

【논문】

The Nature of Diachronic Welfare

– A Defense of the Redemption Thesis –

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【ABSTRACT】 The redemption thesis assumes that how events in a person's life are related to one another is important in evaluating the person's welfare throughout life. In particular, according to this thesis of welfare, the fact that a person's previous hardships contribute to bringing out the same person's later successes, and the person would regard the hardships as having been worthwhile in light of the successes makes the person's life better for the person herself. Recently, Ian D. Dunkle provided four objections to the redemption thesis: the intuition concern, the different redemptions argument, the downplaying hardships argument, and the reconciled irreconcilables argument. This paper examines these four objections. In particular, this paper dismisses all the objections showing that the redemption thesis bases on an appealing idea, does not consider the degree of hardship significant in itself, has plausible reasons to evaluate hardships not as serious as people think, and can successfully reconcile its synchronic and diachronic evaluations.

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I . Introduction

The redemption thesis, a widely endorsed understanding of welfare, explains what determines a person's diachronic welfare (i.e., how well a person fares during a period of time) rather than what decides a person's synchronic welfare (i.e., how well a person fares at a time).¹⁾ In particular, this thesis assumes that the fact that person A's hardships contribute to bringing out person A's successes, and person A would regard the hardships as having been worthwhile in light of the successes contributes to increasing person A's diachronic welfare. The redemption thesis is plausible in that it can successfully explain why the shape of a person's life matters in determining the person's diachronic welfare. According to this thesis, the reason why other things being equal life X, which starts poorly but ends well, is prudentially better than life Y, which starts well but ends poorly, is that the former but not the latter has redemption relations in itself. Recently, Ian D. Dunkle provided four objections to this dominant understanding of diachronic welfare. Dunkle contends that the redemption thesis is a problematic view of welfare because this thesis cannot dismiss the intuition concern, the different redemptions argument, the downplaying hardships argument, and the reconciled irreconcilables

1) Velleman (2000), Dorsey (2015), and Kauppinen (2015) endorse the redemption thesis of diachronic welfare. In contrast, Slote (1983) and Glasgow (2013) provide different accounts of diachronic welfare. According to Slote (1983), if a person obtains a prudentially valuable item at a later period of life, then due to the item's temporal location the item's prudential value increases more than if the person obtains the valuable item at an earlier period of life. According to Glasgow (2013), the fact that a person fares better as time goes by has intrinsic prudential value, so this fact in itself contributes to increasing a person's welfare.

argument. This paper will examine whether or not Dunkle's objections successfully refute the redemption thesis. In particular, this paper will show that these four objections fail in showing that the redemption thesis is a problematic view of welfare.

The structure of this paper is as follows: section two explains the redemption thesis of diachronic welfare. In particular, this section shows that the redemption thesis can explain why the shape of a person's life matters in evaluating the person's welfare. Section three introduces Dunkle's objections to the redemption thesis. After explaining Dunkle's objections, this section argues that all the objections fail in showing that the redemption thesis is a problematic view of welfare.

II. The Redemption Thesis

While discussing the redemption thesis of welfare, Dunkle formulizes a widely endorsed conception of redemption relation. In particular, he introduces a widely accepted conception as follows:

Redemption relation: Event(s) E_2 in the life of subject S redeem event(s) E_1 if E_1 proceeds E_2 , E_1 is a source of negative (welfare) value for S , E_2 is a source of positive value, E_1 enables E_2 either directly or in relation to further actions(s) or event(s), and S would regard E_1 as having been (to some extent) worthwhile in light of E_2 upon consideration. (2021, p. 7)

As Dunkle points out, this conception of redemption relation is not fully fledged. For instance, advocates of this conception have to explain whether event E_2 can be any kind of event, or event E_2 must be actions which are taken on the part of subject S . However,

providing a full-fledged conception is beyond the scope of this paper, so this paper will proceed discussion based on the above formulization of redemption relation. According to this formulization, if a person achieves successes as a result of going through hardships, and the person would regard the hardships as having been worthwhile in light of the successes, then the hardships have redemption relations to the successes.

The redemption thesis of diachronic welfare is that if a person's previous hardships have redemption relations to the same person's later successes, then throughout life the person fares better than if the hardships do not have the relations to the successes. Various interpretations are possible regarding this thesis. The first possible interpretation is that redemption relations have intrinsic prudential value.²⁾ According to this interpretation, if a person's hardships have redemption relations to the same person's successes, then the relations benefit the person atemporally or at specific times.³⁾ The second possible interpretation is that a redemption relation subtracts prudential disvalue from its redeemed event.⁴⁾ According to this interpretation, if a person's disvaluable event has a redemption

2) Kauppinen (2012) endorses a similar position while discussing the issue of why relations among a life's events are important in evaluating the life's value. In particular, Kauppinen (2012) says "[m]eaningfulness [having a valuable relation between events] is, I claim, non-instrumentally or finally valuable." (2012, p. 371)

3) According to Campbell (2015), redemption relations among a person's events benefit the person at a specific time. In particular, Campbell (2015) argues against the position that an item can benefit a person atemporally.

4) Velleman (2000) endorses this view of redemption relations. According to Velleman (2000), "the costs of the misfortune are *merely offset* when the value of the latter life is computed; [...] An edifying misfortune is not just offset but redeemed, by being given a meaningful place on one's progress through life." (2000, p. 65)

relation to the same person's valuable event, then the relation subtracts disvalue from the disvaluable event, so the disvaluable event decreases the person's welfare less than if the disvaluable event does not have the relation. Dunkle's objections mainly target the second possible interpretation, so this paper will examine whether Dunkle's objections successfully refute the second interpretation which this paper will name the *Take-away Interpretation*.

The take-away interpretation has a strength in that it can explain why the shape of a person's life matters in evaluating the person's diachronic welfare. In other words, the take-away interpretation can show that in the following case, which Dorsey provides, Nospmis fares better than Simpson:

Simpson Simpson was a celebrated college and professional football running back and sports commentator. In his mid-forties, in the midst of his success, Simpson was put on trial for murder. And though he was acquitted after a lengthy and highly publicized trial, many were convinced of his guilt, and as a result his reputation had been effectively ruined. Following his acquittal, he was held civilly liable for wrongful death in the same event and was later convicted of burglary in Las Vegas, was sentenced to thirty-three years in prison, and is currently serving his sentence at a correctional center.

Nospmis Nospmis grew up in the midst of gang-related violence and crime, was suspected at an early age of murder, and was eventually sentenced at the age of 25 for a series of armed robberies. Following her stint in prison, Nospmis was released and given an opportunity to coach basketball at a local club for troubled youth. Her success at this endeavor, along with her rapport with players and amazing life turnaround led her to the attention of high schools, later universities. She retired after having coached her team to back-to-back NCAA Final Four appearances, and spent her remaining years as a popular and trusted broadcaster, offering insightful color commentary on women's professional and college basketball. (2015, pp. 304-305)

Suppose that every event in Nospmis's life has a corresponding event in Simpson's life, and these events have the same amount of prudential value or disvalue to one another.⁵⁾ An important difference between Nospmis's life and Simpson's life is that whereas the former starts poorly but ends well, the latter starts well but ends poorly. In this case, although Nospmis and Simpson encounter the same kinds of events throughout life, Nospmis fares better than Simpson. In other words, if a person can choose whether she will live either Nospmis's life or Simpson's life, then in terms of prudence it is irrational for the person to choose Simpson's life rather than Nospmis's life. This is because prudence requires a person to live a better life, and Nospmis fares better than Simpson.

In the cases above, Nospmis's hardships have redemption relations

5) In this paper, the expressions "an item is prudentially valuable" and "an item increases a person's welfare" mean that the fact that a person has the item is a reason to evaluate the person's welfare well. Similarly, the expressions "an item is prudentially disvaluable" and "an item decreases a person's welfare" stand for that the fact that a person has the item is a reason to evaluate the person's welfare badly. There are two types of cases where a fact has the status of a welfare-evaluating reason. The first type is that a fact has the status when it is considered in conjunction with other facts. In this type, whether a fact is a reason to evaluate a person's welfare well or badly, and how much welfare the fact increases or decreases are affected by other facts. The second type is that a fact has the status of a welfare-evaluating reason independent of other facts. In this type, whether a fact is a reason to evaluate a person's welfare well or badly, and how much welfare the fact increases or decreases are not affected by other considerations. In the literature of diachronic welfare, Velleman (2000) pays attention to the first type. According to Velleman, the fact that a person goes through hardships is a reason to evaluate the person's welfare badly. However, if this fact is considered along with the other fact that the hardships contribute to causing the same person's successes, then the fact that the person experiences the hardships decreases welfare less than if the fact is not considered with the other fact.

to Nospmis's successes, for Nospmis achieves the successes as a result of going through the hardships, and Nospmis would regard the hardships as having been worthwhile in light of the successes. According to the take-away interpretation, if these redemption relations are not factored in when evaluating how well Nospmis fares throughout life, then Nospmis's diachronic welfare is the same to Simpson's diachronic welfare. This is because the same kinds of events constitute each of their lives. On the contrary, if the redemption relations are factored in, then throughout life Nospmis fares better than Simpson because the redemption relations in Nospmis's life subtract prudential disvalue from Nospmis's hardships. In evaluating how well a person fares throughout life, redemption relations in that life must be factored in because redemption relations in a person's life are the components of that life. This is why, the take-away interpretation predicts that Nospmis's welfare is higher than Simpson's welfare. As this account shows, the take-away interpretation can explain why other things being equal a person in an upward life (i.e., a person whose life starts poorly but ends well) fares better than a person in a downward life (i.e., a person whose life starts well but ends poorly). Therefore, it is plausible to say that the take-away interpretation is a plausible understanding of welfare.

III. Replies to Dunkle's Objections

The redemption thesis is plausible in that the thesis can explain why the shape of a person's life matters in evaluating the person's welfare. However, Dunkle provides arguments to show that the

redemption thesis is a problematic view of diachronic welfare. This section examines Dunkle's objections. In particular, this section argues that the objections fail in defeating the redemption thesis.

1. The Intuition Concern

Dunkle contends that the redemption thesis is a problematic approach to the nature of welfare because the thesis is not intuitively appealing. Dunkle expresses this concern of the thesis as follows:

I suppose that our coarse intuitions in favor of the value of growth are stronger than those we have for the value of redemption. Why, after all, should bad events coming before and enabling good events be any better for me than just having the bad and good events occur in my life in an unrelated manner? (2021, p. 12)

According to the redemption thesis, the fact that a person's hardships contribute to bringing out the same person's successes, and the person would regard the hardships as having been worthwhile is important in evaluating the person's diachronic welfare. However, Dunkle claims that it is not clear why the fact that hardships and successes have redemption relations to one another is significant for welfare-evaluation. To put this another way, Dunkle contends that there is no motivating thought for the redemption thesis of diachronic welfare. Therefore, Dunkle says, it is reasonable to conclude that the redemption thesis is a problematic view of a person's diachronic welfare.

If Dunkle's concern is reasonable, then the redemption thesis could be an arbitrary position to take. However, unlike Dunkle's concern, whether disvaluable events in a person's life cause valuable events in the same person's life, and the person would

regard the disvaluable events as having been worthwhile upon consideration are important in evaluating the person's diachronic welfare. Imagine that a significant number of workers lose their lives in an industrial accident. This industrial accident makes people realize how dangerous their working environments are, so people create environments where no workers lose their lives in workplace. In particular, after creating the safe working environments, people think that they could not have the environments if the incident did not occur. In this case, the industrial accident is morally disvaluable because due to the accident a significant number of workers lose their lives. However, this industrial accident might not be as disvaluable as other industrial accidents because the accident is an appreciated trigger of a morally valuable outcome (i.e., the outcome where no workers lose their lives in workplace).

Not only does the case above show the significance of an appreciated cause-effect relation (i.e., if a disvaluable event has this relation to a valuable event, then the disvaluable event is less disvaluable than if the event does not have the relation) but cases of commemorative activities also prove its importance. For instance, regarding the case where people establish a VHS medical center to commemorate a deceased soldier, and people appreciate the death's role in the establishment, it is reasonable to contend that the soldier's death is morally disvaluable. This is because the death deprives the soldier of chances to enjoy various prudential goods. However, the soldier's death is not as disvaluable as other deaths, especially if the deaths do not bring out any morally valuable outcomes. The other deaths do not cause any valuable outcomes, so the deaths are meaningless or do not have any points. In contrast, the soldier's death makes people bring out a morally

valuable outcome, thus the death is not meaningless.

Considering that in an axiological domain (i.e., the axiological domain of morality) appreciated cause-effect relations can make disvaluable events less disvaluable, it seems feasible to assume that in other axiological domains the relations can have similar effects. In particular, it seems appealing to say that if a person's prudentially disvaluable event causes the same person's prudentially valuable event, and the person would regard the disvaluable event as having been worthwhile, then the disvaluable event is prudentially disvaluable less than if the event does not cause the valuable event. To be more specific, if disvaluable event X in person A's life has a redemption relation to valuable event Y in person A's life, then person A fares better than if the events do not have a redemption relation to one another. This is because person A at the moment of event X does not merely suffer but contributes to bringing out prudentially valuable event Y, and person A at the moment of event Y would appreciate person A's suffering at the moment of event X.⁶⁾

2. The Different Redemptions Argument

Dunkle says that the take-away interpretation is problematic because this interpretation implies that whether a person's redeemed hardships are severe hardships or moderate hardships is important in evaluating

6) A significant number of welfare scholars are motivated to endorse the redemption thesis of diachronic welfare by this thought. For example, while investigating the prudential significance of a life's shape, Campbell (2015, p. 570) claims that "[i]t seems fair to say that, all else being equal, a person who is wasting her time, money, and efforts is worse off than a person who is engaged in similar activities without such waste."

the person's welfare. In particular, Dunkle provides the second objection as follows:

[V]iewing the redemption of past evils as subtracting from their disvalue would imply that redeeming greater past evils always contributes more value to a life than redeeming lesser past evils *ceteris paribus*. But this implication appears to be false. (2021, p. 15)

Dunkle claims that other things being equal, in evaluating whose lives are prudentially better, it is not important whether severe hardships are redeemed or moderate hardships are compensated. In other words, the fact that person A's redeemed hardships are severe hardships, but person B's compensated hardships are moderate hardships is not significant in itself when evaluating how well person A and B fare throughout life. However, according to Dunkle, the take-away interpretation implies that the degree of hardship matters in itself when evaluating a person's diachronic welfare. This is why, Dunkle says, the take-away interpretation is an incorrect view of welfare.

Imagine that Nospmis and her doppelganger live the same course of life. Nospmis has a successful career after being prisoned twice. Similarly, the doppelganger succeeds in her career after being prisoned two times. The only difference between Nospmis's life and the doppelganger's life is that Nospmis has a successful career due to the experiences of the long imprisonment (i.e., being prisoned for two years), but the doppelganger succeeds in the doppelganger's career as a result of experiencing the short imprisonment (i.e., being prisoned for one year). In other words, whereas Nospmis has a successful career because she learns lessons from her severe hardship, the doppelganger succeeds in her career

due to the lessons from her moderate hardship. In this case, considering that both of Nospmis and the doppelganger succeed in their careers as a result of going through hardships, and their careers are similar to one another, it is reasonable to contend that throughout life the doppelganger fares as well as Nospmis. If a person can choose whether she will live either Nospmis's life or the doppelganger's life, then in terms of prudence it is rational that the person selects any of Nospmis's life and the doppelganger's life.⁷⁾

If the fact that Nospmis's redeemed hardship is a severe hardship, but the doppelganger's compensated hardship is a moderate adversity makes Nospmis's life prudentially better than the doppelganger's life, then all things considered Nospmis fares better than the doppelganger. In contrast, if this fact is not important in itself when evaluating the two lives, then the doppelganger's life is as good as Nospmis's life. As mentioned above, in the case of Nospmis and the doppelganger, the doppelganger fares as well as Nospmis, so it is reasonable to say that the fact that a person's redeemed hardship is a severe hardship, but the other person's compensated hardship is a moderate adversity is not important in itself when evaluating their lives. Therefore, if the take-away interpretation is committed to the idea that whether a person's compensated hardship is a severe hardship matters in itself when evaluating how well the person fares throughout life, then the take-away interpretation encounters a problem. If not, then Dunkle's

7) Dunkle (2021, pp. 15-16) provides his own example to show that the degree of hardship does not matter when evaluating how well a person fares throughout life. In his example, similar to the case of Nospmis and the doppelganger, two agents live the same course of life. The only difference between the two lives is that an agent's redeemed hardship is a severe hardship, but the other agent's compensated hardship is a moderate adversity.

objection commits a straw man fallacy.

Dunkle's objection commits a straw man fallacy because the take-away interpretation is not committed to the claim that the fact that a person's redeemed hardship is a severe hardship is important in evaluating the person's diachronic welfare. The take-away interpretation assumes that redemption relations subtract prudential disvalue from prudentially disvaluable events. In particular, if a redemption relation takes away a huge amount of disvalue from a person's disvaluable event, then the person fares better throughout life than if the relation takes away a small amount of disvalue. Therefore, according to this interpretation, what matters is how much prudential disvalue a redemption relation subtracts from events. Whether a person's hardships are severe or moderate is important because the person's redemption relation can subtract a larger amount of prudential disvalue from the hardships if the hardships are severe than if they are moderate. However, within the framework of the take-away interpretation, the degree of hardship does not have importance in itself. This is why the take-away interpretation can successfully accommodate the case of Nospmis and the doppelganger. Nospmis's doppelganger fares as well as Nospmis because the doppelganger's redemption relation subtracts prudential disvalue from the moderate hardship as much as Nospmis's redemption relation takes away disvalue from the severe hardship.

3. The Downplaying Hardships Argument

Before arguing for the claim that the take-away interpretation downplays a person's hardships, Dunkle provides an objection to the take-away interpretation. In particular, Dunkle contends as

follows:

Telling her life [telling a person's upward life] as a redemption story distracts us from this growth [the person's growth in capacities and motivation] by drawing our attention backward to *past misfortune*, while a growth story draws our attention forward toward the *positive* value of getting better. (2021, p. 20)

According to Dunkle, if a view of welfare considers positive aspects of a person's life important in evaluating the person's diachronic welfare, then the view makes its supporters focus on positive aspects of lives. In contrast, if a view of welfare assumes that negative aspects of a person's life are significant, then the view distracts its advocates from positive aspects of lives. Dunkle says that a view of welfare is correct just in case the view makes people focus on valuable features of lives.⁸⁾ However, the take-away interpretation distracts people from valuable features of lives because the interpretation considers, for instance, a person's hardships important. This is why, Dunkle concludes, the take-away interpretation is not a correct understanding of diachronic welfare.

Dunkle's objection is not convincing for two reasons. The first reason is that the fact that a view of diachronic welfare distracts people from positive aspects of lives does not show any problem of that view. Suppose that physical theory X makes people focus on negative aspects of lives. For instance, if people endorse physical theory X, then they realize the fact that their lives do not

8) Dunkle does not explain why the fact that a view of welfare makes its supporters not pay attention to positive aspects of lives is a reason to abandon that view. One possible explanation is that people lose chances to achieve valuable items if they do not pay attention to positive aspects of lives. Regardless of which explanation Dunkle provides, as this paper will show, the take-away interpretation can avoid Dunkle's objection.

serve God's grand purpose because, according to the theory, there is no God in the universe. In this case, though physical theory X brings out this negative outcome, it does not cause any problem to physical theory X. Since physical theory X aims to tell the truth of the universe, the fact that physical theory X distracts people from positive aspects of lives is not important at all in evaluating whether the theory is a correct theory or an incorrect theory. Similarly, even if the take-away interpretation makes people pay attention to negative aspects of lives, it does not cause any problem to the take-away interpretation. This is because the interpretation purports to tell the truth of welfare rather than aims to make people focus on valuable features of lives. Therefore, in evaluating the take-away interpretation, it is not important which effects the interpretation has on people.

The second reason is that, within the framework of the take-away interpretation, a life's positive aspects are as important as a life's negative aspects. The interpretation considers negative aspects of a person's life significant because redemption relations subtract prudential disvalue from negative aspects of lives (e.g., hardships). However, considering that a person's events can have redemption relations just in case the person's life has valuable features, it is reasonable to say that the take-away interpretation not only considers negative aspects of a person's life important but it also regards positive aspects of a person's life significant. Based on this fact, supports of the take-away interpretation can reply to Dunkle's objection that, even if people endorse the take-away interpretation, the interpretation will not distract them from valuable features of lives. In fact, people will pay sufficient attention to positive aspects of lives, for within the framework of the interpretation positive aspects of a

person's life are as important as negative aspects of the same person's life.

After suggesting the objection above, Dunkle contends that the take-away interpretation is a problematic view of diachronic welfare because this interpretation downplays a person's hardships. In particular, Dunkle criticizes the take-away interpretation of diachronic welfare as follows:

Telling Franklin's life [telling a person's upward life] as a story of redemption also inaccurately diminishes the negative value of hardships she [the person who lives the upward life] faced. By telling her life as one where these hardships were redeemed, one offers a sort of apology for them. One says, in effect, *It is a good thing for you, in the end, that you had these hardships in your life.* (2021, p. 20)

Dunkle contends that the take-away interpretation is a problematic view of welfare because, according to this interpretation, it is possible that a person's hardships are good for the person herself. However, regardless of whether the take-away interpretation actually has this implication, Dunkle's objection fails in defeating the take-away interpretation. This is because it is plausible to say that a person's hardships are good for the person herself. For instance, if a person experiences severe hardships due to a government's unjust policies, then in the perspective of morality the person's hardships are not permissible, but if due to the hardships the person enjoys the best life for the person herself, then in the perspective of prudence the hardships are good for the person herself.

One could revise Dunkle's objection that, according to the take-away interpretation, it is possible that a person's hardships at a time are good for the person at that time because the redemption

relation can make the person's hardships prudentially valuable. However, one might say, it is impossible that a person's hardships at a time benefit the person at that time. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the interpretation inaccurately calculates the prudential disvalue of an event. As Dunkle contends, the take-away interpretation can have the implication that a person's hardships at a time are good for the person herself at that time,⁹⁾ but this fact does not cause any problems to the interpretation because it seems possible that a person's hardships at a time benefit the person at that time. Imagine that person A in childhood has a paper cut. Based on this experience, person A in adulthood invents notebooks which prevent cuts, and as a result of this invention person A in adulthood becomes a billionaire. In particular, after becoming a woman of

9) An issue of the take-away interpretation is whether this interpretation can make its redeemed hardship even valuable. There are two possible positions regarding this issue. The first position is that if a redemption relation subtracts every prudential disvalue from its redeemed hardship, then the redemption relation no longer has effects on the hardship. The second position is that after subtracting every disvalue from its redeemed hardship, the redemption relation can even make the hardship valuable. A reason to endorse the second position is that this position can explain why the redemption of a person's moderate hardship can increase that person's welfare as much as the redemption of the person's severe hardship. Imagine that, in the case of Nospmis and the doppelganger, the doppelganger's moderate hardship has a tiny amount of disvalue, but Nospmis's severe hardship has a significant amount of disvalue. Regarding this scenario, the first position might imply that Nospmis fares better than the doppelganger even though both of them actually fare well to the same degree. This is because whereas Nospmis's redemption relation subtracts a significant amount of prudential disvalue from Nospmis's hardship, the doppelganger's redemption relation takes away a tiny amount of prudential disvalue from the doppelganger's hardship. On the contrary, the second position might imply that the doppelganger fares as well as Nospmis. For instance, an advocate could say that the doppelganger's redemption relation makes the hardship valuable after it subtracts the tiny amount of disvalue from the hardship. This is why the doppelganger's welfare is the same to Nospmis's welfare.

fortune, person A in adulthood regards the painful event as having been worthwhile in light of her great successes. In this case, on the one hand, it is plausible to say that the finger-cutting event is bad for young person A because young person A experiences mild pain. On the other hand, it is feasible to say that the finger-cutting event is good for young person A because due to the experience young person A contributes to bringing out successes in her life. The finger-cutting experience causes mild suffering to young person A, but due to the painful experience young person A contributes to bringing out great successes for herself in adulthood. Therefore, it seems plausible to say, all things considered, the finger-cutting event is valuable for person A in childhood.

One could reply that, at the moment when young person A has a paper cut, young person A might not know that the painful event would bring her great successes. Under this epistemic condition, it is impossible that young person A has any positive attitudes toward the event, so it is difficult to believe that this seemingly pointless event is good for young person A. In the literature of welfare, internalism is a widely endorsed thesis. According to this thesis, a person's actual attitude toward an item is important in determining the prudential value of the item. However, in the camp of internalism, a significant number of scholars also endorse the idea that not only does a person's actual attitude matter but a person's hypothetical attitude is also important. In other words, internalists assume that, in a circumstance where person A is rational and informed, if person A would want an item, then it is possible that the item is good for person A.¹⁰⁾ Therefore, the take-away interpretation

10) For detailed explanations of this position (i.e., internalism of welfare), see Rosati (1996); and Arneson (1999).

can avoid the above internalistic objection. Advocates can say that though young person A does not know that the finger-cutting experience will bring her fortune, young person A would appreciate the experience if she was rational and informed. This is why it is not problematic to say that the experience increases young person A's welfare at the moments of suffering.¹¹⁾

4. The Reconciled Irreconcilables Argument

Dunkle's fourth objection appeals to the fact that, according to the take-away interpretation, two perspectives are possible when evaluating the prudential value or disvalue of an event. Before providing the fourth objection, Dunkle mentions this implication of the take-away interpretation as follows:

[F]rom the *synchronic* perspective [the perspective which does not consider redemption relations in person A's life significant] ... this period of her life [the period where A suffers from hardships] went quite poorly for her. Alternatively and from the *diachronic* perspective [the perspective which considers redemption relations in person A's life important] ... this period of her life [the period where person A suffers] did not go as badly for her as it seems from the first perspective. There is a tension in this view that comes out when we consider whether these two evaluations can be

11) Another possible objection is that, according to the take-away interpretation, it is possible to increase a person's welfare in the past. In particular, critics could say that since it is impossible to increase welfare in the past, the take-away interpretation is a problematic view of welfare. This objection does not successfully defeat the take-away interpretation because this objection relies on a controversial claim (i.e., it is impossible to increase past welfare). For instance, based on desire-fulfillment theories and the discussion of a project-completion's beneficiaries, Bruckner (2013) and Dorsey (2018, pp. 1903-1909) show that it is possible to increase a person's level of welfare in the past.

reconciled. (2021, p. 16)

According to Dunkle, the take-away interpretation implies that there are two possible perspectives (i.e., a relation-factored-in perspective and a relation-not-factored-in perspective) to evaluate the prudential disvalue of an event. In particular, Dunkle contends that the take-away interpretation has two positions to reconcile these two perspectives. The first position assumes that both of a relation-factored-in perspective and a relation-not-factored-in perspective are appropriate in evaluating the prudential disvalue of an event. In contrast, the second position assumes that only a relation-factored-in perspective is appropriate in assessing the prudential disvalue of an event. Dunkle contends that, in any of these two positions, the take-away interpretation encounters a problem. This is why the take-away interpretation is a problematic approach to the nature of welfare.

Besides the above positions which Dunkle introduces, another position is possible to reconcile a relation-factored-in perspective and a relation-not-factored-in perspective. According to this position, which this paper will name the *Purpose Position*, the purpose of an evaluation matters in deciding which perspective is proper. In other words, depending on why a person evaluates the prudential disvalue of an event, the appropriate perspective is determined. If one aims to figure out how much prudential disvalue a person's event has independent of the fact that the event has redemption relations to the same person's other events, then a relation-not-factored-in perspective is proper. On the contrary, if one purports to evaluate how well a person fares throughout life, and this is why one evaluates the disvalue of an event in that life, then a relation-factored-in perspective is proper. This is because one should consider every aspect of a person's life if one purports to evaluate how well the

person fares throughout life, and a life is not a mere set of separate events where events have no relation to one another but an organic whole where events are related in various ways to each another. In any kinds of evaluations, the purpose of an evaluation matters in figuring out the appropriate way to assess. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the purpose position of the two perspectives is a plausible candidate for the take-away interpretation.

The purpose position can avoid the objection which Dunkle suggests against the first position (i.e., the position that both of a relation-factored-in perspective and a relation-not-factored-in perspective are appropriate perspectives). The objection to the first position is as follows:

Notice, finally, that the ambiguity that results from two-answer redemptionism also does not correspond to our intuitions regarding SoL difference [the intuition that other things being equal an upward life is prudentially better than a downward life]. We do not think, for example, of Welles [a person who lives a downward life] and del Toro [a person who lives an upward life] in the following way: *From one perspective I would rather be del Toro, but from another I'm different.* (2021, p. 18)

When assessing how well Nospmis fares throughout life, if the fact that Nospmis's hardships have redemption relations to Nospmis's successes is factored in, then Nospmis fares better than Simpson. In contrast, if the fact is not considered, then Nospmis might fare just as well as Simpson. According to Dunkle, since the first position assumes that a relation-not-factored-in perspective is proper in evaluating the disvalue of an event, the position implies that even when assessing Nospmis's diachronic welfare a relation-not-factored-in perspective is appropriate. Therefore, according to the first position, Nospmis fares just as well as Simpson. In other words, it is

prudentially rational to choose any of Nospmis's life and Simpson's life. This implication does not match with the idea that other things being equal it is rational to choose an upward life rather than a downward life. This is why Dunkle concludes that the first position is a problematic position to take.

The first position encounters Dunkle's objection because without any qualifications the position assumes that a relation-not-factored-in perspective is appropriate when evaluating the disvalue of an event. However, unlike the first position, the purpose position can avoid the objection, for the purpose position assumes that depending on the purpose of an evaluation a relation-not-factored-in perspective could be an inappropriate way to assess the prudential disvalue of an event. Advocates of the purpose position might say that when assessing how well Nospmis and Simpson fare throughout life, a relation-factored-in perspective is the only proper perspective to evaluate the disvalue of their hardships. This is because the purpose of this evaluation is to check how well Nospmis and Simpson fare throughout life not how much prudential disvalue the hardships have independent of their relations to other events. In this perspective, Nospmis's hardships are disvaluable less than Simpson's hardships because Nospmis's hardships are redeemed by Nospmis's successes, but Simpson's hardships are not compensated by Simpson's successes. This is why, it is prudentially irrational to choose Simpson's life rather than Nospmis's life.

After criticizing the first position, Dunkle provides an argument to defeat the second position (i.e., the position that only a relation-factored-in perspective is appropriate when evaluating the disvalue of a person's event). In particular, he criticizes the second position as follows:

Consider a more striking example: an adult who overcame childhood trauma to live a healthy and meaningful life might look back with pride on how far he's come. But again, he will not regard those traumatic events of his past as *themselves* any less bad for him, nor is there any clear sense in which he should do so. In holding that there is only one final answer to the question of the value of events in his life, one-answer redemptionism yields the *wrong* answer regarding the value of those traumatic events for him. (2021, p.17)

According to Dunkle, when Nospmis looks back on her previous hardships, Nospmis will think that the hardships as themselves are so bad for her at the moments of the hardships. However, the second position cannot predict that Nospmis's hardships as themselves are so bad for her. This is because, within the framework of the second position, a relation-factored-in perspective is the only appropriate perspective to evaluate Nospmis's hardships, and in that perspective redemption relations between Nospmis's hardships and successes make the hardships not so bad for her. This is why, according to Dunkle, the second position is a problematic position for the take-away interpretation.

Dunkle's argument against the second position relies on the assumption that if a person thinks that an event in the past is so bad for her in the past, then the past event is actually so bad for her past self. This assumption is difficult to endorse. Imagine that person A enjoyed her secular life style. Person A had pleasant experiences from secular activities, had good friendships with other secular people, and fulfilled every single desire which has to do with her secularism. However, at the end of her life, person A believed in a religion which puts no importance on secularism. This is why person A on deathbed is thinking that every secular event in the past is bad for her in the past. In this case, considering that

person A in the past endorses secularism, it is reasonable to claim that all the secular experiences, relationships, and fulfilled desires are good for person A in the past. In particular, it is unreasonable to contend that all the secular events are bad for the past self because person A on deathbed thinks that the events are bad for the past self. This case shows, even if a person thinks that an event in the past is so bad for her in the past, it is not always the case that the past event is actually bad for her in the past. Therefore, it is not clear whether Dunkle's objection successfully defeats the second position of the two perspectives.

Even if the assumption above is correct, so Dunkle's objection successfully defeats the second position, it does not make the take-away interpretation problematic because the purpose position can avoid Dunkle's objection. According to Dunkle, when Nospmis looks back on her hardships, Nospmis would regard the hardships as themselves so bad for her past self. In other words, if Nospmis evaluates the disvalue of the hardships independent of the fact that the hardships have redemption relations to her successes, then Nospmis would think that the hardships are so bad for her past self. According to the purpose position, a relation-not-factored-in perspective is appropriate if the purpose of the evaluation is to figure out how much prudential disvalue a person's hardships has independent of the fact that the hardships have redemption relations to the same person's successes. Therefore, the purpose position implies that, in this case, Nospmis's hardships are so bad for Nospmis at the moments of the hardships. This is because the purpose of this evaluation is to assess Nospmis's hardships as themselves, and for this evaluation redemption relations are not factored in.

IV. Conclusion

This paper has introduced Dunkle's objections to the redemption thesis. In particular, this paper has shown that Dunkle's objections fail in defeating the redemption thesis (esp., the take-away interpretation). Considering that the take-away interpretation successfully explains the significance of a life's shape, and no other objection has been suggested in the literature of diachronic welfare, it is reasonable to say that redemption relations in a person's life are crucial in evaluating how well the person fares throughout life. A remaining issue is then whether redemption relations are the sole relations which contribute to increasing a person's diachronic welfare, or as Dunkle contends growth relations are also prudentially significant. To solve this issue, it is necessary to search out cases which the redemption thesis cannot accommodate, but Dunkle's growth-based thesis can successfully explain. Depending on the result of this research, theories of welfare have to endorse both of or one of the theses to explain which factors determine a person's welfare.¹²⁾

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국문초록

통시적 복지의 본성

- 만회 논제 옹호 -

최 동 용

복지에 관한 만회 논제에 따르면, 삶 속 사건들이 어떻게 연결되었는지는 그 인간의 통시적 복지를 결정하는데 중요하다. 고난이 성공에 기여하고, 이에 근거해 고난을 당사자 스스로 긍정적으로 판단한다는 사실은 통시적 복지를 향상시킨다고 이 논제는 주장한다. 본 논문은 만회 논제에 대한 이안 덩클의 네 가지 반론 (즉, 직관 우려, 다른 정도의 만회 논증, 고난 경시 논증, 그리고 문제 있는 조화 논증)을 소개한다. 특히, 본 논문은 만회 논제를 뒷받침하는 직관적 토대가 존재하고, 이 논제의 틀 내에서도 고난의 정도는 그 자체로 중요치 않으며, 이 논제는 고난의 부정적 가치를 사람들이 생각하는 것보다 낮게 평가할 그럴듯한 이유를 제시하며, 사건에 관한 공시적 평가와 통시적 평가를 성공적으로 조화시킬 수 있다는 사실을 언급하며, 덩클이 제시한 네 반론을 각각 논박한다.

주제 분류: 분석철학, 윤리학, 가치론

주제어: 통시적 복지, 만회 논제, 삶의 모양, 이안 덩클