W way* is an appearance property. And subjects can have these appearance properties whether or not certain relevant particulars exist.[4]

I hasten to add that appearance properties should be taken to include what might be called "*structured* appearance properties". In the case of visual phenomenology, to have a structured appearance property is to be appeared to in a *W* way at a certain location of the visual-phenomenal field. For example, Alice can have the structured appearance property of being appeared to in a roundish way at one location of the visual-phenomenal field, and in a squarish way at another location of the visual-phenomenal field. This structured appearance property is different from the structured appearance property of being appeared to in a squarish way at the first location of the visual-phenomenal field, and in a roundish way at the other location of the visual phenomenal field. The fact that these structured appearance properties are distinct helps distinguish between different phenomenologies.[5]

Note that on my use of "appearance properties", appearance properties (whether structured or otherwise) are properties of subjects. My use of "appearance properties" is therefore different from that of Genone (2014), Antony (2011), Kalderon (2011), and Shoemaker (1994; 2000; 2006). On their use of the term, appearance properties are not properties of subjects, but properties of objects or scenes. More specifically, they use "appearance properties" to pick out ways that objects or scenes appear *simpliciter* (as opposed to ways that they appear to a specific subject). This use of "appearance properties" will not concern us in this paper, and should be carefully distinguished from my own.

Now let's return to the narrow conception of phenomenology. This conception suggests that a phenomenal property is just an appearance property. It also suggests that the phenomenology of an experience is the set of all appearance properties that the subject has in the experience. So, for example, *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology may be a set which includes the property of being appeared to in a roundish way, the property of being appeared to in a blue_{17}-ish way, the property of being appeared to in a roundish and blue_{17}-ish way at location *l* of the visual-phenomenal field, etc.

4 The narrow conception counts against phenomenal particularity: the initial challenge

With the narrow conception made clear, we can return to the phenomenal particularity thesis. In section 2 we noted that the phenomenal particularity thesis is threatened by (Similar P), (Similar H) and (Different P). So arguments for any of these claims are also arguments against the phenomenal particularity thesis. Importantly, this is where the

[4]There are vexed questions concerning how occurrences of "roundish" (or of "bluish", "squarish", "greenish" etc.) in the expression form "Alice is appeared to in a ___ way" acquire their referents (see, e.g., Block, 2007). Happily, for our purposes it is enough to note that by "Alice is appeared to in a roundish way" I roughly mean that Alice is appeared to in the way that I would be appeared to were I to now be confronted by a round thing under ideal conditions; and similarly for similar expressions.

[5]For more on this topic, see Tye (1984), who is writing in response to Jackson's (1975) Many Property problem.

narrow conception comes in. For if the narrow conception is accepted, it becomes easier to argue for (Similar P), (Similar H) and (Different P). Thus, the narrow conception counts against the phenomenal particularity thesis.

Let's start by seeing how the narrow conception facilitates the argument for (Similar P). The crucial step is that according to the narrow conception, the phenomenology of an experience is the set of all appearance properties that the subject has in the experience. This entails the following conditional: If Alice has the same appearance properties in *p*(Bounce) and in *p*(Roll), then *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology and *p*(Roll)'s phenomenology are identical. An immediate consequence of this conditional is that if Alice has the same appearance properties in *p*(Bounce) and in *p*(Roll), then *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology and *p*(Roll)'s phenomenology differ in no respect. Add to this that Alice has the same appearance properties in *p*(Bounce) and in *p*(Roll), and what follows is the familiar claim that

(Similar P) *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology and *p*(Roll)'s phenomenology differ in no respect.

The arguments for (Similar H) and (Different P) are similar: Regarding (Similar H), the narrow conception entails that if Alice has the same appearance properties in *p*(Bounce) and in *h*, then *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology and *h*'s phenomenology differ in no respect. Add to this that Alice has the same appearance properties in *p*(Bounce) and in *h*, and it follows that

(Similar H) *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology and *h*'s phenomenology differ in no respect.

Regarding (Different P), the narrow conception entails that if Alice does not have similar appearance properties in p_v(Bordeaux) and in p_t(Bordeaux), then p_v(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology and p_t(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology are similar in no respect.[6] Add to this that Alice does not have similar appearance properties in p_v(Bordeaux) and in p_t(Bordeaux), and it follows that

(Different P) p_v(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology and p_t(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology are similar in no respect.

These arguments reveal the importance of the narrow conception. They show that if the narrow conception is accepted, one can establish (Similar P) simply by establishing that Alice has the same appearance properties in *p*(Bounce) and in *p*(Roll). Similarly, if the narrow conception is accepted, one can establish (Similar H) simply by establishing that Alice has the same appearance properties in *p*(Bounce) and in *h*. Finally, if the narrow conception is accepted, one can establish (Different P) simply by establishing that Alice does not have similar appearance properties in p_v(Bordeaux) and in p_t(Bordeaux). For those who accept the narrow conception, then, the fall of the phenomenal particularity thesis is close at hand.

[6] It might be complained that p_v(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology and p_t(Bordeaux)'s phenomenology would be similar in that they are both phenomenologies, or sets. But such technical similarities are not what is relevant for present purposes.

5 The narrow conception counts against phenomenal particularity: the next step

To complete the argument from the narrow conception to the falsity of the phenomenal particularity thesis, one only needs to support the claim (i) that Alice has the same appearance properties in p(Bounce) and in p(Roll), (ii) that Alice has the same appearance properties in p(Bounce) and in h, or (iii) that Alice does not have similar appearance properties in p_v(Bordeaux) and in p_t(Bordeaux). In this section I will discuss how this support for (i)-(iii) can be most plausibly provided.

One consideration often raised in support of (i)-(iii) concerns introspection: Consider subjects whose circumstances are sufficiently favorable for the exercise of their introspective capacities. Such subjects have well-functioning memories, they are attending to the relevant features of their mental life, their conceptual resources are sufficiently broad, etc. We can make certain observations with respect to these subjects. One such observation is that if these subjects are appeared to first in a reddish and then in a greenish way, then they can know by introspection alone that they have different appearance properties in the two experiences. Another such observation is that if these subjects are appeared to first in a roundish way, and then in a roundish way again, then they can know by introspection alone that they have *similar* appearance properties in the two experiences. Such observations can be easily multiplied.

Taken collectively, observations of the sort just discussed support the generalization that if subjects whose circumstances are sufficiently favorable have different (similar) appearance properties in two experiences, then they can know by introspection alone that they have different (similar) appearance properties in these experiences. And this generalization can be used in support of (i)-(iii). For suppose that Alice's circumstances are sufficiently favorable. Then, it follows from the generalization that if Alice *cannot* know by introspection alone that she has distinct appearance properties in p(Bounce) and p(Roll), then she in fact does not have distinct appearance properties in p(Bounce) and p(Roll). Now, both proponents and opponents of the phenomenal particularity thesis accept that Alice cannot know by introspection alone that she has distinct appearance properties in p(Bounce) and p(Roll).[7] So we can derive (i), i.e., that Alice has the same appearance properties in p(Bounce) and in p(Roll). Claims (ii) and (iii) are derivable by similar arguments.

Defenders of the phenomenal particularity thesis might now try to resist such introspection-based arguments for (i)-(iii). First, they might try to resist (iii) by suggesting that in both p_v(Bordeaux) and p_t(Bordeaux), Alice has the appearance property of being appeared to as though by a mind-independent object. Alice might even be able to know this by introspection alone. I am not entirely unsympathetic to this line of resistance.[8]

[7] See Fish (2009); Gomes & French (2016); Logue (2012); Martin (2002a, 2004); McDowell (1998); Mehta (2014); Montague (2016); Schellenberg (2010).

[8] I doubt, however, that if Alice is appeared to as though by a mind-independent object in both p_v(Bordeaux) and p_t(Bordeaux), that is because a single mind-independent wine is a common constituent of both p_v(Bordeaux) and p_t(Bordeaux)'s phenomenologies. After all, Alice is also appeared to as though by a mind-independent object in both p(Bounce) and p(Roll), but in that case no mind-independent ball is a common

Second, Fish (2008; 2009, chp. 4) and Logue (2012) have outlined a way of resisting (ii). According to them, total hallucinations (i.e., hallucinations in which nothing is perceived) have no phenomenology, while conscious perceptions do have phenomenology.[9] So, assuming h is a total hallucination, Fish and Logue would deny that Alice has the same appearance properties in p(Bounce) and in h. They would also maintain that it is plausible that Alice has distinct appearance properties in p(Bounce) and h and yet cannot know that fact by introspection alone. After all, Alice's having hallucination h suggests that her circumstances are not sufficiently favorable for the exercise of introspection.[10]

It should be noted, however, that Fish and Logue's view has been met with serious criticism from both Pautz (2013) and Martin (2013).[11] Furthermore, even if Fish and Logue are right about total hallucinations, Mehta (2014, p. 316) has observed that the argument from p(Bounce) and h goes through just as well if h is stipulated to be not a hallucination, but a piece of visual imagery enjoyed by "an ideal imaginer whose imaginative experiences are as vivid, stable, and forceful as her genuine perceptual experiences."

Third, consider a general approach to resisting (i), (ii) and (iii), inspired by Schwitzgebel's observation that (2011, p. 119):

> There are major lacunae in our self-knowledge that are not easily filled in, and we make gross, enduring mistakes about even the most basic features of our currently ongoing conscious experience, even in favorable circumstances of careful reflection, with remarkable regularity.

These words may lead defenders of the phenomenal particularity thesis to doubt all introspection-based arguments for (i)-(iii).

Though these objections are very serious, I will not pursue them further here. One reason for this is that introspection certainly *is* reliable under some conditions and with respect to some appearance properties, as Schwitzgebel (2011, p. 123) himself concedes. More importantly however, (i) and (ii) can be supported independently of considerations about introspection. So even if the Schwitzgebel-inspired and other objections were perfectly correct, we would still have to accept (i) and (ii).[12]

I believe that (i) and (ii) are true for broadly empirical reasons, chief of which is the finding that certain similarities in ways that subjects are appeared to are well correlated with similarities in the subjects' intrinsic neuro-

constituent of both p(Bounce) and p(Roll)'s phenomenologies. So I am inclined to think that if we wish to better understand the distinctive phenomenological contributions made by consciously perceived mind-independent objects, we should look beyond the contribution that these objects might make to the subject's being appeared to as though by a mind-independent object. Thanks to Craig French for a discussion of this topic.

[9] Sturgeon (2008) also develops and favorably considers this view.

[10] In fact, Fish and Logue offer (distinct) explanations of why Alice cannot know by introspection alone that she has distinct appearance properties in p(Bounce) and h.

[11] For a reply, see Fish (2013).

[12] I am omitting (iii) because one might hold that in both p_v(Bordeaux) and p_t(Bordeaux) Alice has the appearance property of being appeared to as though by a mind-independent object. But see footnote 8.

computational properties, but poorly correlated with similarities in the perceived items.[13] Though it will go beyond the scope of this paper to explore this and related findings in depth, I have elsewhere joined Pautz (2014; 2017) and others in arguing that they make it plausible to accept certain theses about the ways subjects are appeared to in experiences.[14] A relatively weak thesis of this kind is the following: If an ordinary Earth-bound human subject is in the exact same intrinsic neuro-computational state on two occasions, then on both those occasions the subject is also appeared to in the exact same way. This entails that a subject can have the same appearance properties in multiple experiences, even if she consciously perceives different mind-independent particulars in those experiences. The last conclusion, however, removes any in-principle reason to deny (i) and (ii).[15]

So, to summarize: We have broadly empirical reasons to accept (i) and (ii). Section 4 revealed, however, that if (i) and (ii) are conjoined with the narrow conception, (Similar P) and (Similar H) follow. And (Similar P) and (Similar H) are each enough to undermine the phenomenal particularity thesis. So if the narrow conception is accepted, the phenomenal particularity thesis will have to go. This, I submit, is the true insight Mehta (2014), Montague (2016, chp. 6), and Schellenberg (2010) have pointed to.

6 The broad conception

The narrow conception, however, is not the only conception possible. The conception follows from the assumption that aspects of what it is like to be a subject—i.e., phenomenal properties—are nothing but appearance properties. But aspects of what it is like to be a subject can also be conceived in a different way. This is where the broad conception comes in.

To present the broad conception, I must first discuss what I call "item-in-appearance properties". Item-in-appearance properties are the properties of the form *being a subject to whom x appears W*. Examples of item-in-appearance properties are: being a subject to whom Bounce appears roundish, being a subject to whom Bounce appears blue$_{17}$-ish, and being a subject to whom Bounce appears roundish and blue$_{17}$-ish at location l of the visual-phenomenal field. I would like to make three remarks comparing item-in-appearance properties with appearance properties.

First, item-in-appearance properties and appearance properties are different from each other. The difference is that, necessarily, if you have a property of the form *being a subject to whom x appears W* (i.e., an item-in-appearance property), then there exists or has existed an x which appears some way to you. However, it is not necessarily the

[13] For correlations regarding taste, see e.g. Di Lorenzo et al. (2009). For those regarding smell, see e.g. Howard et al. (2009). For those regarding loudness, see e.g. Röhl et al. (2011). Finally, for those regarding color, see Brouwer & Heeger (2013).

[14] My argument is in Beck (2019). Also see Block (2009), McLaughlin (2007), and Papineau (2014).

[15] I take empirical findings to also support the view that if an ordinary Earth-bound human subject is in two entirely dissimilar neuro-computational states on two occasions, then on both those occasions the subject has no similar appearance properties. It is unclear, however, whether we may assume that Alice is in two entirely dissimilar neuro-computational states in p_v(Bordeaux) and p_t(Bordeaux). I therefore refrain from suggesting that (iii) should be accepted on empirical grounds.

case that if you have a property of the form *being appeared to in a W way* (i.e., an appearance property), then there exists or has existed an x which appears some way to you. For example, Alice cannot be a subject to whom Bounce appears in a roundish way, if Bounce neither exists nor has existed. But even if Bounce neither exists nor has ever existed, Alice can still be appeared to in a roundish way—say in a hallucination occurring in a Bounce-free world.

Second, if you are a subject to whom x appears W (i.e., if x appears W to you), then you are appeared to in a W way by x; which in turn entails that you are appeared to in a W way *simpliciter*. For example, if Bounce appears round to Alice, then Alice is appeared to in a roundish way by Bounce, and therefore also appeared to in a roundish way *simpliciter*. This shows that having an item-in-appearance property of the form *being a subject to whom x appears W* entails having a corresponding appearance property of the form *being appeared to in a W way*.

Third, item-in-appearance properties are plausibly relational properties. To see this, consider the relation *x appears W to S*. I suggest that instantiations of this relation relate together a subject, an appearance property that the subject has, and an item x. I also suggest that having an item-in-appearance property amounts to being the subject relatum in some instantiation of this *x appears W to S* relation. As an example, consider again Alice's having the item-in-appearance property of being a subject to whom Bounce appears roundish. According to the present suggestion, for Alice to have this property is for the *x appears W to S* relation to be instantiated, with Alice being the subject relatum, Bounce being the item relatum, and the property of being appeared to in a roundish way being the appearance property relatum. This instantiation requires that Alice has the property of being appeared to in a roundish way.

Note that the third remark goes hand-in-hand with the previous two. For suppose, as the third remark suggests, that if Alice is a subject to whom Bounce appears in a roundish way, then Alice, Bounce, and the property of being appeared to in a roundish way are relata instantiating the *x appears W to S* relation. Then, since any instantiation of a relation requires the existence (or past existence) of all the relata, it follows that Bounce exists (or has existed). This agrees with the first remark's suggestion that if Alice is a subject to whom Bounce appears in a roundish way, then Bounce exists (or has existed). Furthermore, if Alice is a subject to whom Bounce appears in a roundish way, the third remark suggests that Alice has the property of being appeared to in a roundish way. This agrees with the second remark's suggestion that if Bounce appears round to Alice, then Alice is appeared to in a roundish way *simpliciter*.

I can now present the broad conception of phenomenology. This conception construes phenomenal properties more broadly than the narrow conception, in that it takes these phenomenal properties to include not just appearance properties, but also item-in-appearance properties. Given this construal of "phenomenal properties", the broad conception also has its own construal of what an experience's phenomenology is. It suggests that an experience's phenomenology is the union of two sets - the set of all appearance properties that the subject has in having that experience, and the set of all item-in-appearance properties that the subject has in having that experience. For example,

the broad conception allows *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology to include, in addition to the property of being appeared to in a roundish and blue$_{17}$-ish way at location *l* of the visual-phenomenal field, also the property of being a subject to whom Bounce appears roundish and blue$_{17}$-ish at location *l* of the visual-phenomenal field.

7 The broad conception vindicates phenomenal particularity

The broad conception may well seem strange to an opponent of the phenomenal particularity thesis. But I believe proponents of the phenomenal particularity thesis will have a different impression. In fact, the broad conception is inspired by some of what they say. Consider, e.g., Martin's (1998, p. 173) suggestive remark that

> to have an experience is to have a viewpoint on something: experiences intrinsically possess some subject-matter which is presented to that viewpoint. To understand such experience and what it is like, one has to understand the viewpoint on that subject-matter, and hence also to attend to the subject matter as presented to the viewpoint.[16]

Martin's remark captures the intuition that there is a close connection between an experience's phenomenology, and the experiential viewpoint that the experience affords its subject on the world. More specifically, the intuition is that an experience's phenomenology includes all that is included in the experiential viewpoint that the experience affords its subject on the world.

Now let us ask what can be included in a subject's experiential viewpoint on the world. Here Martin makes clear that if a subject's viewpoint is a viewpoint *on the world*, then it can include worldly items being presented to the subject. Furthermore, if a subject's viewpoint on the world is *experiential*, then the presentation of those worldly items can include the items' appearing various ways to the subject. Thus, a subject's experiential viewpoint on the world can include the presented worldly items' appearing various ways to the subject. Or, to put it in more regimented terms, a subject's experiential viewpoint on the world can include properties of the form *being a subject to whom x appears W*, i.e., item-in-appearance properties. For example, if Bounce appears roundish to Alice in *p*(Bounce), then *p*(Bounce) affords Alice an experiential viewpoint on the world that includes the property of being a subject to whom Bounce appears roundish. Similarly, if Roll appears bluish to Alice in *p*(Roll), then *p*(Roll) affords Alice an experiential view on the world that includes the property of being a subject to whom Roll appears bluish. In this way, Martin's view seems to suggest that an experience's phenomenology can include item-in-appearance properties, just as the broad conception suggests.[17]

[16] Also see Martin's (2002a, p. 194) and (2006, pp. 393-394).

[17] The broad conception is inspired by Martin's work in many ways, and I am deeply indebted to him. The passages of Martin's (2002a, pp. 194-196) proved particularly useful. In these passages, he draws a distinction between two aspects of an experience's phenomenology. The first aspect is the "unrepeatable aspect" of the experience's phenomenology. Martin calls this aspect "phenomenal nature". A second aspect of the experience's phenomenology is the aspect that the experience "has in common with qualitatively the same experiential events". Martin calls this aspect "phenomenal character". The reader may wish to note that there is a certain structural similarity between Martin's two aspects

Perhaps these thoughts persuade you that there is something intuitive about the broad conception. Perhaps not. Either way, the point that is of more pressing importance is to show that the broad conception has the following theoretical property: It retains the phenomenal particularity thesis, while also respecting the core insights of our previous discussion. It is to this that I now turn.

The broad conception retains the phenomenal particularity thesis as follows. Suppose that a mind-independent particular, x, is consciously perceived in a given perception. Since x is *consciously* perceived, x appears some way W to the perceiver. And, if x appears W to the perceiver, the perceiver has a certain property - being a subject to whom x appears W. Since this property is a relational property which specifically involves a relation to x, x is a constituent of the property. Furthermore, according the broad conception, this property is part of the perception's phenomenology. The broad conception therefore leads to a result: If a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is a constituent of a property which is part of the perception's phenomenology. A simpler way of putting this result, however, is to say that

(Phenomenal Particularity) if a mind-independent particular is consciously perceived in a given perception, that particular is among the constituents of the perception's phenomenology.

Thus, the broad conception leads to the phenomenal particularity thesis.

The broad conception also allows us to retain the core insights of the previous discussion. These insights are (i) that Alice has the same appearance properties in p(Bounce) and in p(Roll), (ii) that Alice has the same appearance properties in p(Bounce) and in h, and (iii) that Alice does not have similar appearance properties in p_{v}(Bordeaux) and in p_{t}(Bordeaux). In previous sections we saw that if any of (i)-(iii) is conjoined with the narrow conception, the phenomenal particularity thesis will have to be rejected. The broad conception, however, does not have this problem.

To see how this might be, suppose that (i) is true, i.e., that Alice has the same appearance properties in p(Bounce) and in p(Roll). Still, in p(Bounce), Bounce appears roundish to Alice, and Roll does not. Also, in p(Roll), Roll appears roundish to Alice, and Bounce does not. This implies, on the broad conception, that p(Bounce)'s phenomenology and p(Roll)'s phenomenology are in some respect different: While p(Bounce)'s phenomenology includes the property of being a subject to whom Bounce appears roundish and excludes the property of being a subject to whom Roll appears roundish, p(Roll)'s phenomenology is the other way around. Therefore, from the vantage point of the broad conception, it is *false* that

of an experience's phenomenology, and item-in-appearance properties. This is because item-in-appearance properties are relational properties, constituted by a certain relation to an item x and to an appearance property of being appeared to in a W way. Each of these constituents can be said to correspond to one of Martin's two aspects. More specifically, the appearance property can then be said to correspond to a component of what Martin calls "phenomenal character". The item x, on the other hand, can be said to correspond to a component of what Martin calls "phenomenal nature". I must add, however, that despite the structural similarity I just outlined, Martin may not be inclined to accept my broad conception. This is because my broad conception suggests that h's phenomenology includes appearance properties. This suggestion goes against Martin's view, that the phenomenal character of hallucinations like h (which are caused by the same proximal conditions as successful perceptions) consists entirely of "being indiscriminable from corresponding visual perceptions" (2006, p. 369). I do not myself agree with Martin's last view, however, especially given Logue's (2013) and Johnston's (2004, p. 138-139) criticisms of it.

(Similar P) *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology and *p*(Roll)'s phenomenology differ in no respect.

This relieves the pressure on the phenomenal particularity thesis. So the broad conception allows us to accept both (i) and the phenomenal particularity thesis. Analogous arguments can similarly show that the broad conception allows us to accept (ii) and (iii) while maintaining the phenomenal particularity thesis. The trick is to accept (ii) and (iii) while denying (Similar H) and (Different P).

8 The upshot

If the above considerations are correct, then we have made some progress towards breaking through the impasse in the phenomenal particularity debate. We have found that the narrow conception leads to the result that the phenomenal particularity thesis is false; while the broad conception leads to the result that the phenomenal particularity thesis is true. So the question before us is whether we should accept the narrow or the broad conception.

But how should we decide which conception to accept? Earlier I suggested following this recipe: We begin by listing the theoretically interesting properties which phenomenology has. Once we know what these properties are, we will be able to determine what phenomenology could and could not be, given that it has those properties. Then, we should decide to accept whichever conception is compatible with phenomenology's having those properties. I noted earlier that following this recipe can lead to three results: First, it can lead to an acceptance of the narrow conception; second, it can lead to an acceptance of the broad conception; or third, it can lead to pluralism.

I believe that there are good reasons to accept pluralism. To explain them, let me begin with the common view that phenomenology has the theoretically interesting property of "introspective knowability". Phenomenology has this property iff all differences and similarities between phenomenologies are in principle knowable by introspection alone. Or, to put it more cautiously, phenomenology has the introspective knowability property iff

(Introspection) if subjects whose circumstances are sufficiently favorable have experiences whose phenomenologies differ (are similar) in some respect, then they can know by introspection alone that they have experiences whose phenomenologies differ (are similar) in some respect.

Observe that (Introspection) is incompatible with the broad conception, but compatible with the narrow one: According to the broad conception, *p*(Bounce) and *p*(Roll)'s phenomenologies differ in some respect. And, when Alice has experiences *p*(Bounce) and *p*(Roll), her circumstances are sufficiently favorable for the exercise of her introspective capacities. So (Introspection) entails that Alice can know by introspection alone that *p*(Bounce) and *p*(Roll)'s phenomenologies differ in some respect. But it is extremely plausible that Alice is *not* able to know that by introspection alone! So (Introspection) and the broad conception are incompatible. The narrow conception, on the other hand, is perfectly compatible with (Introspection). On that conception, *p*(Bounce) and *p*(Roll)'s phenomenologies

differ in no respect. There is therefore no phenomenal difference that Alice's capacities for introspective knowledge fail to detect.

Now if the introspective knowability property were the only theoretically interesting property which phenomenology had, it would clearly follow that we should accept the narrow conception. But things are not so simple. First, one could try to deny that phenomenology has the introspective knowability property. If one succeeded, one would threaten to completely undercut the last argument for accepting the narrow conception. Second, one could point to other theoretically interesting properties which can be plausibly attributed to phenomenology. These other properties might support acceptance of the broad conception. I will consider these issues in order.

First, the issue of denying that phenomenology has the introspective knowability property. I believe that one could quite plausibly deny this. But one would need to do two things. First, one would need to explain away the intuition that phenomenology does have the introspective knowability property, i.e., the intuition that (Introspection) is true. A good way of doing that is to replace (Introspection) with a similar and no-less intuitive thesis. Second, one would need to plausibly explain how (Introspection) might be false.

To explain away the intuition that (Introspection) is true, one might replace it with the following similar thesis:

(Modest Introspection) If subjects whose circumstances are sufficiently favorable have experiences in which they have different (similar) appearance properties, then they can know by introspection alone that they have experiences in which they have different (similar) appearance properties.

(Modest Introspection) is very intuitive, and arguably, it is no-less intuitive than (Introspection). We also saw some considerations for (Modest Introspection) in section 5. But (Modest Introspection) is also consistent with (Introspection)'s falsity. For this reason, proponents of the broad conception can happily accept (Modest Introspection).

Next, to plausibly explain how (Introspection) might be false, one might say that the falsity of (Introspection) follows from a certain limitation in our capacity to introspect phenomenal differences and similarities between our experiences. The limitation is this: We cannot know by introspection alone that we have experiences whose phenomenologies differ (are similar) in some respect, if the relevant respect only concerns the items that appear to us. Therefore, even given that your circumstances are sufficiently favorable, if you have experiences whose phenomenologies differ (are similar) only in respects that concern the items that appear to you, you will not be able to know by introspection alone that you have experiences whose phenomenologies differ (are similar) in some respect.

Alice's experiences provide a nice illustration. According to the broad conception, Alice's p(Bounce), p(Roll) and h do have different phenomenologies. But the respects in which the phenomenologies differ only concern the items that appear to Alice. More specifically, the phenomenologies differ only in the fact that in p(Bounce), Bounce appears certain ways to Alice; whereas in p(Roll), it is Roll that appears those same ways to her. In h, Alice is again appeared to in the same ways as in p(Bounce) and p(Roll), but neither Bounce nor Roll appear those ways to her. So

the phenomenal differences only concern the items that appear to Alice. Consequently, it is no surprise that Alice cannot know by introspection alone that p(Bounce), p(Roll) and h's phenomenologies differ in some respect. After all, subjects generally cannot know by introspection alone that they have experiences whose phenomenologies differ in some respect, if the relevant respect only concerns the items that appear to the subjects. Similar remarks apply to p_{v}(Bordeaux) and p_{t}(Bordeaux).[18]

It is important to observe here that the limitation one would appeal to—i.e., that we cannot know by introspection alone that we have experiences whose phenomenologies differ (are similar) in some respect, if the relevant respect only concerns the items that appear to us—is not unique. Rather, there are similar limitations in our capacities to introspect differences and similarities between our other states as well.

For example, suppose that as you meet Bob, you judge of him that he is *F*. Bob is then instantaneously replaced with his identical twin, Charlie. Not suspecting a switch has occurred but nevertheless deciding to reconsider whether *F*ness is instantiated around you, you come to make a fresh judgment. This time you judge of Charlie that he is *F*. In this case, you have made two *de re* judgments with different objects. The object of the pre-switch judgment is Bob, while the object of the post-switch judgment is Charlie. Nevertheless, you cannot know by introspection alone that your two *de re* judgments have different objects. This suggests the following limitation: We cannot know by introspection alone that we have made *de re* judgments that differ (are similar) in some respect, if the relevant respect only concerns the objects of those judgments.

Here is another example. Suppose that as you meet Bob, you fear (suspect, desire, ...) him. Then, after Bob is instantaneously replaced with Charlie, you look at Charlie and fear (suspect, desire, ...) Charlie. Here, you have two fears (suspicions, desires, ...) with different objects. The object of the pre-switch fear (suspicion, desire, ...) is Bob, while the object of the post-switch fear (suspicion, desire, ...) is Charlie. But you cannot know that the objects of your fears (suspicions, desires, ...) differ by introspection alone. So another limitation is that we cannot know by introspection alone that we have fears (suspicions, desires, ...) that differ (are similar) in some respect, if the relevant respect only concerns the objects of those fears (suspicions, desires, ...).[19]

Such examples suggest that the original limitation discussed—i.e., that we cannot know by introspection alone that we have experiences whose phenomenologies differ (are similar) in some respect, if the relevant respect only concerns the items that appear to us—can be seen as just an instance of a wider phenomenon. This wider phenomenon amounts to some fairly general limitation in our capacity to introspect differences and similarities between our states, whether they are phenomenologies or not. It belongs to a full theory of introspection to explain why this limitation exists. What is important for present purposes, however, is that whatever this explanation is, one could plausibly

[18] In both p_{v}(Bordeaux) and in p_{t}(Bordeaux), the same Bordeaux appears various (different) ways to Alice. Since this similarity only concerns the wine that appears to Alice, it is no surprise that Alice cannot know by introspection alone that p_{v}(Bordeaux) and p_{t}(Bordeaux)'s phenomenologies are similar in some respect.

[19] I am indebted to an anonymous referee for recommending that I make this point.

appeal to it in explaining how (Introspection) might be false.[20]

It thus emerges that one could (if one were so inclined) deny that phenomenology has the introspective knowability property. It is therefore possible to undercut the argument from introspective knowability to the acceptance of the narrow conception.[21]

But even if the argument can be undercut, we still do not have a separate positive argument for accepting the broad conception. To see such a positive argument, we shall have to consider the second of the two issues I mentioned above. This is the issue that phenomenology might have some theoretically interesting properties other than introspective knowability.

We may start with noting that our conscious experiences have three nice features: First, in having conscious experiences, it often seems to us that the world is certain ways. For example, in *p*(Bounce), it seems to Alice that *something has the properties of roundness and blueness*. It also seems to Alice that *that round thing* [i.e., Bounce] *is present*. Second, conscious experiences often enable us to directly refer to (or think about) certain properties and particulars. For example, *p*(Bounce) enables Alice to directly refer to (or think about) roundness and blueness. It also enables Alice to directly refer to (or think about) Bounce. Third, conscious experiences often enable us to know truths about certain properties and particulars. For example, *p*(Bounce) enables Alice to know truths about roundness and blueness. It also enables Alice to know truths about Bounce. The fact that conscious experiences can have these three features calls out for an explanation.

A particularly attractive explanation is to say that it is the *phenomenologies* of our conscious experiences which are uniformly responsible for all three features. In other words, it is theoretically attractive to hold the following three theses together:

(Seemings) If in having an experience it seems to a subject that *p*, then the experience's phenomenology wholly determines that it seems to the subject that *p*.

(Reference) If an experience enables a subject to directly refer to (or think about) a property or particular, then the

[20] An interesting question is how we are aware of our item-in-appearance properties. Perhaps we are aware of them indirectly, i.e., by being first aware of appearance properties. But whether this is so or not is a difficult question which I cannot hope to address here. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

[21] It might be objected that the strongest argument for accepting the narrow conception does not proceed through (Introspection), but through a related thesis. This is the thesis that all aspects of an experience's phenomenology are in principle knowable by introspection; or, to put it more cautiously, the thesis that if a subject whose circumstances are sufficiently favorable has a conscious experience, then she can know all aspects of that experience's phenomenology by introspection. However, such an objection would be misplaced. The last thesis (on either version) offers *equal* support for both the narrow and the broad conceptions. To see this, note that the broad conception need not suggest that some aspects of an experience's phenomenology are in principle unknowable by introspection. In particular, the broad conception is compatible with the claim that in having an experience, the subject *can* know by introspection which item-in-appearance properties she has. For example, the broad conception is compatible with the claim that in having *p*(Bounce), Alice can know by introspection that *that round thing* [i.e., Bounce] *appears bluish to her*; and that in having *p*(Roll), Alice can know by introspection that *that round thing* [i.e., Roll] *appears bluish to her*. So Alice can introspectively know which item-in-appearance properties she has. The objection is thus refuted. And to be clear: Alice cannot know by introspection that *the round thing which appeared to Alice earlier* [i.e., Bounce] *is distinct from that round thing* [i.e., Roll] *which appears to Alice now*. This, however, is not a problem for the broad conception, as that conception is committed to the claim that a subject cannot know by introspection alone that she has experiences whose phenomenologies differ (are similar) in some respect, if the relevant respect only concerns the items that appear to her. This introspective limitation is not a limitation on knowing aspects of a single experience's phenomenology. Rather, it is a limitation on knowing similarities and differences between the phenomenologies of multiple experiences.

subject's ability is partly explained by the experience's phenomenology.

(Knowledge) If an experience enables a subject to know truths about a property or particular, then the subject's ability is partly explained by the experience's phenomenology.

But how could (Seemings), (Reference) and (Knowledge) be true?

As Sturgeon (2008, p. 120-122) and Gomes & French (2016) note, the answer comes from combining insights from Martin (2002b; 2006), Campbell (2002), McDowell (1998; 2008; 2009) and Johnston (2006): Martin (2002b; 2006) argues that (Seemings) can be true in part because phenomenologies have perceived particulars among their constituent. For example, *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology can determine that it seems to Alice that that round thing [i.e., Bounce] is present, because *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology has Bounce itself among its constituents. Similarly, Campbell (2002; 2010) argues that (Reference) can be true in part because phenomenologies have perceived particulars among their constituents. For example, *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology can partly explain why Alice is able to directly refer to (or think about) Bounce, because *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology has Bounce itself among its constituents. Finally, McDowell (1998; 2008; 2009) and Johnston (2006) suggest that (Knowledge) can be true in part because phenomenologies have perceived particulars among their constituents. For example, *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology can partly explain why Alice is able to know truths about Bounce, because *p*(Bounce)'s phenomenology has Bounce itself among its constituents.

Together, Martin (2002b; 2006), Campbell (2002), McDowell (1998; 2008; 2009) and Johnston's (2006) positions suggest that to preserve the attractive theses (Seemings), (Reference) and (Knowledge), we should accept that phenomenologies have perceived particulars among their constituents. In other words, we should accept the the phenomenal particularity thesis. But if so, we have a strong motivation for accepting a conception of phenomenology on which the phenomenal particularity thesis is true. This conception is precisely the broad conception.

Where do these considerations leave us? Well, I think that they amount to a nice argument for pluralism. The argument is this: (Modest Introspection) suggests that we have the best introspective access to our appearance properties, i.e., to the phenomenologies of our experiences when those are conceived as the *narrow* conception conceives of them. If we call these things "phenomenologies$_{\text{narrow}}$", we could say that phenomenologies$_{\text{narrow}}$ are what (Modest Introspection) tracks. At the same time, (Seemings), (Reference) and (Knowledge) suggest that important explanatory work is also done by the phenomenologies of our experiences when those are conceived as the *broad* conception conceives of them. If we call these things "phenomenologies$_{\text{broad}}$", we could say that phenomenologies$_{\text{broad}}$ are what (Seemings), (Reference) and (Knowledge) track. Both phenomenologies$_{\text{narrow}}$ and phenomenologies$_{\text{broad}}$ have their own theoretically interesting properties. So we should acknowledge both. And we should also accept the version of the phenomenal particularity thesis in which "phenomenology" is replaced with "phenomenology$_{\text{broad}}$", rejecting the version in which "phenomenology" is replaced with "phenomenology$_{\text{narrow}}$".

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