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EXISTENTIAL DEPENDENCE AND THE QUESTION OF EMANATIVE CAUSATION IN PROTESTANT METAPHYSICS, 1570–1620

Andreas Blank

That the world is dependent on God for its existence is a view that many Scholastic and early modern thinkers took to be a philosophical implication of the biblical creation story. However, they strongly disagreed about how to analyse the relation of existential dependence. Christia Mercer has argued that there is an interesting and little noticed group of humanist Platonists in German philosophy in the one or two generations before Leibniz. In particular, she holds that Platonism was adopted to understand the relation between God and the created world. In support of her view, she has brought to light numerous passages from little-known works by early modern German philosophers prominent in their day, such as Johannes Micraelius (1597–1658), Johann Adam Scherzer (1628–1683), Erhard Weigel (1625–1699), and Jacob Thomasius (1622–1684). No doubt, the presence of Platonic strands in German philosophy in the generation before Leibniz is a remarkable but little-appreciated fact. However, I will argue that, if one recalls the revival of metaphysics at Protestant universities in the period between 1570 and 1620, a more complex picture emerges.¹ While Mercer's account focuses on instances where early modern German thinkers seem to accept wholeheartedly Platonic views about the relation between God and the world, there are also critical responses to thinking about this relation in terms of emanative causation. In this article, I will consider some writings by two philosophers who took a critical stance on this issue: Nicolaus Taurellus and Rudolph Goclenius. Taurellus (1547–1606) studied philosophy at the Lutheran University of Tübingen under Jakob Schegk and medicine at Basel. He held a chair in ethics in Basel, and then from 1580 a chair in medicine and natural philosophy at the University of Altdorf.² Goclenius (1547–1628) held a chair in moral philosophy at the University of Marburg, where his long-standing Reformed leanings allowed him to remain in post after the purge of Lutherans from the University in 1605.³

Of the two, Taurellus was the more controversial figure. Famously, he denied that human beings, consisting of a rational soul and an organic body, are genuine unities and held that they are only

¹ On the renewed interest in metaphysics at Protestant universities at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, see W. Sparr, *Wiederkehr der Metaphysik. Die ontologische Frage in der lutherischen Theologie des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1976). Let me emphasize that, contrary to Sparr, I use the term 'Protestant' in an entirely non-essentialist way. In particular, I do not wish to claim that there is anything about Protestant theology that necessitates any Platonic strand in the metaphysical thought of philosophers active in the Protestant territories.

² For overviews of the thought of Taurellus, see P. Petersen, *Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921), 219–58; U. G. Leinsle, *Das Ding und die Methode. Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik*, 2 vols (Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 1985), vol. 1, 147–65; S. Wollgast, *Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung, 1550–1650* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1988), 148–53.

³ On Goclenius's circumstances in Marburg, see H. Hotson, *Commonplace Learning. Ramism and its German Ramifications, 1543–1630* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 230–1. For an overview of Goclenius's thought, see Leinsle, *Das Ding und die Methode*, 175–96. On Goclenius's conception of metaphysics as ontology, see P.-F. Moreau, 'Wolff et Goclenius', *Archives de philosophie*, 65 (2002), 7–14; C. Leijenhorst, *The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism. The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes' Natural Philosophy* (Leiden, Boston and Koeln: Brill, 2002), 24–5.

beings by aggregation.⁴ Moreover, as Christoph Lüthy has documented, Taurellus's writings contain crucial elements of atomistic matter theory.⁵ Taurellus excludes divisibility *ad infinitum*⁶ and denies the reality of Aristotelian prime matter.⁷ According to him, composite bodies are 'by themselves many simple bodies which are composed by accident',⁸ and mixtures are nothing but such composites of elements.⁹ Emanative causation is a recurrent topic in Taurellus's metaphysical writings. Yet, while any interested reader would have been able to derive a detailed account of what different theories of emanative causation amount to, Taurellus developed a barrage of arguments *against* thinking of the relation between God and creatures in terms of emanation. Unlike Taurellus, Goclenius avoided provocation by arguing that apparent contradictions between different philosophical traditions can be resolved by relativizing the apparently contradictory claims to certain aspects. Nevertheless, using such a strategy, Goclenius argued that while the concept of emanative causation is useful for understanding the relation between the divine mind and its attributes and the relation between the human mind and its mental operations, he did not embrace emanative causation when writing about the relation between God and the world. One reason for not embracing emanative causation in this particular respect can be found in Goclenius's view on the structure of reflexive mental operations – a structure that, according to his view, implies that minds possess spontaneous activity that inheres in their own substance without emanating from the divine substance. Looking into the reasons for rejecting emanative causation as an explication of the relation between God and the world thus not only makes clear that Protestant metaphysicians did not unanimously accept Platonism with respect to the relation between God and the world; it also makes clear that the critique of conceptions of existential dependence as an emanation relation is closely connected with two issues that proved central for the development of Protestant metaphysics up to the time of Leibniz, namely the question of how to bring together existential dependence between the world and God with corpuscular matter theories, and the question of how to bring together existential dependence between the world and God with conceptions of the mind as spontaneous, substantial and individual active being.

CONCEPTS OF EXISTENTIAL DEPENDENCE AND EMANATIVE CAUSATION

The discussions of emanative causation in the writings of Taurellus and Goclenius are intricate and technical. Hence, it might be useful first to outline some conceptual distinctions that are relevant for understanding what is going on in these discussions. These conceptual distinctions do not exhaust all senses that the concepts of existential dependence and emanative causation have acquired in late Scholastic and early modern metaphysics. However, they might be helpful for charting the much more limited field of discourse with which I am concerned with. Existential dependence in the sense relevant here is a counterfactual notion. According to this notion, an entity B would not exist if an entity A did not exist. In this case, B is existentially dependent on A. Obviously, this notion has a wide range of application, for example when it comes to characterizing the relation between accidents (properties) and the substances (things) that have them, or the relation between the mind and the body in which the mind is embodied. Naturally, in the context of philosophical theology it was applied to the relation between the world and God, where it gave rise to two different notions of existential dependence (for clarity's sake, let me use the following, somewhat anachronistic labels):

⁴ N. Taurellus, *Philosophiae triumphus, hoc est, Metaphysica philosophandi methodus* (Basel, 1573), d6 recto.

⁵ C. Lüthy, 'David Gorlaeus' atomism, or: the marriage of Protestant metaphysics with Italian natural philosophy', in C. Lüthy, J. E. Murdoch and W. R. Newman, *Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscularian Matter Theories* (Leiden, Boston and Koeln: Brill, 2001), 245–90, especially 278–86. J. W. Feuerlein, *Taurellus defensus* (Nürnberg, 1734), contains a detailed account of the controversies that Taurellus's metaphysics provoked at Protestant universities in Germany.

⁶ N. Taurellus, *Synopsis Aristotelis metaphysices*, par. 55; reprinted as an appendix to Feuerlein, *Taurellus defensus* (unpaginated).

⁷ A. da Villanova, *Arnaldi Villanovi Opera*, edited by N. Taurellus (Basel, 1585), col. 8.

⁸ *Philosophiae triumphus*, 123, defines a *compositum* as 'per se multa simplicia quae per accidens composita sunt'.

⁹ *Philosophiae triumphus*, 124, 170.

1. *Creation dependence*: the world would not have come into existence and would not persist in existence had it not been created by God.
2. *Conservation dependence*: the world would not persist in existence were it not continuously conserved by God.

Note that neither creation dependence nor conservation dependence implies emanative causation. Any account of creation (understood as *creatio ex nihilo*) would be sufficient to explicate creation dependence, and any account of the nature of the conserving activity of God would be sufficient to explicate conservation dependence. Thinking of the relation between God and the world in terms of emanative causation is only one possible way of explicating creation dependence and conservation dependence. The question with which the present paper is concerned is whether Protestant metaphysicians were unanimous in thinking about creation dependence and conservation dependence in terms of emanative causation.

What would be involved in a view of creation dependence and conservation dependence as instances of emanative causation? Mercer notes that, in the Platonist literature, there are three standard ways to describe the relation between God and the world: (1) the model-image relation, (2) the participation relation, and (3) the emanation relation.¹⁰ According to the characterization that she gives, in the emanation relation a more perfect being A possesses an attribute *f* and causes this attribute to be instantiated in a less perfect being B in such a way, however, that A loses nothing while B comes to instantiate *f*-ness. As Mercer explains, emanative causation includes the model-image and the participation relation: B participates in *f*-ness, as long as A emanates *f*-ness (since both A and B instantiate the same attribute *f*); and B is an imperfect image of A, as long as A emanates *f*-ness (since B instantiates the attribute *f* in a less perfect way than A).¹¹ Moreover, she emphasizes that one of the philosophically intriguing aspects of understanding the relation between God and creatures in terms of emanative causation is the combination of an account of divine transcendence with an account of divine immanence: due to the (infinitely) higher perfection of the divine attributes, God is transcendent; but due to the fact that creatures share the same attributes (even if in a less perfect way), God is immanent.¹²

As Mercer notes, in the group of philosophers from the generation before Leibniz, one finds different views about how exactly the divine immanence involved in emanative causation can be explicated. These views are highly relevant for understanding the positions of Taurellus and Goclenius, since they explicitly address these different ways of explicating the emanation relation. Thomasius takes the view that the ‘essence of God permeates’ the world so that there is an ‘effusion of vital spirit’.¹³ In fact, Mercer writes that the basic idea behind theories of emanative causation ‘was that the diversity in the world was the essence of the Supreme Being variously manifested’.¹⁴ Somewhat differently, Scherzer claims to follow Ficino and others by conceiving of God as ‘The light itself [...] the uniform and omniform form [...] the unity in the multitude’.¹⁵ Finally, Mercer argues that for Micraelius, the substance-mode terminology seems to apply both to created and divine substance. Assuming that creatures are modes of God, as she thinks Micraelius assumes, it follows that they are ‘determinations’ of the divine essence.¹⁶ The remarks by Thomasius, Scherzer and Micraelius give us three different concepts of emanation (again, throughout this paper, I will use slightly anachronistic labels for them):

¹⁰ C. Mercer, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics. Its Origin and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 188.

¹¹ Mercer, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics*, 189.

¹² Mercer, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics*, 190–1.

¹³ J. Thomasius, *Exercitatio de Stoica mundi exustione* (Leipzig, 1676), 215–17.

¹⁴ Mercer, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics*, 185.

¹⁵ J. A. Scherzer, *Vade mecum sive Manuale philosophicum quadripartitum*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1675), vol. 1, 52–3. See C. Mercer, ‘Humanist Platonism in Seventeenth-century Germany’, in *Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by J. Krayer and M. W. F. Stone (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 238–58 (242).

¹⁶ C. Mercer, ‘Leibniz and Spinoza on Substance and Mode’, in *The Rationalists. Critical Essays on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz*, edited by D. Pereboom (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 273–300 (285); see J. Micraelius, *Lexicon Philosophicum*, second edition (Stettin, 1662), col. 783–5 (first edition, 1653).

1. *Essential emanation*: through the emanation relation, God and creatures share the same essence.
2. *Formal emanation*: through the emanation relation, God is the formal cause of creatures.
3. *Modificative emanation*: through the emanation relation, creatures are modes or attributes of God.

Note that these three concepts of emanation are not mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, as Mercer argues, Micraelius holds that creatures are modes of God because they share the divine essence.¹⁷ Moreover, one also might plausibly hold that God is the formal cause of creatures because they share the divine essence (after all, the view that essence *is* form was widely discussed in late Scholastic philosophy).¹⁸ Nevertheless, it pays to keep these notions apart since Taurellus and Goclenius address them separately.

TAURELLUS ON EXISTENTIAL DEPENDENCE AND EMANATIVE CAUSATION

The issue of emanative causation is already present in Taurellus's *Triumphus philosophiae* (1573), a book in which Taurellus develops his own version of a Platonic epistemology of innate ideas. It reoccurs in *Alpes caesae* (1597), a long polemical book directed against the Italian Averroist Andrea Cesalpino (1529–1603). Finally, the issue of emanative causation is a central theme in two late cosmological writings, *Kosmologia* (1603) and *De rerum aeternitate* (1604). In these two works, Taurellus gives detailed responses to the discussion of emanative causation in writings by the Paduan philosopher Francesco Piccolomini (1520–1604).¹⁹ Like Taurellus, Piccolomini raises numerous objections against thinking about the relation between God and the world in terms of emanative causation. However, Taurellus criticizes Piccolomini on two levels: he thinks that many of Piccolomini's arguments are flawed in matters of detail and, hence, do not lend support to the desired conclusion; and he reproaches Piccolomini for conceding too much to the Platonists – such as the view that elementary forces derive from the agency of a Platonic world soul. No doubt, Taurellus's books were highly informative for his contemporaries in that they show how a theory of emanative causation might work. However, understanding the relation between God and the world as an emanation relation turns out to be incompatible with his own corpuscularian matter theory and its ontological implications.

Let us first look into a group of arguments that, in Taurellus's view, provides reasons against conservation dependence in terms of formal emanation. Taurellus holds that elementary particles possess forms and forces that are independent of any continued divine agency. That he ascribes formal properties to elementary particles that are independent of a continuous conserving activity of God becomes clear in *De rerum aeternitate*, where he disusses Piccolomini's claim that every part of the world depends on God.²⁰ Taurellus points out that Piccolomini derives this claim from Marsilio Ficino, who held that corporeal mass cannot exist on its own since otherwise it would form itself.²¹ As Ficino and Piccolomini argue, conveying form onto a corporeal substance is not a property of body since all active beings act by means of some incorporeal faculty. Ficino and Piccolomini conclude that the world depends in all its parts on an incorporeal principle of agency in such a way that, since it depends always on this principle, it can be said to be created continually.²² Taurellus agrees that bodily mass cannot

¹⁷ Mercer, 'Leibniz and Spinoza on Substance and Mode', 285.

¹⁸ See, for example, the entry on 'essence' in Goclenius's *Lexicon philosophicum*.

¹⁹ Taurellus's references are to Francesco Piccolomini's *De mundo and De creatione ex Philosophorum sententia*. See F. Piccolomini, *Libri ad Scientiam de Natura attinentes* (Venice, 1596), pars secunda, fols. 1 recto–41 verso and fols 103 verso–118 recto. On Piccolomini's methodological views, see N. Jardine, 'Keeping Order in the School of Padua: Jacopo Zabarella and Francesco Piccolomini on the Offices of Philosophy', *Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy. The Aristotle Commentary Tradition*, edited by D. A. Di Liscia, E. Kessler and C. Methuen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 183–209.

²⁰ See Piccolomini, *De creatione*, II.2.

²¹ M. Ficino, *Theologia Platonica*, I.2. See *Marsilio Ficino. Platonic Theology*, translated by M. J. B. Allen, edited by J. Hankins with W. Bowen, I Tatti Renaissance Library, 6 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001–2006), vol. 1, 18–27.

²² N. Taurellus, *De rerum aeternitate* (Marburg, 1604), 448–9.

convey form onto itself. However, he does not believe that bodily mass, once it is formed, requires any *external* active principle to preserve its form.²³ Likewise, he holds that elements have their own forces – forces that are derived from the elements, not from any being external to them. In his view, the heavens not only do not have the force to convey form to elements, they are also unnecessary to explain the forces that elements possess. In *De rerum aeternitate* Taurellus takes issue with Piccolomini's claim that God imparts forces on things in the world by means of a Platonic world soul.²⁴ For this reason, he holds that in addition to general forces that influence all bodies on earth in a uniform way, there are specific forces that belong to the elements.²⁵

What holds for the parts of the world, in Taurellus's view, also holds for the world as a whole. The world depends on God in the sense that it would not have come into being without an act of divine creation, and it would cease to exist if God decided to bring the world to an end. However, once created, the world as a whole does not require any divine agency to persist in its existence. In *De rerum aeternitate*, Taurellus argues that it does not make sense to say that God conserves the world since there are no adverse factors external to the world that would be able to threaten its existence. Moreover, Taurellus refers to the traditional Aristotelian conception of the immutability of the heavenly bodies to demonstrate that at least *some* bodies in the universe are not subject to decay due to factors that are internal to the world. He concedes that there are composite bodies in the world that are indeed subject to decomposition. Once more, he makes use of his corpuscularian matter theory: according to his matter theory, elements themselves do not change or decompose²⁶ – a view that makes Taurellus's elements much more akin to Lucretian atoms than to Aristotelian elements. In this sense, the world is constituted by bodies that factors internal to the world cannot decompose. In *Alpes caesae*, he summarizes his view concerning the dependence of created beings on God:

We say that there is a dual mode of this [...] dependence [...] The first is the dependence on an efficient cause, the second is the dependence on constituents: We accept the first of these. For the world and the entire nature [...] are produced by God who alone is infinite and eternal. But this is only improperly called dependence. For things no longer depend on God because they are no longer produced by him [...] The other mode is the dependence on constitutive causes. Thus, the essence of human beings depends on the body and the soul. In neither of these two ways, however, do the heavens depend on the prime mover. For the first mode concerns things that, at some time, were made and completed by another being. But who would think that this mover is a constitutive part of the heavens: since he is neither the form, nor the matter, nor the soul of the heavens? [...] Celestial bodies have their own substance, nature, and forces by means of which they act on elementary bodies.²⁷

²³ Taurellus, *De rerum aeternitate*, 449: 'Moles corporea seipsam non potest efformare. Credo equidem, sed dubium est, an aliquando sit efformata, vel semper eodem quo nunc modo suam habuerit formam, neque aliunde, neque ab alio acceptam.'

²⁴ See Piccolomini, *De mundo*, ch. 30.

²⁵ Taurellus, *De rerum aeternitate*, 275: 'An non elementa suas ex seipsis vires habent? Mihi non satis intelligere videtur Piccolomineus, quid communes, & quid propriae sint rerum vires. A supernis quaecunque sunt indifferentes sunt. Et haec non a Deo sunt immediate, sed ab astris, quae naturali sua virtute moventur, & suas etiam pro sua quaeque essentia vires in haec demittunt elementaria corpora: quae tamen vires communes, & eadem sunt, in quaedunque inciderint corpora [...].'

²⁶ Taurellus, *De rerum aeternitate*, 450–51: 'Quomodo etiam mundum servat Deus? Num adversus hostes mundum tuetur, qui nulli tamen sunt? Num alimentaria mundo praebet, quibus sustentetur? Absurdum etiam est, Deum servare mundum, quam ipse non fecerit. Si vero fecit, fecit certe prius quam servaverit. Non ergo hoc cerservatione definienda est aeterna creatio [...]. Non equidem inficior, quin homines, animalia quaedam brutis, & corpora quaedam providentia divina conserventur. At de mundo non videtur hoc esse asserendum. Coelestium namque corporum non est ulla metuanda mutatio [...]. Corpora vero elementaria, non plus mutantur, vel corrumpuntur naturaliter, quam oporteat.'

²⁷ N. Taurellus, *Alpes caesae, Hoc est, Andreae Caesalpini Itali, monstrosa & superba dogmata, discussa & excussa* (Frankfurt, 1597), 133: 'Nos duplicem huius [...] dependentiae modum esse dicimus [...] Primus est efficientis causae: alter est constituentium: Priorem nos admittimus[.] Mundum namque naturamque totam [...] a Deo infinito solo, & aeterno solo effecta esse dicimus. Sed improprie tamen haec dependentia dicitur. Non enim a Deo pendet amplius: quia non amplius ab eo fiunt [...] Alter modus est caussarum constituentium. Ita hominis essentia a corpore, & anima pendet. Neutro certe modo coelum a primo movente pendet. Primus enim modus rerum est, quae ab aliquo factae sunt aliquando, & completae. Quis vero credit motorem illum coeli partem esse constituentem: cuius nec forma ipse est, nec materia, nec anima? [...] Coelestia corpora suam & substantiam, & naturam, & vires habent: quibus in elementaria corpora agant [...].' On Taurellus's opposition to the influence of the philosophy of Cesalpino at the University of Altdorf, see M. Mulsow, 'Ambiguities of the *Prisca Sapientia* in Late Renaissance Humanism', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 65 (2004), 1–13 (esp. 7–9).

The independence of the forms and forces of elementary particles, in Taurellus's view, strongly restricts the sense in which such particles can be said to depend on God. They depend on God in the sense that they would not exist had they not been created, and in the sense that they would cease to exist if God decided to annihilate them; but they do not depend on God in the sense that God continuously conserves their form. Analogously, heavenly bodies are created by God and could be annihilated by him; but they have forces that do not depend on a continuous divine agency.

In the *Kosmologia*, Taurellus develops some considerations against understanding conservation dependence in terms of essential emanation. Suppose, as late Scholastic thinkers such as the Coimbra commentators suggest, that the heavens are preserved by means of continuous creation or by means of a perpetual efflux of divine essence.²⁸ In this case, Taurellus argues, Heraclitus's view of the perpetual flux of all things would be confirmed since nothing would remain intact beyond the duration of a moment. If emanation is thought of as a 'flow' of essence, as much essence as is conveyed to a particular object at a given moment has to be previously withdrawn from its source.²⁹ In this way, essential emanation implies the constant change both of created things and their source. Taurellus argues that such a conception of the mutability of all created things is contrary to the Aristotelian conception of the regular and stable motions of the stars – motions which become inexplicable once one assumes that stars are unstable and momentary objects. The same holds, according to him, for the fixed and stable figure of stars.³⁰ Taurellus also points out unacceptable cosmological consequences of essential emanation. He argues that what emanates from the essence of substance is of the same nature as this substance. Hence, if the world emanates from the divine essence, it is either incorporeal (which is contrary to Taurellus's view of the ultimate constituents of material reality); or God is corporeal (which, presumably, is contrary to received Christian doctrine).³¹

Taurellus also develops a group of arguments against understanding either creation dependence or conservation dependence in terms of modificative emanation. In *Philosophiae Triumphus*, he argues that if, as modificative emanation implies, the world is not substantially separated from God, the world would be an accident of the Divine substance.³² He thinks that this cannot be the case, for two reasons: first, every number and magnitude in the world is finite while the infinite divine substance cannot have finite accidents. Hence, the world cannot be an accident that subsists in another being.³³ Second, God does not have accidents. As Taurellus argues, God is an infinite substance, and due to his infinity nothing can define his essence. Hence, accidents are entirely foreign to his nature, since accidents serve to describe or define the substances to which they belong.³⁴ Moreover, it is possible that the substance that in fact has a particular accident also could not have this accident. Or to put it differently: accidents are contingent characteristics of substances. However, the attributes of God (such as his omnipotence

²⁸ Taurellus refers the reader to Coimbricenses, *Physica* VIII, 2, qu. 1, art. 4.

²⁹ N. Taurellus, *Kosmologia, hoc est physicarum et metaphysicarum discussionum de mundo libri II adversus Franciscum Piccolomineum aliosque Peripateticos* (Amberg, 1603), 235–6: 'Verum ut res haec bene discutiatur: modi nobis sunt exquirendi: quibus conservari quid possit. 1. Primus itaque rerum est consistentium: quae semel factae, & completae alieno conservantur auxilio. 2. Alter vero modus est eorum, quae assiduo essentiae effluxu sustentantur. Utro igitur modo corpora coelestia conservat Deus? Si continuata creatione Deus coelum tueri & conservare dicitur: multa sese offeret difficultas. [...] Heracliti sententia de assiduo rerum omnium fluxu confirmabitur. Quid enim salvum, & integrum vel temporis momento persistat: si corpora coelestia generentur, & corrumpantur assidue? Ita enim necesse est: si semper creantur: ut quantum adjicitur essentiae, tantum ante absumptum sit. Quid quaeso cogitari possit monstrosius?'

³⁰ Taurellus, *Kosmologia*, 236: 'Motus localis certus, & firmus: quales sunt astrorum: substantiae sunt non fientis & fluxae: sed firmae, & permanentes [...] Idem quoque docet astrorum certa, permanensque figura: quae factarum est, & consistentium: non fientium & fluentium substantiarum.'

³¹ Taurellus, *Kosmologia*, 237–8: 'Si mundus essentiae Divinae defluxus quidam sit, vel corporeus est Deus: vel mundus est incorporeus. Omnis enim defluxus naturam eius substantiae refert: ex qua prodierit [...].'

³² N. Taurellus, *Philosophiae triumphus*, 249: '[S]i substantia mundi a Deo separatus non sit, sed coniunctus ab eo semper ut nunc existerit, sicque sit in aeternum perduraturus, per se nequaquam subsistet, [...] sed accidens eius esset, quod ab eo separari, vel separatim consistere non possit [...].'

³³ Taurellus, *Philosophiae triumphus*, 250–1: '[M]undus tamen caeteraque omnia nec numero nec magnitudine vel substantiae sunt infinita. Porro an accidentia Deo possint ascribi, postea vere discutiemus, nunc sufficiat ipsam Dei substantiam nihil quod finitum sit sustinere.'

³⁴ Taurellus, *Philosophiae triumphus*, 273: 'Infinitus substantia Deus existens, suscipit nihil quo possit ipse definiri, quae causa est ut accidentia sint ab eo quam alienissima, quod substantias vel circumscribant, vel alias definiant.'

and omniscience) cannot be absent from God. Or to put it differently: divine attributes are necessary characteristics of the divine substance. Hence, they do not fall under the category of accidents.³⁵

In the *Kosmologia*, Taurellus comes back to the issue of modificative emanation. There, he distinguishes between two ways in which something ‘flows’ from one being to another: the ‘flowing’ of substance, and the ‘flowing’ of accidents.³⁶ Consider the basic late Scholastic concepts of accident and substance shared by Taurellus and other Protestant philosophers.³⁷ Accidents are entities that inhere in another being, while substances are entities that do not inhere in another being. If a new accident of a substance is produced by this substance, we have an instance of immanent causation: a causal relation within one and the same being. If a substance produces a new accident, one could plausibly assume that such a causal relation does not diminish the substance from which the new accident arises, because it is an effect that inheres in it. Taurellus holds that this is the only conceivable conception of how something can be said to be ‘in’ God: divine attributes ‘complete’ (*complet*) the divine essence.³⁸ However, he argues that such a conception of the ‘flowing’ of accidents is of no help when it comes to defending modificative emanation. As he argues earlier in the *Kosmologia*, due to the self-sufficiency of corpuscular forms and forces, corpuscles are the true subjects of inherence of their accidents. Hence, they belong to the category of substance, not to the category of accidents. Therefore, also a world composed of corpuscles does not belong to the category of accidents.³⁹ Consequently, a world composed of corpuscles cannot inhere in the divine substance.⁴⁰ Moreover, if creatures do not ‘complete’ the essence of God, their essence differs from the essence of God. Rejecting modificative emanation, in Taurellus’s view, hence implies rejecting essential emanation.⁴¹

According to Taurellus, emanative causation also cannot be understood as a case of the ‘flowing’ of substance. His argument is elusive, but it might be understood along the following lines. Given the notion of substance commonly shared by late Scholastic metaphysicians, substances do not inhere in other beings. The ‘flowing’ of substance, hence, is an instance of transitive causation: a causal relation between beings that are numerically different from each other. Recall that the emanation relation implies the participation relation: if object A and object B stand in the relation of emanative causation, they share one and the same attribute *f* (in such a way that A possesses *f* more perfectly than B). If A and B differ numerically from each other, a natural interpretation of this situation would be that B instantiates the attribute *f* because *f* has been transferred from A to B. In fact, this may have been the interpretation that Taurellus had in mind, since he argues that the ‘flowing’ of substance ‘diminishes’ the substance from which the new substance arises.⁴² Obviously, the idea that the being from which something flows is diminished is contrary to the concept of emanation, according to which A loses nothing while producing an effect.

Taurellus’s various arguments against thinking about existential dependence in terms of emanative causation are interesting for two reasons. First, the question of whether the relation of existential dependence between creatures and God can be analysed as an emanation relation is an issue to which Taurellus consistently returned over a period of more than thirty years. Due to his insistence on the

³⁵ Taurellus, *Philosophiae triumphus*, 325–6: ‘Deus [...] tale quid est, ut existat perfectissime, nullam sustinens accientium rationem, quo fit ut ab eius definitione removendum sit, quicquid actionem ab ipsa substantia diversa indicat [...]. Videmus hominem vel infantia, vel morbo, vel somno sic affici nihil ut intelligat, quod indicium fuerit accidens hanc esse, cum salva substantia possit abesse: Licet autem hoc ipsum Deo non debeat adscribi, cum nil eius intelligentiam vel tollere queat, vel impedire [...].’

³⁶ *Kosmologia*, 238.

³⁷ See Taurellus, *Philosophiae triumphus*, 165, 176; Taurellus, *Alpes Caesae*, 48–9; Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 243; Microaelius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, col. 18; Scherzer, *Vade mecum*, vol. 1, 3.

³⁸ Taurellus, *De rerum aeternitate*, 458: ‘Extra Deum nihil emanare potest, cum enim sit infinitus, & omne compleat spatium, omnia etiam intra se continet. Proinde si quid extra Deum esse dicatur, locali hoc positu describendum non est, sed substantiae diversitate. Solum id igitur in Deo est, quod eius complet essentiam.’

³⁹ Taurellus, *Kosmologia*, 62–3.

⁴⁰ Taurellus, *Kosmologia*, 238 and *De rerum aeternitate*, 459.

⁴¹ Taurellus, *De rerum aeternitate*, 459: ‘Ita siquidem in Deo sumus, ut extra Deum simus, ob maximam essentiae, virtutis, & voluntatis diversitatem [...]. E]sse extra Deum, nihil aliud est, quam habere diversam a Deo essentiam.’

⁴² Taurellus, *Kosmologia*, 238: ‘Defluxus omnis aut substantiae est, aut accidentis. Neuter mundo competere potest. Non enim accidens est. Substantia vero defluens, eam minuit ex qua profluerit.’ The same argument occurs in Taurellus, *De rerum aeternitate*, 459.

importance of the question, and due to the detailed discussion he devotes to the theories of emanative causation discussed by Piccolomini, his writings kept Platonic views of the relation between God and the world before the minds of his contemporaries. Second, however, the drift of Taurellus's discussion is unmistakably critical: he thinks that theories of emanative causation have consequences that are unacceptable on both philosophical and theological grounds. For example, he gives a resoundingly negative answer to the question 'Does the world emanate from God?': 'There is hardly anything as impious and absurd that it has not been thought, asserted, and defended by some'.⁴³ He also puts it as follows: '[T]he world [...] and all the bodies in it are perfect and complete substances that are at rest in themselves: and there is no longer any movement of generation in them. Hence, the world does not exist (as they express it) *by means of emanation* [...] Since this is so, it becomes manifest that the ancient philosophers did not know anything certain about God. For God is neither the matter, nor the form, nor the entelechy of things [...]'.⁴⁴ Hence, Taurellus serves to illustrate the fact that being deeply interested in Platonic themes for Protestant metaphysicians did not necessarily mean accepting a theory of emanative causation.

GOCCLENIUS ON EXISTENTIAL DEPENDENCE AND EMANATIVE CAUSATION

Goclenius, too, is deeply interested in themes from Platonic philosophy but, unlike Taurellus, he maintains that *something* useful can be done with the concept of emanative causation, namely when the concept is applied to relations within one and the same substance. For example, he suggests that the relation between the human mind and its operations is one of emanation:

Immanent action [...] in the most proper sense has one and the same proximate principle that is both active and receptive. It remains in the same substrate, and in the same potency, from which it is brought forth, such as thought and appetite. Here belong the emanations or results of the spiritual properties of the soul, such that intellect and will are proximately from the soul and in the soul.⁴⁵

Understanding mental causation as an instance of emanative causation is a suggestion that is later taken up by other Protestant philosophers such as Daniel Sennert (1572–1636) and Leibniz.⁴⁶ Moreover, the following passage indicates that Goclenius, like Thomasius, closely connected emanative causation with the role of the essence of the cause from which something emanates:

To emanate is to immediately accompany the essence, albeit without any respect to existence, and before existence, and without any respect to an external cause. In the proper sense, it is to flow from another thing, or to exist due to the principles of the essence of the subject, or to arise out of the essence of something by means of an indissoluble nexus and connection. In this way, real properties emanate. In this way, potencies emanate from the soul.⁴⁷

⁴³ Taurellus, *De rerum aeternitate*, 43: 'Vix quicquam adeo & impium, & absurdum est, quod non & cogitatum, & assertum, & defensum fuerit ab aliquibus.'

⁴⁴ Taurellus, *Synopsis Aristotelis metaphysices*, par. 82: '[M]undum [...] caeteraque in eo corpora perfectas, completas, & per se conquiescentes esse substantias: nec in ipso amplius esse generationis motu. Non ergo mundus a Deo est per *modum* (ut loquuntur) *emanationis*. Quae cum ita sint: manifeste liquet veteres Philosophos de Deo nihil habuisse certi. Deus enim nec materia, nec forma, nec εντελεχεια rerum est [...].'

⁴⁵ R. Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum* (Marburg, 1613), 40: 'Actio immanens [...] maxime propria, habet unum idemque principium proximum & Activum & Receptivum. Manet in eodem supposito, & in eadem potentia, a qua elicitur, ut Cognitio & Appetitio. Huc pertinent emanationes seu resultantiae proprietatum spiritualium animae, ut, Intellectus & voluntas sunt proxime ab anima & in anima.'

⁴⁶ See D. Sennert, *Quaestionum medicarum controversarum* (Wittenberg, 1609), 19; G. W. Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe* (Darmstadt and Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1923–), vol. 2, 1, 113. On emanative causation in Sennert, see A. Blank, 'Sennert and Leibniz on Animate Atoms and Subordinate Forms', in *Machines of Nature and Composite Substances in Leibniz*, edited by O. Nachtomy and J. E. H. Smith (Dordrecht: Springer, forthcoming).

⁴⁷ Goclenius, *Lexicon Philosophicum*, 146: 'Emanare est immediate essentiam comitari, tamen sine respectu existentiae, & ante existentiam, & sine respectu causae externae. Proprie est fluere ab alio, seu ex principiis essentiae subiecti existere[,] ab essentia alicuius indissolubili nexu vinculoque proficisci. Sic emanant reales proprietates. Sic ex anima emanant potentiae.'

Evidently, Goclenius was committed to emanative causation in his philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, in what follows I will argue that he had doubts about whether creation dependence and conservation dependence can be understood in terms of emanative causation. Let us first turn to Goclenius's *Conciliator philosophicus* (1609), a work that consists of several hundred short entries which all take their point of departure from a pair of seemingly contradictory opinions regarding a given philosophical question. Goclenius's strategy throughout the work is to show that the contradiction between these different opinions is only apparent. Most frequently, he suggests that the opinions in question have to be relativized in certain aspects, so that the formal contradiction between them dissolves and both opinions can be held to contain some truth. Such an argumentative strategy allows Goclenius to integrate elements from different philosophical traditions into his own view. In particular, he applies this strategy to issues of philosophical theology.

For example, he considers two seemingly contradictory answers to the question of whether all dependent beings depend on God. One view has it that all dependent beings, i.e. those beings that have a 'being by participation', depend on the independent being, i.e. God. The alternative view has it that the lower beings depend on the heavenly bodies. Goclenius dissolves the apparent contradiction by distinguishing between mediate and immediate dependence: everything depends on God 'primarily and remotely' (*primo & remote*), while all inferior beings depend 'proximately' (*proxime*) on heavenly bodies.⁴⁸ Interestingly, he applies the idea of proximate dependence also to the question of how created beings are preserved in their existence and mentions Scaliger's view that the forms of heavenly bodies are the conserving forms of the forms of the inferior beings.⁴⁹ He also mentions Aquinas's view that God does not conserve all beings immediately, in the sense that only he himself, without the concurrence of secondary causes, would do the conserving.⁵⁰ Goclenius's solution suggests that, in conserving sublunar beings, secondary causes are not identical with aspects of the divine essence since, if they were identical with aspects of the divine essence, the distinction between mediate and immediate existential dependence would not get off the ground. In this way, the distinction between mediate and immediate existential dependence puts strong constraints on the sense in which God can be said to be 'in' created beings: while Goclenius accepts creation dependence and conservation dependence, he does not understand either of these dependence relations in terms of essential emanation.

Goclenius also considers two diverging answers to the question of whether some attributes of God are communicated to creatures. One view has it that only God is immortal, good, and beautiful; the other view has it that the human soul is immortal and can become beautiful. Goclenius suggests that the first view is correct with respect to having these attributes by oneself and in a persistent and perfect way and the second is correct with respect to having these attributes by means of participation.⁵¹ On first sight, Goclenius's solution could be understood as implying a strong notion of the human soul being a part of the divine essence. However, Goclenius hastens to add: 'This kind of participation does not come about by means of the separation of a part but by means of a union, through similarity'.⁵² Hence, the sense in which divine attributes can be communicated to human souls involves a similarity relation but, again, not a conception of the human mind as being 'in' God in the sense of essential emanation.⁵³

Conversely, Goclenius considers the question of whether God possesses all the degrees and perfections of creatures. One view has it that God possesses all degrees and perfections of creatures since he

⁴⁸ R. Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus* (Kassel, 1609), 119.

⁴⁹ Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus*, 119. See J. C. Scaliger, *Exotericarum exercitationum liber XV. De subtilitate, ad Hieronymum Cardanum* (Paris, 1557), ex. 6, 6.

⁵⁰ Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus*, 119. See T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 104, art. 2, ad. 1. On Aquinas's views on the role of secondary causes in conservation and late scholastic alternatives to this view, see A. J. Freddoso, 'God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not Enough', *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 67 (1994), 131–56.

⁵¹ Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus*, 165–6.

⁵² Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus*, 166: 'Participatio haec fit non Abscissione partis, sed unitate, per similitudinem.'

⁵³ So far, no extensive discussion of formal emanation in Goclenius's writings came to my attention. Note, however, that Goclenius rejects the view that God could be understood as a Platonic world soul that is 'the form and internal entelechy' (*forma & εντελεχεια interna*) of things in the world (Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus*, 167).

is infinite by his nature, while the other view maintains that it is absurd to suppose that a single being should possess all degrees and perfections at once. Goclenius suggests that God possesses all degrees and perfections with respect to possibility: he possesses a more perfect foundation of all attributes of created beings and is capable of producing these attributes. In this sense, he possesses the attributes of created beings ‘virtually or eminently’ (*virtualiter seu eminenter*); but he does possess them ‘formally and in himself, really’ (*formaliter & in se, reipsa*).⁵⁴ Goclenius concludes: ‘God therefore is not every substance formally’.⁵⁵ Hence, virtual and eminent containment of attributes, in Goclenius’s view, is compatible with the view that God and creatures do not share attributes, neither by themselves (by sharing qualities) nor with respect to forms (by sharing principles that produce qualities). Goclenius’s view that God and creatures, in this sense, do not share attributes is contrary to both essential and formal emanation.

Surprisingly, it may look as if Goclenius had become an uncompromising Platonist about the relation between God and creatures a few years later, by the time of writing the *Lexicon philosophicum* (1613). As Mercer points out, in the *Lexicon philosophicum* Goclenius uses another, related notion that is bewildering for the modern reader: the notion of ‘eminent containment’. Goclenius explains that God contains all things ‘eminently’ (*eminenter*) in the sense that the divinity contains them ‘above every limit and above every grade’ (*supra omnem mensuram, supra omnem gradus*). As Goclenius adds, the ‘opposite’ of this is to have those things ‘in a certain way and with a limit’ (*certo modo & mensura*).⁵⁶ Moreover, he writes that ‘in the universe, in order for there to be perfection, there are different degrees and modes of things, which are given to things by God [...] A mode in things is a limitation of the divine efficient potency’.⁵⁷ According to Goclenius, ‘God thinks creatures through his nature; we think God through creatures’;⁵⁸ God is ‘everything in all things [...] and is said to be in the things of the universe, that is, in all things and in each thing’.⁵⁹ At first sight, this group of quotations might suggest a picture according to which Goclenius holds that created beings are modes of the divine substance; that God contains created beings eminently because such modes are limitations of the divine essence; that created beings, even if in a less perfect way, participate in the essence of God; and that something about the essence of God, therefore, can be known by knowing created beings. In short: eminent containment, at first sight, seems to imply essential emanation.

However, contrary to first appearances, the passages from the *Lexicon philosophicum* mentioned by Mercer provide no conclusive evidence that Goclenius is committed to understanding the relation between God and creatures in terms of emanative causation. When she quotes a passage that suggests that God is in all things, Mercer omits a crucial qualification. Summarizing what he takes to be the view expressed in the first chapter of Aquinas’s *De divinis nominibus*, Goclenius writes: ‘God is everything in all things *causally, because he does not belong to what is in things essentially* [...]’.⁶⁰ This qualification suggests that, although Goclenius accepts the view that God, in some sense, is ‘in’ creatures, he does not think of creatures as taking part in the divine essence. Rather, restricting the sense in which God is ‘in’ creatures to a causal sense has the aim of excluding the view that creatures are the divine essence variously manifested. Also Goclenius’s view that, in some sense, we can know God by knowing creatures does not commit him to essential emanation. Again, in quoting Goclenius, Mercer omits a crucial qualification. Goclenius continues the passage just quoted as follows: ‘and,

⁵⁴ Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus*, 167.

⁵⁵ Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus*, 167: ‘Deus igitur non est quaecunque substantia formaliter’.

⁵⁶ Mercer, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics*, 207; Goclenius, *Lexicon Philosophicum*, 146 (Mercer’s translations). See also Mercer, ‘Leibniz and Spinoza on Substance and Mode’, 284–5. On eminent containment in late Scholastic thought, see G. Gorham, ‘The Dilemma of Eminent Containment: Descartes and Suárez’, *Dialogue*, 42 (2003), 3–25.

⁵⁷ Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 694: ‘In universo, ut sit Perfectio, sunt diversi gradus & modi rerum, ipsis a Deo tributi [...] Modus in rebus est limitatio divinae potentiae efficientis’ (Mercer’s translation).

⁵⁸ Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 704: ‘Deus quidem creaturas per suam naturam cognoscit, nos autem Deum per creaturas’ (Mercer’s translation).

⁵⁹ Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 704: ‘Deus est omnia in omnibus [...] Deus dicitur esse in rebus universis, id est, omnibus & singulis [...]’ (Mercer’s translation).

⁶⁰ Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 704: ‘Deus est omnia in omnibus *Causaliter, cum tamen nihil sit eorum, quae sunt in rebus essentialiter* [...]’ (my italics).

hence, whatever is known as existing in things [...] once they are known, God, in some way, is known, too, *as a cause: but nevertheless from none of them he is known in the way he is*.⁶¹ Knowing God by knowing creatures is tied to the sense in which God is ‘in’ creatures: not as their essence, but as their cause. Hence, Goclenius does not think that, by knowing the essence of creatures, we can know the essence of God. Nothing in his views about the knowledge of God through the knowledge of creatures suggests that creatures are a manifestation of the divine essence.

That Goclenius also rejects modificative emanation becomes clear in his *Adversaria* (1594), a group of short critical essays on various topics drawn from Julius Caesar Scaliger’s *Exotericarum exercitationum* (1557).⁶² As Goclenius argues, Scaliger’s analysis of reflection provides a strong reason to think that minds are substances, not modes or attributes of the divine substance. In a passage that attracted Goclenius’s interest, Scaliger writes: ‘The mind knows about itself in two ways: first, it is known by itself and knows that it knows itself and is known by itself. Second, it knows both itself and that it has the power of knowing, by which reflection it does not disjoin itself as it were, but rather turns itself into twins’.⁶³ In his commentary, Goclenius notes that, for Scaliger, the capacity of reflection gives a clue as to the substantiality of the mind. He gives the following interpretation of Scaliger’s view:

The intellect knows things or material being by means of species [...] It knows itself, however, by means of reflection, that is, when it knows itself, it is not moved by species but becomes present to itself by means of reflection. However, it cannot know itself independent of knowing other species, or, unless it is led to itself by means of other external things. From hence it knows that these are known by means of its intellectual acts and, consequently, that it is intelligent and something substantial [...].⁶⁴

Goclenius here pulls together several strands in Scaliger’s thought. Discussing the role of sensible and intelligible species in the process of cognition, Scaliger maintains that not all intellectual states are passive. While he thinks that the initial reception of concepts from sensible species is a passive process, he argues that the intellect divides, composes, and deduces other concepts from these first concepts. Scaliger holds that things become objects of cognition by means of intelligible species. Intelligible species themselves are objects of cognition in two ways: in so far as things are represented by them, and in so far as they are species; but then, Scaliger argues, in both ways species are known not by means of other species but by being present to the intellect.⁶⁵

Scaliger maintains that the intellect can have cognition without the help of species in two ways. One way is when the intellect knows the intelligible species itself. The other way is when the intellect knows itself by means of reflection, ‘insofar as it is present to itself’ (*quoad ipse sibi praesens sit*).⁶⁶

The soul must perform its operations due to its own dignity, and put its capacities to work without the intervention or help of any accident or inherent quality; rather, it puts them to work without any intermediary,

⁶¹ Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 704: ‘& ideo quidquid in rebus existens cognoscatur [...] in omnibus istis cognitis quodammodo cognoscitur Deus, sicut causa: cum tamen ex nullo cognoscatur, sicut est’ (my italics).

⁶² On Scaliger’s presence in the Protestant university curriculum, see K. Jensen, ‘Protestant Rivalry – Metaphysics and Rhetoric in Germany c.1590–1620’, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 41 (1990), 24–43.

⁶³ Scaliger, *Exotericarum exercitationum*, 389 recto: ‘[S]unt enim eius actiones duae: una recta, altera reflexa. Prima quidem cognoscit aliquid. Secunda cognoscit se & cognoscere, & cognoscendi habere potestatem. Qua reflexione seipsum, tametsi non disiungit, tamen geminat.’ On Scaliger’s views on reflexive minds, see I. Maclean, ‘Language in the Mind: Reflexive Thinking in the Late Renaissance.’ *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle*, edited by C. Blackwell and S. Kusukawa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 296–321, esp. 317–18 (Maclean’s translation).

⁶⁴ R. Goclenius, *Adversaria: Ad exotericas aliquot Julii Caesaris Scaligeri acutissimi philosophi exercitationes* (Marburg, 1594), 192: ‘Intellectum cognoscere res seu entia materialia per speciem [...] Se vero ipsum per reflexionem id est, dum intelligit se ipsum, non moveri sui specie, sed per reflexionem sibi ipsi praesentem fieri. Nec tamen posse se intelligere absque aliarum specierum intellectione, seu, nisi seipsum ad sese ducat per alia externa. Quo intelligat illa ab sese intelligi per intellectionem suam, atque iccirco se esse intelligentem, & aliquid substantiale [...].’

⁶⁵ Scaliger, *Exotericarum exercitationum*, 405 verso. On Scaliger’s account of intelligible species and its influence on Goclenius’s, see L. Spruit, *Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge. Volume Two: Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy* (Leiden, New York and Koeln: Brill, 1995), 250–4.

⁶⁶ Scaliger, *Exotericarum exercitationum*, 406 verso.

immediately by means of its essence. This essence, without any real disjunction of capacities, is a principle that is autarkic by itself: that is, it is self-sufficient to produce its own effects [...].⁶⁷

Since reflexive self-knowledge does not involve higher-order species that represent mental operations, this kind of knowledge cannot be a matter of receiving an impression of the self in a passive way. Rather, self-knowledge is the result of an activity of the intellect that has its origin in the essence of the intellect itself. According to Scaliger, the intellect is a simple being in the sense that it is a principle of self-induced activity.

The notion that self-induced activity is central to the mind's substantiality is echoed in Goclenius's work. According to him, understanding the mind's substantiality is crucial for answering the question of whether all dependent beings receive their essence formally from another being. In the *Conciliator philosophicus*, he writes:

The being of the soul is not the being of the soul as a receptacle, even less as a first receptacle. Intellectual life [...] is the being of the intelligent soul. Hence, intellectual life [...] is not the life of the soul as a receptacle, even less as a first receptacle, and this kind of life is not an accidental characteristic of the soul or passivity, but rather it is substance.⁶⁸

According to Goclenius, intellectual souls possess a kind of activity that makes it impossible to understand the kind of life that is characteristic of them as being received from another being since any kind of life that is received from another being would be a form of passivity.

It is exactly this connection between activity and substantiality that, in Goclenius's view, speaks against understanding intelligent souls as modes of the divine substance. Certainly, he admits that accidents can be said to be active; but he holds that they can be active only with respect to effects.⁶⁹ By contrast, action belongs to substances in three different senses:

- (1) *Denominatively*: What is a *per se* subsisting being, is called an agent;
- (2) *Sustentatively*: That is, due to the dependence of the accident on the substance;
- (3) *Determinatively or modificatively*: The determination of the accident [...] arises *subjectively* from the substance in which it inheres; *with respect to final causes* it must arise from the substance by means of the substance itself.⁷⁰

As Goclenius explains, action belongs '*primarily and with respect to its foundation* to substance (which is the foundation and root of the accident). It belongs to the accident *secondarily and instrumentally*.'⁷¹ Hence, accidents can be said to be active in the sense that substances produce effects by means of accidents. The origin of activity, however, cannot lie in the accidents themselves, but rather in the substances in which they inhere. Hence, if minds, due to the structure of reflexive

⁶⁷ Scaliger, *Exotericæ exercitationes*, 399 verso: 'Decet enim Animam propter suam dignitatem fungi suis officiis: suasque exercere potestates, absque ullius accidentis, aut inhaerentis, vel praesidio, vel adminiculo: sed sine ullo medio statim per essentiam suam. Quae essentia sine reali potestatum disiunctione, est principium sibiipsi αὐταρκής: id est quod sit satis sibi, ad producendas effectiones suas [...].'

⁶⁸ Goclenius, *Conciliator philosophicus*, 119: 'Ipsum esse animae, non est animae ut δεκτικῶ, multo minus ut πρωτῶ δεκτικῶ. Vita [...] intellectiva est ipsum esse animae intelligentis. Ergo vita [...] intellectiva, non est animae intelligentis ut δεκτικῶ, multo minus ut πρωτῶ δεκτικῶ, seu primi recipientis, nec vita haec est proprium animae intelligentis adjunctum seu παθος, sed substantia.' For recent discussions of the concept of receptacle in Plato's *Timaeus*, see A. Silverman, *The Dialectic of Essence. A Study of Plato's Metaphysics* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002), 155–70; T. K. Johansen, *Plato's Natural Philosophy. A Study of the Timaeus-Critias* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 95–9.

⁶⁹ Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 39: 'Actio est Accidentis, *Effective*' (my italics).

⁷⁰ Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 39: '[Actio est] Substantiae seu rei subsistentis (suppositi) accidenti affectae 1. *Denominative*: Quod est per se subsistens, denominatur agens. 2. *Sustentative*, id est, propter dependentiam accidentis ab illa. 3. *Determinative seu modificative*. Determinatio autem accidentis provenit *Subjective* ex substantiae in qua inhaeret. *Finaliter* ex substantia per ipsam debet produci' (my italics).

⁷¹ Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 39: 'Actio est [...] *Primario et fundamentaliter* substantiae (quae accidentis fundamentum et Radix). Accidentis *secundario et instrumentaliter*' (my italics).

mental activities, possess self-induced activity, they belong to the category of substances, not to the category of accidents. For this reason, modificative emanation is incompatible with the substantiality of minds.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the works of Taurellus and Goclenius we encounter a barrage of arguments against three ways of explicating the sense in which emanative causation involves divine immanence. According to their view, the forms of divine immanence connected with essential, formal or modificative emanation do not go together with conceptions of corpuscles and minds as genuine substances that are the bearers of their own forms, forces and activities. Obviously, the conceptual distinctions made by Taurellus and Goclenius do not exhaust all notions of existential dependence and emanative causation discussed in late scholastic and early-modern metaphysics. For example, one could ask whether it is possible to hold the view that the ultimate constituents of matter are both corpuscles and emanations of the divine essence. As Mercer has pointed out, such a strategy can be found in the work of Weigel, who combined a Neoplatonic emanation scheme with a mechanical physics.⁷² But then, how can one obviate the difficulties that, as Taurellus has argued, arise from corpuscularianism with respect to all three versions of emanative causation considered here: essential emanation, formal emanation and modificative emanation? Alternatively, one could embrace the view that created beings are modes or accidents of the divine being but nevertheless ascribe spontaneous activity to them. Such a strategy is documented in the thought of Spinoza. However, as Leibniz has noted, the notion of activity is one of the most problematic within Spinoza's metaphysics and, like Scaliger and Goclenius, Leibniz argues that one of the phenomena that Spinoza's account of activity cannot accommodate is the structure of reflection.⁷³ One could ask whether it is possible to explicate an emanation relation that does not imply that the created being shares the divine essence. Such a strategy is documented in Suarez's account of creation. Maybe, strictly speaking, emanative causation does not *imply* essential emanation. Certainly, essential emanation gives a striking account of why two beings share the same attribute *f* while the being that causes the other being to instantiate *f* does not undergo any change: both beings share one and the same essence.

Certainly, all the arguments developed by Taurellus and Goclenius can be challenged on philosophical grounds; but none of these arguments should be dismissed out of hand as absurd. Rather, their arguments identify real difficulties that arise when one tries to integrate the view that emanative causation implies a form of divine immanence into a metaphysical framework that accepts individual substances such as corpuscles and minds. In this way, Taurellus and Goclenius set the stage for subsequent discussions on how to accommodate an account of existential dependence between creatures and God with conceptions of corpuscles and minds as individual substances. Having their critical arguments in mind may shed new light on how philosophers such as Scherzer, Weigel, Thomasius and Leibniz have dealt with the same set of problems. Taurellus and Goclenius are evidently subtle metaphysicians that warrant further study in their own right. What is more, studying their views on existential dependence may contribute to an understanding of the accounts of the relation between God and the world found in works by Protestant metaphysicians in subsequent generations.⁷⁴

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⁷² Mercer, 'Humanist Platonism in Seventeenth-century Germany', 239.

⁷³ See A. Blank, 'The Analysis of Reflection and Leibniz's Early Response to Spinoza', forthcoming in *Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft*.

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