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Judgment, Extension, Logical Form

Luciano Codato

In Kant's logical texts the reference of the form of the judgment to an "unknown = x " (KrV, B 13) is well known, but its understanding remains far from consensual. Due to the universality of all concepts, the subject as much as the predicate, in the form S is P , is regarded as predicate of the x , which, in turn, is regarded as the subject of the judgment (AA 17: 345 f. (Refl 3921), AA 17: 616–619 (Refl 4634)). In the KrV, particularly in the text on the "logical use of the understanding" (B 92–94), this Kantian interpretation of the subject-predicate relation leads to the question about the relations that must hold between intuition and concept in the judgment. In contrast to intuition, if no concept, due to its universal character, refers immediately to an object, how should we understand the relations of subject and predicate to one another, as well as their relations to intuition, which corresponds to the very special individuality of that object in general = x ? In short, the question at hand is to understand by what means could something completely indeterminate x be represented in the judgment S is P through the concepts S and P . In view of the universality of the concepts and their mediate reference to objects, one must notice that the x is not to be considered as an individual, but only as something marked by individuality devoid of substance, i.e., something marked by an empty singularity.

In the *Kant-Literatur*, the relations between intuition and concept in the judgment have been considered in diverse theoretical backgrounds, mainly in Fregean logic and in the logic of Port-Royal. Although so markedly different, these two solutions to the problem above seem to share a common thesis, in so far as they claim, though in different ways, a *predicative* character to those relations. If the analytic tradition recognizes in the relation between x and the concept S the marks of a propositional function Sx , in turn, the interpretation elaborated from the background of the logic of Port-Royal recognizes in this relation the minor premise x is S implicit in the judgment *every* S is P (i.e., *every* S is P ; x is S , x is P). This being the case, if it were possible to prove, on the contrary, that the relations between intuition and concept in the judgment could only be of a *non-predicative* character, then a third solution would be open to us, a

solution that could enable us to track down the sense of the conceptions of judgment and “logical form” in the KrV (B 362). In applying this argumentative strategy, it is of the utmost importance to insist on the specificity of Kant’s notion of extension, in order to prove its irreducibility to the Port-Royal notion of extension as well as to the modern one.

In order to gain a clearer view of the matter, one must recover some notions of Kant’s logic, such as the difference between the extension and the intension of a concept, literally expressed by the use of the prepositions *in* and *under*. Designated by the verbal locution “contain under”, the extensional relation between the concepts *S* and *P* consists of a relation of *subordination*. Designated by the verbal locution “contain in”, the intensional relation consists of a relation of *inclusion*. In both respects, extensional as well as intensional, *P* is a mark of *S*. On the one hand, if *S* is subordinated to *P*, then *S* includes *P*. On the other hand, if *P* is included in *S*, then *P* subordinates *S*. In regard to the word “mark”, it acquires, according to extension, its sense as “ground of cognition”: if *S* is subordinated to *P*, then *S* has in *P* one of its grounds of cognition, i.e., *S* is a part of the totality of the extension of *P*. According to intension, in turn, the word “mark” acquires the sense of “partial concept”: if *P* is included in *S*, then *P* is one of the partial concepts of *S*, i.e., *P* is a part of the totality of the intension of *S*.


In what concerns judgment, in so far as the relation *S is P* is considered according to the extension of *P* or to the intension of *S*, one moves from a strictly logical relation of the concepts to a non-strictly logical relation. As can be read in the *Philippi Logic*:

The [subject-predicate] relation is dual: 1) logical, in which I consider the concepts according to the relation of extensions; 2) metaphysical, if the notions are represented as they are contained in one another. The subject is contained under the predicate, i.e., under its extension; but the predicate is contained in the subject, i.e., as constitutive of the concept. (LPhilippi, AA 24: 473)

As Kant remarks in the Refl 4295: “The way by which the predicate resides in the subject belongs to metaphysics; the way by which the subject is under the predicate belongs to logic” (AA 17: 499).

From a logical point of view, the relations between concepts and things, and not only among concepts must be considered as relations of subordination, i.e., as relations between the grounds of cognition *S* and *P*, and the *x* in the extension of both. According to the Refl 3096 (AA 16: 657–658), in a judgment *every B is A*:

x , which is contained under B , is also contained under A :



In view of this strictly logical relation of subordination, understanding of both the figure and the sentence above is clarified in Refl 3098: “Everything that is contained under a part of a concept is also contained under the whole. Universal affirmative” (AA 16: 659). In such an extensional account of the S - P relation, just as the model of subordination is expressed through the universal affirmative *every S is P*, the ground of predication must be the more extensive concept P . According to *Hechsel Logic*: “In universal affirmative judgments, the subject is a part of the extension of the predicate”.¹ In a Kantian sense, the A proposition of Aristotelian syllogistic could be described as follows: x , which is found in the extension of S , completely subordinated to the extension of P , is also found in the extension of P . Since the logical form of the judgment *every S is P* (e. g., *all bodies are divisible*) represents the total subordination of subject’s extension to predicate’s extension, Kant’s interpretation of the principle *nota notae est nota rei ipsius* seems to give ground to the *dictum de omni* as follows: the ground of cognition P of the ground of cognition S is ground of cognition of the x itself. In order to understand the relations between intuition and concept in the judgment, one must decide if the relation between x and S (or x and P) could really have the form of a judgment.

In its most general version, Kant’s notion of extension is defined in the *Busolt Logic*: “The extension consists of what is under the concept” (LBusolt, AA 24: 655). Among the traditional accounts, the analytic one tends to fashion Kant’s notion of extension closer to the modern notion of extension, as is used in predicate calculus. Such a claim differs from the attempt to find in Kant’s texts the meaning that the logic of Port-Royal attributed to the word “extension”. In contrast to the analytic account, this second view assumes as a reference the definition coined by Arnauld and Nicole: “I call extension of an idea the subjects to which this idea applies, which are also called the inferiors of a general term, also called superior in relation to them, such as the idea of the triangle in general is extended over all various species of triangles” (59). Grounded by

1 I. Kant, *Logik Vorlesung: unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II* (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1998), 447.

substantial reasons, B. Longuenesse recognizes Kant's notion of extension in the definition above:

[F]rom a strictly logical standpoint, Kant's notion of extension is essentially inherited from Port-Royal: the extension of a concept consists of the representations thought under it, whether these representations are universal or singular (in Kant's terms, whether they are concepts or intuitions).²

In response to the analytic tradition, Longuenesse advises against an anachronistic definition: "This is not the modern (Russellian) notion of extension as the class of individuals thought under a concept".

Longuenesse's thesis seems to suppose that just as the concept of triangle is higher than the concepts of right triangle, equilateral triangle etc., the concept of man would be higher in relation to the intuition of every human being (Socrates, Caius etc.). In this account of Kant's notion of extension, intuition would be related to the concept in the same way that a concept would be subordinated to another. As it seems, the intuition would take up the role played before, in Kant's pre-critical texts, by the singular concept of a completely determined thing. In considering the extensional relation between higher and lower, Longuenesse seems to recognize, between concept and intuition, the same relation that Arnauld and Nicole³ recognized between "universal ideas" and "singular ideas". In Kant's terminology, just as the universal representation "man" would subordinate the singular representation "Socrates", the universal representation "horse" would subordinate the singular representation "Bucephalus".

In order to reduce Kant's notion of extension to the definition proposed in Port-Royal, one would have to admit that the form through which the intuition is related with *S* and *P* is the same through which the lower *S* is subordinated to the higher *P*. If the inferiors of the concept are universal and singular representations, then the relation of the intuition correspondent to the individuality of *x* with the *S* and *P* should be possible to be express, in a predicative way, in the judgments *x is S* and *x is P*, whether they are represented by themselves, whether they are deduced from the major *every S is P*. This requirement explicitly appears in the reconstruction of the syllogism potentially contained in a judgment *every S is P*, such as presented by Longuenesse. The first example of the text on

2 B. Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 383 n. 97.

3 Cf. J.-C. Pariente, *L'Analyse du Langage à Port-Royal* (Paris: Minuit, 1985), 232, 238, 245.

the “logical use of the understanding” would comprehend the reasoning: “All bodies are divisible; now, this thing x is a body; therefore, this thing x is divisible”.⁴ According to Longuenesse: “What is valid to the concept of body is valid to everything that is contained under the concept of body”.⁵ In terms of genera, species and individuals, the correspondence between *every S is P* and the major of a possible syllogism would express the following fact: to attribute the genus P to the species S is also implicitly to attribute P to all the individuals x, y, z of the species S .⁶

Regardless of how compelling Longuenesse’s arguments may be, why is Kant’s notion of extension irreducible to the notion of extension of Port-Royal? In a word, this reduction is impossible due to the principle of specification, which characterizes the relation genus/species as an extensional relation between lower and higher *concepts* with reference to a multitude of *things*. According to the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectics, but for the supreme genus, which is absolutely superior, the distinction between genera, species and subspecies is always relative. Every species must be considered as a genus in relation to its subspecies, which must also be considered as a genus in relation to its subspecies:

[E]very genus requires diversity of species, and these in turn diversity of subspecies; and since no one of these subspecies is ever itself without a sphere (extension as *conceptus communis*), reason demands in its entire extent that no species be regarded as being in itself the lowest. Since the species is always a concept, containing only what is common to different things, this concept cannot be completely determined, hence it cannot be directly related to an individual, consequently, it must always contain other concepts, i.e., subspecies, under itself. (KrV, B 683–684.)

If there is no subspecies without extension, it is because it also possesses the form of a universal representation, i. e., general validity. The relation genus/species must be restricted only to concepts; it does not embrace concepts and intuitions. No matter how small the extension of a concept may be, and, by the law of reciprocity, the greater its intension must be, it still subordinates other concepts and refers mediately to various things. The order that goes from the more extensive concept to the less extensive one would never end in a representation without extension (KrV, B 686). If the form of the judgment consists of a subordination of extensions,

4 B. Longuenesse, *op. cit.*, 91.

5 B. Longuenesse, *Kant et le Pouvoir de Juger* (Paris: PUF), 105.

6 Cf. 103 (trans. 90).

then the relation between intuition and concept could never be a predicative one.

Frequently disregarded, the proof of the validity of the principle of specification is found in § 9 of the KrV. In addition to Kant's logical texts, lacking passages where the singular judgment is presented as a predicative relation between intuition and concept, § 9 anticipates the lessons of the Appendix, recognizing also in the singular form a subordination of extensions. In Kant's argument, it is not the case to deny the reference of the subject of the singular judgment to an individual. As the *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic* suggests: "The singular representation possesses an *intuitum*, indicates it immediately and it is not, in the end, a concept. E.g.: Socrates is not a concept" (LDohna, AA 24: 754). Strictly speaking, one must recognize in the singular representation a dual character, according to its being considered either for itself, as intuition, or in relation to a universal representation, i.e., as the subject of a singular judgment. According to § 9, in the use of a singular representation in the judgment, the predicate has a universal value to the subject, as if *S* "had an extension" and, such as *P*, it was "a concept with general validity" (KrV, B 96). More than an analogy, such an "as if" expression points out in which sense "singular judgments can be treated as universals". In a logical sense, the identification of a singular judgment with a universal one is justified by the lack of restriction in the application of the more extensive concept. As *P* is said of every *S* in the universal judgment, there is no *S* of which *P* is not said in the singular one. In both cases there would be no exception in the determination of the lower *S* by the higher *P*, in contrast to the judgment *some S is P*. According to the *Bauch Logic*: "Judgments are universal when the predicate is valid for the subject without exception. A judgment is particular, though, when the predicate is not valid for every subject".⁷ In addition to those evidences, it is important to remark that, instead of identifying the subject of the judgment *Socrates is mortal* to an intuition, Kant uses, bordering on nonsense, the oxymoron *concept without extension* (Log, AA 09: 102). As can be read in the *Busolt Logic*: "A singular judgment is one which the subject lacks extension, and therefore the predicate is predicate of the whole subject" (LBusolt, AA 24: 665).

In the analytic tradition, in turn, one usually attributes to the relations between intuition and concept in the judgment the character-

7 I. Kant, *Logik Vorlesung: unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I* (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1998), 174.

istics of a propositional function. This account is found in the very instructive book of P. Schulthess, although it seems to be present, in a more or less implicit way, also in the interpretations of P. F. Strawson,⁸ F. Kaulbach,⁹ G. Patzig,¹⁰ J. Vuillemin¹¹ and several authors. Schulthess, e. g., recognizes an analogy between the notion of propositional function and Kant's conception of the judgment, grounded mainly upon two textual evidences: the characterization of concepts as "predicates of a possible judgment" (KrV, B 94); Kant's mention of an object "still undetermined", which is symbolized by x . Regarded in a functional sense, i. e. as an unsaturated predicate, a concept would be applicable to a class of individuals through the representations of them, tending to its saturation in the act of judging. In view of the approximations demanded by Kant's text, the extension of a concept would correspond, according to Schulthess, to an "infinite multitude of undetermined representations".¹² In this sense, not only the lower S would be subordinate to the higher P , but also the intuition of an individual just like a class defined by a propositional function. This interpretation is confirmed in Schulthess' attempt to translate the relation *enthalten unter* such as it takes place in the judgment *every S is P* into the predicate calculus. In this way, the statement " x , which is contained under B , is also contained under A ", and its respective figure, could perfectly be expressed through the formula $\forall x(Bx \rightarrow Ax)$.¹³

In contrast to the analytic account, it seems possible to demonstrate, through logical arguments, that Kant's notion of extension is irreducible to the modern one. Since the model of subordination of extensions is the universal affirmative judgment, the demonstration of the extensional relation superior/inferior must be made explicit not only in *Barbara*, in a mediate way, but also in the conversion by accident or limitation, in an immediate way (*SaP-PS*).

8 P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Routledge, 1999), 78–82.

9 F. Kaulbach, "Kants transzendente Logik zwischen Subjektlogik und Prädikatlogik", in: P. Heintel, & L. Nagl, *Zur Kantforschung der Gegenwart* (Darmstadt: WBG, 1981), 122–45, *passim*.

10 G. Patzig, "Rapporteur", in: J. Vuillemin (org.), *Mérites et Limites des Méthodes Logiques en Philosophie* (Paris: Vrin, 1986), 243–248, *passim*.


11 J. Vuillemin, "Reflexionen über Kants Logik", *Kant-Studien*, 52.3 (1960–1): 319 n. 36, *passim*.

12 P. Schulthess, *Relation und Funktion* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1981), 90. Cf. 270–271.

13 *Id.*, 83.

Apparently insignificant, why should conversion by limitation formally prove the irreducibility of Kant's notion of extension to the modern one? First, because it exhibits more directly the meaning attributed by Kant to the relation between the grounds of cognition *S* and *P*, dismissing the mediation of a ground of cognition in the role of middle term *M*. If the subordination of the inferior *S* to the superior *P* depends, in the syllogism, upon the mediation of *M*, which is itself superior to *S* and inferior to *P*, then the same is also demonstrated merely by the relation between *S* and *P* in the judgment. Second, and foremost, the conversion by limitation cannot be translated, as an immediate inference, by the predicate calculus.¹⁴ To translate it, it is necessary to introduce, as an additional premise, the presupposition of the existence of at least one individual under the extension of *S*.

Concerning the first point, in order to identify *P* as superior and *S* as inferior, it is necessary to see not only the total subordination of the extension of *S* to the extension of *P*, but also the complementary space in the extension of *P*, not fully filled up by the extension of *S*. As shown in the figure



(AA 16: 616 (Refl 3016)), if *every S is P*, then *not every P is S*. In short, if *every S is P*, then *some P is S* and *some P is not S*. In the grounds of Kant's conception of quantification, it must be possible to deduce, from the convertend universal *every S is P*, not only the *converse* particular *some P is S*, but also the sub-contrary of the converse, the particular *some P is not S*. At first sight not valid, how is this deduction possible?

In steps, the deduction is logically justified by the following immediate inferences: 1) *every S is P* (premise); 2) if *every S is P*, then *some S is P* (by subalternation); 3) if *some S is P*, then *some P is S* (by simple conversion); 4) if *some P is S*, then *some P is not S* (by the falsity of *every P is S*, contrary to *every S is P*, assumed as true in the premise).

14 Cf. A. Church, "The history of the question of existential import of categorical propositions", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (org.), *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science* (Amsterdam: N. Holland, 1965), 419–420, 423.

One has to understand the implicit assumptions in the premise. If P is superior to S , then they cannot be reciprocal concepts, so that *every P is S* is supposed to be false and, therefore, its contradictory *some P is not S* is true. If the conversion by limitation makes the truth of the judgments *every S is P* and *some P is S* explicit, it implicitly justifies also the truth of the judgment *some P is not S* , since one cannot simply convert *every S is P* into *every P is S* . The 4th step is justified on account of the superiority of P admitted in the premise, so that both the total subordination of the subject's extension to the predicate's extension, as well as the partial subordination of the predicate's extension to the subject's extension is confirmed.

Concerning the second point, this inference shows that the relation *enthalten unter*, such as presented in the judgment *every S is P* , cannot keep the same meaning in the predicate calculus. As it is well known, the universal affirmative receives the form $\forall x(Sx \rightarrow Px)$, while the particular affirmative receives the form $\exists x(Px \wedge Sx)$. All the difficulty consists in that the supposed truth of the convertend does not necessarily imply the truth of the converse.¹⁵ In view of the truth-functions of the conditional and conjunction, there is at least one instance wherein the falsity of the antecedent of the convertend determines the truth of this conditional, as well as the falsity of the conjunction in the converse. On the one hand, when there are no individuals under the extension of S , the antecedent is false and the conditional is true. On the other hand, given the falsity of the second conjunctive, the conjunction is false. In short, when the extension of S is empty, the convertend is true and the converse is false, what obliges the predicate calculus to refuse the deduction of the converse from the convertend.¹⁶

The validity of the inference could only be observed by means of the formulation of the existential import of *every S is P* , assuming that only predicates with at least one individual under their extensions would be dealt with. This assumption would be expressed, e.g., in $\forall x(Sx \rightarrow Px) \wedge \exists xSx$. In this solution, formulated by Strawson,¹⁷ whose attempt to translate all the immediate inferences as well as the

15 P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London: Methuen, 1971), 167–168.

16 *Id.*, 169.

17 *Id.*, 166, 169–170.

mediate ones into the predicate calculus was refused by A. Church,¹⁸ the existential import $\exists xSx$ in the convertend must acquire the status of a second premise. As a result, this not only eliminates the immediate character of the conversion by limitation, but also modifies the Kantian sense of the words *every* and *some*, in so far as quantification is thus defined in the universe of discourse, i. e., beyond the more extensive concept. In this way, the x acquires the character of a completely determined individual, and a logical status, since it takes place in the formal relations of the judgments. In contrast to what is supposed, the concept, even as “predicate of a possible judgment”, is not to be understood in functional sense, the judgment cannot be characterized as a propositional function, and the x , even though presented as an object “still undetermined”, does not play the role of a variable. If the counterexample of the conversion by limitation is conclusive, then Kant’s notion of extension must be irreducible to the modern one.

In view of the specificity of Kant’s notion of extension, how can the relations between intuition and concept performed in the judgment *S is P* be understood in a non-predicative sense? The response to this question is based on two evidences in Kant’s logical texts: 1) as strange as this condition may seem, the intuition, as well as the concept, is composed of partial representations; 2) the irreducible difference between concept and intuition relates only to their form, the one universal, the other singular, and not content.

According to the Refl 2286: “A mark is a partial representation that as such is a ground of cognition. It is either intuitive (synthetic part): a part of the intuition; or discursive: a part of the concept, which is an analytical ground of cognition. Either partial intuition, or partial concept” (AA 16: 299–300). Following Kant’s remark, one must realize that a mark is a partial representation both of a concept and of an intuition: “Partial representations as grounds of cognition can be partial concepts and partial intuitions. The latter do not concern logic” (LDohna, AA 24: 725). As Kant suggests in the *Busolt Logic*: “I may have in the intuition several representations; in the concept, only those that are common to a lot of things” (LBusolt, AA 24: 654). The same framework is also found in the *Bauch Logic*:

18 Op. cit.; cf. J.-C. Pariente, “Le Système des Propositions Catégoriques à Port-Royal”, in: J. Vuillemin (org.), *Mérites et Limites des Méthodes Logiques en Philosophie* (Paris: Vrin, 1986), 238.

A partial representation, in so far that it is a ground of cognition of the total concept, is a mark. We say concept, because we do not speak here about intuitions. Thus, roof is a partial concept of a house, but this occurs only to intuitions; for if I had not seen a house, I would not even think the roof as its partial concept.¹⁹

As to the second evidence, since only the concept has extension, and, on the other hand, both intuition and concept have content, the issue is in understanding that the irreducible difference between them has to do solely with the extension, and not with the intension of the concept. According to Kant: "For a representation to be a cognition [...], we need to have concept and intuition of an object combined in the same representation, so that the concept is represented as containing the intuition under itself" (FM, AA 20: 273). On account of this mention to the relation *enthalten unter*, it seems to be a matter of course to recognize the intuition as one of the inferiors of the concept. The sequence of the text, however, clarifies the supposed subordination of the intuition to a concept:

Now, if a concept is one drawn from the sensible representation, i. e., an empirical concept, then it contains as a mark, i. e., as a partial representation, something that was already comprehended in the sensible intuition, and differs from the sensible intuition in logical form only, namely, in respect of its general validity, e. g., the concept of a four-footed animal in the representation of a horse. (FM, AA 20: 273–274.)

As Kant points out, the four feet of the horse I see are reduced to a partial intuition of this horse, just as the roof of the house I see, according to the *Bauch Logic*, consists of a partial intuition of the intuition of the whole house. In so far as the representation of the four feet of the horse serves to represent not only the individual of which I have an intuition, but also to recognize all the horses and several animals, equines or not, it is not anymore a partial intuition, but a partial concept used as *Erkenntnisgrund* for the cognition of a multitude of concepts and of things x, y, z . In other words, in so far as it is represented as ground of cognition that has general validity ("quadruped"), it is not anymore merely a partial intuition of the horse I actually see, but a part of another concept ("horse"), so that this one is inferior.

In its proper sense, the intuition is not subordinated to the concept, rather, the concept is included, i. e., it is already comprehended as partial

19 I. Kant, *Logik Vorlesung: unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I* (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1998), 235.

intuition in the very intuition. By means of the consciousness of the mark, the relation of inclusion between intuition and its partial intuition acquires the *form* of the relation of subordination between the concept and its partial concept, used as ground of cognition in a judgment. In this varying of the status of the partial representation, the result is a representation in whose logical form intuition and concept are combined in a non-predicative way. In the subordination of extensions, the intuition of a completely determined individual is represented as concept *S*, which possesses a certain extension, in so far as the partial intuition is represented as a representation that possesses a certain extension, i. e., concept *P*, itself referring to a multitude, and not to a singular. As common representation, *P* must be superior to another concept, and not to an intuition. In the same operation whereby, from the analytic unity of the *Erkenntnisgrund*, the “logical form of a judgment” (KrV, B 104–105) is produced, it should be noticed not only the reflective origin of the form of the concepts *S* and *P*, but also the extensional meaning of the thing represented. In so far a partial intuition, which is represented as a common concept, is ranked as concept *P*, the intuition of which it is a part of is ranked as concept *S*, reducing the completely *determined* thing represented in the intuition to the condition of an *x*, inferior to the superiors *S* and *P*.

This reconstruction of the relations between intuition and concept in the judgment seems to be confirmed in a note in the Transcendental Aesthetics (KrV, B 33): “Intuition is opposed to the concept, which is a mere mark of intuition. The universal must be given in the singular” (HN, AA 23: 21). To say that the concept is a mere mark of the intuition is the same as to say not that the concept subordinates the intuition, but that the partial concept must already be included under another form, i. e., without general validity, as partial intuition in the very intuition. One has to understand that the universal *P* cannot be contained in the singular as universal, but only as one of the parts of the singular. Further, this part of the singular only comes to be universal in the very act of the judgment *S is P*, transforming the singular of which it is a part of, in its turn, equally in the universal *S*.

Considering the production of the “logical form of a judgment” (KrV, B 104–105), the more striking such results may seem, the reconstruction of the non-predicative relation between intuition and concept seems to find a reflective activity at the very bottom of the Transcendental Analytic. Considering the relation superior/ inferior and the notion of “logical form” also in the Introduction to the Tran-

scendental Dialectic (KrV, B 362), would not subordination of extensions be found in the grounds of Kant's conception of reason?